

EDUCATION IN GREEK AND ROMAN ANTIQUITY



Edited by Yun Lee Too

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EDITED BY

YUN LEE TOO



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In Memoriam

Don P. Fowler, classical scholar and teacher
(May 21, 1953–October 15, 1999)

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INTRODUCTION: WRITING THE HISTORY OF ANCIENT EDUCATION

Yun Lee Too

... we require a history that will educate us to discontinuity more than ever before, for discontinuity, disruption and chaos is our lot.

Hayden White, "The Burden of History"¹

I

If there has been a widely regarded and accepted narrative of teaching and learning in Greco-Roman society in the second half of the twentieth century, it must be Henri Irenée Marrou's *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité*. Originally published in France in 1948, this work saw five further editions in French; it was translated into Italian (in 1950), into English by George Lamb (in 1956), into German (1957), Greek (1961), Spanish (1965), Polish (1969), and Portuguese (1969).² Marrou's work has come to occupy a position as *the* authoritative history of ancient education. It is one whose mention often and still commands awe and reverence, and it produces submission to its grand overarching but also detailed narrative of how and what young men, and occasionally girls and young women, were taught and learned from pre-Homeric times to the Byzantine period.

Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité is a remarkable work, especially when viewed in light of what came before. L. Grasberger's *Erziehung und Unterricht im klassischen Alterthum* (1864–80) studied ancient education but it did so without historical sensitivity, failing to distinguish between various historical periods. The article "Éducation" by P. Girard and E. Pottier in Ch. Daremberg and E. Saglio's *Dictionnaire des Antiquités*

¹ H. White, "The Burden of History", in *The Tropics of Discourse. Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Baltimore and London, 1978) 50; originally published in *History and Theory* 5 (1966).

² See Pierre Riché, "In Memoriam Professeur Henri-Irénée Marrou", *Pedagogica Historica* 17 (1977) 493.

Grecques et Romaines (1892) provided its reader with a succinct portrait of the nurture and training of young people in Greek and Roman society that managed to incorporate some remarkable detail and which might in many ways be regarded the model for Marrou's own narrative. But the article was a mere thirty pages long, so that its coverage was inevitably limited. Other books treated either Greek or Roman education alone. Where Greek education is concerned, there was Paul Girard's *L'éducation Athénienne* (1891) and Kenneth Freeman's *Schools of Hellas* (1912), both Athenocentric works, and of course, Werner Jaeger's *Paideia*, a work on culture in three volumes which looked at how the Greeks educated man to his "true form, the real and genuine nature". Where Roman education is concerned, the offerings were fewer. Emile Jullien offered a comprehensive survey of literary education in Rome from the beginning to the death of Augustus in his 1885 book, *Les professeurs de littérature dans l'ancienne Rome*, a work that Marrou commends as excellent in his bibliography. Aubrey Gwynn focussed his *Roman Education from Cicero to Quintilian* (1926) on rhetorical education in particular.

Against this background Marrou's work on education in antiquity is extraordinary above all for its comprehensiveness. Its subject is ancient education from 1000 BC to AD 500, and it offers a "general treatment of the whole subject, integrating all that is really valuable in the new acquisitions into a total synthesis" (p. xi). The volume surveys the development of a social process in order to insist that antiquity knew "only one coherent and clearly defined educational system" (p. xiii). What Marrou ended up offering was a totalizing narrative that insisted upon a single system and curriculum as the paradigm for education in all of antiquity. This unified and distinct education is a Greek one, and this is hardly surprising in light of prior scholarship which emphasizes the Hellenic contribution to Western intellectual culture.³ Yet Hellenic in Marrou's case needs to be qualified. According to him, antiquity's privileged education is one that emerged fully formed only after the classical Greek period, with

³ Cf. K. J. Freeman, *Schools of Hellas. An Essay on the Practice and Theory of Ancient Greek Education from 600 to 300 BC* (London, 1907); W. Jaeger, *Paideia. The Ideals of Greek Culture*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1939-44). In French classical scholarship, see e.g. Paul Girard, *L'Éducation Athénienne au V^e et au IV^e siècle avant J-C* (Paris, 1889) and H. Jeanmaire, *Couroi et Courètes. Essai sur l'éducation spartiate et sur les rites d'adolescence dans l'antiquité hellénique* (Lille, 1939).

which Plato and Isocrates are identified, in the Hellenistic period.⁴ The narrative of *Histoire* reflects Marrou's view of the privilege of Hellenic education in its Hellenistic incarnation. Of the work's more than four hundred pages (in the English translation) spanning a millennium and a half, some hundred and fifty are devoted to the *paideia* of post-classical Hellenic North Africa, to its various educational institutions, and multi-faceted curricula—grammatical and literary studies, mathematic and scientific learning, medicine and so on.⁵ Marrou demonstrates that social history “does not flow at one even rate, but goes at a thousand different paces, swift or slow, which bear almost no relation to the day-to-day rhythm of a chronical or of traditional history.”⁶

Histoire is, moreover, in many senses an anatomy of *one* culture's teaching and learning. The narrative of archaic and classical Greek education is a proleptic narrative. It is an account of how the instruction of young men is about to take on the characteristics of a *subsequent* pedagogy, while the treatment of Roman and later Christian education is in many senses a retrospective or nostalgic analysis. It becomes a story of the continuation of Hellenistic education and for this reason, worthy of less attention. If Roman education merits only some sixty pages, it is because Marrou regards this portion of volume superfluous, for “the general principles, the syllabus and the methods used in Roman schools were simply copied from their Hellenistic prototypes . . .”⁷ Likewise, Christianity is the product of Hellenistic culture born and nurtured in Palestine, and it is the case that any Christian culture inherits this legacy; so, “Nothing shows the extent of the synthesis achieved in four centuries of Christianity and Hellenism better than the Christian cultures that sprang up in barbarian lands.” (p. 424). Following Jaeger and Guthrie,⁸ Marrou reinstates the priority of Greek intellectual achievement, although in such a way that enables him to appropriate all subsequent pedagogies—up to the

⁴ P. xiii.

⁵ W. V. Harris, *Ancient Literacy* (Cambridge, MA, and London, 1989) 244 rightly sees Marrou as hugely exaggerating the scope of the Hellenistic school system.

⁶ Cited from Fernand Braudel, “The Situation of History in 1950” [a lecture for the Collège de France, 1950] in *On History*, tr. Sarah Matthews (London, 1980) 12.

⁷ P. 358. Sewter criticises Marrou for appropriating the Roman model of education to the Hellenic paradigm (1951) 191.

⁸ See W. Jaeger, *Paideia. The Ideals of Greek Culture* (New York, 1939–45) and W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1962–81).

Byzantine period and various aspects of contemporary education—on the basis that they too are essentially “Greek”. Numerous and frequent analogies to e.g. the scouts (pp. 42–3), to Nazism (pp. 46 and 52), to modern universities (p. 262), to British public schools (p. 48) insist upon *our* inheritance of the model articulated by the narrative. Marrou surrenders historical cultural specificities and difference, and he justifies this as a rejection of prior research in the field which has by and large neglected larger contexts to dwell upon minutiae (cf. p. xi).

Marrou ends his narrative by insisting on the continuities between classical learning and subsequent forms of education. Classical education continues unbroken in the Greek east, into the Byzantine period because this culture holds onto Hellenistic paradigms and texts (452ff.). But it also endures in the West, though somewhat less intact, in monastic training and culture well into the medieval period (pp. 439ff.). Antiquity’s pedagogies are so ingrained in Western civilization that they enjoy a series of renaissances, above all in the Carolingian period (pp. 297, 464). Modern man inherits a venerable legacy, “[D]espite the barbarian interlude there was a certain continuity of matter, if not of form, that made Western man the heir to the old Classicism” (p. 465). The continuity between past and present is articulated over and over again in the analogies that Marrou draws between antiquity and the twentieth century: so Spartan education has its analogies in the Boy Scouts or fascist youth organizations (p. 42), while corporal punishment, a mainstay of ancient pedagogical discipline, remains a constant of educational systems well into the nineteenth century (pp. 220–2).

II

Some fifty years later we might now think it a curious matter that *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité* should have served as a singularly authoritative text on education in Greek and Roman antiquity inasmuch as Hellenistic education is Marrou’s “classical/ancient education”. The matter is even more curious once we begin to contextualize the scholar and his work within their broader historical and intellectual contexts. From an obituary written by Pierre Richié, we learn that Henri-Irénée Marrou was born into a modest family in 1904. As a boy and young man, he distinguished himself academically and

went on to study at the prestigious École Normale. After studying at the École Normale, he graduated first in the Aggrégation d'Histoire et de Géographie, and then he attended the École Française de Rome, where he began his dissertation on the culture of Low Antiquity. Work continued at Naple and Cairo, after which he began a succession of teaching posts at Nancy, Montpellier, and Lyon. In 1945 Marrou was elevated to a Professorship of the History of Christianity at the Sorbonne. It is in the field that the majority of his major publications fall: *St. Augustin et la fin de la culture antique* (Paris, De Boccard, 1938), *L'ambivalence du temps de l'histoire chez Saint Augustin* (Paris: Vrin, 1950) and under the pseudonym, Henri Davenson, *Fondements d'Une Culture Chrétienne* (Paris, Bloud et Gay, 1934), and *traité de la musique selon l'esprit de Saint Augustin* (Paris, Seuil, 1942).⁹

Marrou was above all a cultural and intellectual historian of early Christianity. But where most classicists are concerned, he will be remembered first and foremost as a historian of education—indeed, he played a key role in founding the journal *Pedagogica Historica* and went on to publish numerous books, essays, and reviews concerned with education in classical antiquity and patristic authors.¹⁰ It is this body of work which is of particular interest, and possibly also surprise, for an assessment of the scholar as a historical thinker and writer. Marrou himself tells a story about the origins of *Histoire* which reinforces perceptions of it as an idiosyncratic and extraordinary work at the point it came into being in his oeuvre. In his later philosophical work on history, *De la connaissance historique* (*On Historical Knowledge*, 1954), Marrou reflects that *Histoire* was written as a favor. He informs the reader that he was asked to produce this study by the editor of the Paris publishing house Éditions du Seuil in 1943, who happened to be his personal friend. Marrou is careful to insist that, despite its instigation by his friend, the project is very much

⁹ For a complete bibliography of Marrou's works from 1928 to 1975, see *Patristique et humanisme. Mélanges*. Patristica Sorbonensia 9 (Paris, 1976).

¹⁰ Cf. *Pedagogica Historica* 17 (1977) 491. Marrou's publications included: *Mousikos Aner* (Grenoble: Didier et Richard, 2nd ed., 1937), "Clément d'Alexandrie, *Le pédagogue*, Introduction et notes, 1-3, Sources chrétiennes, vols. 70, 108, 158 (1960, 1965, 1970); "Les arts libéraux dans l'Antiquité classique" in *Arts libéraux et philosophie*, actes du IV^e congrès international de philosophie médiévale (Montreal, 1967), pp. 5-27; "Education (History of—), Ancient Hebrews, Ancient Greeks, Ancient Romans", *Encyclopaedia Britannica* VI (Chicago, 1974, 15th ed.) 322-9; and *Patristique et humanisme. Mélanges*.

his *own*.¹¹ This is a significant protestation because, following this personal narrative, the author insists that in the writing of history—and “history” here is most obviously *Histoire*—subject matter is less important than the historian’s *method*. *De la connaissance historique* is a work which continually insists that method must be understood as intimately connected to the historian.

There is yet another aetiological story which provides an enormously helpful gloss on the work as historical artefact. In *Time and Narrative*, significantly a work dedicated to the memory of Henri Marrou, Paul Ricoeur observes that the former worked in the tradition of critical philosophy of history.¹² Ricoeur in effect declares for his mentor an intellectual affiliation with one of the most important historical movements this century. In 1929 the historians Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch founded a journal named *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale* (renamed *Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisation* after 1954). The founding of this journal marked a rejection of what was then official French historiography, the unrelentingly positivist *l'histoire Sorbonniste*, and the inception of a radical historiography, the *Annales*-movement.¹³ Where *l'histoire Sorbonniste* emphasized political and diplomatic history, analyzing wars, political events and important figures,¹⁴ the concern of *Annales* history, as the full title of the journal suggest, was larger contexts and social (often underlying) structures—economies, class, “mentalités” and so on. In rejecting the political event as the unit of historical analysis, *Annales* historiography necessarily had a distinctive temporality. It resisted the view that history is a series of events, that is, *histoire événementielle*, as conventionally conceived and produced at the Sorbonne. Opposed to what might be termed “short termism”, its narrative was not an account of discrete events but rather it sought to trace historical change over a long period of time (*la longue durée*).¹⁵ This structuring of historical attention was designed to allow

¹¹ Marrou (1954) 209.

¹² Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, vol. 1, tr. K. McLaughlin and D. Pellauer (Chicago and London, 1984) [= *Temps et récit* (Paris, 1983)].

¹³ Stuart Clark, “The *Annales* Historians”, *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*, ed. Q. Skinner (Cambridge, 1985) 181.

¹⁴ See Ricoeur (1980) 10; Traian Stoianovich, *French Historical Method. The Annales Paradigm*, foreword F. Braudel (Ithaca, 1976) 19; and Le Goff in Le Goff, Chartier, and Revel (1978) 215.

¹⁵ “La *Longue durée*”, *Annales E.S.C.* 4 (1958) 725–53, reprinted and translated as “The *Longue Durée*” in F. Braudel, *On History*, tr. Sarah Matthews (London, 1980) 25–54.

a deeper grasp of the realities which may undergo a slower change, and at an extreme permitted certain scholars, e.g. Fernand Braudel and Le Roy Ladurie, to propose an “immobile” history.¹⁶ Accordingly, its subjects are not monumental events or crises but the environmental factors which produce civilization, systems of human society, of human thought, with the result that its subjects were: the geography and economy of the Mediterranean world in the time of Philip II of Spain, human attitudes towards death from the middle ages up to twentieth century, rather than death in itself,¹⁷ childhood, amongst other issues.

Moreover, annalistic historiography studies aspects of human civilization, and as Stuart Clark observes, there is a sense in which *Annales* history is to be regarded as being socialist before the fact of socialism.¹⁸ Following Paul Ricoeur’s remarks, this historical school was concerned with a social history that focussed on the roles played by large groups, whether classes, towns, the countryside, and with individuals in group identities, and these were the heroes of history.¹⁹ Le Goff reminds his readers that if Bloch made his history the study of a man as part of a social group, Febvre in particular made it the study of human societies.²⁰ But it is also the case that where Marxism purports to offer a materialist analysis, then *Annales* work is an even more radical and fundamental materialism. In *The German Ideology* Karl Marx had declared his concern to be with real individuals and their material condition short of man’s actual physical condition—“geological, orohydrographical, climatic and so on” (tr. W. Lough) (p. 7); yet annalistic history did make physical geography and climate the matter of its narratives. Fernand Braudel’s famous study of the Mediterranean, often cited as exemplary of annalist historiography, opens with a panoramic account of the landscape, geography and climate of its topic.²¹

It is with this holistic historiographical outlook that Marrou loosely associates himself. He recalls in *De la connaissance historique* that when

¹⁶ Le Goff (1992) xxii.

¹⁷ Philippe Ariès’ *Western Attitudes toward Death from the Middle Ages to the Present* (London, 1976).

¹⁸ Clark in Skinner (1985) 195.

¹⁹ Ricoeur (1980) 10.

²⁰ Le Goff (1992) 106–7.

²¹ F. Braudel’s *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de philippe II^e* (Paris, 1949, rev. 1966); and see also Le Goff in Le Goff, Chartier, and Revel (1978) 211.

he arrived at the Sorbonne in 1925, positivism was the dominant history; Febvre and Bloch were exiles (from Paris) in Strasbourg. He tells us that in his search of intellectual allies and community, he looked to the “annalists” for inspiration.²² Marrou either took cues from *Annales* history such that his history of education demonstrates parallels with that school of historiography, or else he independently developed a historical methodology with analogies to *Annales* history. *Annales*-thought treated human nature and culture, and education was certainly a topic that addressed this agenda. Marrou wrote in his introduction to *Histoire*, “[Education] is the concentrated epitome of a culture and as such it is inseparable from the form of that culture, and perishes with it.” (p. xx). If *Annales*-thought initially saw historical change as needing to be discerned over the *longue durée*, then *Histoire* measured any development in ancient education over its long period of time, fifteen hundred years. Much later, he would criticize the tendency in ancient studies to focus itself on a narrow, privileged sector of antiquity (“un secteur unique et privilégié de cette Antiquité”), to concern itself only with classical Athens at the expense of the rest of Greece, of the Hellenistic, and even the Roman periods, which were frequently located in a narrative of decline and decadence.²³ In Marrou’s treatment of it, education is a topic that broadens the classicist’s horizon such that she considers not classical Athens or Greece as an acme or privileged locus but directs attention rather to the Hellenistic period and its pedagogical legacy.

Education, as Marrou conceptualizes and studies it, is not a subject of study in which the historian could expect to analyze earth-shattering events which change the course of history in significant ways. Young people begin instruction; they learn; they finish study, and they go on to function as adults in their communities. These events form relatively a constant pattern in a human lifespan, and are the process whereby social and political identities are formed. Ancient education is above all the development of the “man” rather than the child—the latter is a subject of *Annales* movement history in the work of Philippe Ariès—with the result that one cannot expect to find anything resembling child psychology in Marrou’s narrative (297–8). Sometimes teachers and students come up with new ideas

²² Marrou (1954) 22.

²³ Marrou (1976) 29–30.

or bodies of knowledge—in Marrou's narrative, such as the Hellenistic *egkuklios paideia*—and new methods for teaching—sophistic *technê*, Socratic dialectic, state-funded education. But in the contextualization of *Histoire* these are to be integrated into the whole known as “ancient education”. If there are great events, they are systemic—e.g. the “sophistic revolution”, or the Christianization of education—or they occur at the level of individuals. One might perhaps point to the death of Socrates (so Plato's *Apology*), the birth of Plato (so Apuleius' *De Platone et eius dogmate*), the opening of Isocrates' school of rhetoric, and the like. The invasion of the “civilized world” by the Vandals in the fifth century AD is a significant historical event; however, it serves as the limit of *Histoire*, rather than as its subject. The Vandalisation of civilization is what stands outside the topic and temporality demarcated as ancient education proper.

The ideology of *la longue durée*, one which has an interesting counterpart in the idea that historical time is ambivalent in the thought of Augustine as Marrou read him,²⁴ entails that historical scholarship results often in a monumental work. *Histoire* is quite clearly such an account, with a temporal span of over millenium and a half, and the author seems clearly loath to draw the boundaries at even the fifth century AD. But this insistence on *continuity*—which we might now redescribe as “anachronism”—reflects another tenet of annalistic methodology, the belief that the historian is inevitably involved in his or her history and therefore necessarily lacking in objectivity. “History: science of the past, science of the present” was one of catch-phrases of Lucien Febvre,²⁵ and indeed for both Febvre and Marc Bloch, past and present were linked precisely because they are necessarily so distinct and unknown to each other. For Marrou in particular, the understanding of the past is out of the reach of historians; the historical investigator must rely on testimonies and on faith.²⁶ Because he has no direct knowledge of the past, he must rely on *traces*, say, from documentary evidence.²⁷ Thus Marrou cites, as the *Annales* historians do, literary texts as if they are documents to be taken at face value and as straightforward fact. He mediates knowledge

²⁴ Marrou, *L'ambivalence du temps de l'histoire chez saint Augustin* (Montréal, 1950) and Le Goff (1992) 122.

²⁵ See Ricoeur (1980) 9.

²⁶ Ricoeur (1984) 98; also Marrou, *The Meaning of History* (1954) 152.

²⁷ Marrou (1954) 68; Ricoeur (1980) 8.

of the past through himself, so that there is a dialectic of historical and present understandings. So a historian such as Marrou will employ analogies (so note the parallels between ancient and modern education in *Histoire*), resemblances, and the assimilation of historical context to subsequent context in the pursuit of understanding of the past—and these to a subsequent reader might justifiably be redescribed as “anachronisms”.²⁸ His narrative is a representation of the past; however, it is to be regarded as distinct from what we might have assumed to be the object of history itself, the past.²⁹ Certainly, Braudel observes that narrative history is above all a *philosophy of history*.³⁰

III

In the twenty-first century the task is now to edit a new history of education in antiquity. And the question is: what justifies such a rewriting of the history of education after Marrou, for the project to some degree involves rewriting? Is it that we have discovered quantities of new material which transform how we think about teaching and learning in the ancient world? No. Rather it is rather that we are now asking different questions about what teaching and learning were in the ancient world, and we are discovering that the material speaks in different ways. For Marrou and his predecessors, the story of ancient education is a story about children and young men, and sometimes women, being instructed by their teachers in gymnastics, in music, in literature, and in oratory. Education is an activity confined to a particular time of life—childhood and youth—and to a particular circumstance, the home (at Rome) and/or the classroom. It is an activity distinct from the concerns of adulthood, of politics, of power. In her 1958 paper “What Was Authority?” Hannah Arendt perpetuated this approach to education. She identified child-rearing and education as the realm of the prepolitical, and thus, as a sphere distinct from the *polis* and its concerns, from the public domain, from the political domain. Arendt writes, “In education . . .

²⁸ Marrou (1954) 96–8; Ricoeur (1980) 13–14.

²⁹ Ricoeur (1984) 96.

³⁰ From the Preface to *Mediterranean and The Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, in Braudel, *On History*, p. 4.

we always deal with people who cannot yet be admitted to politics and equality because they are being prepared.” (p. 97).³¹ For her education has not political relevance unless it directly assists the student to participate in public affairs, and it does not.

Yet such certainty about education in antiquity is no longer intellectually defensible. We can no longer take it for granted that we know what ancient education was in each and every one of its manifestations, and if the history of ancient education is a narrative of representations concerning activities and discourses we denote by the word education/*paideia*, this becomes the basis for the production of a new history.

When antiquity discussed “education”, it was in terms of *paideia*, a word that has among its senses the rearing or upbringing of a child, teaching, discipline, and correction. In Plato’s *Symposium* Eryximachus glosses *paideia* as the correct usage of already composed melodies (cf. *melesi*) and rhythms (cf. *metrois*) (*Symposium* 187d1–2)³²—the firm distinction is between *poiësis*, or the composition of music and poetry, and its use. Athenaeus corroborates the understanding that education has a musical basis in antiquity when he offers that *paideia* is equivalent to “*paidika asmata*”, or songs to young boys or beloveds (*Deipnosophistae* 238). Elsewhere Athenaeus notes that the words *paideia* and *paidika* are erotic songs (601a).³³ But *paideia* was more than just music, for music was in turn part of a process of socialization. The ordered chorus is a paradigm for the harmonious and well-governed city; in particular, the proficient *chorêgos* or chorus leader is a model for the good leader. It is no accident that the same word *koruphos* denotes both the leader of the state (cf. Herodotus 3.82.3) and the leader of the chorus (cf. Aristotle *Pol.* 1277a11).³⁴ Moreover, the narrator in Xenophon’s *Hiero* begins to effect the translation of the chorus into a political metaphor when he asks what prevents the training and ordering of a chorus by its leader, the *chorêgos*, from being carried over into other political matters (*t’alla ta politika*, 9.4–5). In a later work Xenophon uses the choir’s obedience to its teacher as an image to illustrate the inherent orderliness

³¹ Arendt (1958).

³² ἡ χρώμενον ὀρθῶς τοῖς πεποιημένοις μέλεσι τε καὶ μέτροις, ὃ δὴ παιδεία ἐκλήθη, . . . (*Symposium* 187d1–2).

³³ See C. B. Gulick, *Athenaeus. The Deipnosophists*, vol. vi, p. 239 fn.b.

³⁴ See Nagy (1990) 368–9.

of Athens and her citizens to his interlocutor Pericles (*Memorabilia* 3.5.17–19).

At Plato *Laws* 672e5–6 the Athenian stranger proposes that the whole choral process (*choreia*), the choral rhythms and harmonies be viewed as a form of *paideusis*; if *choreia* is a mode of pedagogy, it follows that the uneducated citizen is one who is *achoreutos* (654a9). In book 7 of the *Laws* the Athenian Stranger elaborates this idea. In the context of a discussion of musical education, he describes the role of the choral participation in establishing the character and identity of a citizen.³⁵ At *Politics* 1325b37–8 Aristotle declares that an ideal state cannot exist without a *chorêgia* which is moderate in character—the training and ordering of the chorus serves as an image for the good leader. Earlier in the same work, at *Politics* 1288b37–1298a5, the author portrays Sparta as an ideal chorus when he holds up the Lacedaemonian state as a model practical constitution.³⁶ Certainly, political discourse of the fourth century saw choral process as an initiation into social structure.³⁷

Furthermore, antiquity seems to have produced a whole body of writing which was consciously concerned with, and often declared itself as concerned with, *paideia* because this was a political issue. Much of the Platonic corpus is concerned with the education of young men and indeed whole communities, precisely because the formation of the soul was the means by which the ideal community could be formed. The philosopher-king of the *Republic* speaks emphatically to the intricate connection between knowledge and power. Aristotle devotes sections of his works, especially the *Politics*, to the issue of how to instruct and socialize children and young people within the civic community. As with Plato, it is understood that what children hear, read, and watch determines who they will be and in turn, what the community they inhabit will become, and so, these influences are rigorously regulated. Also, in the fourth century Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, quite literally "the education of Cyrus", concerned itself with the nurture and subsequent career of the Persian prince,

³⁵ See discussion of the role of music in the educational programme of the *Laws* by Glenn Morrow, *Plato's Cretan City. A Historical Interpretation of the Laws* (Princeton, 1960) 297ff.

³⁶ At *Oeconomicus* 8.3; *Memorabilia* 3.3.12; 3.4.4; and 3.5.6; *Cyropaedia* 1.6.18 the order of the chorus is employed as a metaphor for military order. Later Pausanias (3.11.9) also depicts the chorus as a microcosm of Spartan society in particular.

³⁷ Nagy (1990) 142 and 339.

while Isocrates showed that *paideia* might involve the instruction of the adult. He addressed issues of the leader's education for rule in his Cypriot trilogy *Evagoras*, *To Nicocles*, and *Nicocles*. In the *Areopagiticus* he celebrates the ancestral Areopagus court as the body which historically educated the Athenian people, while in the *Antidosis* he defends Athens as the educator of Greece as a result the city's own cultivation of rhetorical *paideia*.

In current scholarship, the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron has no less suggested that education is a form of socialization that translates into social (re-)production: schools tend to recreate and perpetuate the existing social, political, and economic hierarchies in society.³⁸ It is now the case that the intellectual history of antiquity has to address the political dimensions of Greek and Roman culture, which have come recently to the forefront in a variety of other areas of classical scholarship, say, in the treatment of Greek tragedy as an expression of the *polis*, in the understanding of rhetoric as an articulation of class identities and ideologies, and so on. In antiquity, education was not disinterested. It was a process of socialization, one that seeks above all to create the productive and loyal citizen with the aim of maintaining the community in a state of equilibrium. It was implicated in the structures of power, and specifically in training the rulers to rule and the ruled to be ruled. It was a largely exclusive process, and birth and class, rather than ability (although the rhetoric of innate virtue was frequently invoked), were the operative criteria for determining who would be given training and "knowledge". It created the empowered as empowered, the subjects as subjects; but sometimes, it subverted these structures; sometimes, it created alternatives to these structures.³⁹

Furthermore, contemporary work on "pedagogy", as distinct from "education", asks us to recognise the multiple and various dynamics of scenes of teaching and learning. In current scholarship, largely outside of the field of classics, choosing to talk about "pedagogy" rather than "education" has become more than a matter of mere

³⁸ See P. Bourdieu and J.-C. Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, tr. Richard Nice, London and Beverly Hills, 1977; P. Bourdieu, *Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, tr. R. Nice (London, 1984) = *La Distinction. Critique Sociale du Jugement* (Paris, 1979) and *Homo Academicus* (Oxford, 1988).

³⁹ See the essays in Too and Livingstone (1998).

terminology, more than a preference for Greek over Latin vocabulary—"pedagogy" from Greek *paid-* + *agôgê*, "the leading of the child/slave" and "education" from Latin *educare*, "to raise up", "to lead out". The discourse of education tends to be a descriptive and normative language, treating the largely practical side of things concerned with the scenario of teaching and learning such as the training of teachers and curriculum. Henry Giroux ventures, "Highly pragmatic and behavioristic in both its assumptions and practices, the field of education historically always viewed theory as something of an unnecessary intrusion".⁴⁰ By distinction, pedagogy is a mode of engagement with a social process—or rather with social processes since part of its project is pluralization, and this may explain the prominence of "pedagogy" in contemporary literary and cultural studies.⁴¹ It is an enterprise often associated with social change and left-leaning agendas, perhaps as a result of Paolo Freire's immensely influential book *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (originally published New York, 1972);—hence "radical pedagogy".⁴² And pedagogy has come of age in a variety of fields, literary and culture studies, feminism, philosophy, political theory, and it is the case that scholars who write about pedagogy tend to be literary scholars with either theoretical or political agendas which come under frequent attack from more conservative quarters.⁴³

If there is a body of pedagogical scholarship, it is for the most one which leaves history aside even if the "Socratic method" is a prominent metaphor for ideal pedagogies. When it does treat its own history, the approach tends to be superficial or uphelpfully idolatrous: "antiquity" is uniformly and statically a text *déjà lu*. (And it for this reason that a volume such as the present one, which acknowledges the capacity of ancient material for reading, reinterpretation

⁴⁰ Giroux (1994) 109.

⁴¹ See e.g. Johnson (1982) and (1987); Ulmer (1985); Graff (1988) and (1992); Davis and Mirabella (1990); Gless and Herrnstein Smith (1992); Gallop (1995).

⁴² See, of course, P. Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (Harmondsworth, 1972; originally published New York, 1970).

⁴³ I might cite here L. Davies and M. B. Mirabella (eds.), *Left Politics and the Literary Profession* (New York and Oxford, 1990); J. Gallop (ed.), *Pedagogy: The Question of Impersonation* (Bloomington, IND, 1995); D. J. Gless and B. Herrnstein Smith, *The Politics of Liberal Education* (Durham, NC, 1992); G. Graff, *Beyond the Culture Wars. How Teaching the Conflicts Can Revitalize American Education* (New York and London, 1992); B. Johnson, *The Pedagogical Imperative. Teaching as a Literary Genre*, Yale French Studies 63 (1982); M. Le Doeuff, *Hipparchia's Choice* (Oxford, 1992).

and alternative interpretation, can make such an important contribution in a wider field of cultural debate.) There may also be an assumption that history, and particularly antiquity's history, is a conservationist force, and certainly, works like Allan Bloom's *The Closing of the American Mind* (1987), a retrospective nostalgia for the "good old days" as represented by the Academy of Plato, have provided support for this suspicion. After all, the distant past is at different times and to various degrees insulating, intimidating, and too unfamiliar. But possibly another reason for its resistance to antiquity is that it also has numerous skeletons in its closets—among them, pederasty, homosexuality and -sociality, disciplines which amount to physical abuse. These one must add to what the literary scholar Jane Tompkins has observed to be embarrassment about thinking and writing about pedagogy.⁴⁴ Having said this much about pedagogy, it is the case that Marrou's *Histoire* might well be shifted from its authoritative place in the history of *education* and appropriated rather by the *pedagogical* canon. Its author was after all deeply committed to opposing totalitarian political structures and also its scholarly counterparts, such as Sorbonne history might be described—although it might be argued that the totalizing account of ancient education as Hellenistic is in its own ways absolutist.⁴⁵ The historian Marrou proposed that historical accounts are gratuitous and uncertain; there are always many more possible accounts of the past.⁴⁶ I take this as Marrou's invitation

⁴⁴ See Jane Tompkins, "The Pedagogy of the Distressed", *College English* 52 (1990) 653–60, esp. p. 655 and Susan Miller, "In Loco Parentis: Addressing (the) Class", in Gallop, *Pedagogy*, p. 155. For William Armstrong Percy III talking "pedagogy" is indeed talking "sex", for he celebrates the archaic and classical pedagogical scenario as a site of pederastic activity in his book *Pederasty and Pedagogy in Archaic Greece* (Urbana and Chicago, 1996). He argues that Athenian education only became great after pederasty was institutionalised (by Solon); see p. 171. Athenaeus tells us that in archaic Greece erotic songs were called *paideia* and *paidika* (XIII.601a).

Also cf. David Lusted, "Why Pedagogy?", *Screen* 27 (1986) 2–4. The uncomfortable affinity of the words "pedagogy" and "pederasty"—both share the "*pais*" (Greek for "child" or "slave") root—may explain the embarrassing association between pedagogy and sex, one supported by traditional stereotype of teaching and learning as a site of male homosocial and -sexual interaction.

⁴⁵ See E. R. A. Sewter, "H. A. Marrou, *Histoire de l'Éducation dans l'Antiquité*, 2nd edition . . .", *JRS* 41 (1951) 191–2. Sewter points out that the work is dedicated to a young friend who died in the French Resistance, while the author's dislike of totalitarianism is displayed in his account of post-Lycurgan Sparta. Marrou also wrote a biography of Edith Stein, who was killed in a concentration camp, *Edith Stein, 1891–1942, par une moniale française* (Paris, 1954).

⁴⁶ Marrou (1966 [= 1959]) 192–212.

to reread the pedagogical past as far as antiquity is concerned, and to offer an alternative narrative, or in the case of an edited volume, a set of alternative narratives.

IV

This volume acknowledges the social and political dimensions of education in antiquity. It offers a chronological narrative, beginning with an examination of how Hellenic education begins in the larger cultural fabric of early antiquity, continuing through the classical Greek period to the Hellenistic and Roman periods, and then to the late antique period. Where Marrou and others offer the rise of Christianity as the end point of ancient education, this volume does not end with a story about the triumph of Christian culture, but rather shows how aspects of ancient education continue well beyond into the otherwise Christian era. Despite its structure, it does not insist upon the continuity of its narrative, for it stands as a series of independent studies which focus on particular moments in and aspects of education in antiquity. Together these studies offer the realization that there are ancient educations, rather than one single ancient education, pluralizing the narrative which stands as the history of education in antiquity. Together they offer a narrative about the variety of pedagogies from the Greco-Roman world.

The volume opens with a chapter by Mark Griffith which considers the socialization of the student in archaic Greece through erotics, initiation age-groups like the *partheneia*, the *ephebeia*, and the *hetaireia*, through athletics, and military training which trouble the often made distinction between “public” and “private” education in antiquity. Next are Andrew Ford’s exploration of sophistic education, which seeks to qualify the traditional account of the sophists as teachers of a largely formal and stylistic rhetoric, Yun Lee Too’s examination of the rhetoric which presents the laws of classical education as a civic pedagogy, and Andrea Nightingale’s treatment of that the ideology of “liberal education” in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. Josiah Ober’s study looks at the competing pressures that educate citizens both to conformity and dissidence within classical Athens, and concludes by offering an aitiology of the *ephêbeia* before the Hellenistic period. Raffaella Cribiore studies the way in which Euripides’ *Phoenissae*, the most popular school text in the Hellenistic

and Roman periods, was encountered and re-encountered by the student as he progressed through his studies, while Elizabeth Asmis examines the techniques, namely of memorization and frank speech, which constituted Epicurean education as a break with former pedagogies. Anthony Corbeill looks at a Rome which appropriated Hellenic education by denying its Greekness; Ruth Webb examines the progymnasmata, rhetorical exercises in both the Greek and Roman traditions, which involved the use of traditional poetic material and common topics, while Robert Kaster considers what declamations, the exercises that followed the progymnasmata, dealing with the rape of young women did to the young men who had to recite them. Aline Rouselle marries art history with the history of pedagogy as she examines hermeneutic techniques surrounding artistic images—*εἰκόνες* and *εἰδῶλα*—to show that these teach the viewer a cultural heritage. Joy Connolly considers Greek education in the later Roman Empire, looking at the complicated structures of authority that the models supplied by the classical past produce in the Second Sophistic. Next, Sara Rappe considers the various ways in which Christian education from the second to fifth centuries negotiated the urban and elite pagan *paideia*, subtracting and adding, excluding and including elements of it within a new and distinct culture. Finally, Robert Lamberton closes the volume, reading the biographies of the scholarchs of the Platonic schools as offering testimony to how the doctrines of teachers beginning with Plato were handed down to their students and providing evidence of a pagan intellectual movement that transcends cultural, temporal, and social boundaries. In this volume, Christianity does not provide the *terminus* of ancient education, but rather a form of Platonism that has evolved through schools and their representatives.

Diversity marks the history of ancient education presented in this volume, and the collection of essays encounters ancient education through a variety of discourses: *literary*, as in the case of Mark Griffith's use of epic and archaic poetry, Raffaella Cribiore's study of the popularity of Euripides' *Phoenissae* in the Hellenistic and Roman periods; *rhetorical*, as in Ruth Webb's treatment of the progymnasmata as a school exercise, as in Robert Kaster's analysis of rape narratives as a ordering principle in Roman declamation, and Joy Connolly's study of Greek education in the later Roman Empire; *philosophical*, as in Andrea Nightingale's chapter on the idea of "liberal education" in Plato and Aristotle, in Elizabeth Asmis' account of Epicurean pedagogy

in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, in the studies of late neoplatonism and early Christianity by Robert Lamberton and by Sara Rappe respectively; *allegorical*, as in Aline Rousselle's examination of visual pedagogies, and *legal*, as in the case of Yun Lee Too's chapter on the representation of the laws as the teachers of the classical democratic state. Andrew Ford uses both philosophical and literary material in his study of the sophists.

Because education is now recognized as a political process, there is realization in the new volume that teaching and learning in antiquity occur elsewhere apart from childhood and in places other than the anachronistically conceived classroom. Mark Griffith's second chapter considers the chorus, the mess-hall, the symposium, and the cult as spheres of formation for the youth in the archaic period. Yun Lee Too's chapter is one that explores Athenian law as a discourse which is viewed as instructing the Athenian citizen—the adult male—in his identity and responsibilities as such: law is a discourse which produces the city as the teacher of its inhabitants. Elizabeth Asmis' examination of Epicurean material and Aline Rousselle's study of visual imagery assume that the viewer is an adult, while Sara Rappe's chapter deals with Christian instruction, one that rewrites a new ideology over the pagan culture of the adult in late antiquity with the aim of constructing an elite and esoteric group of individuals within society. That education is inextricably intertwined with other aspects of culture becomes clear from the different realms in which it can be identified.

Education requires its authorizations, and a number of the chapters explicitly address just this issue. Andrew Ford argues that the sophists could not claim to teach the art of speaking well, an activity that was suspicious, and rather emphasized that what they imparted to their students was social skills. Sara Rappe looks at the ways in which pagan culture overtly and covertly gave Christian education its validities. The chapters by Webb, Kaster, and Connolly demonstrate how the material of rhetorical education asserted in various and sometimes complicated ways the importance of social order and authority to their students.

Any narrative, or set of narratives, of socialization or social process over such a large topic as education in antiquity must now admit to inadequacy for the reason that an account of the formation of *just* male identity is no longer satisfactory. The chapters in this volume reject the notion that ancient education is only a scenario of male teachers instructing young boys. Mark Griffith's study of archaic

structures of socialization where both young men and young women are concerned, and Yun Lee Too's chapter on legal pedagogy show that teaching may be done by institutions rather than by people. Contributors consider that women, children, and slaves do (and do not) participate in a variety of ways in the pedagogical process, and that in addition to the hegemonic accounts, there are other ones which might be written, ones involving the socializations in and not in any variety of othernesses. Elizabeth Asmis' study of Epicurean teaching shows it to be a practice that was in theory open to all individuals, regardless of their standing in society, and Robert Kaster's chapter shows how women were involved in a different way as the subject of rhetorical material used in the training of young Roman men.

Education in antiquity is now also no longer just a largely static Greek education. Mark Griffith's chapter shows the need to distinguish between the different cultures—Athenian, Spartan, Cretan—that would later constitute the Hellenic world in the archaic period. Josiah Ober shows Hellenic pedagogy to be a product of civic structure, that is, to be a product of a particular type of state; then, Plato and Aristotle are contextualized by Andrea Nightingale's reading of "liberal" education as a construction of a particular class ideology. Anthony Corbeill offers a more qualified account of how education in the Roman Republic took over Greek practices and methods: Rome relied on a teaching class composed for the most part of Greek freedman, and recreated their knowledge and skills as Roman "tradition", denying its Hellenism. Likewise, Joy Connolly's study of the Second Sophistic considers what it means for classical Greek models to be introduced into later imperial Roman society. Ruth Webb's chapter looks at a rhetorical form of training common to both the Greeks and Romans that lasted well into late antiquity. Then, Aline Roussell and Sara Rappe independently show the adoption of Greek and Roman systems of education to greater or lesser degrees by Christian teachers and thinkers, while Robert Lamberton demonstrates how the philosophy of Athens and specifically, of Plato was handed down into much later cultures through the instruction of the Platonic academies. Overall, the book recognizes that late antiquity is a field which can no longer be treated as an appendix to classical antiquity, particularly following the more detailed studies in this area by Kaster and Ilsetraut Hadot, among others. Ruth Webb, Robert Lamberton, and Sara Rappe treat late antiquity thus from very different rhetorical, literary and philosophical perspectives.

"It is sometimes said that no books are duller than those on education. M. Marrou's is an exception." M. L. Clarke offered that comment in 1957 in his review of the English translation of Marrou's *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité*. Clarke made explicit what most scholars have thought about the history of education.⁴⁷ Marrou proved the exception that interrogated this perception, and to him we owe the history of ancient education. Following on from Marrou and in the belief that the history of education is a topic which merits study, *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity* is a further step in an evolving understanding of ancient education as a complex and plural process. The new history that we present here considers education in its various forms and manifestations throughout antiquity. We move from static paradigms to descriptions of cultural processes, of socializations, of knowledges. What this pluralization means is that we may wish to take only certain aspects of Greco-Roman history with us into the future and to abandon others rather than seeking to affirm Greco-Roman antiquity as a necessary genealogy for what we do as teachers and students. The volume as a whole becomes an invitation to the reader to reflect what the history of education in antiquity might mean for the discipline we now call education/pedagogy.

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PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN EARLY GREEK INSTITUTIONS OF EDUCATION

Mark Griffith

1. *Introduction: private, civic, and public in early Greece*

The history of Classical education is often told as a story of steady diachronic progression, from the performance culture of the Homeric age, through the choruses, symposia, rites of passage, and athletic competitions of the 7th and 6th C., to the intellectual-verbal focus of the first true schools—a progression, as Marrou terms it, from the “noble warrior” to “the scribe”, or from “sport” to “intelligence.”¹ This story goes hand-in-hand with that of the evolution of the Classical polis (especially the Athenian democracy), and its need to develop citizens capable of participating rationally and articulately in the political process: thus the individual brilliance of Homeric achievement, and the family-based distinction of athletic display, give way to the culture of the assembly and law-courts, and to a sophistic-rhetorical education geared to those contexts. These two narratives both obviously have a sound logic to them;² but they collide awkwardly with another familiar and powerful story of Greek pedagogical development: the clash between “Sparta” and “Athens,” between the rigid militarism of a state-organized (totalitarian) system designed to produce brave (but blindly conformist) sons and daughters of the fatherland,

¹ Marrou (1956) xiv, 59–60. See further below, pp. 66–71. I should like to thank David Cohen, Andrew Ford, Leslie Kurke, Ronald Stroud, and Yun Lee Too for corrections and helpful comments on an earlier (and much longer) version of this paper.

² But they do run the risk of understating the continuities between the Archaic and Hellenistic periods, and of overemphasizing those aspects of Greek culture that Classical and humanistic scholars would naturally wish to see predominate—literary study, liberal values, philology, and respect for the activities of the classroom. For example: “The main cause of the decline of athletics [sc. from the 4th C. onwards] was . . . the development of other ‘subjects’, especially literature. This had become the really dynamic element in the culture of the day, and it tended to monopolize the whole of the young people’s time and energy and interest”, Marrou (1956) 130. For a useful corrective, emphasizing the continuing concern for bodily and performative distinction, see Gleason (1994).

and the open-minded cultural experimentation (free-enterprise) of Athenian liberalism, home to the arts and free expression, and to all kinds of intellectual exploration—and to the first universities.³ This story seems to grant to Sparta a premature (if unattractive, to many) success in developing civic institutions (at least as early as the 6th C.) for the training of model citizens, while acknowledging that Athens, for all its political ingenuity and educational aspirations (this was, after all, the center of operations for Sokrates, Isokrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and was described by Perikles as “the education (*paideusis*) for all of Greece”, 2.41.1), largely failed to provide any coherent system for educating the mass of its citizens for their civic responsibilities—a failure that both Plato and Aristotle in the 4th C. found quite shocking and in need of correction.⁴ Athenian schools were privately run; and citizens were fairly free to choose what kind of education to give their children. Thus the more “advanced” political system apparently demonstrated less interest in education as a civic concern than the more backward and repressive one; and the neat progression from the Homeric individual (the focus of Marrou’s “knightly culture”) and Pindaric athletic family, to the Athenian political community of Sokrates and Isokrates, seems to be turned on its head.

In this chapter, I wish to explore these contradictions, in the hope of elucidating the complex nature of “civic education” during the Archaic period (c. 800–450 BC), given the difficulties of distinguishing satisfactorily between “private” and “public” responsibilities within this kind of society. The time for such an exploration seems ripe. Recent studies have demonstrated, on the one hand, how thoroughly enmeshed in civic concerns the intensely aristocratic field of athletic endeavor and display could be: even a Syracusan tyrant or Aiginetan nobleman had to make sure that his whole community felt itself to be engaged in the celebration and benefits of his achievement; his family’s largesse and style were subject to civic scrutiny, and were a matter of civic pride.⁵ Conversely, the mechanisms of the mature

³ Different terms are even employed by modern scholars to describe the two educational systems: the Spartan *agôgê* vs the Athenian-style *paideia*. But this terminological distinction may be Hellenistic in origin; see Kennell (1995), and below, p. 50, n. 87.

⁴ See Ober’s paper in this volume for a more detailed consideration of these issues. Marrou devotes a separate chapter to Sparta (after Homer, and before Athens); and his account is linked to an implicit progression from (fascist) German to (liberal) French cultural values, together with a continuous (but largely submerged) dialogue with Jaeger’s influential volumes: these nationalistic issues emerge explicitly on pp. 23–5.

⁵ Kurke (1991), especially 163–224.

Athenian democracy (including maintenance of the navy, and training of choruses) continued throughout the 5th and 4th C. to be deeply dependent upon the traditional processes of private munificence and selection; and the numerous "associations" (*koinônai*, *orgeônes*) and commensal "clubs" (*hetaireiai*, *syssitia*) that flourished in the city-center of Athens and the rural areas of Attika present a bewildering variety of statuses and modes of operation, for which often neither "public" nor "private" will quite suffice.⁶ Thus the simple progression, "from" aristocratic, family-based patronage and domination of the public arena "to" civic control of revenues and expenditures, and new political procedures for the execution and supervision of public business, does not play out so tidily. The opposition between Spartan "state control" and Athenian "free enterprise" is less clear-cut than we might like.

Of course Sparta and Athens did not comprise all of Archaic and Classical Greece. Both cities were in their own (very different) ways anomalous. Ideally, we would examine in detail a number of other Greek communities selected out of all those that were sprinkled around the Mediterranean, from Spain to Syria, and from the Black Sea to Egypt, in our efforts to determine the full range of educational institutions and attitudes. But in reality, we have pitifully little information about anywhere else apart from these two cities (and Crete—a kind of shadow-Sparta in many respects); so to some degree we are compelled to work within this polar opposition. The evidence that does exist for those other communities, however, (much of it of course from later sources, and not free from distortion and error) suggests that, despite their wide geographical dispersal and differing cultural contexts, they seem to have observed a fair degree of uniformity in the types of institutions that they contained. I think it is therefore justified to talk of an Archaic Greek "educational system," or set of systems, even as we take care to specify when we can their divergent, even competing, characters.

From the 8th C. onwards, we can trace the remarkable efflorescence of religious, architectural, visual, and performative arts that took place throughout Greece, as an increasingly numerous and prosperous elite sought (more or less self-consciously) to develop and maintain a suitably distinctive style of living, and a pedagogy to reinforce it, within

⁶ On Athenian *chorêgiai*, see Wilson (2000). On "associations", see Jones (1999); also Murray (1990), Schmitt-Pantel (1992). For observations along these lines in the Spartan context, see Kennell (1995), Ducat (1999).

the constraints and opportunities presented by the institutions of the newly emergent polis. The educational "system" thus involved a shifting and contested set of goals and methods. On the one hand, a continuing need was felt among the elite to define, maintain, and justify the distinction of particular individuals, families, and groups, while on the other, the pressure for civic solidarity, and a sense of shared social responsibilities, was promoted at all levels (though often in quite contradictory ways). In what follows, I shall try to lay out the processes whereby the various "trainings" of the young were institutionalized through laws, customs, and other forms of ideological reinforcement. What were the mechanisms through which such training was implemented, funded, and supervised? To what degree was the larger community (the "public") involved in regulating the training of the youth, to what degree was this left to the discretion and resources of individual families and the free market? The exploration of these questions exposes an interesting nexus of spoken and unspoken social requirements that is illuminating, I hope, for the larger study of the early polis.

The multiple institutions and competing ideologies of the polis at this period made for an intricate and dynamic field of competition for its members. Within each separate political community⁷ (and to some degree, within the collective community of "Hellenes") there existed a number of interlocking and overlapping groups and fields of activity within which a young man or woman was expected to be active: family and friends; local or civic cults, choral groups, and associations; the military; particular crafts or professions, and a number of more or less organized pursuits that we might characterize as "leisured" (though this term should not obscure the deep social, religious, and ethical seriousness that the participants attached to

⁷ Although it is common and convenient scholarly practice to use the term "polis" as equivalent to "political community" in Archaic Greece, it should be borne in mind that a good number of Greeks lived in communities to which this term would not apply (e.g., in an *ethnos*). And even in itself the term *polis* is quite vague and capacious during this period: many inhabitants of Attika, for example, while indubitably "Athenians", clearly felt strong allegiance to their own local deme (Marathon, Thorikos, Eleusis, etc.); the members of the Dorian colonist/citizen-class of Crete appear to have thought of themselves both as "Cretans" (sharing certain distinctive political forms and characteristics) and as (e.g.) "Gortynians" (with a separate law-code of their own); etc. Similar divisions of focus and loyalty existed among (e.g.) the towns of Ionia and Boiotia. Questions of "public" vs "private" are thus more complicated than simply *polis* vs *oikos*: local and professional groupings and organizations were also important factors, as we shall see.

them: e.g., athletics, erotics, hunting, commensality).⁸ Membership in some of these groups was conferred more or less automatically, as a result of kinship, geography, profession, and military classification; but in other fields a greater degree of choice existed, and also a greater or lesser challenge as to how far each individual might progress and what degree of distinction s/he might attain. For each field, however, there was a recognized institutional path to follow, with rules to observe and tests to be faced; and full "membership"—let alone a position of honor and distinction within the "institution"—involved demonstrating a mastery of the appropriate discipline and techniques.

For every young man or woman, the "passage" from childhood to full adult membership in several of these separate but overlapping communities, each with its attendant entitlements, expectations, and performativities, might thus take place at different times and in different forms. This obviously has an important bearing on the disputed question of adolescent "rites of passage". Modern scholars have debated vigorously whether or not Archaic Greek society required some or all of its members to undergo such a rite. As we shall see, the question cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. Boys and girls, and young men and women, did indeed have to pass through definitive ritual procedures before being admitted into full adult membership of the religious and political community; but these rituals took several different forms, and there was no *single* "rite" that encompassed and transcended all the others, and thereby constituted "the" rite of tribal passage for all. Archaic Greek rites of institution⁹ were thus various—but no less obligatory and universal, and no less demanding of the appropriate preparation and pedagogy. For, in the end, we might say that it was the sum total, and quality, of such group "memberships," and the associated performativities embodied

⁸ The prestigious and mystified status of these various activities was often enhanced by ritual and cult. "The aristocratic habit . . . is one that mobilizes all the minor activities of life which fall outside the serious specialities of other classes, and injects into these activities an expression of character, power, and high rank," Goffman (1960) 33–4. Thus e.g. athletic contests were devoted to the cult of Zeus (Olympia, Nemea), or of Apollo (Delphi and the Isthmus), or of Athena (Panathenaic Games), etc.; a hunter was in a sense dedicated to Artemis (like Hippolytos); Athenian sympotic groups swore oaths of loyalty to one another and observed strict rituals in their drinking; and so on. These activities were not just for fun, or for the love of sport.

⁹ For definition and justification of this term, in preference to "*rites de passage*", see below, pp. 35–9.

in an individual, that constituted his or her adult identity and status.

In what follows, I will begin with a brief consideration of those trainings that fall clearly into the category of "private"—i.e. crafts and skills handed down and taught within the family or professional association, and not subject to the collective concern of the community. Then we will proceed to look at certain areas in which the training of young men and women was unequivocally subject to the rules and requirements of the polis at large—primarily civic choruses and the military. Even these trainings will be found to be closely tied to associated activities (especially the commensal living-arrangements, and certain kinds of physical training) that involve a significant "private" dimension too. The bulk of the chapter therefore will focus on a number of overlapping age-group associations and trainings (choral, military, commensal, cultic), that seem to straddle—sometimes almost to obliterate—the division between private and public, and thus to bring into focus some of the most interesting cross-currents of Archaic Greek political life. Given the broad focus of this chapter, I shall concentrate more on larger continuities and patterns than on particular differences and evolutions; but in places I shall try to sketch some of the more interesting areas of variation. After a brief consideration of ways in which institutionalized homophilic relationships were incorporated into the educational system, and the extent to which these relationships were and were not regulated at the civic level, we will turn finally to look at the role of the earliest Greek "schools" in relation to these different models of public/private training. Thus we will come face to face with the questions raised (in different ways) by the chapters of Ford, Ober and Nightingale in this volume, concerning the level and nature of "political education" before the establishment of the first "real" schools.¹⁰

¹⁰ A word of apology: I will be using the expressions "private", "public", and "civic", for convenience and for their heuristic value; but I do not intend these terms to correspond to transparent and satisfactory economic, legal, or political categories. On the contrary, it is one of the aims of this chapter to complicate and "thicken" the description of such categories, to the point that they may become less easy to use, but perhaps more useful.

2. *Families, crafts, and specialized trainings*

For most free, non-elite Greeks, the main occupation for which they had to be trained was that of their father: more likely than not, farming; otherwise a more or less specialized craft. Agriculture (*geōrgia*), from Hesiod to Xenophon, and beyond, remained in most areas of Greece largely a family business; and children learned it by doing it, not by studying it.¹¹ The Hesiodic *Works and Days* provided advice on the calendar and some general principles of agriculture; but its usefulness as a manual of instruction was quite limited. (That was not its purpose.) The poem's chief cultural value lay rather in its broadly ethical message, as its stories, maxims, and aetiologies were heard, memorized, and internalized by Greeks in all regions and of all classes. This message focuses overridingly on the individual "household" (*oikos*), and its livelihood (*bios*) and socio-moral standing (*kydos, aretē*), exhibiting little concern for the larger community. (Does the farmer expect to serve as a soldier? How often will he attend a public assembly? Who would call such an assembly? In what venue, and before whom, was the verdict in favor of Perses delivered? We are not told.)

Most crafts and professions (*technai*) were equally "private" in their orientation and training. Even in the highly centralized Minoan and Mykenaian societies, the palace administration apparently did not involve itself directly in the training or selection of the numerous craftsmen under their control.¹² In the Archaic period, the level of centralization and planning within each city was minimal, and craft skills almost without exception were maintained and taught privately

¹¹ The disputed social status of "working the land" (noble toil or demeaning grunt-work?) is an interesting topic in Greek political theory. In the 4th C., Xenophon and Aristotle represent opposite poles: e.g., Aristotle *Pol.* 8. 1328b, Xen. *Oik.* 4.3–4, 6.4–10, 13, 7.22, 18.9–10, with Pomeroy (1994) ad loc., R. Descat, *L'acte et l'effort: une idéologie du travail en Grèce ancienne* (Paris, 1986), Johnstone (1994), Hanson (1995) 91–126, 181–219. Part of the reason for this was doubtless the different land-holding arrangements: in Lakonia, Messenia, and Crete, for example, agriculture was conducted mainly by a sub-class of non-citizen (but indigenous and Greek) workers (Helots, *dóloi*); and in many Northern and Western colonies the laborers were non-Greek subjects. By contrast, Athenian or Boiotian farms were generally worked by their owners and their families (who naturally tended to hold a higher opinion of the value and appropriateness of such work for a "free citizen"). There is no room here for the fuller discussion this topic deserves.

¹² See e.g. Chadwick (1976), Laffineur & Betancourt (1997), on weavers, smiths, carpenters, etc. For the Linear B scribes, see below, p. 33, n. 29.

and on a small scale, within the family or through apprenticeships.¹³ Solon, it is true, was credited (by an unreliable source) with legislating a requirement that fathers educate their sons in a craft (*technê*), or lose the right to be supported by them in their old age; but there is no suggestion that the city itself would have taken any role in the teaching of such craft skills.¹⁴

A few crafts and professions are singled out in the Homeric poems as involving "public workers" (*dêmioergoi*): seer, healer, carpenter, poet, and herald.¹⁵ What does this designation entail? They seem to be distinguished by their itinerant character, and also perhaps by their exceptional degree of specialization.¹⁶ But carpenters in fact rarely appear as distinct individuals in the epic,¹⁷ whereas, by contrast, metal-working, which had been a highly-specialized and economically important occupation in Mykenai and Knossos, seems to occupy a distinct province of its own, which may reflect the existence of an exclusive group (guild?), perhaps of non-Greek origins and connections, like Hephaistos himself.¹⁸ Ceramics (at least in major centers, such as Corinth and Athens) likewise came to be another increasingly specialized craft, with potters often concentrated in one section of a city and closely guarding their techniques within families and/or workshops.¹⁹

¹³ On apprenticeships, see Burford (1972), Jordan (2000). On crafts in general, Glotz (1927), Forbes (1955), Burford (1972).

¹⁴ Plutarch *Solon* 22.1–3.

¹⁵ *mantis*, *iêtêr*, *tektôn*, *aoidos* (*Od.* 17.383–4) and *kéryx* (19.135). This is a much narrower range of craft-activities than is recorded among the Linear B tablets, or the cuneiform records of the Near East; but it does perhaps gesture towards the greater social complexity of the lost palace culture, and at the increasing possibilities in the 8th C. for accumulation of surplus and luxury goods, and enjoyment of leisure; cf. Vermeule (1972), Chadwick (1976) 135–58, Morris (1992).

¹⁶ Several craft activities could be relatively non-specialized: Odysseus is a capable ploughman, boat-builder, carpenter, etc., when he has to be.

¹⁷ But skillfully-made doors, beds, chairs, chests, etc. are admired; and Epeios is credited with constructing the Wooden Horse. The Linear B tablets show that chariot-making and -repair was an important business in the Bronze Age. On carpenters (and architects) in general, see Burford (1972) 86–7, 96–7, 99–100, 141–2.

¹⁸ See Vermeule (1972), Burford (1972) 101, 196–8; and Grottanelli (1982), Morris (1992) 3–35, E. F. Bloedow in Laffineur & Betancourt (1997) 439–47, on the international character of Bronze Age metal-working. Hephaistos's workshop is in a building separate from the rest of the Olympian gods (*Il.* 18.368–83); tradition held that his first smithy was based on Lemnos, where he was attended by a special band of semi-human workers, the Kabeiroi, or else the Kyklopes or demonic Telchines; see Burkert (1985) 167–8, (1992), Morris (1992) 73–149; and for Archaic and Classical Athens, see Wilson (2000).

¹⁹ Professional rivalries (Hesiod *WD* 25–6); but also loyalties, reinforced by shared

Healers (*iatroi*) and seers (*manteis*) seem sometimes to have formed a sub-culture of their own—somewhat organized and “public”, but for the most part (in contrast to the Near Eastern and Iranian contexts from which much of their expertise came) relatively independent of any particular political community. In mythical terms, Chiron, Apollo, and Asklepios are the specialized purveyors of medical expertise and training; and in real life the *Asklepiadaí* maintained this tradition generation after generation.²⁰ Even though formal “schools” of doctors are not attested until the 5th C. (at Kos and Knidos), it seems that associations or sects of healer-seers (*iatromanteis*) and purifiers had flourished previously in several locations throughout Greece.²¹ The spheres of “healer” (*iatros*) and “seer” (*mantis*) might often overlap, and some practitioners combined both functions. Some made use of written texts;²² some employed musical, mimetic, and choreographical accompaniment to their words.²³ The learned and/or inspired knowledge of seers came to play many important roles in civic and family cult, military campaigns, and personal conduct: but we know relatively little about the methods of instruction and training followed in the Greek world (in contrast to the extensive audience for such specialized training in the Babylonian and Hittite, and Assyrian contexts), though it appears that the techniques, like those of other crafts, were closely guarded by individual experts and their

cults (Hephaistos, Prometheus) and facilities (e.g., Kerameikos); Burford (1972) 61–2, 94, 159–70, 211. For Athens in particular, J. A. Beazley, *Potter and Painter in Ancient Athens* (Berkeley, 1944), Boardman (1974) 9–13, (1975) 9–15. For the Corinthian potters’ quarter, see *Corinth* VII.2 (1975), XV.3 (1984).

²⁰ Hom. *Iliad* 4.192–219, 11.830–2. The “sons” of Asklepios could be biological or symbolic: thus the Hippocratic covenant requires a young doctor “to hold him who has taught me this art as equal to my parents and to lead my life in partnership with him . . . and to treat his offspring as equal to my brothers . . . etc.” (*Hipp. Oath* 5–7); cf. L. Edelstein, *Ancient Medicine* (Baltimore 1967) 40–8, Burkert (1985) 214–5 with Near Eastern parallels.

²¹ The career of Demokedes in the late 6th and early 5th C. offers an informative perspective on the cosmopolitan and cooperative community of physicians (Hdt. 3. 125, 129–138); cf. Grottanelli (1982), Morris (1992). This is consistent with the larger Near Eastern pattern of specialist doctors, seers, and exorcists who are sent from one court to another by rulers as gifts or favors: cf. Kuhrt (1995) 306 (Ugarit and Egypt), Hdt. 3.1 (Persia and Egypt), and further Burkert (1992) 9–87. On non-Hippocratic traditions of healing, and the different strands and locations of Greek medicine, see Lloyd (1983), Kingsley (1999).

²² Esp. Orphics: West (1983); cf. too Epimenides: West (1983) 45–53, and Roman/Etruscan *haruspices* and *sibyllae*: R. Bloch in Caquot & Leibovici (1968) 197–232.

²³ *epôidai*, *goêtai*: cf. Meuli (1935), Burkert (1965), Grottanelli (1982), Smith (1995).

families (e.g. the prestigious Iamidai), and not regulated or institutionally supported by the polis.²⁴

From time to time, at least from the 6th C. on, individual healers, or medicine-men, ended up leading whole communities of followers in lives of spiritual enlightenment involving quite distinctive regimens and educational routines. Their powers and practices thus acquired a distinctive political and public dimension. The most famous and influential of these charismatic sages was Pythagoras, whose sect at Kroton was soon replicated in other Italian and Sicilian towns.²⁵ Italy and Sicily (as well as various Greek communities in Thrace and the Black Sea—and of course Crete) seem to have been especially open to such eschatological study and training.²⁶

Despite Homer's inclusion of "heralds" among the *dēmiourgoi*, and Aristotle's specification of "priests" as a separate class within his ideal state (*Pol.* 1328–29), neither of these publicly visible and responsible professions appears to have required much formal training, at least in the Archaic period. The requirements for a Greek *hiereus* were simple: sufficient wealth and familiarity with the cult calendar.²⁷ The case of heralds (*kérykes*) seems to be similar: this office too was prestigious, and often hereditary (Kerykes, Eumolpidai, etc.), involving

²⁴ For Greek divination, see Burkert (1992) 41–87, (1985) 111–14; J. Defradas, in Caquot & Leibovici (1968) 157–95, P. Kett, *Prosopographie der historischen griechischen Manteis* (diss. Erlangen 1966), Pritchett (1979) 47–90. In the Babylonian, Hittite, and Assyrian schools, divination and exorcism formed important branches of the scribal-priestly educational curriculum (*Eduba*), and Greek extispicy was indebted to that tradition: Burkert (1992) 46–52. I cannot here pursue the other Near Eastern and Northern (Thracian, Scythian, Iranian) influences on Archaic Greek techniques of healing, magic, incantation, spiritual salvation, and "wisdom" in general: see e.g. Meuli (1935), Dodds (1951), West (1971, 1983, 1997), Burkert (1992), Kingsley (1994), S. I. Johnston, *Restless Dead* (Berkeley, 1999).

²⁵ On Pythagorean life and teachings, see Burkert (1972), Kirk, Raven & Schofield (1983) 213–38, Kingsley (1994); on Empedokles, Epimenides, and other charismatic leaders and wise-men, see Kingsley (1994); on Parmenides and other "lair-leaders" (*phôlarchoi*) with their incubation cult at Elea, see Kingsley (1999); on Damon's (5th C.) educational applications of Pythagorean theories about the different musical modes, see Anderson (1966).

²⁶ Orphics in North: West (1983) 1–26. Shamans: Meuli (1935), Dodds (1951), Burkert (1965), Kingsley (1994) and *Stud. Iranica* 23 (1994) 187–98. Pythagoreans and Zoroastrians: Kingsley (1994) and *Bulletin of the School of Oriental & African Studies* 53 (1990) 245–65. At Eur. *Hipp.* 952–6, an eccentric upper-class adolescent is accused by his father of studying "Orphic writings" and practising vegetarianism.

²⁷ "Greek religion could almost be called a religion without priests. . . the god admits anyone . . . [there was] no priestly caste as a closed group with fixed tradition, education, initiation and hierarchy. [The] priesthood is not a way of life, but a part-time and honorary office", Burkert (1985) 95, 97; cf. Parker (1996) 56–66.

special badges, behavior, and clothing, but little expert knowledge.²⁸ As for “singers, poets” (*oidoi*), the other category of “public workers” specified in Homer, while they too played important public roles, in festivals and at the courts of leading noblemen and monarchs, their skills were handed down through family connections and guild-associations (as in the case of the Homeridai, on Chios and elsewhere), rather than through any civic training program or schooling.

One further craft deserves mention here, by reason of its close association with public administration in many societies (including those of Bronze Age and Classical Greece). Scribes in the Minoan and Mykenaian palaces had formed another specialized craft, as in many parts of the Near East. But few Greek communities of the Archaic period required the services of more than a handful of professional secretaries and record-keepers, though in Athens at least from the 6th C. the clerks (*grammateis*, *anagrapheis*, *mnêmones*), stone-cutters, and “public interpreters” (*exêgêtai*) of legal, administrative, and religious documents came to represent an increasingly substantial and respectable segment of public employees of the *polis*. In other crafts, a basic knowledge of reading, writing, arithmetic, geometry, and accounting, might be helpful (though not essential), to facilitate business transactions and the conduct of civic affairs; and, as we shall see, it was this basic competence that the early schools were primarily set up to teach.²⁹

The “education” of the aristocratic warrior-class took a different form, of course. Here too we rely to some degree on the evidence of epic, especially for the earlier Archaic period. Whether or not (as some have claimed) the original purpose of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* was precisely to provide a comprehensive ethical reference-work for the young,³⁰ the poems certainly came to play such a role in the soci-

²⁸ Merely a strong voice and the ability to preside over auctions, lotteries, arbitrations, and other diplomatic processes (in some cases including knowledge of foreign languages): see F. E. Adcock & D. J. Mosley, *Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* (London 1975) 9–11, 152–60, 174–6, 229–30. The intriguing question of bilingualism cannot be pursued here: how many Greeks learned languages (or dialects) other than their own, or could write more than one script?

²⁹ For Near Eastern scribes, see e.g. Vansiphout (1979); for Bronze Age Crete and Greece, Chadwick (1976), Palaima (1988). On the activities and status of secretaries and scribes in Archaic Athens, and on early record-keeping on wood and metal, as well as inscriptions on stone, see Thomas (1992) 61–100, Sickinger (1999) esp. 36–41.

³⁰ See especially Plato's *Ion*, and Havelock (1963, 1982). “Homer, the educator

ety of the 7th and 6th C., both within the individual household and on a larger scale, at public festivals and contests (and subsequently in the schools too). The poems show little interest in the (emerging?) institutions of the polis, of course;³¹ but the recitation at local and Panhellenic festivals of epic—along with innumerable hymns, genealogies, foundation-poems, etc.—served as an ideological reinforcement of aristocratic values and processes, a reinforcement endorsed at both public and private levels. Tyrants such as Peisistratos or Polykrates were quick to see the value of fostering and funding the rhapsodes and choral lyric poets whose performances were among the cultural highpoints of the annual festivals.

Within this poetical context, and also within the heroizing visual art of the Archaic period, the figure of Chiron the centaur constitutes a striking educational “institution,” whose status and relevance to actual Archaic practice is hard to determine. Both within the epic, and in Archaic art and literature, we find Chiron receiving Achilleus as a baby or child from Peleus and/or Thetis, raising him in the wild, and teaching him, not only to hunt, but all kinds of military, artistic, medical, and ethical excellence (as he does for other heroes too).³² Marrou characterizes Chiron as “the typical educator,”³³ but this may be misleading, not only because the heroic world is in so many respects so idealized and fantastic, but also because several different pedagogical models are in fact to be found within the poems, operating in competition with that of Chiron. Thus, in the *Iliad*, Phoinix, who resides in Peleus’ house as a combination of guest-friend and retainer or dependent, has served as nurse and tutor to

of Greece” has been eloquently described by others too, notably Marrou (1956) 8–13, and Jaeger (1946).

³¹ For discussion of the class-orientation of the poems, see Donlan (1980), Rose (1992), Hanson (1995), W. G. Thalmann, *TAPA* 118 (1988) 1–28. This is not the place to go into the much-discussed traces of hoplite tactics, popular assemblies, law-courts, and other characteristic features of “the polis” that have been detected here and there in the Homeric poems.

³² See Marrou (1956) 7–13, Jeanmaire (1939) 290–1, Beck (1964), Schnapp (1997) 437–52 (who also compares Pholos). Xenophon (*Cyn.* 1) lists over twenty heroes who were tutored by Chiron; cf. Pindar *Pyth.* 4 (Jason), *P.* 6 and *N.* 3 (Achilleus), *P.* 9 (Apollo). The iconography of Achilleus with Chiron evolves from a baby in swaddling clothes or young child (7th–6th C.), to a nude ephebe (late 6th–5th C.): Schnapp (1997) 437–52, Beck (1975) nos. 1–21.

³³ Marrou (1956) 7–8; Jaeger (1946) 25–34. Later generations of Greeks frequently took the Homeric portraits of Achilleus, Odysseus, Telemachos, Herakles, etc. as models for emulation.

the baby Achilleus, and now accompanies him on campaign to Troy;³⁴ in the *Odyssey*, Mentor (at times impersonated by Athena), a respected older friend of Odysseus, supervises and escorts Telemachos as he begins to make his way in the adult world (rather as a Roman uncle or family-friend ushers his young ward through the *tirocinium fori* or *militiae*);³⁵ in both poems, too, Nestor, as father and revered elder statesman, gives practical and moral instructions to his sons, Antilochos and Peisistratos.³⁶ It may be that the family-based pedagogy, represented by the purely human figures of Phoinix, Mentor, and Nestor, is the more firmly rooted in contemporary Greek practice; "Chiron" may represent more of a fantasy, or a dim memory of a now-defunct Bronze Age institution of initiation.³⁷ In either case, the relationship between teacher and "student(s)" appears to operate entirely through family networks, with no involvement of the larger political community. But in any case, our view of the historicity and ideological value of these imagined adolescent trainings under the tutelage of "Chiron" will depend heavily on our assessment of the Archaic evidence for "ephebic" rites of passage and age-group trainings in general—to which it is now time to turn.

³⁴ *Iliad* 9.432–605; Achilleus addresses him as "Dad" (9.607 *atta*). In some respects, Phoinix's role (ex-nurse, family-retainer) is analogous to that of Eurykleia in the *Odyssey*.

³⁵ Bonner (1977) 84–5. Other heroic "mentors" recorded in Greek myth include e.g. Herakles for Philoktetes (or Iolaos), and Poseidon for Pelops (a relationship which like many others, evolved into a pederastic one in later tradition: cf. Pindar *Ol.* 1, and below, pp. 61–6).

³⁶ *Iliad* 23, *Od.* 4; cf. Plutarch, *Life of Cato* 20, Bonner (1977) 10–14; we may compare too the conventions of near Eastern wisdom literature, along with Hesiod's advice to his brother.

³⁷ For the "initiator" aspects of Chiron's tutelage, see especially Jeanmaire (1939), Sergent (1986), Schnapp (1997) 437–57. Whether or not Bronze-Age and/or Archaic Greek rites of passage lie in the background of the mythic Chiron, it is hard not to see here a relic of an ancient Indo-Iranian institution. In its range, as well as location and context, the training that Chiron provides strikingly resembles that of an Indic Brahman to a warrior-king (*kshatriya*): prolonged association with an older teacher in the wilds (forest, mountainside, or cave), training in both spiritual and martial arts (esp. archery and riding—but no writing), and a strong connection to the divine. See A. S. Altekar, *Education in Ancient India* (6th ed., Varanasi, 1965), F. E. Keay & D. D. Karve, *A History of Education in India and Pakistan* (4th ed., Oxford 1964). Marrou remarks that Chiron's diversity of expertise has a "truly oriental flavor", and compares the education of Solomon (*Wisdom* 7.17–20); but that passage refers to a much more abstract and spiritual "knowledge" of the universe than we find attributed to Chiron's pupils. Jeanmaire (1939) 290–1 terms Chiron "l'antique chamane du Pélion".

3. *Age groups, military training, and rites of institution*

Let us now consider those areas of Archaic Greek education in which communal and/or city-wide organization is more clearly evident. Here we encounter a profuse, and often confusing, cluster of institutions and procedures that are usually studied under separate rubrics (musical, military, athletic, sympotic, religious, etc.), but that are probably best considered as one complex, interlocking system. Organized age-groups and institutional rites of passage for boys and girls are well-documented for the Archaic and early Classical periods. The most striking and peculiar manifestations of these are found at Sparta and Crete, and scholars have tended to concentrate almost exclusively on these, treating them virtually as a topic to themselves. But in recent years, with the help of comparative anthropological study and detailed analysis of the literary and archaeological Greek evidence, the larger social system and mechanisms to which such rites belonged have come to be better recognized.³⁸ Some scholars, admittedly, are still reluctant to concede that any single system can be identified, so great is the variation between one context and another: for, whereas some rites involved a program of training extended over several years, others may have occupied merely a few days of ceremonial activity—a “rite of passage” indeed, but little that qualifies as “education.” Consequently opinions have ranged from one extreme to the other, some seeing adolescent rites of passage and initiation as ubiquitous and essential to the character of Archaic Greek society,³⁹ others as merely of marginal significance and restricted to a few particular regions and specific cults.⁴⁰ On balance, though, the weight of evidence seems by now solidly to confirm the widespread existence of extensive—and formative—age-grouped training of a kind that we may term “pedagogical”, not just in Sparta and Crete (and the reactionary minds of Plato and Aristotle), but all over Greece; and such organized age-groups present themselves as likely candidates for the title of “public education”, whether we mean by this that they were specifically oriented towards public performance and

³⁸ For a good account of these developments, see Calame (1999b), Ducat (1999). The earlier work of Jeanmaire (1939) and Brelich (1969) was seminal.

³⁹ E.g., Jeanmaire (1939), Brelich (1969), Vidal-Naquet (1986), Cole (1984), Sergent (1986), Seaford (1992), Calame (1997).

⁴⁰ E.g., Dover (1989), Hamilton (1989); cf. Leitaio (1999), Dowden (1999).

self-presentation, or that they were maintained at public expense, or that the selection of members and regulation of their activities were carried out by representatives of the larger community—or all of the above.

It is not necessary (though it has proved tempting to many) to posit a common origin for all these rituals, nor to insist that they all functioned in precisely the same way.⁴¹ A “rite of passage”, strictly speaking, may attend any stage in the sequence of birth, maturation, marriage, child-birth, and death of a human being in a social group;⁴² but the term is generally used to refer specifically to the passing from adolescent to adult status.⁴³ As such, it is often equated with “initiation”:

Tribal initiation . . . (*rite de passage*) aims to confer on the individual, by a more or less lengthy series of rites, full-fledged membership in the community formed by the tribal society. It integrates adolescents . . . into the system of institutions and norms that govern the political, social, cultural, and religious life of the adult community. So the rituals of tribal initiation concern the totality of the body politic, and are therefore official and public.⁴⁴

Such a definition implies that every adolescent in the community is similarly “initiated”, by means of the same series of rites, and also that the adult population of the community is centrally involved in the formulation and execution of the training (whether as “teachers” themselves, or through delegates).⁴⁵ But in the Greek contexts of the

⁴¹ An original Indo-European system, in which three separate classes were trained to be (respectively) sages, warriors, and producers, was posited by Dumézil (1941–45, 1957); cf. Jeanmaire (1939) 115–9, Sergent (1986), Kennell (1995) 15, 138–42, and D. Briquel, *Annales (ESC)* 37 (1982) 454–64; see too Bethe (1907), Bremmer (1980), Patzer (1984), Halperin (1990) on the alleged Dorian origins of pederastic initiation rites.

⁴² Van Gennep (1960); thus, for example, almost every Athenian boy passed through rituals celebrating his birth (*amphidromia*), introduction to the phratry (*apaturia*), registration on the deme rolls, acceptance as voting citizen (*dokimasia*), marriage (*gamêlion*), birth of children, and burial, to say nothing of possible membership of local deme cults, choruses, Eleusinian Mysteries, commensal associations, and annual civic appointments, etc. But few of these rituals seem to have involved any specific training or pedagogy.

⁴³ See Cole (1984), Calame (1999b) 278–88.

⁴⁴ Calame (1997) 11, and see his further remarks on pp. 11–4, with reference to Van Gennep (1960). Whether or not we agree to describe Archaic Greece as “tribal” need not affect the rest of this discussion.

⁴⁵ Some scholars prefer to reserve the term “initiation” for more secret rituals restricted to a narrower group within a given community (i.e., one particular type

Archaic period, most “pedagogical” age-groupings, so far from being universal, were quite selective (as we shall see), and served to distinguish their members more or less sharply from others—usually a majority—to whom such a pedagogy was not granted. So, while accepting the “communal” and “public” nature of these rites, I prefer to describe the range of age-group practices we shall be examining, not in terms of “tribal initiation” (helpful and valid though this concept can be for many Greek contexts),⁴⁶ but as “rites of institution” through which select groups were trained, prepared, and hailed into membership of their particular social classes and adult functions.

The act of institution is . . . an act of communication, but of a particular kind: it signifies to someone what his identity is, but in a way that both expresses it to him and imposes it on him by expressing it in front of everyone (*katēgorein*, meaning originally to accuse publicly) and thus informing him in an authoritative manner of what he is and what he must be.⁴⁷

As we shall see, there were many different kinds of “institutions” and statuses into which Greek men and women might thus be admitted, with varying scopes and functions. Some were compulsory, others voluntary: some not quite either. Some were restricted to citizens, or even to particular families; others admitted non-citizen residents, or even foreigners.⁴⁸ Some groups were in effect restricted to the

of rite of passage); e.g. Hamilton (1989). There is also often some imprecision as to whether the term “rite of passage”, or “initiation”, is being employed literally or metaphorically—i.e., whether a particular observed social practice or narrative structure is bearing full ritual and symbolic weight, or merely resembles, or gestures towards, such a ritual: see Dowden (1999), and the literary contributions to Padilla (1999).

⁴⁶ Calame’s excellent study (1977/1997), to which I am much indebted, focuses primarily on choral organizations and performances.

⁴⁷ Bourdieu (1991) 121 (and 117–26); cf. Calame (1997) 12. For the notion of “hailing” into a newly legitimated status, cf. Althusser (1971).

⁴⁸ Athenian metics could serve as hoplites or cavalry, and could row in the fleet, though they may have trained in separate units; at Sparta foreigners could enroll in squadrons as “foster-sons” (*trophimoi*), and acquire a limited sort of citizenship (Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.9, V. Ehrenberg, *RE* 7A. 1 (1939) 675–6 s.v. *trophimoi*), and the Spartan army also relied quite heavily on (non-Spartiate) *periokoi* and even Helots, who must have been given some military training, though no evidence for this survives. (A system of adoption also enabled children from poorer families (*mothakes*) occasionally to attain to Spartiate status (Kennell (1995) 118, with further references.) By contrast, cult associations were often family- and/or locally-based and tightly restricted in membership. As for sympotic *hetaireiai* and musical associations (*choroi*, *thiasoi*), conditions of membership varied considerably; see Jones (1999) and below, pp. 43–61.

wealthy, whereas in other cases measures were taken to limit distinctions of wealth and rank, and to enhance the sense of equality and common interests among the members, by restricting the opportunities for individual expenditure and competitive display.⁴⁹ Some were publicly administered (i.e. by the polis and its officials); others organized and funded by private individuals (or families), or by voluntary associations of friends and partners.

There are no direct allusions in Homer or Hesiod to institutionalized age-groups or rites of passage. But a number of formulae and contexts involving "youths" (*kouroi*) suggest many of the distinctive features that will be found in Archaic choruses and "herds," and we should perhaps recognize these *kouroi* as occupying a specific category of "warriors-in-training", or "young elites."⁵⁰ In addition to the heroic trainings with Chiron that we discussed above, many Greek myths lend themselves to being read as adolescent rites of passage. Some involve a liminal phase of isolation for the male hero in a wild and unpopulated place (often including some gender inversion and questioning of parentage), before s/he is reintegrated into her/his community as a prince(-ss) and object of veneration;⁵¹ often animal disguises, mistaken identities, and/or disastrous hunting mishaps occur.⁵² Sometimes, a particular version of a myth clearly evolved to suit local ideologies and rituals: thus, for example, we can trace in Attika from the late 7th C. a sudden burst of iconographical and poetical representations of Theseus' ephebic labors,⁵³ at Sparta, from

⁴⁹ One common method of doing this was by maintaining an institution "at public expense" (*dēmosiai*), i.e. through direct payment to the members with the help of liturgies and taxes on the wealthy (as at Athens), or the use of a surplus generated by a servile class (as at Sparta and in Crete); another was the pooling of contributions by all members (*eranos*); see below, pp. 48–51 (Spartan *syssition*) and Appendix pp. 74–80 (Crete).

⁵⁰ *Kouroi* serve wine at banquets (*Il.* 1.465, 470; 10.175; *Od.* 1.148, 3.339, 21.271); as a group they sing the paian to Apollo (*Il.* 1.472–4); etc. *kouroi* also engage in competitive "speech" (*mythoi*) with one another; *kouroi prōthēbai* dance marvellously (*Od.* 8.262–3); youthful competitions in archery are mentioned in both poems (*Il.* 23.850–83, *Od.* 8.214–28); cf. too Hes. *Th.* 429–52. See further Jeanmaire (1939) 11–111, Brelich (1969), Kennell (1995) 138–41, Schnapp (1997), Calame (1999b).

⁵¹ E.g., Achilles, Herakles, Jason, Perseus, Telemachos, and many others; among the gods, Apollo, Dionysos, and Hermes. (Oedipus and Pentheus can be seen as failed cases.) For females, n.b. Atalanta, Hippolyta, Iphigeneia, and other heroines and nymphs associated with Artemis. See further Sergeant (1986), Dowden (1999).

⁵² Vidal-Naquet (1981), Schnapp (1997).

⁵³ See further Jeanmaire (1939), Calame (1990), Sergeant (1986).

the 6th C. on, cult and military ideology were intensively focused on the *Dios-kouroi* (Kastor and Polydeukes), foundational twin-kings, horsemen, and athletes;⁵⁴ Arkadia was imagined as the archetypal scene of wildness and blurring of distinctions between animal and human;⁵⁵ Crete's Mount Ida and Diktaean Cave were renowned as being the site(-s) where the "Young Zeus" (*Zeus Kouros*) was brought up by the Nymphs and Kourêtes.⁵⁶ But it is often hard to determine whether such narratives and cults were accompanied by, and/or explanatory of, any serious program of adolescent training, be it military, athletic, or musical: most of the direct evidence for such institutionalized training comes from the 4th C. or later; and although in several cases the sources specify that these are old and hallowed customs, nostalgia and ideological bias have certainly distorted the picture—perhaps beyond recognition.⁵⁷

In any case, whether these mythological narratives and numerous but scattered cults preserve the faint outlines of a deeply embedded Bronze Age and/or Indo-European institution, or whether instead they represent a distinctly new phenomenon of the 7th C. and later,⁵⁸ there is no denying the widespread existence of homosocial age-groups and coming-of-age rituals throughout Greece in the Archaic period. Among the many different kinds of age-groupings that can be seen to have served a clearly "pedagogical" function, we may distinguish broadly between the following: (a) cult chorus (*choros*), (b)

⁵⁴ Kennell (1995) 136–41. Although Spartan youths who graduated into adulthood are usually called *hippeis* in 5th and 4th C. sources, a 6th C. grave-relief of an ephēbic youth carries the inscription, "The *koroi* dedicated this [image of] Theokles" (*IG* V.1 457; and cf. Stob. 4.1.138).

⁵⁵ Schnapp (1997).

⁵⁶ See Harrison (1927), Jeanmaire (1939), West (1965). On Thera, 7th C. inscriptions (*IG* XII.3 350–71, *Suppl.* 1311), carved into rocks near the (later) precinct of Apollo Delphinios-Karneios (an initiation deity), honor "ZEUS KORAS," "KORES," and "APOLLO"; see Jeanmaire (1939), Graf (1979).

⁵⁷ On the Spartan *agôgê* (and *krypteia*), see Kennell (1995), who argues persuasively that most of the details described by Plutarch and other late sources (age-gradations, special names, whipping-ceremony, etc.) were first introduced, or greatly embellished, in the 3rd and 2nd C. BC; see further Ducat (1999), and below, pp. 48–51. For the problems of dating the Athenian *ephēbeia*, see pp. 55–6; on the 4th C. accounts of Cretan customs (Ephoros, Plato, Aristotle) see Appendix pp. 76–7.

⁵⁸ For sceptical discussion of the likelihood of survival of Minoan or Indo-European initiation rituals into the Archaic period, see especially Dover (1989), and Leitao and Dowden in Padilla (1999); more positive are Lembessis (1975), Säflund (1987), Koehl (1986), Stewart (1998); also Ducat (1999). (The issue overlaps with that of the "origins" of institutionalized Greek homoerotics; see below, pp. 62–3.) This is a topic to which I hope to return elsewhere.

military mess-hall (*syssition* or *andreion*, along with the *ephêbeia* and *krypteia*); (c) drinking-club (*symposion* and *hetaireia*); and (d) cult/craft association (*thiasos* or *orgeônes*).⁵⁹ These categories often overlapped with one another; but overall, each of them may be said to have served in its own way as a "rite of institution" for its members; and we may regard them collectively as comprising an interlocking "system of education" that seems to have been shared by most of those Greek communities that we are able to study in sufficient detail during this period.

Before we discuss each of these categories in more detail, some general questions and observations should be framed. How large a segment of society (i.e., what proportion of the adolescents in the community) was involved? How were the group-members selected, and how was the institution supervised and legitimated? How representative of the polis or larger community was the group, and how was this "representation" effected? How (from what resources, and by what mechanisms) were the age-groups funded and supported?

In general, we will see that these age-groupings were restricted to a select minority of the population.⁶⁰ The process of institution thus involved both inclusion and exclusion: the young women or men

⁵⁹ In the final section of this chapter, we will look briefly at the "school", as another "age-group" of especial interest to our investigation.

⁶⁰ The evidence is obviously far from complete: but this is certainly true in principle of the *symposion* and *hetaireia*, and of some cultic *thiasoi* and *orgeônes* too. Even age-group choruses seem to have been selective, and to "represent" their age-group on behalf of the whole community, rather than including all of the relevant age (pace Calame (1997): not every Athenian girl got to be a Little Bear; see Cole (1984), Sourvinou-Inwood (1988). The *syssition* and *ephêbeia* are less easy to determine: in both Crete and Sparta (where citizens comprised only a small proportion of the adult Greek males) membership of a *syssition* was required for full citizenship; but the Cretan *agôgê* was selective and elitist (Appendix, pp. 77–80), and at Sparta we are told not only that an application process was in place (*dokimazesthai*) that was quite picky (Plut. *Lyk.* 12—though this may date to a later period?), but also that failure to contribute one's share consistently to the *syssition* was grounds for expulsion (Ar. *Pol.* 2.9.32.1271a). It appears too that relatively few even of those who entered the *agôgê* as children reached the advanced levels of *hippeis* and *homoioi*: see Hodkinson (1983), Kennell (1995) 115–42. For the conflicting evidence concerning membership in the Athenian *ephêbeia*, see refs in n. 83 below. In the case of Plato (as of Aristotle), it is specified that *all* citizens are to be enrolled in the three sets of training choruses (children, youths, elders): but both these authors have in mind a polis that limits citizenship to a fairly small proportion of the inhabitants. By contrast, we may note that the criteria and processes for initiation into the Eleusinian Mysteries involved no age-groups, no requirement of membership, no formal program of instruction, and few exclusions (except for pollution); even slaves were included.

came to be included (homogenized and integrated) as equal members of the like-aged group (*homêgyris*, *hêlikia*), sharing identical costume, hairstyle, musical modes, and verbal codes,⁶¹ while at the same time differentiating themselves from all others whose age, gender, ethnicity, or social status excluded them from membership. The place where the group met (a shrine, stadium, grove, dining-room, wilderness, or even the chorus-organizer's own house) was likewise reserved, if only temporarily, for their exclusive use, with the help of ritual language (oaths, incantations, and purifications), special foods, perfumes, and liquid offerings. But at the same time, it was often crucially important that this select group, however narrowly selective it might be, earn acceptance as *representing* the community as a whole, and as performing *on behalf* of the rest of their age-fellows, as their best and worthiest members. The training involved in each of these activities was thus neither entirely "private", in as much as the contests and performances followed publicly approved rules and norms and were subject to the supervision of polis-appointed officials (judges, priests, etc.),⁶² nor entirely "public", given that group-membership and opportunities to perform and/or compete were restricted, and the funding and instruction were largely provided by the participants' own families or (e.g., in the case of the Athenian chorêgic system, or the owners of the earliest *gymnasia*) by wealthy individuals who acted as patrons for their local community and/or extended family. The force of custom, and the internal pressure on elite families to maintain and justify their cultural domination, helped to disguise the gap between the two.

Within each group, we will note too that there was usually room for individual competition. In some cases, a "leader" was selected from among the young members;⁶³ athletic, aesthetic, sexual, gas-

⁶¹ See Calame (1997), for terminology emphasizing collectivity and equality; and cf. Bourdieu (1991) 43–65, (1984). Groups were given special titles, nick-names, temporary identities, and secret phrases; the individual members' names that are mentioned in Alkman's *Partheneion* fr. 1 (below, p. 47) may have been generic, not actual (Nagy (1990) 344–51, 362–73).

⁶² Of course, some events were Panhellenic, and thus superseded local (polis) requirements. But in these areas of activity (athletics, and some forms of musical performance) care was taken at the polis level to integrate the local conditions of competition with the national ones. Local variations did still exist, however (particular dance steps, musical modes, peculiar rituals, etc.); and these constituted an important element in polis-identity.

⁶³ See Calame (1997) 43–73 on the term *chorêgos*; Cartledge (1981a) on Agesilaos and Spartan kings (and below, p. 45). One way of referring to a drinking-club was

tronic, and musical challenges were faced, involving special prizes, a favored position in the formation, and other marks of honor.⁶⁴ The very exclusivity of the group, its guarantee of privilege and immunity from external intervention, made this internal competition safer and less threatening—though still potentially full of tension and passion; and the group's collective distinction and success in competition against other groups would reflect credit on all its members, even the less prominent. Thus future habits of hierarchy and shared or alternating leadership were instilled and institutionalized. Indeed, the system as a whole was thoroughly ambiguous, both inclusive and exclusive, geared simultaneously to the production of "likeness" and to fostering individual superiority, while producing "representatives" of the larger community whose legitimacy resided in their very distinction from the rest.

With these preliminary observations in mind, let us look briefly at the main categories of age-group associations, and try to assess both their pedagogical components and their public/private status.

(a) *Chorus*⁶⁵

When Plato's Athenian Stranger proposes a system of education (*choria*) involving three sets each of male and female choruses (children, youths, and elders), he offers a tongue-in-cheek explanation:

Education (*paideia*) is the excellence (*aretê*) that first is acquired by children (*paides*). If pleasure, friendship, pain, and hatred are properly engendered in the souls of children who can't yet capture them through reason (*logos*), then, when they do acquire reason, they will find that their reason and their feelings are in harmonious agreement (*symphônêsi*) about the fact that they have become habituated by the proper habits (*ethê*). This harmonious agreement (*symphônia*) is precisely what virtue (*aretê*) consists of. . . . Shouldn't we say that education comes originally from Apollo and the Muses? . . . And by 'uneducated' (*apaideutos*) we shall mean a person who has not been trained to take part in a chorus (*achoreutos*); and we must say that if someone has been sufficiently

"those around x", "x's associates" (*hoi peri . . .*): Jones (1999) 223–7. N. b. too Kyros' displays of leadership as a child (Hdt. 1. 114–116).

⁶⁴ Thus, in a chorus, e.g. Alkman fr. 1 (below p. 47), cf. Winkler (1990); in a military context, Hodkinson (1983) 258–9. For erotic competition, cf. Calame (1997, 1999), Schnapp (1997), Fisher (1999); below, p. 45.

⁶⁵ See esp. Jeanmaire (1939), Brelich (1969), Nagy (1990), Calame (1997), Stehle (1997), Wilson (2000).

trained, she is 'educated'. . . . So the well-educated person must be able to sing and dance well [*kalôs*].⁶⁶

This use of music and dance to align corporal, emotional, and intellectual impulses into a "harmonious" set of "habits" (*ethê* or *hexis*),⁶⁷ is typical of Archaic and Classical Greek attitudes. "Apollo and the Muses" are regarded as the sources both of physical symmetry (choreography, callisthenics, gymnastics) and of aesthetic form and wisdom (rhythm and melody, poetry and visual art—and in due course also mathematics, rhetoric, and philosophy);⁶⁸ and the organization of choral groups, and public presentation of their performances, constituted some of the most visible and definitive embodiments of communal energy and identity.⁶⁹

Three main age-groups for choruses are commonly distinguished: "children" (*paides*, often undifferentiated in gender), "youths/maiden-s" (male *neoi*, *kouroi*, *ephêboi*, *meirakia*, *êitheoi*; female *parthenoi*, *korai*, *neanides*, *nymphai*), and "men/women" (*andres/gynaikes*).⁷⁰ It is the middle category, adolescents around the age of puberty, that is the primary object of our attention here,⁷¹ since in their case,

⁶⁶ *Laws* 2. 653b1–6, 654a6–b7. Plato, writing in the 4th C., may have Sparta and Crete primarily in mind here; but his system certainly corresponds in several respects to the arrangements of other parts of Greece in previous centuries, including Athens: see G. Morrow, *Plato's Cretan City* (Princeton, 1960), E. David, *American Journal of Philology* 99 (1978) 486–95, Jones (1999) 268–87.

⁶⁷ See Bourdieu (1979) *passim*, on the "habitus." Of course, the clear distinction between "corporal", "emotional", and "intellectual" was hardly made before the late 5th C.: such terms as *thymos*, *phrenes*, *noos*, *pathos*, *psychê*, operated in all three dimensions. Thus the effects of musical, magical, and verbal *rhythmos*, *harmonia*, *symphônia*, and *psychagôgia* were often imagined in very physical terms: see Anderson (1966), R. Padel, *In and Out of the Mind* (Princeton, 1992).

⁶⁸ Plato's philosophical school was in due course established in a precinct dedicated to the Muses; Aristotle's in Apollo's Lykeion. Pythagoras and Parmenides each consecrated their sects to Apollo the healer. See Lynch (1972), Kingsley (1999), Jones (1999).

⁶⁹ See esp. Stehle (1997), Calame (1997), and Wilson (2000), as well as the work of Victor Turner and Richard Schechner.

⁷⁰ Brelich (1969), Calame (1997) 26–30, etc. Particular privileges and occupations were often reserved for "older men" (i.e. those past 40 or so = *gerontes* > *gerousia*, cf. Latin *senes* > *senatus*); but Plato is probably eccentric in assigning them to separate choruses in the *Laws*.

⁷¹ The span covered by *neos/parthenos* usually covered 13–17 or so, but could range a little higher in some cases. The Spartan gradations in Xenophon's day seem to have lumped 7–13 or so together as *paides*, 13–19 as *paidiskoi*, and 20–29 as *hêbontes*; later, additional subdivisions were introduced: see Calame (1997) 158–9, Kennell (1995), H. W. Singer, in Hodkinson & Powell (1999) 67–89, with further references. Choruses of "children" (i.e. under 13) rarely seem to have undergone

The instruction given to chorus members was more than just preparation for a performance. The form and content of this instruction seem to have been those of a true education, with the aim of making the chorus-participants not only good dancers and singers, but also accomplished men and women".⁷²

The normal size for an "educational" chorus of young men or women was between eight and fifteen members.⁷³ At least one adult instructor and/or organizer was in charge, male for a male chorus, either male or female for female chorus.⁷⁴ In addition, within the group itself there was usually a "chorus-leader" (*chorégos*, *bouagor*, etc.), who might be slightly older than the others, or of higher social status, or selected on the basis of looks and accomplishments.⁷⁵

How were such choruses funded, and how were their members and teachers selected? Circumstances varied: but those responsible for administering a particular sanctuary and cult or festival would usually be entrusted with these matters too. In the case of Athens, where (from at least the late 6th C. on) several hundred boys and youths were involved each year in choral performances at the Panathenaia and/or City or Rural Dionysia, we can trace in some detail the evolution of the office of *chorégia*, through which wealthy citizens were appointed to select and train a chorus on behalf of a tribe or of the city as a whole. Even under the democracy, some of these choregic appointments (which were simultaneously a significant financial imposition and a precious privilege) were restricted to par-

sustained programs of instruction (though the Little Bears of Brauron may be an exception; cf. Cole (1984), Hamilton (1988), Sourvinou-Inwood (1988)). For boys' (and girls') athletic competitions, see below, p. 53. As for adults, "men" and "women" might occasionally perform in groups, but were not assigned instructors or (except at Sparta) any special regimen.

⁷² Calame (1997) 222.

⁷³ Calame (1997) 21–5; the same is generally true of commensal and sympotic groups and *thiasoi/orgeônes*. Some choruses could be bigger, however, up to 50 or 60 (e.g., the tribal dithyrambs for "boys" and "men" in 5th C. Athens); cf. Wilson (2000). Sometimes choruses might combine to perform together.

⁷⁴ Calame (1997) 66–72: thus Alkman at Sparta and Sappho on Lesbos both presided over groups of young women. The terms *didaskalos*, *choropoios* (cf. Hes. *Th.* 7–8), *chorastatês/is* are found, as well as *chorégos* (which is also used of the member of the chorus who "leads off"); for the dual meaning of this latter term, see Calame (1997) 43–73; also Wilson (2000) 113–16.

⁷⁵ Cartledge (1981a), Hodkinson (1983), Calame (1997) 43–73. Sometimes the leader was assigned from a class that had previously graduated, to assist the instructor in the training of the new members; cf. the Spartan *eirên* (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 2.11), and below, p. 50.

ticular families,⁷⁶ and it is clear that these procedures were adapted from an earlier (predemocratic) system of local and family-based control of such activities. Where once a *basileus* or priest, or aristocratic family-group (in some cases, perhaps, all these in one) had organized and presided over musical and athletic assemblies/contests (*agônes*: funeral games, cult festivals), by the 7th and 6th C. such responsibilities were increasingly assigned to civic officials (*archontes*, *ephors*, *agônothetai*, ktl.)—though the practical difference may have been relatively small, since the same noble families tended to receive the most prestigious appointments.⁷⁷ The key components of choral preparation and performance, for which the choregos (and/or archon or priest) was responsible, were the selection of chorus-members, a place to rehearse and perform, board and lodging during the rehearsal period,⁷⁸ a poet and/or chorus-teacher (sometimes paid, sometimes him/herself a member of the group), payment to a musician (and possibly extra trainers and instructors), costumes and accoutrements for the choral members (oil, crowns, fillets, perfumes, etc.), and animals, wine etc. for the celebratory feast following the main performance itself. A festival chorus was thus both a cult group, dedicated for at least a few weeks, maybe longer, to the service of a particular divinity, and a civic association administered by a representative of the polis, who was responsible for ensuring that they performed in accordance with the (musical, religious, social) *nomoi* and in a way that would bring distinction to their constituency (village? family? tribe?—and himself) before the assembled citizens.

Of the particular “curriculum” that was followed within a choral group, apart from the songs, races, and dances etc. that would be publicly performed in the final ritual, we have disappointingly little detailed knowledge. According to Plato, Aristotle, and others, it should include reading and writing, as well as study of the lyre and aulos, dance, and athletics: to what degree some or all of these were taught to choruses in the 7th and 6th C. we do not know.⁷⁹ In some com-

⁷⁶ Wilson (2000) 12–18, 32–4, 42–4.

⁷⁷ Nagy (1990) on *agôn*. On priest-families, see Parker (1994) 56–66, 125–6.

⁷⁸ Sometimes in the case of choruses this might involve some ritual abstinence or special diet (to improve the singing voice, it was believed); but often choregic hospitality was regarded as a treat: Wilson (2000); likewise athletic diets and celebrations.

⁷⁹ See Calame (1997), Wilson (2000) 71–86. On reading and writing at Sparta (allegedly minimal), see below n. 69.

munities, at least by the 5th C., a *stadion*, *palaistra* and *gymnasion*, even perhaps a school-room, will have existed separately from where the choruses met and trained; but the distinction between "school" and "chorus" may not have been always sharp. In 5th and 4th C. Athens, a chorus was sometimes trained in the chorêgos' own house, or else in a designated local *chorêgeion* ("chorus-space").⁸⁰

Usually an adolescent chorus's ritual activities would culminate in a public performance in honor of their designated divinity, marking the passage to adult status, with its attendant expectations of marriage (for females) and military service, civic duties, etc. (for males). An illuminating example has survived in the form of Alkman's *Partheneion* (from 6th C. Sparta): the singers refer to themselves as a "band of ten" (*dekas*), humbly dependent on the favor of their dazzling "leader" Hâgesichorâ (and of the gods), and yet confident that their finery and disciplined cohesion (like that of race-horses, or rowers) are well qualified to compete with their rivals, in pursuit of the "lovely peace" (*erata eirênê*, 91) of public triumph.⁸¹

Sometimes such "graduation" to adult status might be less public, however: for example, how should we envision Sappho's group performing/responding to her songs? How should the group even be categorized? As a "chorus", or a "sect" (*thiasos*), or a "women's-club" (*hetaireia*)—or a private "household" (*oikia*)? They appear collectively to be dedicated to Aphrodite, with Sappho as their leader; they celebrate together, with music, song, fineries, and wine; they confront rival groups, which have their own leaders; and from time to time, individual younger members depart to live elsewhere—with a husband? or back with their families far away? Whatever we term this group, it is surely pedagogical; and it is both intensely "private" (in its rejection of the male world of war and politics, and its focus on the personal status and concerns of Sappho and her friends) and conventionally "public" (in its cult orientation and presentation of musical performances—and even its "published" texts).⁸²

⁸⁰ See Wilson (2000) 71–3 on the overlap between *chorêgeion* and *didaskaleion*; and below, pp. 66–70, on the earliest "schools". The "old-style" education described in Aristophanes' *Clouds* contains much musical and ethical instruction, akin to what e.g. Sappho or Theognis taught centuries before.

⁸¹ P. Louvre E 3320 + P. Oxy. 2389 = Alkman fr. 1, esp. 39–72, 77, 84–99. See Calame (1977), and Campbell (1988) 364–9 for Greek text, translation, and discussion.

⁸² On Sappho's "circle", see Burnett (1983) 209–28, Winkler (1990), Calame (1997) 210–14, (1999) 98–101, esp. nn. 16 and 17, Lardinois (1994) and (1999);

(b) *Mess-hall and military training—Syssition, ephêbeia*⁸³

Male homosocial commensality played a central role in upper-class Greek society of the Archaic and Classical periods. Commensal groups are often crudely divided into two kinds, “mess-halls” (*syssitia*, *syskēnia*, *phiditia*) with a primarily military—and “public”—orientation, and “clubs” (*hetaireiai*, *enômotiai*, *synômosiai*), whose focus was more specifically on drinking and on “private” (especially musical) leisure pursuits. I will maintain this distinction for now, and discuss the two categories separately. But the distinction frequently breaks down: for example, the sympotic poetry of Archilochos, Alkaios, and Theognis reminds us constantly of the military-political preoccupations of their group; and conversely, Tyrtaios’s elegiac poetry may well have been delivered in the Spartan mess-halls—or even to hoplite formations in the field—rather than in a “private” symposium. Here too, then we have a reminder of the impossibility of drawing neat lines between the “public” and “private” realms of upper-class Greek social life at this period.

Once they reached the age of puberty, boys ceased to eat meals with their mothers and the other women.⁸⁴ In less well-off families, presumably they usually ate and spent their time henceforth with their fathers and fellow-laborers or -apprentices. But among the more affluent, men were often organized into associations, for the purpose of eating and drinking together on a regular basis. In some cities, a polis-wide commensal institution existed—at least by the 4th C.—specially for those of ephebic age, as an introductory stage in their military service. But it is notoriously hard to determine to what

contra, Parker (1993), who argues that this was merely a social *hetaireia*, with no pedagogical function at all. For 5th C. Athenian illustrations of “Sappho” reading and singing among her female friends/followers, see Immerwahr (1964), Beck (1975).

⁸³ On *syssitia* and similar commensal associations in general, see Jeanmaire (1939) 421–7, Hodkinson (1983) 251–4, Murray (1990), Schmitt-Pantel (1992), Jones (1999) 284–7, 308–9, 316, with further references. On the Spartan *agôgê*, Marrou (1956) 14–23, Finley (1983), Hodkinson (1983) 251–4, Kennell (1995), Ducat (1999); on the Spartan *krypteia*, Jeanmaire (1939) 540–58 and *Revue des Études Grecques* 26 (1913) 121–50, Lévy (1988), Schnapp (1997) 126–33. On the Athenian *ephebeia*, and systems of ephebic training in general, Marrou (1956) 105–14, Pelekidis (1962), Vidal-Naquet (1986), Schnapp (1997) 133–5, Sinclair (1988) 55–61, Rhodes (1981) on Ar. *Ath. Pol.* 42.

⁸⁴ It was believed by some (especially in democratic Athens) that aristocratic (and Persian) boys continued to spend too much time at home with their mothers, and consequently developed cowardly and luxurious habits: e.g., Hdt. 1. 136, Plato *Laus* 694a–695e, Ar. *Ath. Pol.* 35.2; see Slater (1968), Griffith (1995) 84–6, and *PCPhS* 44 (1998) 34–5, 55–7.

degree and by what means such associations may have been organized and administered in the earlier periods.

Spartan society (from at least the mid-6th C. on) was peculiar in requiring all Spartiate males to continue eating and sleeping together in common mess-halls from adolescence through the age of thirty, even to the point of restricting the domestic living arrangements of married men, so that their availability for continuous military training would be guaranteed. In addition, the austere life-style, strict discipline, and rigorous physical training set this system somewhat apart from others, and helped the Spartan army (and to some degree Spartan athletes too), build a reputation for toughness and near-invincibility. But it is probably a mistake to treat this Spartan institution as something radically different from its counterparts elsewhere in Greece.⁸⁵ For example, the familiar picture of Spartan boys suffering from a continuous shortage of rations, and of all their men limited to a menu of broth and barley-bread, seems to be misleading: it appears that, in addition to the common fare, wealthier members of the mess-halls were expected to contribute extra treats, such as wheat-bread (*artos*) or after-dinner cakes (*epaikla*), or game from their own hunting-expeditions or estates—nothing purchased—in a kind of competitive hospitality familiar in other aristocratic Greek contexts.⁸⁶

In most respects, indeed, the structure and functions of the “mess-halls”, “herds”, military “squadrons”, and homoerotic pairings, into which the Spartan youth of the 6th–4th C. were organized, seem to have been quite similar to age-groups elsewhere in Greece—and to be paralleled by Sparta’s own “maiden-choruses” too. The (fairly

⁸⁵ See Kennell (1995) 115–42, Ducat (1999). Marrou (1956) devotes a separate chapter (pp. 14–25) to Spartan education, emphasizing the analogies between their *agôgê* and Italian/German fascist youth organizations; and he differentiates sharply between Spartan militarism and the rest of Greece (notably Athens). “The whole system of [Spartan] education was thus collective: children were simply torn from their families and made to live in community . . . They learned to be soldiers: everything was sacrificed to that” (Marrou (1956) 20–1). This in turn provides Marrou with his “explanation” for the origin and nature of educational pederasty, as a “courtship of warriors” (pp. 26–32); see below, pp. 62–3. British scholars often find their Spartan analogy instead in the 19th C. public school system (e.g., Freeman (1907)).

⁸⁶ Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 5.3, cf. Molpis *FGHist* 590 F 2 = Athen. 4.140c–141f.; Hodkinson (1983) 251–4, Kennell (1995) 130–31, Ducat (1999) 48. The famous cheese-thefts and ritualized whippings of the Hellenistic and Roman periods were apparently a later development, out of a more restrained form of corrective discipline observed by Xenophon and others; see below, n. 93.

detailed) 4th C. testimony of Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle, together with the scattered bits of archaeological and literary evidence from the 7th–5th C., present a familiar picture, quite compatible with that of other Greek communities of the same period—provided we do not insist on trying to incorporate too all the enthusiastic descriptions of Plutarch and the late lexicographers.⁸⁷ Boys at Sparta, as elsewhere, were organized into three age-groups: Xenophon calls them *paides*, *paidiskoi*, and *hēbōntes*.⁸⁸ Their training emphasized physical and musical activity; and opinions have differed (in antiquity, and among modern scholars) as to what level of reading and writing was included.⁸⁹ Upon becoming a *paidiskos* (i.e. age 12 or 13), a boy could be courted by a lover of the next age-group (i.e. 18–30); such courtship would normally lead in due course to acceptance into the same *syssition*, though full membership could not take place until the age of 20 (by which point the pair might have been associated for several years—and they might continue in that association for years longer.) Membership of a Spartan *syssition* was for life (unless one became unable to pay one's contributions, or was otherwise disgraced); each mess-hall comprised c. 12–20 members, of ages extending from 20 upwards.

Within the mess-halls (or “mess-tents”, *sysekēnia*), the Spartan men devoted their time to drinking, conversation (including question-and-answer drills, pointed jokes, and criticisms),⁹⁰ moralistic poetry, and courtship. (Presumably they spent much time out of doors too, devoted

⁸⁷ The pedantic age-divisions, with their pseudo-archaic “Lakonian” terminology, and the sadistic public whippings, for which the Spartan *agōgē* was famous in the days of Cicero, Plutarch, and Lucian, were for the most parts inventions of the 3rd and 2nd C. BC. Even the term *agōgē* itself for Spartan *paideia* is not attested before the 3rd C. The mythically unchanging Lykourgan system of Spartan “good-government” (*eunomia*) in fact needed intermittent buttressing and revamping; in particular, the reforms of the period after 146 BC were decisive in developing “traditional Sparta” into a major tourist-attraction: see Finley (1981) 161–77, Kennell (1995); also Rawson (1968), Tigerstedt (1969–74).

⁸⁸ These age-divisions seem to have been roughly 7–12 or 13, 13–19, 20–30; presumably the physical development of each boy was a factor. The term *hēbōntes* is found in Thucydides too (4. 132); but in the 6th C. the term *ko(u)ros* was also used by the Spartans (see n. 54 above, and Kennell (1995) 115–21, 138–41).

⁸⁹ See Plut. *Lyk.* 16, and P. A. Cartledge, *JHS* 98 (1978) 25–37, Harris (1989) 112–14, Ducat (1999) 46–7. On their study of music: Plut. *Lyk.* 18, 21, Athen. 14.632f.

⁹⁰ “Right from childhood, they practise short-talking (*brachylogein*); then mocking and being mocked (*skōptēin kai skōptesthai*),” Aristotle fr. 611.13 Rose; cf. Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 3.5, Plut. *Lyk.* 18–20.

to hunting, and to physical and military training, much of which was presumably conducted in larger formations. They were not allowed to engage in work of any kind.) The under-age "boys" (*paides*) and *paidiskoi* could attend (mainly as *erômenoi*?), but only to listen, not to speak or participate; rules governing length of hair, sexual conduct, eating, drinking, and musical activities, were strictly applied.⁹¹ As for the notorious *krypteia*, a harsh program in outdoors survival skills that also apparently served as a kind of paramilitary force for terrorizing the Helots,⁹² this too was a more extreme example of the usual adolescent initiation procedure (i.e., a period of hunting and endurance in the wild).⁹³ A small number out of all the youths would eventually be selected into the "Knights" (*hippeis*, 300 in all); the rest were expected to keep themselves fit and alert until one of those 300 should die or be disgraced, and thus open up a space for a replacement.⁹⁴ How many eventually attained to the status of Spartiate *homoioi* is unknown. Overall, the system thus combined the stages and rigors of a "rite of passage" with a recognizable "education" for military and social life as an adult; and it can legitimately be regarded both as a "state system" geared to the production of loyal soldiers and citizens, and as an intensely tight-knit process of elite self-selection.

Less austere and prolonged than the Spartan system, and thus perhaps a more typical example of Greek practice, was the Cretan institution of the "men's hall" (*andreion*).⁹⁵ Here, we are told, boys would first be selected as wine-servers (standing while the full members reclined); later, after a period of homosexual courtship and initiation in the company of an older partner in the countryside, they would return as "distinguished" (*kleinoi*) members of the *andreion* (and

⁹¹ Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 2–5, cf. Plut. *Lyk.* 12; Cartledge (1981a), Kennell (1995) 115–20. For the importance of wine (-serving and -drinking), and of standing or reclining, within these rites of institution, see p. 57, and Appendix p. 77.

⁹² The two functions should perhaps be distinguished; the test in survival skills was required of all who went through the age-group training; but the "policing" duties may have been restricted to a special squad: Lévy (1988).

⁹³ Jeanmaire (1939), Marrou (1956) 19–23, Schnapp (1997) 126–33, with further references. The requirement of constant hunger, theft and physical torment seem to have been much exaggerated in the Roman period, from an earlier process of occasional ritual deprivation: Kennell (1995), Ducat (1999).

⁹⁴ Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 4.1–7, Hodkinson (1983), Kennell (1995) 129, emphasizing the highly competitive nature of this process. On *hippeis* (doubling as hoplites and cavalry), see p. 54 below.

⁹⁵ For a fuller account, see Appendix below. Further Murray (1990), and for Roman analogies, J. D'Arms, A. Booth in Slater (1991).

would also get married in a mass ceremony). In this Cretan system (at least as described in the 4th C.), an extensive educational curriculum of reading, writing, music, dance, and athletics was provided in the early stages (sometimes involving inter-group contests and even mock-battles), with the focus subsequently shifting to military, sympotic, and erotic activities. Thus the resemblance to the *choroi* of Plato's "Cretan" city, or even to Sappho's group, seems to have been quite close.⁹⁶ Crete, of course, both was and was not a single community, or political unit: the island contained numerous separate cities and villages, which certainly did not all follow identical laws and customs; but it is also clear that the Dorian colonist-class that dominated the island—rather as the Spartiates dominated the indigenous Lakonian and Messenian Helots—assiduously preserved certain cultural and political continuities, as Plato, Aristotle, Ephoros, and others duly noted.⁹⁷ The "Cretan" educational system was indeed "public" in its concern for educating all or most of its citizens "at public expense" (*dēmosiāi*) and thus reinforcing their cultural solidarity and authority; but it was certainly not open to the majority of Cretans—one class of whom were specifically classified as "non-companions" (*apetairoi*).⁹⁸

As for the formal military training of citizens, in most Greek communities (apart from Sparta) this seems to have taken place during the years of late puberty or early adulthood (c. 18–20).⁹⁹ At an ear-

⁹⁶ For fuller discussion (and consideration of the possible continuities from Minoan Crete and Archaic Thera), see the references in Appendix, 74, n. 3, and pp. 76–7.

⁹⁷ On the history and social structure of Archaic Crete, see Willetts (1977), especially 154–90, and Saunders (1995) 158–61.

⁹⁸ Willetts (1977) 172–4, 184–5. The rest of the non-citizen inhabitants of Crete are referred to (e.g. in the 6th C. Law Code of Gortyn) as *do(u)loi*, a term which seems to include both indigenous Cretan "serfs" (similar to the Lakonian Helots or Thessalian *penestai*), and chattel-slaves. It was their labor that produced the "publicly-provided" (*dēmosiāi*) food and drink (and table-service) enjoyed in the citizens' *andreaia*; see Appendix, pp. 74–5.

⁹⁹ Our evidence comes entirely from the 5th C. and later (especially Ar. *Ath. Pol.* 42); cf. Pritchett (1974) 208–31, Cole (1984), Hanson (1989). After the initial late-adolescent training, further military training for adults probably occurred only during times of war (which were not infrequent, of course). Some kind of basic training in light-armed fighting (bow, sling, javelin, and light shield) was provided for those below hoplite status; cf. Plato *Laws* 834a, Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.16, 4.2.5, *Ages.* 1.25 (mentioning prizes for best performance as peltast, separate from hoplite prizes); and in some states (e.g. Thessaly) peltasts were more highly regarded for their military effectiveness and expertise than in Athens (Diod. 15.85.5); cf. J. G. P. Best, *Thracian peltasts* (Groningen, 1969). How much of this evidence applies to the Archaic period we can only guess.

lier age, aristocratic boys in many cases learned individually to ride, shoot, and hunt, techniques that would prepare them for service in the cavalry.¹⁰⁰ Choral dances and athletic contests also sometimes involved groups of boys in quasi-military formation-drills and exercises: in particular, youths' and men's choruses raced and/or danced in armor (notably the *pyrrhikos*).¹⁰¹ Some athletic events also were related to military activity, though none involved teams or formations.¹⁰² Adult hoplite training obviously required larger-scale teamwork than could be provided by one family or a small age-group. But in the earlier period, we have little idea how well-organized and systematic such military training was; nor do we know much about the precise methods of hoplite drill and specific war-training (apart from the quasi-military gymnastic and choral exercises, which are relatively well-documented).¹⁰³ In the 6th and 5th C., Spartan "good order, precision" (*eutaxia*) was universally recognized as superior, while other cities' hoplites were apparently much less controlled and well-practised.¹⁰⁴ Platoons of hoplites would usually be organized by tribe and village or deme, so that each soldier would know well many of the others around him in the ranks: these might include his own family and friends—a system that enhanced cohesiveness and loyalty, and increased the peer pressure not to be a coward.¹⁰⁵ Several

¹⁰⁰ The military role of cavalry, esp. in mainland Greece, diminished during the period c. 700–400 BC (though it grew again in subsequent years): Greenhalgh (1973); so most "knights" (*hippeis*) were also trained to fight as hoplites. But ceremonial displays of cavalry (in sculpture, painting, and real-life) were quite common even in 5th C. Athens: see Greenhalgh (1973), Bugh (1988).

¹⁰¹ Winkler (1990), Lonsdale (1993) 137–68; and cf. the Cretan *kourêtes* (above, p. 40).

¹⁰² I.e. javelin, discus, and the "heavy" events (not irrelevant to close-combat). Rowing-races, tribe vs tribe, are attested in the PanAthenaic Games, but not before the 4th C.: Kyle (1987).

¹⁰³ E.g. Plato *Laches* (*passim*, for armor-dance), *Rep.* 416d, 422b, 521d, 543b, *Laws* 829e, *Plut. Mor.* 639e, Lucian *Anacharsis*; see J. Jüthner, *Die athletische Leibesübungen der Griechen* (Vienna, 1965), E. K. Borthwick, *Hermes* 98 (1970) 318–31, Pritchett (1974) 209–21, Winkler (1990).

¹⁰⁴ "The Spartans are the only really skilled artists (*technitai*) of war" (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 13.5); likewise Aristotle asserts (*Pol.* 8.3.4.1338b) that before the 4th C. no other states except the Spartans trained their hoplites at all. On e.g. the Syrakousans' inexperience in hoplite training, see Thuc. 6.68–72; further Pritchett (1974) 208–31.

¹⁰⁵ Whitehead (1986), Hanson (1989) 121–5. But how much could be practised at the local level? Wearing heavy body-armor, hoplites had to learn to walk, run, turn and "shove" in close formation, thrust with the long spear, handle their shield so as to protect both themselves and the soldier next to their left, and above all hold their positions as they manoeuvred and fought in massed ranks. We are given no references to new recruits practising such manoeuvres on a large scale.

states developed a squadron of crack troops (sometimes cavalry, sometimes hoplites, it seems) who presumably received extra training: e.g. the Theban "Sacred Band" (Plut. *Mor.* 639f, *Pelop.* 18), the 300 Spartan *hippeis*, the 300 Athenian "chosen" (*logadês*) at Plataiai (Hdt. 9.21.3), the Argive 1000 (Diod. 12.75–80, cf. Thuc. 5.81.2).¹⁰⁶ It was apparently among these groups that loyalties and devotion to duty were most often enhanced by paired homoerotic associations, another example of the interconnections between pedagogy, erotics, and elite physical training.¹⁰⁷

Team-work and extensive practice were no less essential for trireme crews,¹⁰⁸ which became an increasingly vital part of the military in many *poleis* from the 6th C. onwards. The navy comprised mainly the poorer citizens, though the hoplites and metics would occasionally be required to row as well (e.g. Thuc. 3.16.1, 8.24). Building and maintaining the triremes, and training their crews, became a large-scale and meticulously regulated liturgical duty by the late 5th and 4th C.; this was yet another area in which a "public" training of citizens was subsidized and effected by the (in this case, compulsory) "private" generosity and expertise of the private individual. The discipline and technique of rowing were less glamorized than those of infantry battle, but nonetheless demanding: control of the oar and greased cushion, endurance and stamina, and responsiveness to the piper and captain, were all required. By the late 5th C., in the more democratic segments of society, this was regarded as one of the basic tests of a man's fitness to serve his city.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ Pritchett (1974) 221–4; the evidence for the Boiotian "300 chosen" (*epilektoi*, "charioteers and footmen" (*hêniochoi kai parabatai*) is less secure (Diod. 12.70.1).

¹⁰⁷ See Appendix p. 79 below (Ephoros), and e.g. Plut. *Pelop.* 18, Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 2; Marrou (1956) 36–8, Hanson (1989) 123–4.

¹⁰⁸ "Naval warfare is governed by art (*technê*), like any other skill, and does not allow itself to be practised just at odd times, as a side-line (*ek parergou*); in fact it leaves room for nothing else to be a side-line" (Thuc. 1.142.9); cf. Hdt. 6.12–16 (on the disastrous results at Lade of insufficient training). On the 5th C. (post-Themistoklean) Athenians' superior "experience" (*empeiria*), "precision and discipline" (*eutaxia*), "practice" (*meletê*), and "knowledge" (*epistêmê*) of naval warfare, cf. Hdt. 7.144.2, Thuc. 1.18.2, 31, 142.6–7, 2.84–89, Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.18, Plut. *Kimon* 11.2–3; further Pritchett (1974) 225–7.

¹⁰⁹ See Morrison (1969), Pritchett (1974) 227, and esp. Strauss (1996), on the democratically-oriented, lower-class political discourse of the fleet, as contrasted with the more "aristocratized" ideology of the hoplite (on which see Loraux (1986) 98–106, 161–3. Xenophon's Sokrates and Perikles even indignantly assert that naval discipline is stricter than that of the army: "Don't you see how disciplined (*eutaktōi*) the Athenians are in their navy, and with what good discipline too they obey

But it is far from clear at what age formal training as a hoplite took place, and how systematic or concentrated the adolescent period of military service usually was. In particular, it is impossible to determine how widespread was the system of formal "ephebic" training, as a preliminary to enlistment as hoplite. The programs about which we are best informed (the Spartan *krypteia*, Cretan *kleinoi*, and Athenian *ephêbeia*) had each evolved by the 4th C. into an elaborate combination of adolescent rite-of-passage with full-scale physical and military training; but it is uncertain whether these institutions, with their conspicuously "non-hoplite" features (archery, hunting, lack of body-armor, night-escapades, stealth, border-patrols, and other "liminal" activities), represent continuations of traditional Archaic (or even older—Indo-European?) practices, or whether some of them might be specific innovations of the 5th or even 4th C.¹¹⁰ The detailed evidence concerning the Athenian *ephêbeia*, with its border-garrisons, oath of loyalty, and designated officers (*didaskaloi* = "teachers," *sôphronistês* = "supervisor", *kosmêtês* = "keeper-of-order"), comes entirely from the 4th C. and later.¹¹¹ By the 3rd and 2nd C., it became little more than a prep-school for the wealthy (even including some non-Athenians), with gym and school-rooms.¹¹² Certainly at this late date, it was no longer expected of every male citizen that he should be prepared at short notice to fight in the hoplite ranks; war was less common, and was conducted increasingly by mercenaries. But in the 7th–5th C. things had been very different: the city's survival and prosperity depended on the citizen army and navy, and a man's

the judges in the athletic contests, and follow the instructions of the teachers (*didaskaloi*) in the choruses?" "Yes; and it's amazing that those kinds of men obey the orders (*peitharchein*) of their superiors, while the hoplites and cavalry, who are supposed to be the pick of the citizens for their good character (*kalokagathia*), are the most insubordinate (*apeithestatoi*) of all!" (Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.18–19).

¹¹⁰ See the references in n. 83 above. On the Athenian *ephêbeia*, Pélékidis (1962), Reinmuth (1952, 1971), Vidal-Naquet (1968), Schnapp (1997) 133–5 all support Archaic origins; contra, U. Wilamowitz, *Aristoteles und Athens* (Berlin 1893), Ruschenbusch (1979, 1981), Sinclair (1988) 55–61, Rhodes (1981) argue for 4th C. innovation or major reform (as in the case of the Spartan *agôgê*: see above, n. 87); see too Marrou (1956) 105–14.

¹¹¹ Aristotle *Ath. Pol.* 42 with Rhodes' comm., and Tod (1948) #204. Certainly some elements (such as naval training) are unlikely to have existed earlier than the 5th C.; and the suggestion (e.g., Ober in this volume, p. 203), that the extant inscriptions and descriptions reflect a new program instituted in response to the published educational treatises of Plato, Aristotle, and others, is attractive.

¹¹² Marrou (1956) 105–12.

reputation was intimately bound up with his courage and military record. The 4th C. Ephebic Oath included the words, "I shall not abandon my comrade-in-line (*parastatês*)". Likewise, in the 7th C. the Spartan poet Tyrtaios had stated,

A common (*xynon* = *koinon*) good for the city and all the people is this,
 When a man takes his stance and remains firm in the front ranks,
 Fearlessly, and has utterly no thought of shameful flight;
 . . . Standing-by (*parestôs*) the next man in line, he encourages him with words.

(Tyrtaios fr. 12.15–19 West)¹¹³

Although nothing as formal and systematic as the 4th C. and Hellenistic Athenian *ephêbeia* can have existed in the 7th or 6th C., the Ephebic Oath does thus seem to preserve the spirit, and perhaps something of the letter, of a highly traditional age-group training, conducted in the countryside and incorporating elements of an adolescent rite-of-passage, that was geared to the production of trusty and like-minded comrades-in-arms. In Athens, as in Sparta, Crete, and presumably many other Archaic Greek communities too, such "ephebic" and commensal training of the best young men, whether informally organized by families and "men's clubs", or (perhaps more likely) somehow required and administered by the representatives of the polis itself, in conjunction with those families and by means of those local "clubs", formed a vital element in the "common good for the city and all the people".

(c) "Club"—*symposion and hetaireia*

The "higher education" of the male members of the Archaic Greek elite seems largely to have been obtained at drinking-parties and dinners.¹¹⁴ As children, in grammar-school or at home, they had learned

¹¹³ The junior partner in Cretan homoerotic pairing was likewise termed a *parastatheis* (Ephoros; see Appendix, pp. 76, 79); and in addition to Tyrtaios (quoted here), the term is found also at Theognis 473 (in parodic-sympotic context), and e.g. Diod. 12.70.1 (above, n. 106). For the ways in which the democratic city adapted the sympotic language of the "trusty companion" (*pistos hetairos*) from Tyrtaios, Mimnermos, Theognis, and extended it to include a broader range of hoplite citizens, see Donlan (1980), Loraux (1986).

¹¹⁴ Reitzenstein (1893), Burnett (1983), 8–9, 31–2, 121–81 (esp. on Archilochos and Alkaios), Gentili (1988), Schmitt-Pantel (1990, 1992), Murray (1990), Schnapp (1997). Ancient testimony to the educational and evaluative functions of drinking is provided by Theognis 467–96, Plato *Laws* 1.645c–650b, 2.671a–674, Xen. *Lak.*

(mostly from slaves or low-class professionals) to read and write, to recite Homer and Hesiod, and to manage rudimentary skills of drawing, singing, geometry, and arithmetic. But it was among their adolescent and adult “comrades” or “buddies” (*hetairoi*),¹¹⁵ as they exercised during the daytime in the gymnasium (or on military duty), and later in the evening as they enjoyed a shared dinner,¹¹⁶ reclining around the mixing-bowl in a “men’s hall” (*andreion*) or dining room of a private house, that they learned the finer arts of sophisticated conversation, literary and musical analysis, eulogy, invective and personal ridicule, sexual seduction and resistance, and stylish self-presentation. A man’s sympotic companions, together with his extended family, were likely to form the nucleus of his life-long associates and political allies; often they might train and fight alongside one another in the hoplite phalanx too.¹¹⁷ Their shared knowledge, beliefs, and practices constituted their collective habitus as (self-styled) “fine and good men” (*kaloï kai agathoi*), and provided a half-private, half-public guarantee of their integrity and worth. Not surprisingly, in a democratic city such as Athens in the 5th and 4th C., this “clubby” education came to be regarded in some quarters with suspicion, as it often promoted favoritisms and a competitive pursuit of honor (*philotimia*) that were directly at odds with the democracy and its institutions—as the flamboyant names of the clubs often indicated (e.g. *Kakodaimonistai*, *Triballoi*, *Autolékynthoi*).¹¹⁸

Pol. 5. It is argued by some that the symposium, like athletics and the gymnasium, became more open to non-elite participation during the course of the 6th and 5th C., especially through the upwardly-mobile mechanisms of pederastic selection and virtual “adoption”: see (e.g.) Fisher (1998). But the prevailing tone certainly remained elitist.

¹¹⁵ On *hetairoi*, see Calhoun (1913) 4–9, Jeanmaire (1939) 97ff., C. Talamo, “Per le origini dell’eteria greca” *PP* 16 (1961) 297–303, H. J. Kakridis, *La notion de l’amitié et de l’hospitalité chez Homère* (Thessaloniki 1963), Benveniste (1969) (quoted below, p. 80), Calame (1997) 33–4. For the overlap between *hetairoi*, *synōmotai* (“oath-brothers, conspirators”) and other kinds of *philoï* and associates, see Jones (1999) 223–7, 285–6.

¹¹⁶ For discussion of the history and characteristics of the Greek “communal dinner” (*dais*), and of the relationship between this and the *eranos* and *symposion*, see Schmitt-Pantel (1992), and cf. Jones (1999) 223–7, 285–6. Many features of upper-class Greek dining and drinking customs appear to have been borrowed from Minoan and/or Near Eastern (first Hittite and/or Luwian; later Lydian and Persian) practice; see Burkert in Slater (1991) 7–24.

¹¹⁷ See above, pp. 53–4. Thus the *andreion* in any Greek community (not only the Spartan *phidition*) could be either a military or a social space—or both (“bar-racks” and “men’s club”).

¹¹⁸ Lysias fr. 53.2, Dem. 54.39, 54.14; see Calhoun (1913), Jones (1999) 223–7, and further Murray (1990) 3–13, Kurke (1999) 17–18, 182–6, for discussion of the

While choruses were usually involved in public performances of song and dance, and military mess-halls likewise formed part of the city's collective organization, these sympotic groups (which, like choruses, normally numbered between eight and twenty members) generally met in a private space, and had no civic functions to perform.¹¹⁹ In this context, members took turns (i.e. participated as "equals" in the sympotic *isonomia*) in performing solo songs, speeches, and other forms of entertainment, including various conversational and/or erotic interactions, as well as contributing to the elegant visual and stylistic ambience of the group. As with the choruses—and to an even greater degree—the topics of song and discussion tended to be self-referential and heavily normative: praise of one another and of the occasion; commentary on musical, poetical, and aesthetic questions; affirmation of shared values and aspirations; criticism and put-downs of rivals and enemies.¹²⁰ Although some sympotic "clubs" seem to have consisted entirely (like choruses) of age-mates, others included a greater mixture: adults and more experienced adolescents would take the lead, while the younger novices were expected to remain largely silent and modestly receptive of their elders' wisdom and erotic attentions.¹²¹ Ethical instruction could be expressed gnominically or parainetically and for the benefit of all, or one-to-one and with overtly pederastic dimensions.¹²² Thus, when Theognis instructs young

oligarchic (or anarchical) activities of some of the Athenian clubs. But there were also *polis*-organized *symposia*, that met in the *prytaneion* or other public buildings. At these, members apparently did not recline, but sat. See further Schmitt-Pantel (1992).

¹¹⁹ "All-male groups, aristocratic and egalitarian at the same time . . . , affirm their identity through ceremonialized drinking . . . The symposium has private, political, and cultural dimensions: . . . it guarantees the social control of the polis by the aristocrats." (Burkert (1991) 7, cf. Griffith (1995) 68–72). For fuller discussion of the relationship between sympotic-commensal spaces and the polis, see esp. Schmitt-Pantel (1990, 1992), Murray (1990), Gentili (1989), Kurke (1999).

¹²⁰ For the adversarial, evaluative, and competitive techniques of sympotic interaction, see Griffith (1990), Nagy (1990). The conduct of a symposium was conventionally analogized to that of a "ship at sea," steered by the symposiarch, under the control of Dionysos, and of a "city", whose *eunomia* ("good order") and *hêsychia* ("peaceful enjoyment of aristocratic leisure") depended on the avoidance of "storms" (*cheimôn*), "disruption" (*stasis*) and "disorderly violence" (*hybris*): thus ethics and politics formed an integral part of the sympotic code.

¹²¹ Likewise the Spartan *syssitia* (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 3, Plut. *Lyk.* 12.4, etc.). Theognis' Kynos (below) is not expected to reply to the "instructions" of his older lover-singer, merely to "learn"—and to "gratify" his friends.

¹²² For Theognis, Solon, and other sympotic moralists, the standard terms of address include *sophizesthai*, *didaskain*, *hypothesthai kt.*; see Jaeger (1946) 1.194–201, Nagy (1990), Murray (1990).

Kyros with political and erotic elegiacs, or Alkaios exhorts his comrades to share his anger or martial enthusiasm, the processes of inclusion and exclusion, self-definition of the group and its traditions, and institutionalizing of elite values and attitudes, are heavily and self-consciously pedagogical:

With good intent, I will instruct you (*hypothêsomai*), Kyros, of the things
That I myself learned from the best people, when I was a boy . . .
. . . Don't spend time with bad men; always stick with the best;
Drink and eat with those, sit with those,
And gratify (*handanê*) those, whose power is great.
For you will learn (*mathêseai*) good things from the good; but if you
mingle
With the bad, you will ruin even the mind you have.

(Theognis 27–36)

As these and similar snippets of verse circulated, with the older men either “impersonating” the traditional educators of the past (Hesiod, Archilochos, Theognis, Solon, Alkaios, Anakreon), or composing their own paraenetic speeches, stanzas, and couplets, their young companions absorbed lessons and models of behavior that were sometimes broadly panHellenic, sometimes specific and local, but in either case deeply traditional and replicable. Should we characterize this instruction as “private”, given its non-civic context? Or as fundamentally “public”, given the social prominence of the participants and the overtly political slant of the educational “program”? As we noted above, the distinction is sometimes drawn too cleanly between *syssition* and *hetaireia* by modern scholars: how much difference was there, in practice or in concept, between, on the one hand, the sympotic gatherings of Alkaios and Theognis, like-minded aristocrats and (would-be) city-leaders, whose “funding” and “administration” were carried out through private—but rigidly observed—modes of hospitality and personal generosity, and, on the other, the men’s halls of Sparta or Crete, where food (and presumably wine) were provided “at public expense” and the regulations governing behavior, training, and military obligation were ascribed to “Lykourgos” or “Thaletas”?¹²³

¹²³ We might even broaden our focus further, to include the activities of a tragic chorus, meeting daily with *chorêgos* and poet to rehearse its songs and dances, heroic conflicts and moral dilemmas, before appearing “in public” to perform their roles for the god and the community, and finally (if victorious) celebrating their victory with a grand goat-feast at the city’s (i.e. the *chorêgos*’) expense.

(d) *Cult or craft association*—thiasos, orgeônes

Many local cults and practical-professional activities were administered by more or less formally organized groups or “associations” (*koinônai*) of family-members, co-workers, fellow-demesmen, or friends. Such a group might be called a *thiasos* (“cultic-band”) or (especially in Athens) *orgeônes* (lit. “worshippers”); and these terms could be used to cover many different kinds of associations.¹²⁴ Most of these involved adults, whose activities were not especially “educational”. But in some cases the musical and/or instructional nature of these groups aligned them quite closely with the choruses, “clubs”, and commensal associations that we have been examining (and also with the philosophical “schools” that later established themselves in Athens and elsewhere). One further dimension should be recognized here: several of the *orgeônes* of Attika operated in quite remote villages, far from the mercantile and political center of Athens, and thus served quite different social needs from the civic cults and polis-focused activities of the urban center (*asty*); and such rural/urban differences added further imprecision to the notions of “public-civic” and “local-private”.¹²⁵

Elsewhere, the sects led by (e.g.) Pythagoras and Parmenides, and those devoted to the healing wisdom of Orphic books and practices, clearly operated in self-conscious separation from, even rejection of, the dominant polis-structures, and thus provided an alternative—but still legitimate—cultural outlet and habitus.¹²⁶ They thus anticipated in several respects Plato’s 4th C. Mouseion (founded in the Akademeia grove of the Muses), Aristotle’s Lykeion, and the Gardens of Theophrastos and Epikouros. With music, poetry, healing, spiritual salvation, or other peacefully-oriented rituals as their focus, such

¹²⁴ “Among other uses, the Greek word *thiasos* could denote a band of revelers, a cultic association, or, less specifically, any kind of group or association” (Jones (1999) 216–17). On *thiasoi* in general (both Archaic and Hellenistic), see P. Foucart, *Les associations religieuses chez les grecs* (Paris, 1873), E. Ziebarth, *Das griechische Vereinswesen* (Leipzig, 1896), Calame (1997) 208–14, S. D. Lambert, *The phratries of Attica* (Ann Arbor, 1993) 81–93, and Jones (1999) 216–20.

¹²⁵ Jones (1999) usefully emphasizes the geographical and cultural oppositions between urban democratic life, and the life-style and values of those in the more remote regions of Attika: the subtitle of his book is “The response to democracy.” Cf. too Hanson (1995).

¹²⁶ On Orphic sects, see West (1983), W. Burkert, *Ancient Mystery Cults* (Harvard, 1987), and above, p. 32; for Parmenides’s group, see Kingsley (1999). On “alternative religions”, see M. Detienne, *Dionysos Slain* (tr. M. & L. Muellner, Baltimore, 1979) 72ff., Burkert (1983) 276–304, and R. Edmonds, *Classical Antiquity* 18 (1999) 52–3.

groups sometimes acquired a tightly-knit and strongly pedagogical character—less formal perhaps than a civic-military *agôgê*, but more so than a sympotic *hetaireia*.¹²⁷ For women, especially, such associations may sometimes have provided the opportunity for musical and/or literary activity similar to that of the boys' schools or men's drinking clubs.¹²⁸

4. *The institutions of homophilia*

There are several other areas of Archaic Greek pedagogy that we could discuss, if space permitted: for example, athletics and musical instruction, both of which offer interesting and complex intersections of publicly and privately maintained instruction and performance. But I will consider here just one more vitally important "institution" that operated in conjunction with several of those we have already surveyed: that of homophilic pairing and pederasty.¹²⁹ The role(s) of homophilic relations in the education of Greek adolescents continues to be hotly debated in the modern era, as it was in antiquity.¹³⁰ We cannot here discuss these issues in detail; but a few words on the public dimensions of the institution may be helpful. For what is

¹²⁷ See especially Jones (1999) 249–67 on Athenian *orgeônes*, in relation to the founding of the philosophical "schools" in the 4th C.; cf. W. S. Ferguson, *Harvard Theological Review* 37 (1944) 61–140, and *Hesperia Supplement* 8 (1949) 130–63, Boyancé (1972). Following Lynch (1972) (but in opposition to Wilamowitz and many other scholars), Jones concludes that the philosophical schools of Plato, Aristotle, and others in the 4th C. were not termed, nor organized, as *thiasoi*, but began as fairly loose "associations" (*koinônai*) in private houses or gymnasia, before being assigned quasi-public spaces in the suburbs.

¹²⁸ See the illustrations of women reading and writing in Beck (1975), Immerwahr (1964, 1973). On the status of Sappho's group (*choros*, *hetaireia* or *thiasos*?), see above, p. 47 and n. 82.

¹²⁹ I will use the term "homophilia" to cover all forms of homosocial (same-sex) relationship and activity: pederasty, teacher-student crushes, student-teacher crushes, student-student crushes, partnerships and sex-acts between adults, erotically-tinged adult homosocial friendships, and intimate, but non-erotic homosocial friendships. By "pederasty", I mean the courtship of boys by older youths and adult males. This is not meant to imply that all of these are equivalent, or necessarily even closely similar: but they are related, and we have to start somewhere; see further Calame (1997), and (e.g.) Sedgwick (1985).

¹³⁰ Important contributions (since Marrou) to the study of the Greek material include: Calame ([1977] 1997, 1999), Dover (1978, 1989), Cartledge (1981a), Patzer (1984), Sergeant (1986), Foucault (1985), Reinsberg (1989), Halperin (1990), Winkler (1990), Cohen (1991), Stehle (1997), Schnapp (1997), Hubbard (1998). See too Sedgwick (1985) and Butler (1993).

remarkable about ancient Greek homophilia is not so much that homoerotic relations existed, but that for several centuries they came to be so overt, and so positively and strongly reinforced by an institutional framework and semi-official ideology of mutual educational benefit.

From the late 8th or early 7th C. onwards, conspicuously homoerotic images, texts, and courtship practices begin to proliferate, and to occupy the foreground of cultural production and ideology. A bisexual norm came to be quite widely accepted among both men and women, and the training and upbringing of young men and women was generally conducted within a more or less formally acknowledged framework of homophilic relations.¹³¹ At the same time, it is clear that there was considerable variation from one region to another,¹³² and perhaps from one social class to another too,¹³³ in the attitudes and institutions (military, athletic, sympotic, pedagogic) that were involved.

The origins of this set of practices are much debated,¹³⁴ as are their dynamics and social functions.¹³⁵ Their "educational" and mil-

¹³¹ It was still taken for granted, of course, that heterosexual marriage and legitimate child-rearing were the eventual goal of every man and woman of citizen status; all other sexual activity and significant "pairings" had to be compatible with (though not necessarily subordinated to) that goal.

¹³² Xenophon *Lak. Pol.* 2.12–14: "In some Greek states, such as Boiotia, men and boys live together like married couples, or they reach intimacy (*hōra*) by means of exchanges of favors (*charites*), as in Elis; but others completely forbid lovers from even talking with boys. Lykourgos, however, instituted a different policy [sc. at Sparta] from all the others . . ." [i.e. encouraging chaste homophilic pairings of younger and older males as the basis for "the best education" (*kallistē paideia*), but forbidding all physical acts of homoerotic sex]; cf. Xen. *Symp.* 8.34–5, Plato *Symp.* 182a–b (quoted below, p. 63). Xenophon adds (*Lak. Pol.* 2.14), "I am not surprised that some people don't believe this [about the Spartans]; for in many cities the laws/customs (*nomoi*) do not oppose the satisfying of pederastic desires".

¹³³ For the elitist tendencies, real or perceived, of many of these homophilic behaviors, see Dover (1978), Hubbard (1998).

¹³⁴ Strong arguments have been advanced for and against an old Indo-European and/or Dorian pederastic tradition (e.g., Bethe (1907), Bremmer (1980), Sergent (1986); contra, Dover (1978, 1989) 115–34; also for and against a continuation (via Crete and Thera) of Minoan practices (e.g., Säflund (1987), Koehl (1986), cf. Lembessis (1976); contra, Leitaο (1999). But most Classicists appear to regard the phenomenon as new, and quite specific to the conditions of 8th–6th C. Greece.

¹³⁵ Marrou (1956) 26–35 opts for military bonding; cf. Murray (1990) on *Männerbund*, commensality, and drinking-groups. On non-competitive male-male companionship, see Dover (1978); on female-female companionship, see Burnett (1983), Stehle (1997). Further proposed explanations include: population-control (R. Sallares, *The Ecology of the Ancient Greek World* (Ithaca, 1991) 2, W. A. Percy, *Pederasty and Pedagogy in Archaic*

itary benefits were eulogized by some, and scorned by others: most of the discussion centered then (as now) on the presence or absence of genital sex, and there was little disagreement about the benefits of close homophilic teacher-student and student-student relations, provided the appropriate limits were observed as to their physical expression. For our present purposes, the questions to be addressed concern their institutional character, and the extent to which they were publicly monitored and supported (or repressed). How large a segment of the population was involved in homoerotic relations, and how dominant, consistent, or coherent was the homophilic ideology that we find reflected in Archaic vase-painting, *kalos*-graffiti, and (certain forms of) literature? How strongly and univocally was this "visible" behavior approved by the general public? And in particular, how formal and official were the guidelines and/or requirements authorizing and regulating these same-sex pairings, and by what means (with or without the involvement of the city's official "administration") were they enforced?

Homosocial pairing and pederasty were far from stable and watertight categories or institutions; so much is clear. The highly-charged dynamics of these relationships, especially amidst the factionalism and competing class ideologies within the polis—and between rival poleis—often gave rise to differing interpretations of the "rules" of the game, or even (in the case of pederasty, however "pure" and desexualized it might claim to be) to outright repudiation of it. Thus, in Plato's *Symposium* (182a–b), Pausanias claims (not entirely credibly),

The law/custom (*nomos*) concerning love (*erôs*) in most cities is easy to understand: it is simply defined. But here and in Sparta it is complicated (*poikilos*). In Elis and Boiotia, and places where people aren't too clever with words, the law says simply that it is noble to gratify (*charizesthai*) lovers . . . But in Ionia and everywhere else where people live under Persian rule, it is considered (*nenomistai*) shameful. . . .¹³⁶

Greece (Urbana, 1996), following Aristotle *Pol.* 2.7.1271b); a (Freudian) reaction to Greek parenting, with absent fathers and over-attentive and resentful mothers producing narcissistic and "inverted" boys (P. Slater, *The Glory of Hera* (Harvard, 1968), T. McCary, *Childlike Achilles* (New York, 1982)).

¹³⁶ On the shifts in the configuration and representation of Greek sexual conduct and attitudes in general, see esp. Halperin (1990) 75–87, Winkler (1990), Cohen (1991). Plato's dialogues themselves, from the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*, to the *Laws*, seem to arrive at distinctly different conclusions concerning the propriety, and acceptable forms, of pederasty. Likewise, blanket statements about "Persian" attitudes may have been over-simplified (see e.g. Xen. *Ages.* 5.4–7).

It is hard to know how to interpret the word *nomos* here. Both Solon and Lykourgos were credited (probably anachronistically) with laws restricting pederastic sex,¹³⁷ but homophilic behavior and relationships were regulated more by custom and mechanisms of social approval and disapproval (prestige, shame) than by legal statute. (Likewise, there was presumably no “law” in Athens that men and women should get married to one another. Rather, it was an unwritten *custom* that this would happen; the laws merely regulated the ways in which an official citizen marriage might or might not take place, and the privileges (mainly in the area of citizenship, property-ownership, and inheritance) that might attach to it.) So, while homophilic courtship and attachments became “customary” in certain regions of Greece, only occasionally was statutory “law” introduced to regulate, restrict, or protect those involved.

The customs (or “rules” of the homosocial game) that prevailed during the Archaic period seem in fact to have been quite straightforward. Adult men—mostly young, i.e. under 30 or so, and primarily those of leisure and sophistication—would seek out attractive boys and court them. Boys were brought up to expect such courtship, and were taught how best to manage it; fathers took care that their *paidagôgoi* and school-teachers (as well as uncles and family friends) could be trusted to supervise the sexual, as well as the intellectual and athletic, progress of their sons (much as they had always guarded that of their daughters), and in some cities there were strong social and/or legal restrictions on the kinds of contacts that were permitted. A similar (though less broadly publicized) pattern seems to have existed on the female side, to judge from the evidence of Alkman and Sappho. From the educational angle, it became “customary” in many cities for a boy’s admission to the “men’s-hall” (*andreion*, *syssition*), or to a particular elite squadron of the military, to depend upon the sponsorship of an older youth (his “lover”: *erastês*, *philêtôr*), who was regarded, even formally designated, as that boy’s mentor and teacher. In adolescent choruses, too, it was common for intense homophilic attachments to be formed, usually between a younger

¹³⁷ Aeschin. 1.9–14; Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 2.10–14, Plut. *Lyk.* 16–17; see Cohen (1991) 176–82. In Athens, laws against “assault” (*hybris*, which appears to include both rape and seduction), pimping, and prostitution were occasionally invoked with regard to sex acts between males (as they more often were for male-female sex); Cohen (1991) 171–202, 218–40.

and older choreut; sometimes these relationships would continue as friendships into adult life. In general, it was "customary" for considerable aesthetic-social cachet and practical benefit to accrue to those who formed suitable erotic attachments, within the context of the symposion, gymnasion, or even the political arena.¹³⁸

These "customs" were strongly reinforced by peer approval and by a sophisticated "educational" ideology; but they probably did not constitute formal or written "laws"—though they might be attributed to "Lykourgos" or "Thaletas" or some other widely respected ancestral "law-giver". Nor was the precise sexual and emotional component of the homosocial pairing normally specified, though the behavior of the pair (including their overtly sexual conduct) was carefully monitored by the members of the group itself, and in some cases by the polis as whole. In so far as legal statutes were ever in fact invoked in reference to homophilic relationships, it was usually for negative purposes, i.e. to forbid a particular practice (such as access of older men to boys' schools and gymnasia; or the prostitution of citizen boys by their parents; or nudity and use of oil by slaves in the gymnasion). But the evidence (mainly Athenian, of course, given the nature of our sources) is scanty, and generally quite confusing: "The set of legal norms embodied in these statutes reflects a social order which encompassed a profound ambivalence and anxiety in regard to male-male sexuality; a social order which recognized the existence and persistence of such behavior but was deeply concerned about the dangers which it represented."¹³⁹

We are entitled, however, to interpret some of the ritual celebrations of homoerotic pairings that are found from the Archaic period as constituting a public affirmation and confirmation of these as normal, perhaps even required, components of official "rites of institution." Thus the homoerotic graffiti from 7th C. Thera, invoking the name of Apollo Delphinios, and the paired 7th–6th C. figurines and plaques from the sanctuary of Hermes and Aphrodite at Kato Syme (Mt Ida) in Crete, along with the poems of Sappho and Alkman,

¹³⁸ See Cartledge (1981a), Fisher (1998), Singor (1998).

¹³⁹ Cohen (1991) 181. In the case of other cities in the Archaic and early Classical periods, all too often we have to rely on the testimony of Athenians (Aristophanes, Xenophon, Plato, etc.), or other outsiders (notably Aristotle and Ephoros). The evidence of Alkman, Theognis, and Sappho (and of inscriptions) is thus especially valuable because it comes at first hand and from places other than Athens (Sparta, Megara, Lesbos, and e.g. Thera, respectively).

confirm the central role played by homophilic relations within adolescent choral and initiatory ritual.¹⁴⁰ By the 4th C. and later, the polis regularly appointed officials to supervise the training and moral well-being of ephebes and youthful athletes (*sôphronistai*, *kosmêtai*, *paidonomoi*, etc.);¹⁴¹ and we may take these officials (like many others at this period of polis-administration) as representing an extended and formalized version of a function shared in the Archaic period between individual families and the senior members or leaders of the groups in question (*syssitia*, *choroi*, etc.). Monitoring and controlling sexual behavior necessarily formed a crucial component of Greek pedagogy; and characteristically it was managed through a combination of private and public agencies working in combination, and through the hallowed powers of "custom" and public opinion.

5. Conclusion: pedagogy, schools and the polis

With these various age-groups and public/private institutions of education in mind, let us finally turn to a brief consideration of the earliest Greek "schools." It is hard to determine when the first paid teachers in Greece began to offer instruction in letters, music, and physical training, and how these early schools functioned.¹⁴² The archaeological evidence is scanty, especially since a teacher did not necessarily occupy a special building of his own: letters, arithmetic, and geometry could be taught in any room large enough to contain benches for the students; and music (*kitharistikê*) and physical training (*gymnastikê*) could be practised in any gymnasium or palaistra, or anywhere that choruses normally trained.¹⁴³ But by the late 6th C.

¹⁴⁰ For Thera: *JG* XII.3 536–47, with the commentary of F. Hiller von Gaertringen, together with Graf (1979) on Apollo Delphinios. For the Kato Syme finds (bronze plaques and figurines), see Lembessis (1976), Koehl (1986), Stewart (1998) 27–9, 34–7; for Alkman and Sappho, see Burnett (1983) 209–28, Calame (1997).

¹⁴¹ *Ar. Ath. Pol.* 42, Plato *Laws* 746c–766c, etc.

¹⁴² Grasberger (1864), Ziebart (1914), Marrou (1956) 39–40, Delorme (1960) 3–92, Beck (1964, 1975), Harvey (1966), Cole (1984), Immerwahr (1965, 1973), Harris (1989) 15–17, 56–62, 96–102. Because so much of the evidence comes from vase-painting, the picture is inevitably skewed in favor of Athens.

¹⁴³ Indeed, Greek has no regular word for "school" at this period: students are said to go "to the teacher's" (*eis didaskalou*), "to the writing-teacher's" (*eis grammatis-tou*), "to the music-teacher's" (*eis kitharistou*), or "to the trainer's" (*eis paidotribou*), or else to the palaistra or gymnasium: e.g., *Ar. Clouds* 964, 973; *Xen. Lak. Pol.* 2–3, Plato *Prot.* 325e–326b. See above, n. 80, on the *chorêgeion*.

at least, some recognized schools did exist; and by the end of the 5th C. they were quite widespread, at least in urban communities.¹⁴⁴ In smaller towns and villages, schools must have been (at best) quite rudimentary, and the *grammatistês* and *kitharistês* may often have been the same individual; likewise, by no means every community boasted a separate *gymnasion* or *palaistra* before the 4th or 3rd C.¹⁴⁵

In general, an elementary schooling in "letters" (*grammata*) was regarded as a useful basic skill, but far from the ticket to social advancement that it was in many Near Eastern societies, where the daunting cuneiform script and elaborate scribal training set the literate few decisively apart from the rest. The Greek alphabet was far easier to acquire, and correspondingly carried relatively little prestige: among the upper classes, oral and physical performance were still much more important. By the 4th C., it is clear that a regular school sequence of letters first, then music and gymnastics, was in place; it is not clear whether this was already the case in earlier periods.¹⁴⁶ A few educational theorists of the 4th C. (notably Plato, *Laws* Book 7) proposed that the city should subsidize schooling for all citizens; but there is no credible evidence that such legislation was ever passed anywhere. Apparently the Spartan and Cretan *syssitia* offered basic schooling as part of the all-round training; but elsewhere teachers continued to charge fees directly to the parents of their students. By either arrangement, probably only a small pro-

¹⁴⁴ The chief relevant texts are: Hdt. 6.27.1, Thuc. 7.29, Ar. *Clouds* 961–1100, *Knights* 987–96, 1238–9, Plato *Prot.* 325e–326b, *Charmides* 159c, Xenophon *Lak. Pol.* 2.1, Isokrates *Antid.* 267. From c. 500 BC, visual representations of school scenes begin to appear (mainly on Athenian Red Figure vases), and these grow increasingly common during the 5th C; they are collected by Beck (1964) 320–46, (1975) nos. 349–373, Immerwahr (1964, 1973). A remarkably high proportion of these illustrations show women reading; sometimes these are labelled "Muses" or "Sappho", but sometimes they appear to represent contemporary wives, daughters, and mothers, or hetairai. See Cole (1981), Harris (1989) 106–8. Never are women represented reading and writing with a professional teacher, as boys often are.

¹⁴⁵ Delorme (1960). Harris (1989) 15–17 presents a low assessment of levels of literacy and schooling, esp. among the rural populations of Greece in the Classical and Hellenistic periods, challenging the more optimistic picture of Marrou (1956), Nieddu (1982), and others. For the low social status of school-teachers, see Harris (1989) 98, 135–6.

¹⁴⁶ The chief relevant texts: Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 2.1, Plato *Prot.* 325e2–326b7, *Laws* 7.809e–810b, Aristotle *Pol.* 7.1386b35ff., 8.1337b21ff. (who adds drawing (*graphikê*), which presumably included geometry, architecture, etc.); see further Marrou (1956) 116–17, 142–4, Booth (1985), focusing on the early 5th C. Berlin kulix by Douris (*ARV* 431.48) and *SIG* 3.578.8–20 (3rd C.).

portion of the citizens' children spent more than 2–3 years in formal school. Many boys presumably ended their schooling at or before puberty, and went to work in the fields or as apprentices in their designated crafts. But at least the relatively widespread instruction in elementary *grammata* to the youngest students enabled a good number of future citizens to acquire a basic, practical level of literacy, while leaving optional the leisured skills of song, dance, and the other arts of *mousikê*.¹⁴⁷ The Athenian 4th C. *ephêbeia* offered a more enlightened policy, for the several hundred upper-class students (not all Athenian) who attended; and in the Hellenistic period, wealthy philanthropists sometimes subsidized teachers for their local communities, in much the same way that Roman benefactors built libraries and patronized the arts. But it is unclear how widely available such subsidized schooling was even then.¹⁴⁸ In the Archaic and early Classical period, the proper way for a wealthy benefactor (or tyrant) to demonstrate his generosity, taste, and sense of civic responsibility was through producing a chorus or maintaining a gymnasium, not promoting basic literacy.

Relative and absolute numbers for school attendance and literacy are in fact almost completely lacking. The only two figures that are recorded from the whole of the 6th or 5th C. curiously both involve incidents from the 490s in which children were killed by the collapse of their school-building: 119 out of 120 boys died in a school in the capital city of Chios "as they were being taught letters" (Hdt. 6.27.1), and 60 on the small island of Astypalaia were killed by an enraged Olympic boxer (Pausanias 6.9.6–7). These numbers are surprisingly large, and neither is above suspicion;¹⁴⁹ but they are perhaps less extraordinary (and more believable) if they represent a

¹⁴⁷ For the restriction of paid schooling to mainly the wealthy (and urban) elite, even in the 4th C., see Dover (1968) lx–lxii, citing [Lysias] 20.11, Demosthenes 18.265, Plato *Prot.* 318d–e, 325e–327, [Theages] 121d–122e, Xen. *Mem.* 2.2.6, *Lak. Pol.* 2–3, and Harris (1989). It was the sophists that were primarily responsible for introducing the concern for correct verbal expression and style (*Hellenismos*, *orthotês onomatôn*, etc.) into the school curriculum: previously these had been topics of verbal contestation in the symposium and elsewhere; see Ford in this volume.

¹⁴⁸ *SIG* 3.578 (Polythrous, in 3rd C. BC Teos); cf. Ziebart (1914) 54–9, Marrou (1956) 102–7, 112–15, 144, Harris (1989) 96–102. Little or no credibility can be attached to the stories concerning legislation for public education by Solon (Plut. *Solon*) or Charondas of Katana (Diod. Sic. 12.12.4, 13.3–4).

¹⁴⁹ See Harris (1989) 57–8 on these numbers and on population.

"primary school" (= *grammatistês*), which children from even relatively impecunious families could attend for a year or two.¹⁵⁰

The cases of Sparta and Crete are especially difficult to assess: both had reputations for ignoring or belittling literacy and higher education, in favor of more traditional (musical and military) training. Yet certainly some members of the Spartiate upper crust were literate and articulate (even if they might prefer often to emphasize their "Laconic" and "simple-minded" upbringing, as a contrast to Ionian and Athenian hyper-sophistication);¹⁵¹ and likewise, Cretan communities are found to employ inscriptions quite freely, and appear in this respect no less literate than other areas of mainland Greece.¹⁵²

There is no evidence for girls attending schools to learn letters or music, though domestic scenes of women reading and playing musical instruments are popular in 5th C. Athenian art, and a certain number of elite women clearly did attain a high level of literary and musical accomplishment.¹⁵³ In some cases, performance in choral and

¹⁵⁰ Yet it is hard to see how 120 boys could effectively be taught letters at the same time under one roof, given the normal class-size attested in other contexts, and the usual practice of close attention from teacher to individual student. Perhaps several different teachers could have operated in separate rooms; but such a degree of central organization seems unlikely: smaller classrooms in local regions of the city were the normal pattern. Or were the 120 children members of choruses, for whom "learning letters" was a part of their musical training? Later in the 5th C., in describing the sack of the small Boiotian town of Mykalessos (413 BC), Thucydides remarks (7.29) "[The Thracians] broke into a boys' school (*didaskaleion paidôn*), the largest in the place, into which the boys had just entered, and killed all of them (*pantas*)." The passage tells us little about the actual number of students (at least a dozen? perhaps many more); but it does imply that this relatively small town had several schools.

¹⁵¹ So Aristotle fr. 611.13 Rose, Plut. *Lyk.* 16.10, *Mor.* 237a. Two tendentious comments from the 4th C. about Spartan illiteracy are often quoted: "To the Spartans, it is fine (*kalon*) for children not to learn music and letters (*môsika kai grammatia*); but for the Ionians it is disgraceful not to know all these" (*Dissoi Logoi* 90 2. 10 DK); "The Spartans are so far behind our common culture that they do not even learn to read and write" (Isokr. *Panath.* 209; cf. 250–51). For differing assessments of Spartan literacy, contrast Cartledge (1978, 1981), T. A. Boring, *Literacy in Ancient Sparta* (Leiden 1979) [both positive], with Harris (1989) 112–14 [negative]; Kennell (1995) 125–6 takes a middle position; see too Ducat (1999). For discussion of Athenian literacy (which was clearly more extensive than most other parts of Greece), see Harvey (1966), Hedrick (1994), Sickinger (1999).

¹⁵² Apart from Sparta, for the period before the 4th C. the literary and iconographical evidence concerning literacy outside Athens is almost non-existent: for the surviving epigraphical evidence, see Jeffery & Johnston (1990).

¹⁵³ On female literacy and education, see Harvey (1966), Immerwahr (1964, 1973), Beck (1975), Cole (1981), Harris (1989). In Attic tragedy, Phaidra can write (Eur.

cultic age-groups must have contributed to this; in others, instruction and practice took place within the home.¹⁵⁴ Plato's recommendation of full inclusion of girls in the educational system (*Laos*) was eccentric, presumably inspired by Sparta's example of girls' choruses and female athletic training in the *gymnasion* and *palaistra*. Here again, however, we face the recurrent difficulty of distinguishing between domestic and choral contexts for learning on the one hand, and a formal "school" program on the other. "Teachers" there certainly were for girls who wanted to read and write: but about "schools" we can only guess.

As for "higher education" in music, poetry, and literature in general, this too was largely left to the private domain (school and symposium), though selection to serve in a chorus gave many citizens and future citizens opportunities to sing and dance under the supervision of an expert teacher, as we have seen.¹⁵⁵ On an individual level, knowledge of Homer, Hesiod, and the other great poets of the past never ceased to be a fundamental requirement of Hellenic culture, and these texts were memorized and studied—and increasingly, by those who could afford it, read in school—as paradigms to be cited, invoked, and emulated on all manner of occasions. By the mid-5th C., challengers to the poets had emerged, as new sources and types of wisdom and verbal display (religion, philosophy, medicine; and above all, eristics and rhetoric) were added to the old. The performance of poetry (like athletics) became more specialized, and claims to verbal-musical expertise became more fiercely contested: thus the field of gentlemanly performance (like that of athletic competition) became narrower and less rewarding, save for a few full-time practitioners. Spectatorship and criticism began to take the place of performance.¹⁵⁶ The verbal and political arts taught pri-

Hippolytos), but Iphigeneia apparently cannot (Eur. *IT* 584–5; cf. too Klytaimestra at *IA* 115–23, 891).

¹⁵⁴ For such illustrations, see Immerwahr (1964, 1973), Beck (1975) nos. 349–372. On Sappho's "circle" or *thiasos*, see above, p. 47. Xenophon's *Oikonomikos* represents a wealthy husband home-schooling his young wife.

¹⁵⁵ Above, pp. 43–7; Calame (1997), Wilson (2000).

¹⁵⁶ Aristotle indeed ingeniously and decisively redefines political "activity" (or "performance", *praxis*) so as to include private, leisured discussion among friends and the practice of philosophy: "The active life (*praktikos bios*) is the best life both for the whole state collectively and for each man individually; but the active life is not necessarily active in relation to other men (*pros heterous*), as some people think, nor are only those processes of thought active that are pursued for the sake of the objects that result from action; but far more those speculations and thoughts that have

vately by the sophists and their successors provided distinctive new attributes (to those with the leisure and means to study them) for entering a prestigious field of competition (assemblies, law-courts, council-chambers—or leisured discussion in private) which to a large degree took the place of athletics and music. By the mid-5th C., amateur solo performances of music, dance, and poetry were losing their luster as an index of personal brilliance, sophistication, and moral integrity (though they still had a place in certain sympotic settings); instead, it was increasingly the spoken word that was employed to demonstrate “musical” talent, in the organization of narrative and argumentative structures, skillful modulation of diction, word-order, and tropes, and expressive command of posture, gesture, and physical delivery.¹⁵⁷

As we look back over the range of educational institutions that we have surveyed, we may make some general observations about their effectiveness in preparing citizens for public life. For most adult male citizens of the Archaic period, membership in a polis, and participation—to varying degrees and in different fashions—in the civic affairs of their community (war, assemblies, cult activity and festival performances; perhaps legislation too), loomed large in their collective consciousness and individual self-image: these multiple activities defined what it meant to be an “Athenian”, or “Cretan” or “Milesian”. And on the one hand we can certainly say that, in so far as both choral and military training were effectively required (whether by statute, or by custom, or by peer-pressure) of all members of the propertied classes, a “political” education of a kind was provided “at public expense” (*dēmosiai*), i.e. by and for the community at large. For, although the costs (stipends for trainers, chorus-teachers, etc.; purchase of equipment, food, decorations, etc., and maintenance of spaces) were borne largely by the participants’ families themselves, and/or by wealthier patrons (*chorēgoi*) assigned by lot or choice, these

their end in themselves and are pursued for their own sake . . .” (*Pol.* 7.3.1325b15ff.); and further, “In order to decide questions of justice and in order to distribute the offices according to merit, it is necessary for the citizens to know each others’ personal characters (*gnōrizein allēlous poioi tines eisi*)” (*Pol.* 7.4.1326b16ff.); cf. too *Pol.* 7.8.1339b11ff., and the central role assigned to “friendship” (*philia*) in Aristotle’s ethics (*NE* Book 7). The ideal citizen is thus effectively restored to the mentality and activity of Theognis’ symposiast (see above, p. 59), discoursing with his like-minded peers; see further Nightingale, in this volume.

¹⁵⁷ Gleason (1994).

trainings in combination comprised a form of "civic education" for all those that were privileged enough to be included.

It is on that basis that law-givers and sages such as Thaletas, Lykourgos, and Solon were credited by later generations with having made systematic attempts to design and maintain whole educational programs for the youth of their respective cities—though it is unlikely, as we have seen, that anything so formal or coherent was attempted at such a date. Even when formal institutions of education were put in place, they were generally applicable only to a small proportion of the population, and were enforced through mechanisms that were still largely private and self-regulating.¹⁵⁸ Athletic competition, sympotic commensality, musical-religious cult practice—all these we have seen to be concerned as much with the solidarity and representative status of the group, as with the individual achievement of this or that performer. The training of a young man or woman, to excel among his or her peers and thereby win prestige for self, family, group, and community, was generally both a "civic" (and sometimes pan-Hellenic) and also a fiercely private—undertaking.

Nowhere, however, were legal, constitutional, judicial, and other political duties formally taught to the citizens, young or old. Only military training was obligatory and guaranteed (and even here, as we noted, the Spartans seem to have been exceptional in their consistent attention to the training of hoplites). Even basic literacy was treated as a private affair. On the other hand, attendance and participation in a wide variety of cults and activities, both within the local community (*deme*, village), and in the polis at large, were required for full membership in the citizen body, and even more so for positions of leadership and responsibility. Thus, as Ober observes in this volume,¹⁵⁹ the "schooling" of democratic citizens in the political processes and values of their community was left to be acquired through observation and practice, not formal instruction or study.

¹⁵⁸ Most scholars these days regard "Lykourgos" and his *rhētrai* as largely fictitious; likewise Thaletas: but most would agree that the institutions of age-group choruses, mess-halls, pederasty, and military training were firmly in place in Sparta and parts of Crete by the late 6th C., whether or not formal laws had ever been passed that brought them into existence or (more likely) consolidated what had been there before; see above, pp. 48–53 on the Spartan and Cretan *gysistia*, and Appendix. As for Solon, it is impossible to determine how much of the moral, social, and sumptuary legislation attributed to him was authentic; and here again, the distinction between "law" and "custom" may not be hard and fast.

¹⁵⁹ Below, p. 186; see also e.g. Strauss (1996).

That is not to deny the educational value of e.g. the Athenian dramatic competitions, with their scenes of debate and moral evaluation, or of the rhapsodic and choral performances presented at festivals all over Greece, commemorating (and critiquing) traditional myths and paradigmatic achievements. But the "art" of contributing to, or managing, a city's affairs (*politikê technê*) was never formally propounded as a field of study in itself until the mid-5th C., with the arrival of the sophists—whose emphasis, in any case, was generally on individual and transferable skills, and on powers of leadership, rather than adherence to common goals and sharing of communal resources. Previously, these skills had been imparted less self-consciously, but perhaps no less comprehensively, through the interlocking, half-private, half-public educational "systems", of commensal and choral comradeship, athletic and military achievement, homophilic pairing, and musical-verbal-gymnastic style, which served both to test, and to narrow down, the field of would-be political performers, and at the same time to prepare them for the contests and rewards of "public" life.

Archaic pedagogy was oriented, consistently and systematically, towards the production of a self-chosen, yet publicly affirmed and acclaimed, elite group, who were to be conceived and institutionalized as symbolic "equals" (*homoioi*), and whose shared values and interests must be shown (by any ideological means necessary—and often despite the economic and political realities) to coincide perfectly with those of the polis as a whole. The work of reassuring all parties, therefore, rich and poor alike, that the brilliant achievements and style of the elite not only entitled them to the rewards of prestige and power, but also benefited the whole community and therefore deserved its unstinting admiration and approval—this work lay at the heart of Archaic Greek pedagogy. Athletic and musical fluency, bodily deportment, and elegance of speech, i.e. all those visible and audible hallmarks of "excellence, brilliance" (*aretê, lamprotês*) and "style, charm" (*eukosmia, euexia, charis*) that were most characteristic of Greek *paideia*, were subjected to the scrutiny both of the elite themselves, within their own intense system of competition and evaluation, and of the whole community, in the festivals, contests, and other public performances—including war—that served to select and define the worthiest representatives of the body politic. It was a matter of the highest concern that the city should be led by those best qualified to lead: and it was to this end that the citizens directed their *paidagôgia*.

APPENDIX

EPHOROS ON CRETAN PEDAGOGY

The remarkable and much-discussed account of Cretan customs provided by the 4th C. historian Ephoros¹ has often been dismissed either as being wholly unreliable, or else as referring to a relatively late and merely local phenomenon.² But, as several scholars have noted in recent years, many details in the account do mesh curiously well with some of the archaeological evidence from much earlier periods;³ and the description in general, in its corroboration and supplementation of the scattered remarks of Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle on Cretan and Spartan pedagogy, is intrinsically of great interest and potential value as evidence for Archaic and Classical practice. This is the only continuous and detailed description that survives of a traditional age-group pedagogical system in operation (Ephoros remarks that it is already on its way out in his day); and whether or not we are prepared to believe that significant elements of Minoan ritual and pedagogy could have been continuously maintained for over a thousand years—and accurately noted by Ephoros—the phenomena described in the text represent such a typical (if somewhat exaggerated) model of Archaic Greek systems of education that they merit full quotation and analysis.

Ephoros begins by explaining that the Cretans have designed their society in such a way as to minimize competitiveness, luxury, and inequality, and to promote “fellow-feeling . . . among equals (*homonoia* . . . *pros tous homoious*, 16)”. Then he continues:

(16) So they tell the boys to join what they call “herds” (*agelai*), and tell the adults (*teleioi*) to have all their meals in the common mess-halls (*syssitia*), which they call “men’s-rooms” (*andreia*), so that the poor will enjoy the same fare as the rich, all being fed at public expense (*dēmosiai*). And in order to make sure that courage and manliness prevail in them from childhood on, and not weakness and cowardice, they raise them together in military training and toil (*hoplois kai ponois*) . . . They train them in archery and “armor-dancing”, which they say the Kourêtes first showed them, and then later Pyrrhichos taught them the so-called ‘Pyrrhic’ dance, so that not even their entertainment should be lacking in military usefulness. . . . Likewise they employ the very strenuous “Cretic” rhythms in their songs which Thaletas invented (and they ascribe the paians

¹ *FGrHist* 70 F 149, supplied by Strabo 10.4.16–22.

² E.g. Dover (1978) 189–90, “It would be prudent to treat it as a special local development irrelevant to the problem of the origins of the homosexual ethos”.

³ See Bremmer (1980), Koehl (1986), Säflund (1987), Stewart (1998), all investigating possible Minoan survivals. Earlier, see too Bethe (1907) and Hiller von Gaertringen (1912), with regard to the epigraphical evidence of pederasty on Archaic Thera (above, p. 66, n. 140); also Saunders (1995) on *Ar. Pol.* 2.10.1271b20ff.

and other local songs and many other customs to him);⁴ they also wear military clothing and footwear, and the most highly valued gifts to them are weapons . . . [Ephoros goes on to discuss (in chs. 17–19) whether these and the following customs are originally Cretan or Spartan, since there are strong resemblances between them: he concludes that the Cretan institutions probably came first—partly because the shared term “*Hippeis*” (“Horsemen”) properly belongs in Crete, but not in Sparta, and the original term for “mess-halls” has been preserved in Crete (*andreon* = “men’s quarters”), but changed in Sparta (*gysition*).]⁵

(20) The most important of the Cretan customs are the following: all of those who are selected at the same time out of the “herd” (*agelē*) of boys are required to get married together; but their young brides are not brought to them at once, but only when they are properly prepared to manage the household: their dowries, if they have brothers, are one half of the brother’s inheritance. Boys learn reading and writing (*grammata*) and the traditional songs and various kinds of music. When they are still quite young, they bring the boys into the mess-halls; there they sit on the floor and spend their time together wearing cheap little cloaks, summer and winter alike, and waiting on each other and on the men; the members of the same mess-hall sometimes enter into fights with each other, or with other mess-halls. Each mess-hall has a supervisor (*paidonomos*) in charge of the boys. When the boys get older, they are introduced into the “herds”; the leaders of the herds are the most distinguished and powerful of the boys, each one gathering together as many to lead as he can manage: usually the “officer” (*archōn*) of each herd is the father of that leader, and he has the authority (*kyrios*) to take them hunting or running, and to punish anyone who is disobedient. They are all supported at public expense (*dēmosiāi*). On certain specified days, one herd fights against another, to a rhythmical accompaniment from pipe and lyre, just as in war; and they deliver blows both with their bare hands and with iron weapons.

(21) They have a peculiar custom in regard to love affairs, for they win the objects of their love (*tous erōmenous*) not by persuasion but by abduction (*harpagēi*). Three or four days beforehand, the lover (*erastēs*) tells the friends of the boy that he is going to make the abduction; but for the friends to conceal the boy, or not allow him to go forth on the appointed road, is utterly shameful, as if they were acknowledging that the boy was unworthy of such a lover. When

⁴ Ephoros claims that Lykourgos, the Spartan law-giver, spent time with Thales/Thaletas (it is not clear which he means) and learned from him how Minos and Rhadamanthos had acquired their laws from Zeus; then travelled to Egypt to study their customs, and even met with Homer in Chios, before returning home to Sparta to dispense his new laws—making a show of “consulting the oracle at Delphi and bringing instructions from there, just as Minos had brought his from the cave of Zeus. That is why most of the Spartan customs are similar to the Cretan ones.” Obviously the story in itself is untrustworthy; and other sources distinguish between Thales (the Milesian sage of the 6th C.) and Thaletas, the 7th C. Cretan music-teacher who visited Sparta—but this version brings home the similarity of function that is imagined between such disparate figures as Minos, Lykourgos, Thales, and the Cretan Zeus as “law-givers” (i.e., dispensers of wisdom and ritual practice) for their respective communities.

⁵ Some scholars, emphasizing the shared Dorian heritage of Sparta and much of Archaic Crete, have argued for a specifically Dorian origin to these pederastic initiation rites: notably K. O. Müller, *Die Dorer* (2nd ed., Breslau, 1844) 289–98, Bethe (1907), Patzer (1984). Others (above, n. 134) have seen a continuation or revival of Minoan and/or Mykenian practices.

they meet, if the abductor is the boy's equal or superior in rank and other respects, the friends pursue and grab hold of him only in a perfunctory way, just to satisfy tradition, and then they cheerfully hand him over to be taken. But if the abductor is unworthy, they take the boy away from him. The end of the pursuit comes when the boy is taken into the men's-house (*andreion*) of the lover. A desirable boy (*erasmios*) is regarded as being, not the one who is exceptionally handsome, but the one who is exceptionally masculine and brave (*andreiai*) and well-behaved. The abductor gives the boy presents, and then takes him away to any place in the countryside that he wants; and those who are present at the abduction follow along after them. After feasting and hunting together for two months (it is not allowed to keep the boy any longer than that) they return to the city. The boy is released, taking with him as gifts a military outfit, and an ox, and a drinking-cup (these are the gifts required by law) and many other expensive presents too, so that the friends make contributions of their own to help cover the cost. The boy then sacrifices the ox to Zeus, and provides a feast for those who travelled with him. Then he makes known his opinion about his time spent with his lover, whether he has any complaints or not (since the law gives him the opportunity, if violence was employed during the abduction, to get revenge and rid himself of the lover). For boys who are good-looking and of distinguished ancestry, it is shameful not to obtain a lover, for people assume it is because of their character. Those who have been abducted are called "stand-by's" (*parastathentes*), and they receive high honors: for they occupy the most prestigious places in the chorus-dances and running-races, and they are allowed to dress up differently from everyone else in the clothing given them by their lovers. And not only then, but even when they are full-grown (*teleioi*) they wear distinctive clothing, from which each one can be recognized as having been "glorious"—for they call the beloved one "glorious" (*kleinos*), and the lover "friend" (*philêtôr*). So much for their customs about love.

Clearly many of the details in this account are open to question, both for Ephoros' own time and as a possible relic of Minoan practices 1000 years before his time. However traditional-minded and remote from the mainstream Archaic Crete may have been (and "Crete" cannot safely be regarded as a single cultural entity),⁶ some of the practices described (e.g. reading and writing) are likely to have undergone considerable changes between the 7th and 4th C. (e.g., the teaching of reading and writing; the particular musical modes and dances), just as those of Sparta, Athens, and other communities did. Furthermore, the similarities between the Cretan "herds" and those of Sparta, and between the Cretan officials and those of the Classical Athenian *ephebeia*, could as easily argue for Ephoros' conscious or unconscious assimilation of them to his imagined Cretan model as for a true continuity and universality of Archaic Greek practice. But before we reject too hastily the "traditional" character of the whole account, and insist that this is merely a retrojection from the 4th C.,⁷ we should note, first,

⁶ See above, pp. 51–2, and Saunders (1995) 158–61.

⁷ So, e.g., Dover (1978), Bremmer (1980), Patzer (1984), Sargent (1986); as comparable examples of such "archaizing", the 4th C. revisions to the Athenian *ephebeia* (above p. 55, n. 110) and to the Spartan *agôgê* (above, pp. 48–54) should certainly give us pause. But even sceptical historians have generally conceded that some kind

that several of the features of this account do appear to find corroboration from much earlier (and distinctively Cretan—or Theran) material, some of it dating back to the Bronze Age;⁸ and furthermore—and for our present purposes this is the main point—we should acknowledge that in their own terms, bizarre though some of the details are, the social and pedagogical processes that are described fit broadly into a familiar pattern of adolescent rites-of-institution, a pattern that we have seen to be entirely characteristic of “publicly organized” elite Greek male (and female) *homêlikia* and *syssitia/hetaireiai* of the Archaic and Classical periods. The account therefore deserves to be taken seriously, and to be analysed for what it can tell us about the organization, especially the educational goals and methods, of early Cretan and/or early Greek society.

The youth of the community are organized into age-groups, separated by gender. We are told little about the girls; but what we are told is significant, and consistent with other accounts of Archaic Greek practices:⁹ they are selected for betrothal at a young age,¹⁰ but do not go to live with their husbands until several years later, when they are “ready” (*hikanai*). Even then, their husbands spend little time in the family dwelling, and usually eat and sleep with the other men, as in the Spartan system.¹¹ Since all the boys and girls of the prescribed age are “married” at the same time, marriage is thus precisely a “coming-of-age.” The boys, while still “quite young” (*neôterous*), are admitted to the male mess-halls, but not yet as full members: they wear different clothes (simple cloaks), sit on the floor, and “serve” (*diakonousi*) food to the men.¹² They also undertake (at an unspecified age) strenuous physical training that combines song, dance, running, and military exercise (including archery), performed in a distinctive “warlike” costume. Boys are then selected to join a particular age-group, at which point they may temporarily leave the normal domestic setting and become “semi-wild.”¹³ There is (as we noted earlier) the familiar contradiction here,

of ephebic and commensal age-group rituals and training were in place at Athens and Sparta before the 4th C.; e.g. Rhodes (1981) 493–95, Jones (1999) 140–1, 188–9, Finley (1981), Kennell (1995).

⁸ This is not the place to explore these in the detail they deserve; see above, n. 134.

⁹ See above, pp. 43–7, Jeanmaire (1939), Brelich (1969), Sourvinou-Inwood (1988), Calame (1997).

¹⁰ The Gortyn Law Code (6th C., from central Crete) specifies 12 years as the earliest for girls to marry; cf. Willetts (1977) 174–6.

¹¹ The “sleeping-quarters” (*koimêterion*, cf. Dosiadas *FGrHist* 458 F 2 = Athen. 4.143B, Heraclides *FGrHist* 312) seem to serve both as guest-house for visitors, and as dormitory for male members of the community; cf. Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 1, Plut. *Lyk.* 15.

¹² This presumably includes pouring wine for the seated/reclining symposiasts; cf. Ganymedes and Homer’s *kouroi* (above, p. 39); also Minoan and Hittite practice.

¹³ For some of the technical terms employed of “herd-members”, according to Hesychios and other grammarians, see Calame (1997). The Gortyn Code uses the term *dromeus* (“runner”); cf. Plato *Laws* 666e (where restrictions on drinking-age are also stipulated). Before admission into the *agelê*, a boy is *skotios* (“in the dark” [sc. of the women’s quarters], or *apagelos*).

between the impetus to include *all* boys as “equals”, and the process of distinction and *selection*, whereby the more powerful boys “lead” only those they choose;¹⁴ likewise the herds are expected to share common activities (including eating and drinking, dancing, and “fighting” as teams), and eventually to rejoin the community as its collective warriors and citizens. In the meantime, close comradely ties are formed within their own small group, in competition with other groups: personal hierarchies, dependencies, rivalries, and “comradeships” (*hetaireiai*) are thus developed that may persist into adult life.¹⁵

The next phase, pederastic rape and courtship, is often taken out of context by modern scholars and explored for what it has to say about “Greek attitudes to homosexuality”, even though it is presented by Ephoros as just one phase within a larger process. Ephoros himself is clearly uneasy about some of the implications of the institution, and takes pains to reassure his readers that the pederastic relationship is based primarily on virtue (“manliness” and “order”), not sex—an anxiety that crops up in many of our other sources about Spartan and Athenian pederasty too.¹⁶ Such ambivalence is characteristic of institutions of this kind in many societies around the world: for not only do adolescent rites of passage frequently involve cross-dressing and gender-experimentation of various kinds (some of which are supposed to be kept secret),¹⁷ but also it is common for erotic attachments within particular homosocial groups to be quite apparent even to an external observer, yet vigorously denied by the participants themselves and their community.¹⁸ In Crete, as in other regions of Greece in the Archaic period, the ritualized pederastic courtship is geared to occupy a specific phase of adolescence and early adulthood, and to prepare the participants for full membership of the community, as warriors, husbands, and future heads of households. It also appears to be predominantly an elite practice: for, even though the “public expense” (*demosiai*, Strabo 10.4.16) and leveling of “rich and poorer” (*euporoi kai penesteroi*, 16), imply a democratic impulse to produce “equals” (*homoioi*, cf. Ar. *Pol.* 2.10.1272a), the selectivity of the “leaders” and “friends,” ostentatious gift-giving (clothing, armor, an ox), and strong pressure for the “best-looking and most powerful” to win extra honor and status, all contribute to the exclusive character of the institution within the larger community. These *homoioi*, like others so des-

¹⁴ See Calame (1997) on the role of the *chorêgos*, and Hodkinson (1983) (and pp. 48–51 above) on the selection-process of the Spartan *agôgê*.

¹⁵ See Cartledge (1981a); and Murray (1990) on *hetaireia* and *symposion*; also pp. 56–9 above. The supervisory role of the designated older man (the father of the “most distinguished” herd-member) also may play an important role in maintaining elite hierarchies, as in the Athenian *chorêgia*: Wilson (2000) 71–86.

¹⁶ Both Plato (in the *Symposium* and *Charmides*) and Xenophon (in *Lak. Pol.* and *Agésilaios*) focus intensively on this topic; likewise Marrou himself (1956), and even more so Patzer (1984).

¹⁷ Bremmer (1980), Leitaio (1995).

¹⁸ Cohen (1991), Sedgwick (1985) 1–5, Tiger (1984).

ignated elsewhere, are indeed supposed to share food and drink (and gift-giving) with one another on equal terms; but they are nonetheless clearly distinguished as *kleinoi* from the majority of the population, and the friends who "share the cost" (21 *syneranizein*) of the ox and other gifts fit exactly into the familiar pattern of elite *hetaireia*. An *andreion* that was "publicly" subsidized (*dêmosiai*) in the 4th C., would probably have operated in earlier centuries by means of shared/collective contributions by its own members.¹⁹

At the psycho-social level, such a rite of passage performs the function of separating boys from their mothers and families, placing them temporarily in a liminal state, training them in masculine activities and bodily hexis, and subjecting them to arduous humiliations and/or trials (serving at table; military drill and athletics; "rape" victimization; hunting in the wilds), before finally bestowing upon them special gifts and favors and returning them to their community in a newly elevated status—as "famous men" and "comrades-in-line".²⁰ Transition through the different stages is marked by designated spaces, clothing, and diet, and by the awarding of badges/gifts, animal sacrifice, and the application of special names and titles.²¹ One function of the temporary gender inversions characteristic of the "liminal phase" is to reduce boys temporarily to a servile or "feminine" state—a state clearly differentiated from "childhood"—and to make them undergo a virtual "death" (loss of their previous identity), in order for them subsequently to achieve all the more forcefully (and demonstrate publicly) their "(re-)birth" as true men.²² The further question, whether or not this ritual death and rebirth may also mirror the cycle of the seasons and crops, and/or of a dying god (and priestly or royal representative) whose miraculous resurrection brings salvation to the fortunate celebrants, cannot be pursued further here.²³

The "educational" and social value of such a program is obvious: in addition to specific training in song, dance, athletics, military activity, and

¹⁹ See above, p. 49. On the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of Greek mess-halls and rites of institution in general, see pp. 50–4; also Schnapp (1997), and Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.15, with Ducat (1999) 48. For ambiguity over "public" vs "private" subsidizing of commensal associations, see too Jones (1999) 221–27.

²⁰ *kleinos* . . . *parastathês*. The Dioskouroi were known (especially at Sparta) as the *parastatai*; and the Ephebic Oath at Athens stated: *oude leipsô ton parastatên*, "I will never abandon my comrade-in-line"; cf. Soph. *Ant.* 671/666, and Tyrtaios fr. 12.19 (quoted above, p. 56, with n. 113).

²¹ See above p. 42; and Van Gennep (1960), Schnapp (1997), Leitao (1995). At Thebes, the lover was supposed to give his chosen beloved a suit of armor (Plut. *Amat.* 930). (Ephoros curiously makes no mention of hair-style, which did in fact play a conspicuous role in many Minoan rituals and at Sparta; see Koehl (1986), E. David, in Cartledge, Millett & Von Reden (1998).)

²² See Leitao (1995). One common initiatory formula enunciated, "I left behind the ill, I found the better!" (*ephygon kakon heuron ameionon*).

²³ The "dying" Cretan Zeus Kourês certainly suggests this (above, p. 40); cf. too the Parthenesia at Sparta, and Mystery cults of Demeter and Dionysos in Athens and elsewhere.

hunting (all key components of masculine performance),²⁴ the boys develop social skills of subordination and leadership, loyalty and rivalry, acceptance and selectivity, self-advertisement and modesty. The older youths have to assess both their own capacities, and the most appropriate recipient of their attention, in order to determine at what level to pitch their abduction (how handsome, how powerful a boy are they “worthy” of? how fine should the gifts be? which friends can best be trusted to aid him in the endeavor, and to prepare his intended mate for the ordeal?). The younger boys likewise need to learn how highly to assess their own desirability (sexual, economic, social), how resistant and critical to be of their lover’s advances, how to make sure that their abduction is seen as an index both of their looks and of their virtue—for one without the other is worthless. The outcome (ideally, and ideologically) is a community of men whose shared experience and interests, shared modes of self-presentation and performance, and shared standards of evaluation and reward, guarantee their future loyalty and recognition of one another as “comrades” and “equals”—even as they have also developed smaller and tighter networks of friendship and reliance, rivalry and rank, gratitude and duty, that will stay with them in their later years as elite citizens, soldiers, and leaders.

Above all, the initiates are validated, recognized, and enfranchised (some perhaps more fully than others): they *belong*, and have proven that they have subjected themselves to the rule(s) of the community and of each other. They know how to behave as men—while those who have not been admitted to the herds and the men’s-hall, and have not been selected as “stand-bys”, are thereby disqualified from the fullest degree of membership in the community. Their acceptance of this disqualification depends, of course, upon their willingness to recognize the legitimacy of the criteria by which the “famous ones” were picked, and the genuineness of their “manliness” and “orderliness”, 21 *andreia kai kosmiotês*). That is what institutions of elite education are for: the acquisition of a special language, clothes and other mystified badges of distinction, and a set of physical and social skills that will entitle their possessors to the prizes of membership and leadership. And although Ephoros does not here employ the term, the process that he describes exactly defines what is elsewhere called *hetaireia*,²⁵ a process that “implies at one and the same time a distinction from all the rest, a focus on oneself and effort to separate oneself from everyone that is not ‘one’s own’ (**swe*-), and yet also, within the select circle that is thus formed, a tight bond with all those who make up that circle.”²⁶

²⁴ Feminine performance too, *mutatis mutandis*: see above, p. 47, on Sappho’s Lesbos and female choruses and athletics at Sparta (and in Plato’s *Laws*); Brelich (1969), Calame (1997), Stehle (1997), Stewart (1998).

²⁵ “*Hetairias: kalousi de tautas andreia*” (Athen. 4.143B = Dosiadas *FGrHist* 458 F 2).

²⁶ Benveniste (1969) l. 332. *hetairos* (like Homeric *etês*) is derived from I-E **swe*-, from which comes also Latin *sodalis*—as well as *suus, idios* (“what is restricted to oneself, not available to others”) and *êthos* (“one’s distinctive sphere or mode of activity”): Benveniste (1969) l. 330–3. See further above, p. 57, with n. 115.

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SOPHISTS WITHOUT RHETORIC: THE ARTS OF SPEECH IN FIFTH-CENTURY ATHENS

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The sophists tend to dominate our picture of fifth-century education, but the 'revolution' they set in motion depended on other, more widespread and fundamental changes in Greek *paideia* through the fifth century. Among these were a general increase of formal schooling among non-artisanal classes and a basic transformation by which the teaching of reading and writing was first introduced into and eventually came to dominate the traditional *mousikê* and *gymnastikê*.¹ The innumerable anonymous teachers who prepared the sophists' students have left the least trace in the material record in proportion to their importance: schoolrooms are hard to identify in archaeological contexts; pre-Hellenistic educational texts only survive in the minutest fragments; school-scenes on vases are difficult to read in themselves and a perilous basis for generalization. If in this chapter I fall back on the sophists yet again, it is in the hope that by bearing down on a single specific question the evidence leaves open—what precisely did sophists teach their students?—we may in developing an answer also sketch the outlines of the missing larger picture.

Although the sophists are the most vividly remembered of fifth-century educators, our evidence for them is also unsatisfactory: we have a fair amount of Gorgias' *ipsissima verba*, but only a few sentences from Protagoras and virtually nothing from Prodicus and Hippias (to name only the best known individuals). Complementing this is an abundance of difficult indirect testimony: Plato is a pre-eminent source, since his lengthy impersonations of these figures put "the sophists" on the map of intellectual history; but Plato's determination to portray them as antitypes to Socratic philosophy makes him as unreliable as he is indispensable. Cross-checking these sources with contemporary witnesses such as Aristophanes and Euripides only

¹ Marrou (1965) Ch. 5; Beck (1964) 71–5. Important recent discussions are Robb (1994), Morgan (1999); cf. Woodbury (1976).

brings in another set of delicately nuanced texts that contain dramatic distortions and popular stereotypes. In spite of these difficulties, a basically stable idea of what sophists were and did has prevailed among scholars since H. Gomperz' *Sophistik und Rhetorik* identified the core of their interests with rhetoric and relativism. This view gives us the sophists as they are portrayed in Plato—selling arts of persuasion along with anti-idealist philosophies that suited the needs of democratic societies.² The same general picture is also assumed by anti-Platonic champions of the sophists, who accept relativism but redefine it as the liberation of thinking from oppressive metaphysics and who embrace the priority of rhetoric to philosophy as the only possible basis on which to conduct truly free and open debate.³

Notwithstanding the broad acceptance of this picture, some of its main lines fit incongruously with the evidence: the sophists are supposed to have been democratic in their willingness to challenge hierarchy and tradition in the name of the individual and the “here and now”; but it is not clear that they were any more critical than, say, Xenophanes; and some recent philosophical analyses have found “relativism” unhelpful in characterizing sophistic thought.⁴ Again, their teaching of rhetoric is held to have broadened the paths to political influence; yet only the leisured and wealthy could have afforded to follow their courses, and these itinerant wise men were by no means reluctant to visit Sparta or Thessaly. Even at Athens and at the time of their greatest influence, the really active political persuaders, the “demagogues” of Aristophanes and Thucydides, were not typically the products of sophistic or any higher education and in fact showed contempt for intellectuals.⁵ Stressing rhetoric as a

² E.g. Guthrie (1969) 44, 50–1, Kennedy (1963) 26–7, Kerferd (1981) 78; cf. 68–9.

³ The numerous recent re-interpretations of the sophists can be canvassed through the bibliographies of Schiappa (1991), (1999) and Jarratt (1991) 1–25, both of whom have an uncommon familiarity with rhetoric-and-communications scholarship.

⁴ E.g. Richard Bett, “The Sophists and Relativism” *Phronesis* 34 (1989) 139–69 and Gisela Striker, “Methods of Sophistry,” in *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics* (Cambridge and New York, 1996) 3–21. More generally, Wallace (1998) stresses how un-exceptional the sophists may appear when we cease to view them from an Athenocentric perspective.

⁵ Reported fees of 10,000 minae are doubtless fantastic, but there is no doubt that their education was very expensive: see most recently W. T. Loomis, *Wages, Welfare Costs, and Inflation in Classical Athens* (Ann Arbor 1998) 62–3 with Marrou (1965) 71–2. For demagogues as anti-intellectuals (e.g. Thucydides 3.37.3–4), see Wallace (1998) 218–9, Blank (1988) 14–5 with Connor (1971) 95 and 163–8.

common preoccupation of the sophists, then, is at the least an oversimplification.⁶ Nowadays their main aim is more generally described as preparing their students to excel in civic life, what Plato's Protagoras agrees to call "the political art."⁷

This paper seeks to understand the sophists not as philosophers—whether pre-, anti-, or post-Platonic—but as educators. In particular, I want to ask what exactly it was that the sophists were teaching when they taught. What did they communicate to their students that was felt to be worth so much? My attempt to press our evidence for such information is provoked by two recent studies of ancient rhetoric which claim the sophists never taught "rhetoric" and indeed never conceived of an *art* of persuasion (*technê rhêtorikê*) based solely on linguistic techniques. In different ways, Edward Schiappa and Thomas Cole have argued that rhetoric only became a fully independent and definable *technê* in the fourth century (when the word *rhêtorikê* is first attested). This occurred especially under the impetus of Plato for whom *rhêtorikê* named a fatally flawed alternative to his philosophical dialectic.⁸ This is clearly a bold revision of a subject that always seems to be being revised, and I do not expect to settle a matter that has only begun to be debated.⁹ I shall, however, adduce some considerations concerning the roles of both the sophists and the status of the arts in classical Athens which make the rhetorically centered view hard to believe. Taking the sophists as rhetoricians and relativists may give us consistent thinkers and an orderly (if suspiciously Hegelian) progression of philosophic ideas, but at the price of creating figures who are incredible from a social and cultural point of view. I shall argue that, though many sophists were keenly interested in the nature and power of *logos*, there were strong

⁶ As Gomperz (1912) 282–4 naturally acknowledged; the breadth of their interests is stressed by Kerferd (1981) 1–2 and throughout, and G. E. R. Lloyd, *The Revolutions of Wisdom* (Berkeley, 1987) 92–3 with n. 152.

⁷ *Prot.* 319A (discussed below). So Marrou (1965) 83–7. Jaeger (1961) Vol. 1, p. 293 already defined, against Gomperz, "political *aretê*" as the sophists' main objective.

⁸ Cole (1991a), developing Cherniss and Havelock; Schiappa (1990), (1999) comes to compatible positions from other, especially lexical considerations. Yunis (1998) appreciates the implications of Cole's view, but suggests a greater role for Thucydides in the development of rhetoric, as does, more strongly, June Allison, *Word and Concept in Thucydides* (Atlanta, 1997).

⁹ Pendrick (1998) reasserts the Platonic view against Schiappa; Usher (1999) 1–5 with n. 3 against Cole.

reasons for them not to set up as teachers of an art of verbal manipulation. Whatever Aristophanes or Plato may imply, sophists would have been foolish to advertise a persuasive skill divorced from knowledge and moral authority. In place of rhetoric as the defining feature of sophistry, I shall pursue Marrou's presentation of sophistry as "higher," liberal education. They were "graduate professors" above all, and their recondite, often paradoxical performances had the effect of enabling their students to speak on equal terms with the master and with each another well before, and for some instead of, addressing an assembly or, if it had to come to that, a jury. The modern analogy is intended to be suggestive, but my hope of a plausible reconstruction lies in keeping a steady eye on the particular needs of the sophists' clients and on the pressures they felt in democratic Athens.

My argument is structured according to the different kinds of evidence we are forced to use. I shall first draw attention to the social obstacles to professing any *art* of persuasion in the democracy. This will lead me to consider the self presentation of two influential and relatively well preserved sophists: neither in Gorgias' extant writings nor in the traces of Protagoras' words do we find a solid basis on which to ascribe to them an art of speech. This negative picture will then be complemented by a look at the few extant examples of Protagorean *orthoepeia*. These instances of applied linguistic criticism are very hard to understand as elements of a serious rhetorical program, but they can be fit in to a sophistic education in poetry that prepared one for cultivated and noble leisure. This differential approach to their instruction as "higher" education will finally be fleshed out with an attempt to discern the benefits of advanced literary study by reading the parodic scene of sophistic teaching in *Clouds*.

Sophists and the Arts

Marrou portrayed the advent of sophistry as fundamentally a structural change: allowing that many sophists propounded influential and unsettling ideas, he identified their most profound innovation as establishing, on the model of the rising medical schools, a new level of advanced study for students after they had passed from the hands of the *kitharistai* and *grammatistai*. In line with what Too describes as his "systemic" approach to the history of education, he pronounced

their revolution “technical rather than political,” an improvement in the way young Greek men of means were equipped with the skills for success—*aretê*—in their cities.¹⁰ This analysis leaves out the substance of what sophists taught, but it does remind us that in interpreting them we should try to make sense of their relations to contemporary education and culture before placing them in an intellectual history culminating in Plato and Aristotle. The question as to whether an art of speech figured in the sophists’ training thus requires attentive sorting of Platonic and pre-Platonic evidence.

Proponents of the view that Plato first conceptualized rhetoric as a systematic art point out that the word *rhêtorikê* is first attested in his *Gorgias*. There Gorgias offers “the speakers’ art” in response to Socrates’ demand that he identify “what sort of art” he practices (449a5). Whether or not we may infer from this that Plato actually coined the term, it is suggestive that the word is at first used in the fourth century, and chiefly in Platonic circles: earlier ways of referring to excellent speakers seem to support the thesis that the idea of “speaking well” was not usually spoken of as an “art” (*technê*) in the fifth century.¹¹ Before 400, excellence in speaking was most commonly called *eu legein* (Gomperz’ subtitle was *Das Bildungsideal des EY ΛΕΓΕΙΝ in seinem Verhältnis zur Philosophie des V. Jahrhunderts*). As Fournier points out in his survey of Greek words for “speaking,” this phrase was used with notable breadth, implying speaking good sense along with propriety—in short, making a good speech.¹² In the last third of the fifth century *eu legein* comes to be used for “plausible” or “fancy” speaking at the expense of right and justice, and Aristophanes and Thucydides begin to condemn specious orators. This must reflect the influence of the sophists, which reached its peak in Athens at

¹⁰ Marrou (1965) 83–5 (quotation from p. 85); for sophists stepping in to remedy the inadequacy of the old education to produce leaders (*Meno*, *Laches* 178–84), see J. K. Davies, *Democracy and Classical Greece* (Cambridge, MA, 1978) 100. Cf. Too, “Introduction” on Marrou’s focus on “systemic” changes in his larger conception of Hellenic education.

¹¹ Platonic coinage: Schiappa (1999) 70, (1991) 41–8, 207–13, citing *Gorgias* 449a; Cole (1991a) 2, more cautiously at 98–9, 121. The phrase τὴν λεγομένην ῥητορικὴν at 448d9 does not seem to me a decisive objection to this possibility: there it is used by Socrates in inferring “from what Polus has said” (perhaps originally in his treatise referred to at 462c) that he practices “the so-called art of speeches.”

¹² Fournier (1946) 69–71 well compares the positive connotations of the late archaic “fair speech” (*kala legein*, e.g. *Theognis* 1047, *Soph. Tr.* 290).

this time.¹³ But none of these passages specifically indicates there is an *art* to speaking well, even among those who are singled out as “formidably powerful speakers” (*deinos legein*).¹⁴ The closest we come to a reference to arts of speech is in the sophistically inspired *Dissoi logoi* around the end of the century: “the man who has mastered the arts of speeches” (ὁ τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων ἐπιστατεῖται) will know how to speak “correctly” (*orthōs*) on every matter. It is hard to know what the author has in view with these *technai*: are they the model-speeches known as *technai*, or arts (plural?) of rhetoric, or simply general skills in arguing?¹⁵

Of course, the lack of a word would not have made a sophist hesitate to proclaim an “art” of rhetoric. Whenever *rhêtorikê* was coined, it can be urged, democratic Athens had no need to wait for Plato to interest itself in a form of rhetoric *avant la lettre*. But here the revisionary argument makes an important point about the nature and scope of early sophistic writings. Pfeiffer held that “books came into common use in the fifth century, especially as a medium for sophistic writings,”¹⁶ but there is very little evidence that such writings took the form of rhetorical treatises as we know them from the fourth century. In an important challenge to the usual view, Cole has followed the testimony of Aristotle (a collector of rhetorical *technai*) that early sophistic *technai* contained little in the way of theory and were nothing more than model-speeches handed out for students to memorize and then adapt in their own speeches. Examples of such *technai* are the *Tetralogies* of Antiphon of Rhamnus, Gorgias’ *Helen* and *Palamedes*, the *Dissoi logoi*, along with such trifles as the “Stronger” and “Weaker” *logoi* Aristophanes says are kept in Socrates’ school (*Clouds* 112) and the Lysianic *erotikos logos* represented in the *Phaedrus*.¹⁷

¹³ Fournier (1946) 73–4 cites Thucydides’ Nicias as the first instance (7.48.3): ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις εὖ λέγων διάβαλλοι. Cf. Eur. *Antiope* Fr. 206 quoted below.

¹⁴ For *deinos legein*, not in Aeschylus or Herodotus but in Sophocles *OT* 545, Eur. *Medea* 580, etc., see Fournier (1946) 72.

¹⁵ *Dissoi logoi* 8.3 (which should be read for “Hdt. 8.3” at Fournier p. 71). Cf. T. M. Robinson, “A Sophist on Omniscience, Polymathy and Omnicompetence: Δ. Α. 8.1–13,” *ICS* 2 (1977) 125–35, esp. 129–30. For fourth-century references to *tekhnê logôn*, see Guthrie (1969) 44 n. 4.

¹⁶ Pfeiffer (1968) 17; cf. 31–2 for their “exaggerated respect for the written word.”

¹⁷ Cole (1991a) 75–6, 83, 92. Aristotle *Soph. el.* 33.183b29ff. (= A V 6 Radermacher; cf. 82 B 14 DK) ascribes such texts to Gorgias; Cicero, drawing perhaps on Aristotle’s *Technôn sunagôgê*, adds Protagoras and Antiphon of Rhamnus (*Brutus* 12.46–8 = A V 9 Radermacher; cf. 80 B 6 DK). Kennedy (1963) 52–4 recognized the existence of such exemplary texts, but supposed that sophists from the time of Tisias and

As for the lost *technai* of Corax and Tisias in which rhetoric as a discipline is said to have been founded, the evidence is so thin, late, and contradictory as to oppose no barrier to assuming that their arguments from probability circulated in model speeches as well.¹⁸ The attempt to assemble the elements of rhetoric through synoptic treatises has every appearance of being a fourth-century phenomenon and part and parcel of its construction as a systematic art.

It remains possible to believe that other masters of eloquence wrote rhetorical treatises which have not been preserved, though Cole at the very least vastly reduces the number of places where one might look for them.¹⁹ One may also suppose that theory and precept were supplied in the many lectures and question-and-answer sessions on which sophists and all public intellectuals had to rely.²⁰ But I believe that such defenses take too little account of the fact that Plato's construction of a specific group of *sophistai* bent on studying techniques of persuasion in utter indifference to philosophical truth does not really fit the fifth-century explosion of "professional wise men" (a main pre-Platonic meaning of *sophistai*) who traveled from city to city to lecture on and in some cases teach such topics as astronomy, history, natural philosophy, music, the history of literature, military tactics, household management, and mathematics. Neither rhetoric nor relativism figures in what is possibly the first pejorative use of the word *sophistês* (Aristophanes' *Clouds* 331) where it covers a wide range of social parasites: political "prophets," lecturers and writers on medicine, practitioners of the "new" music, and snooty connoisseurs of art (σφραγιδονυχαργοκομήτας).²¹ Even among the sub-set of *sophistai*

Corax also produced handbooks containing rules and theoretical expositions. Similarly, Kerferd (1981) 28–33, 35–6.

¹⁸ See Cole's (1991b) doxographic analysis (arguing, among other points, that Corax, "Crow," was a nickname for Tisias); cf. Shciappa (1991) 49–53.

¹⁹ Kennedy (1994) 25 holds out for at least Thrasyarchus' *Art of Rhetoric* (Suidas A 1 DK) as a treatise; Usher (1991) 2 n. 3 adds Euvenus and possibly Lycimnius. A cautionary parallel against crediting doxographic ascriptions of *technai* to such figures is the vain search once conducted for Isocrates' presumed *technê*, on which see K. Barwick, "Das Problem der Isokratischen Technê," *Phil.* 107 (1963) 43–60.

²⁰ As Morgan (1999) 60 n. 49 notes with Guthrie (1969) 41–4. See esp. Robb (1999) 197ff. and 214, who stresses the continuing importance of oral instruction and of personal *sunousia* into the fourth century.

²¹ For early usage of *sophistês*, see G. B. Kerferd, "The Image of the Wise Man in Greece in the Period Before Plato," in *Images of Man in Ancient and Medieval Thought*, ed. F. Bossier et al. (Louvain, 1976) 17–28 and Ford "Sophistic" (1993) 33–41, with further references. On the history of the term, see T. Cole, "Le metamorfosi della saggezza: *sophia* fra oralità e scrittura" in *Tradizione e innovazione nella cultura*

that Plato emphasized (esp. Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias), not all showed an interest in rhetoric or even in teaching. Fifth-century “intellectuals” or “professors” or, in comedy, “egg-heads” (all pre-Platonic nuances of *sophistai*) were not particularly concerned with rhetoric as opposed to natural science or moral philosophy; for contemporaries, Socrates’ “prattling” (Eupolis Fr. 386 PCG) was indistinguishable from that of the sophists (Fr. 388).²²

It must be admitted that skill in speech and argument was surely prominent among the many abilities sophists professed, and many of these successful and well-paid experts were thought to make their associates better at arguing. Long before Plato rewrote intellectual history, Aristophanes’ Strepsiades thought there was such a thing as “learning how to speak” (μαθεῖν λέγειν, *Clouds* 239; cf. 738–9, 1106), and repaired to the “wise souls” in the Thinkery because “these fellows teach—provided one pays—how to win in speaking, regardless of whether one’s case is just or not” (98–9; cf. 112–18, 657, 885). In Plato, Aristides and Thucydides want to find sophists for their sons so they can be leaders in the city (*Lysis imit.* cf. *Prot.* 316b, 319a), and one can hardly imagine that a sophist would have confessed to having nothing efficacious to offer.

Yet, paradoxically, such evidence makes it doubtful that sophists presented themselves as specialists in this dubious subject. To become a master of verbal manipulation was hardly a commendable ambition in Athens where a Euripidean character could lament, “O child, often can well-spoken words be false, and fineness of phrase can vanquish truth.”²³ Athenian drama makes it clear that exceptional facility in speech was the last thing parents would have wanted thought was being taught their children, and Athenian history bears this out. Antiphon of Rhamnus was castigated on the comic stage for selling, at high prices, dishonest speeches to dishonest litigants (Plato Com. 110 PCG). According to Thucydides, Antiphon’s great effectiveness (*deinotês*) in helping his friends prepare to speak for court

Greca da Omero all’ eta ellenistica. Scritti in onore di Bruno Gentili, ed. R. Pretagostini (Rome, 1993), Vol. 2 753–763.

²² For sophistic “prattling” (*adolsechein*), cf. Ari. *Clouds* 1485, Pl. *Phaedrus* 269e.

²³ Eur. *Antiope* Fr. 206.1–2. ὦ παῖ, γένοιντ’ ἂν εὖ λελεγμένοι λόγοι/ψευδεῖς, ἐπὼν δὲ κάλλεσιν νικῶεν ἂν/τάληθές. This short speech is extraordinarily rich in sophistic expressions and oppositions (τάληθές/τάκριβέστατον; φύσις καὶ τούρθόν/εὐγλωσσία; σοφός/τὰ πράγματα κρείσσω τῶν λόγων).

or assembly so aroused public suspicion that was reluctant to speak publicly himself.²⁴ Hence, when Pericles is said to have had his sons (who are among Protagoras' audience in Plato's *Protagoras*) taught horsemanship, wrestling, *mousikê*, "and the other *technai*" (*Meno* 99b), we should not assume that these latter arts would have included "rhetoric," at least under that description. What would it imply for the democracy if the man who was universally acknowledged to be the most dominant orator of his day were able to purchase for his sons the ability by which he bestrode Athenian politics for decades?²⁵

Apart from its dubious political implications, professing an "art" or "craft" in speech could have unwelcome social connotations. These educators were not eager to be thought as teaching merely useful skills, such as the reading and writing *grammatistai* taught, or as inculcating good deportment, such as music and gymnastics were thought to do.²⁶ The sophists took for their pupils young men who had at last "broken out," as the comic poet put it, from the prison of mechanical elementary instruction.²⁷ When the Platonic Protagoras declares that education is "not for a craft but for *paideia*" (οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ: *Prot.* 312b, cf. 312a–b), he accuses his rivals of abusing their clients precisely by teaching them arts: "just when students ought to have escaped technical study, they plunge them back into the arts" (ἄλλοι λωβῶνται τοὺς νέους· τὰς γὰρ τέχνας αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας ἄκοντας πάλιν αὖ ἄγοντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας *Prot.* 318d–e = 80 A 5 DK).²⁸ Having "escaped" such arts, the sophists' associates were not to be expected to endure what Protagoras pointedly refers to as the "compulsory" education of grammar school (*Prot.* 326a: ποιήματα καὶ ἐκμανθάνειν ἀναγκάζουσιν).

This "liberal" accent of sophistic education ran directly counter to the Platonic-Socratic valuation of "craft" knowledge. Advanced intellectual study was explicitly characterized in the fifth century as something "beyond" (*ta peritta*) the strict necessities, as the pursuit of

²⁴ Thuc. 8.68. My focus on sophistic *teaching* allows me to leave aside the identity of "Antiphon the sophist"; for the debate, see Ostwald (1986) 359–65 and n. 88.

²⁵ Isocrates' response to such concerns in the fourth century are revealing: cf. Too, Section III and Ford "Isocrates" (1993).

²⁶ See Nightingale above, esp. Section I, Morgan (1999), and bibliography in Blank (1988) 10 n. 41.

²⁷ Aristophanes Fr. 206 *PCG* (ἀπεδίδρασκες ἐκ διδασκάλου).

²⁸ The sophists' primary clientele must have been at the age Prodicus ascribed to Heracles in his *Choice of Heracles*: "when he had left childhood and entered onto youth, that moment when young men become *autokratores*" (Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.21).

elegant accomplishments (*ta kompsa*).²⁹ Of course, this elitism generated resentment: “give me not niceties, but what the city needs” (μή μοι τὰ κόμπ’ . . . ἀλλ’ ὧν πόλει δεῖ, Fr. 188.5) thunders a Euripidean character, and Medea complains that “No man of sense should have his children educated in higher studies [περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεισθαι]. For apart from the uselessness of such study, they will incur the hostility of their fellow citizens” (*Med.* 294–7).³⁰ But resentment is not outrage, and there were more than monetary advantages to elevating one’s teaching above the utilitarian: by stressing the “liberal” or impractical, sophists could promise that, even if their students did not get elected generals or win every law suit, they would emerge as polished gentlemen able to act and speak impressively on a wide variety of social occasions. Such graduates, as Pfeiffer noted, are likely to lie behind the portrait of “ideal” suitors described in a Satyr play who boast of their skill in games and contests, music and dancing, and science and scholarship.³¹ Thus to call a sophist a teacher of rhetoric would have risked degrading him to the level of a schoolmaster or *technitês*. This can be seen from the texts of Gorgias of Leontini, who is usually taken as one of the main pioneers in the technical study of rhetoric.

Gorgias and the Arts

Gorgias was best known to the Greeks as an orator for grand public occasions: he could deliver a funeral oration or encomium for the Eleans (82 B 10 DK) and address a panhellenic audience at Olympia on weighty themes (B 7–8 DK). His Pythian Oration was so successful that it earned him the privilege of dedicating a gold statue of himself at the sanctuary (B 9; cf. A 1 § 4 DK). His most memorable performance in Athens was when he presented himself there as an ambassador from his native city in 427; it is reported that on this occasion Gorgias mesmerized the “naive and *logos*-loving” Athenians with his dazzling style. But such myths of origins, rooted

²⁹ On *kompsos* (e.g. Soph. *Antig.* 324, Eur. *Aiolos* Fr. 16, Eupolis *Kolakes* Fr. 172 PCCG), see P. Chantraine, “Grec κομπός” *REG* 58 (1945) 90–6 and cf. Carter (1986) 54 n. 7, O’Sullivan (1992) 137–9.

³⁰ *Kompsos* is used pejoratively of Theramenes (*Frogs* 967) and of the Muse of Unjust Logos (*Clouds* 1030).

³¹ [Sophocles] 1130 Radt, adduced by Pfeiffer (1968) 54.

in Aristotle's disdain for the flashy, "poetic" style of Gorgianic writing, run up against the fact that a decision to form an alliance with a Sicilian city was a very serious matter at the time, and it is impossible to believe that Gorgias trusted only in his notorious figures without advancing some cogent political considerations.³²

Gorgias never once professes, in all his comparatively extensive writings that survive, to teach an art of persuasion. He certainly discoursed on the power of *logos*, and the word *kairos* was apparently often on his lips (as Plato hints, *Gorgias* 448a); but in postulating a rhetorical *technê* for him (possibly *Peri tou kairou*) Diels-Kranz find themselves with no attributable content to put in it.³³ Gorgias' rhetorical theory and the theory of art that is often reconstructed for him have had to be derived from references to *logos* and deception in his writings.³⁴ The long encomium to *logos* in the model-speech *Helen* is made to serve as the central pillar of such reconstructions, and yet this same text makes clear that Gorgias, no less than Isocrates or Plato, would have much rather been thought of as a "philosopher" than professor of rhetoric. The *Helen* once adverts to an "art" of speech when Gorgias is listing the ways *logos* can dominate beliefs: he mentions "compulsory contests" of the law courts in which "a single speech written by art rather than spoken in truth pleases and persuades a great multitude" (εἰς λόγος πολλὸν ὄχλον ἔτερψε καὶ ἔπεισε τέχνηι γραφεῖς, οὐκ ἀληθείαι λεχθεῖς B 11 § 13 DK).³⁵ The *technê* in

³² Diodorus 12.53.3 (= 82 A 4 DK); cf. Ari. *Rhet.* 3.1 1404a20ff. (= A 29 DK). On the political context of the embassy, see Ostwald (1986) 312–15. Cole's (1991a) 71–9 argument that a Gorgianic *performance* would have been less "Gorgianic" than the dense compendium of figures that is the *Helen* is supported by Agathon's speech in Plato's *Symposium* where the real flurry of Gorgianisms is saved for a paragraph in the peroration (197d–e; cf. 80 C 1 DK). *Contra*, O'Sullivan (1996) esp. 117ff. challenges Cole's view of the relation of written texts to oral performance.

³³ The title is taken from Satyros *apud* Diogenes Laertius 8.58 (= 82 A 3 DK; cf. DK Vol. II, p. 303.21–2). Diels-Kranz assign to it (1): Aristotle's remark that Gorgias "said" one must counter an opponent's gravity with humor and vice versa (*Rhet.* 3.18 1419b3 = B 12 DK) and (2) Dionysius of Halicarnassus' claim that Gorgias was the first to try to "write" about the *kairos*, though he wrote "very little of value" (*Comp.* 12 = B 13 DK). DK venture (II p. 304) that Gorgias' *Technê* contained the *Helen* and *Palamedes* as exemplars; but more fitting the evidence is Cole's view is that these speeches *were* the art, at least in its written form.

³⁴ Usually by combining *Helen* 8ff. with B 23 DK on a theatrical audience's willing suspension of disbelief; see most recently Wardy (1999), whose objections (e.g. p. 153) to Cole amount to charging him with failing to find the same rather subtle implications in the text as he himself does.

³⁵ For "compulsory contests" as court-speeches, cf. O. Immisch, *Gorgiae Helena* (Berlin and New York, 1927) 32, with the decisive parallel at Isocrates 15.1.

question is judicial speechwriting, a relatively new profession regarded with suspicion at Athens and one Gorgias never practiced as far as we know. In Gorgias' phrase the word *technê* suggests dishonest cunning rather than admirable art, and he clearly regards the craft with an elitist's disdain for a skill that works with a large, indiscriminate mob (ὄχλον, § 13). It is noteworthy that Gorgias' audience is thereby made to assume the role of intimate insider and not democratic everyman.³⁶ Equally significant is the following sentence in which Gorgias moves on to speak of the belief-altering power of *logos* in "philosophers' verbal battles" (φιλοσόφων λόγων ἀμίλλας, § 13). Gorgias only gives the title "philosophers" to these men whose "quickness of thought" (γνώμης τάχος) in unscripted debates resembles the talents of this self-proclaimed master of improvisation. Thus in *Helen* Gorgias shows no admiration for the technical writer of public speeches and sympathizes rather with the philosophers and their impressive oral scrimmages. His dismissal of the demagogic ability to sway mass audiences would have appealed less to politicians on the rise than to those elites who, like young Hippolytus, were content to appear elegant before a few wise judges but not before the many.³⁷

Promising to teach a purely verbal art with no reference to the speaker's knowledge or values—the position toward which Plato drives his Gorgias—was not wise public relations in the fifth century. Instead, sophists characteristically insisted that any *technê* was insufficient without a student of the appropriate character (*physis*) and without that student's dedicated practice (*askêsis*, *epimeleia*, *meletê*).³⁸ This well known nexus of ideas could obviously be deployed in any number of ways, one of which was to make sophistic study at once appealing to elites and safely admirable. The emphasis on "nature" put the blame for pernicious students on the student rather than the teacher, and at the same time allowed for the traditional aristocratic view that polit-

³⁶ A *captatio benevolentiae* from *Palamedes* (B 11a 33 DK) shows a similar unflattering portrayal of mass deliberative assemblies (ἐν ὄχλοι μὲν οὔσης τῆς κρίσεως) as a foil to the speaker's audience, "reputedly and truly, the foremost of the Greeks" (παρὰ δ' ὑμῖν τοῖς πρώτοις οὖσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ δοκοῦσιν). Plato's Gorgias strikes a similar attitude at *Gorgias* 455a.

³⁷ Eur. *Hipp.* 986–9; we find the same pose taken by Antiphon of Rhamnus (cf. Thuc. 8.68 and the anecdote in Ari. *EE* 1232b7) and Agathon and Socrates (Plato *Symp.* 194c).

³⁸ As Protagoras put it, "education [*didaskalia*] requires nature and *askêsis*" (B 3 DK; cf. B 10 and Plato, *Gorg.* 484c). On *physis* and teaching in the 5th century, see Woodbury (1976) 351–3 with references.

ical excellence reposed on moral rather than technical bases.³⁹ The stress on practice was new and noteworthy: the need for *meletê* is the central theme of Prodicus' educational protreptic, *Choice of Heracles*, and the industriousness of "the womanish men who are thoroughly practiced in speaking" struck Sophocles (Fr. 963 *TGrF*, οἱ γὰρ γύνανδροι καὶ λέγειν ἡσχηκότες).⁴⁰ The insistence on practice was in part simply realistic: practice was as crucial to their students' improvement as speakers as it is today. But by calling practice *ponos* or *askêsis*, sophists could assimilate the hard work their students undertook to the old ethic of *noblesse oblige* as exemplified, for example, in Pindar's victory odes: there *ponos* and its cogeners signify the noble's voluntary expenditure of effort and resources in behalf of the community at large. If such effort should bring him glory, this is but the fruit of his high-mindedness.⁴¹ This aspect of Gorgias' self-presentation is preserved by one of his grateful students (and relatives) in an inscription for a statue dedicated at Olympia. Although, in Plato's century, Gorgias is credited with having invented an "art," it is far more than rhetoric: "Eumolpus dedicated this for two reasons: teaching and friendship. No mortal ever discovered a finer art [*technê*] to train [*askêsai*] the soul for contests of excellence."⁴²

Protagoras' Advertisements

It is more difficult, but I believe possible, to consider in these terms one of the earliest and most influential of the sophists, Protagoras of Abdera. Born around 490, by 444 he had acquired such a reputation

³⁹ Marrou (1965) 96.

⁴⁰ Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.21–34 (= 84 B 2 DK), esp. 24, 28. Cf. Protagoras 80 B 19 (no art without *meletê*), Critias 88 B 9.

⁴¹ For *ponos*: Democritus B 240 DK (voluntary toils more endurable), B 243 (toils in leisure [*hêsychia*] are sweeter), B 157 (great things from toil) Antiphon the sophist B 49 (honors and prizes attend great toil and sweat). Cf. Pythagoras C 4 (opposes good *ponoi* to *hêdonai*), Epicharmus B 36 (the gods sell us good things for toil). For *askêin* in connection with *logos*, Cf. Democritus B 53a (*logous askeousi*), B 110 (women should not practice *logos*), B 65 (one must practice much intelligence, not *polumathia*), Gorgias B 6 DK. On Pindar, see Carter (1986) 11–2 and Leslie Kurke, *The Traffic in Praise* (Ithaca, 1991) 98–100.

⁴² From 82 A 8 DK (= 875a.5–8 Kaibel): 'Ἰπποκράτους δ' Εὐμόλπος, ὃς εἰκόνα τήνδ' ἀνέθηκεν/δισσῶν, παιδείας καὶ φιλίας ἔνεκα./Γοργίου ἀσκήσαι ψυχὴν ἀρετῆς ἐς ἀγῶνας/οὐδεὶς πω θνητῶν καλλίον' εὔρε τέχνην. For *askêin* in Gorgias, cf. A 7 DK and B 6 DK (as supplemented by Foss: II.286.1 DK).

for political wisdom that he was invited to assist Pericles in framing laws for the Athenian colony to Thurii. Outside of Pericles' circle, his terms and methods for linguistic and poetic analysis were sufficiently well known to be parodied on the comic stage without naming him. Late stories of his books being burned notwithstanding,⁴³ he remained a successful and influential teacher throughout his long life and into the next generation (Pl. *Meno* 91d: οὐδὲν πέπανται εὐδοκίμων).

What did this great sophist promise to teach? It is hard to reconstruct what was intended by his most notorious boast, to make the *hêttôn* argument *kreittôn*: Aristotle said that this public announcement or advertisement (*epaggelma*) aroused popular resentment, and quite rightly in the philosopher's view since it was achieved by specious reasoning (*Rhet.* 2.24 1402a23 = A 21 DK); Aristophanes associates the phrase with a charlatans' art of making a morally or logically inferior proposition defeat a superior one.⁴⁴ It is not likely that Protagoras or his circle intended to outrage public opinion with the slogan, and other construals are possible (e.g. improving an unsatisfactory state of affairs, coming to the rescue of a worthy but unpopular proposition, etc). But a more revealing interpretation of the teacher's mission may be discerned in Plato's *Protagoras* when the sophist declares the object of his education (318e–391a):

PROT: My instruction consists in good judgment [*euboulia*] about domestic matters—so the student might best manage [*διοικῶν*] his own household—and about civic matters—so that he might become extremely powerful in speaking and acting in the city's affairs.

SOC: Can it be that I understand you aright? For you seem to me to mean the art of citizenship and to promise you will make men good citizens

PROT: That, Socrates, is precisely the profession I profess.⁴⁵

⁴³ K. J. Dover, "The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society," *TALANTA* 7 (1976) 34–7.

⁴⁴ Aristophanes *Clouds* 112–14, printed by Diels-Kranz as a C testimony to Protagoras (= 80 C 1 DK; cf. 893–4, 1337, 1444–51), but it quickly became a more general calumny aimed at any clever arguer (e.g. Socrates): cf. Lloyd (1979) 99–102.

⁴⁵ τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικῶν, καὶ περὶ τὴν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατάτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν. Ἄρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπομαί σου τῷ λόγῳ; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑπισχνεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας. Αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦτο ἐστίν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐπαγγέλλμαι ὃ ἐπαγγέλλομαι.

When Protagoras assents to Socrates' paraphrase he concedes that his public pronouncements imply a promise to teach a "political art." This concession is of the same kind as Gorgias makes for "the rhetorical art" in the *Gorgias* and similarly exposes Protagoras to Platonic standards of knowledge he will be unable to meet. The advantage of the quoted passage is that it shows Plato moving carefully from the kinds of things a sophist was likely to say to their implications (drawn by Socrates) for how their education is to be appraised in the fourth century. By following his translation of terms backwards we may glimpse how a sophist like Protagoras presented himself in his time.

I take Socrates' exaggerated caution to indicate that his phrase "art of citizenship" is a Platonic interpretation of the term *euboulia*, a gloss on the actual language Protagoras or a Protagorean would use. Protagoras' "good judgment" is a credible fifth-century concern: *euboulia* was commonly praised in the fifth century, and its formation is paralleled in other sophistic terms.⁴⁶ Also noteworthy is Protagoras' promise to improve skills for "both household and city," a pair of concerns Plato also lists in speaking of Protagoras and Prodicus in the *Republic*. This I believe is also authentic, as is suggested by the fact in neither place is "household management" relevant to Socrates' subsequent attack, while "household" education was another concern in the late fifth century.⁴⁷ In Protagoras' original response, the argumentative and technical aspects of his instruction are downplayed and placed within a wholistic practice leading to prudent behavior and speech in any of a citizen's activities. Such a phrase could allow a sophist's pupil to say that his goal in taking on higher study was not to become a dominant influence in the city but was simply to manage his own affairs well. It was not disadvantageous for a sophist that skill in domestic management was thought to be transferrable to civic leadership, as, for example, when serving as

⁴⁶ E.g.g. *euepeia*, *orthoepieia*. For fifth-century *euboulia* (Hdt. 7.10, *Soph. Ant.* 1050, *Eur. Helen* 757, *Aeolus* Fr. 16.3), cf. Untersteiner (1961) 30-1 and Heinimann (1961) 120.

⁴⁷ At *Rep.* 600c-d Protagoras and Prodicus and many others persuade students "that will they be able to manage neither their household nor the their city [οὐτε οἰκίαν οὐτε πόλιν τὴν αὐτῶν διοικεῖν οἰοί τ' ἔσονται] unless they understand their *paideia*." Cf. Niceratus in *Xen. Symp.* 4.6 (ὅστις ἂν οὖν ὑμῶν βούληται ἢ οἰκονομικὸς ἢ δημηγορικὸς ἢ στρατηγικὸς γενέσθαι) and *Pl. Symp.* 209a. For "household" education (e.g. Amphion in Euripides *Antiope* Frr. 187, 200 and satirized in Aristophanes *Frogs* 976-7), see Beck (1964) 172.

stratēgos (Xen. *Mem.* 3.6). In this connection the metaphor for “managing,” (*di*)*oikein*, would have been a convenient euphemism for *kratos*, power: Thucydides’ Pericles famously glossed the word *dēmokratia* as the people’s power to “manage” (*oikein*) affairs in the interest of the majority (Thuc. 2.37.1). For a Protagorean pupil, the word *oikein* could suggest that he would be equipped to take on directing roles in civic life, though it democratically presented such expertise as a form of stewardship, an unassuming competence in the duties of an earnest householder.

Of course, once sophists attracted pupils they had to provide some specific content, and so we must turn to the nitty-gritty question of what their instruction consisted of. In the case of Protagoras, we can be sure that a main topic was something he called *orthoepeia*, “correct-speaking,” for Aristophanes confirms that he and Prodicus were conspicuously interested in what was called “correctness in speech” (*orthotēs tōn onomatōn*).⁴⁸ Under the term may be put Protagoras’ discussion of the genre of nouns, distinguishing masculines, feminines, and objects (*Rhet.* 3.5 1407b6 = 80 A 27), and his classification of verbal moods, or kinds of sentences, into request, question, answer and command (Diog. Laert. 9.53–4; cf. A 1 DK).

Considered etymologically, the *orthos* (“right, correct”) in *orthoepeia* could connote a strict precision, even a scientific accuracy in using terms. This old word for “straight, right, correct” took on such nuances in the enlightenment when an *orthos logos* could be a “properly thoughtful consideration” of a topic as opposed to common, casual (*eikēi*) usage (cf. *Clouds* 683, 742; *Frogs* 1182). But any speaker wished to speak “correctly” or “rightly,” and there was no sophistic monopoly on “correctness”: already in Aeschylus’ *Oresteia* (*Eum.* 657, a passage discussed by Too) Apollo gives a “correct” explanation of a child’s obligations to parents by adducing considerations of reproductive biology; similarly, Herodotus is drawing on his wide travels when he pronounces that Pindar “rightly” poetized when he said “law is king.”⁴⁹ The compound abstract *orthoepeia* was likely Protagoras’

⁴⁸ On connections between *Clouds* (esp. 122ff., 658ff.) and doctrines elsewhere attributed to Protagoras, cf. 80 C 2–3 DK with Classen (1959) 220–1, Pfeiffer (1968) 280–1, Guthrie (1969) 205 with n. 2. Neither the evidence at our disposal nor semantics supports the attempt sometimes made to distinguish (Prodician) *orthotēs tōn onomatōn* from (Protagorean) *orthoepeia*.

⁴⁹ On *orthos* and enlightened thought, cf. Heinimann (1961) 126 n. 100 and Untersteiner (1954) 72 n. 19. So Anaxagoras (59 B 17 DK) claims the Greeks do

own attention-getting coinage; but if it suggested a new level of scrupulousness in speech, it hardly implied that the linguistic "correctness" had nothing to do with other "right" ways of knowing the world.⁵⁰ A wise man would best sustain a reputation for wisdom by saying "the right thing to say in the right way," as Gorgias put it.⁵¹

Orthoepia has been interpreted in many ways, usually in a fashion that connects it with both Protagoras' rhetorical instruction and his skepticism toward transcendent truth in human affairs.⁵² Because of the paucity of direct evidence, such reconstructions tend to move with worrying speed to questions (e.g. whether names are natural or conventional) that are only clearly articulated in Plato's *Cratylus*.⁵³ I shall not attempt my own definition, for it is not certain that we should expand this word into an entire philosophic program. As far as we can tell, Protagoras never devoted a treatise to *orthoepia* (unlike Democritus who wrote on Homer and *orthoepia*: 68 A 20a DK); the term may only have featured within another tract, Protagoras' *Aletheia*, also known as "Knockout Arguments" (*Kataballontes*).⁵⁴ But some further progress can be made if we bear in mind that *orthoepia* had a definite role in Protagoras' discussions of poetry.

As we will see more fully below, the *Clouds* confirms the Platonic Protagoras who connects "correct speaking" with the interpretation of poetry: "I consider the most important part of a man's education to be extraordinary skilled in poetic expression [περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν

not reflect rightly (οὐκ ὀρθῶς νομίζουσιν) about coming to be and passing away, and proposes how the terms should be rightly used (καὶ οὕτως ἂν ὀρθῶς καλοῖεν). Cf. Antiphon the sophist 87 B 44.4–10 DK.

⁵⁰ Cf. the work of Protagoras known as "On human affairs that are not rightly [*orthōs*] done" (80 B 8c DK).

⁵¹ Gorgias *Helen*: 82 B 11.2 DK (*to deon orthōs*); cf. B 6 and Thucydides' Pericles, 2.60.5. Of course, this was not proof against a hostile interpretation: *Clouds* identifies what appears to be another sophistic piece of language, "rightly making distinctions and investigating" (*orthōs diairōn kai skopōn*) with skill in flummery (*Clouds* 737–84).

⁵² E.g. Classen (1959) 220–5, Pfeiffer (1968) 37–9, Guthrie (1969) 205–6, Cole (1991a) 65–6, Schiappa (1991) 163–4, and, most portentously, Untersteiner (1961) 35, 63 and (1954) esp. 56–7. Cf. Kerferd (1981) 75–6.

⁵³ Cf. D. Fehling, "Zwei Untersuchungen zur Griechischen Sprachphilosophie," *RhM*. 108 (1965) 218ff.

⁵⁴ Hermogenes' joke in *Crat.* 391B–C (= 80 A 24 DK) falls flat unless "correctness of names" was discussed in Protagoras' *Aletheia*. And yet this book (*Kataballontes*), according to Sextus, began with the "man-measure" pronouncement (B 1 DK). Protagoras' trope for arguments as wrestling "falls" seems alluded to in *Bacchae* 202 (80 C 4 DK) where it is connected with the false wisdom of questioning traditional beliefs about the gods.

εἶναι]; that is, knowing how to comprehend what is *correctly* said by the poets and what is not [ὀρθῶς πεποιήται καὶ ἄ μὴ], and to be able to distinguish the two and give an explanation when challenged" (*Prot.* 339A = A 25 DK). A problem with taking *orthoepeia* too seriously is that the few examples we have of Protagoras assessing the "rightness" of poetic expressions are unimpressive, not to say absurd. It seems that his doctrine on nominal genre was illustrated by claiming that Homer committed a solecism at the beginning of the *Iliad* when he modified "wrath" (*mênin*, a feminine abstract in Greek) with a feminine participle (*oulomenên*); apparently Protagoras held the noun *mênis* should be masculine, as "wrath" is characteristically a male state of mind (*Aristotle Soph. el.* 14.173b17 = A 28).⁵⁵ This would be disastrous preparation for the courtroom or assembly where such linguistic eccentricity would have been regarded as either an imbecilic lapse or an intolerable pretension. In the same way, Protagoras' classification of verbal moods was the basis of a quibbling objection to the *Iliad*'s invocation, where the imperative in "Sing goddess, the wrath" (*mênin aeide thea*) was faulted as an inappropriate way to address the divinity. Aristotle, who reports this argument to us (*Poet.* 1456b16 = A 29), found it ridiculous, and no wonder since the traditional and commonest way of beginning an epic was an imperative "sing" or "tell" addressed to the Muse.

It is thus very difficult to believe that *orthoepeia* was a serious attempt at linguistic reform. Even G. B. Kerferd, who is prepared to countenance such a possibility, calls it "drastic measures" to "correct usage."⁵⁶ In a classic article, Detlev Fehling offered a different reconstruction from the evidence. On his view, the passages cited above can be harmonized if we see them stemming from a bravura introduction to one of Protagoras' displays of his wisdom.⁵⁷ The point would be to say that, if the revered Homer can be shown to have made such errors in expression, Protogorean wisdom must be very

⁵⁵ I follow the interpretation of J. Wackernagel, *Vorlesung über Syntax*, Vol. 2 (Basel 1924) 1–6. Some hold Protagoras wanted consistent morphology. Radermacher compares *Soph. el.* on Protagoras with Zoilus (B XXXV 4 Radermacher): "Homer solecizes using the plural instead of the singular" at *Il.* 1.129.

⁵⁶ Kerferd (1981) 68–9.

⁵⁷ Fehling (1965). In support of Fehling's reconstruction, see Segal (1970) and note also that the parody of *orthoepeia* in *Frogs* (1129ff.) begins with Euripides finding more than a dozen—"nay more than a hundred"—faults in just three lines opening an Aeschylean play.

powerful indeed. The thesis makes good sense, though we are still left wondering what the practical benefit was once the showmanship was over. There is one piece of evidence Fehling leaves out: this is the report in the Ammonian scholia to Homer that Protagoras explained the placement of Achilles' battle with the river Xanthus in the *Iliad* in structural terms as a transition to the battle of the gods (A 30 DK). Unlike the examples cited above, this interpretation is not *prima facie* specious. To best account for the possibility of more substantial Portagorean observations on Homer, we may understand his criticism of the poets as a way of practicing antilogistic—to "give an explanation of what is *correctly* said by the poets *when challenged*" (*Prot.* 339a, quoted above).

Whatever linguistic theory *orthoepeia* may have involved, it came into play in antilogistic discussions of the wise old poets. I suspect that a main payoff of learning Protagorean (or Prodician) "correctness of speech" was that it enabled a speaker to catch up an opponent, "My dear fellow, you do not consider the matter rightly . . ." In my final text to be examined, I will pursue the thesis that sophists' students debated the merits of poets as a suitably refined and abstract way to practice antilogistic; though nothing in the cut-and-thrust game prevented useful rhetorical insights from emerging, the exercise was conscientiously focused on evaluating social and ethical as well as linguistic "correctness."

Sophistical Education in Poetry

For Werner Jaeger the sophists were heirs to the rhapsodes and inaugurated the "methodical" study of literature.⁵⁸ Such study is often regarded, as by Aristotle in *Rhetoric* 3, as merely ancillary to their rhetorical teaching, mining the old texts for stylistic tricks.⁵⁹ Once again, Marrou cautiously focuses on structural change: they placed the study of literature, that is, poetry, "at the heart of education, where it remains today."⁶⁰ But even this is not quite so, since teachers

⁵⁸ Jaeger (1961) 1.296. Pfeiffer (1968) 45 also presented them as the heirs to the poets and rhapsodes as educators, even if "the sophistic study of poetry served rhetorical and educational purposes" rather than philology.

⁵⁹ So Tsirimbis (1936) 28–33. Cf. Guthrie (1969) 180.

⁶⁰ Marrou (1965) 96. Cf. Untersteiner (1961) p. 64 "one of the essential moments

of reading and writing had been active at least since the 490's in Athens, and the texts they used were, to judge from inscribed school books on Greek vases, predominately poetry.⁶¹ Through their efforts the traditional education in gymnastics and *mousikê* was supplemented with a separate education in writing and recitation of verse under the *grammatistês*.⁶² This broader dissemination of literary knowledge at Athens provides an important context for appreciating what the sophists did with verse and why. As skill in reading and closely studying poems reached a wider public in fifth-century Athens, sophists supplied elites and would be elites with a more sophisticated familiarity with songs than they had acquired in youth from letter- and lyre-teachers.⁶³ As is amply attested by Aristophanes, along with this came an abundance of technical terms for literary and rhetorical parts of speeches. *Clouds* and *Frogs* depend on a broad interest among the Athenian public in innovative and startling new approaches to poetry and on their awareness of criticism's jargon.⁶⁴ The *Phaedrus* (265d–67d) refers to the early sophists and their successors for a number of technical terms for parts of speech and kinds of argument, an arcane terminology Socrates identifies with the “true refinements” (*ta kompsa*) of the rhetorical art (266d9).

However systematic as such studies may have been, their neologisms functioned as watchwords of a sort that gave admission to what was frequently troped as the “higher mysteries” of wisdom.⁶⁵ In offering a deeper sophistication about conventionally admired verse, sophists formed an elite band of experts in language and exercised them in defending themselves before others in the same group.

in sophistic education was precisely the education of poets.” Kerferd (1981) 78: the theory of literature and the rhetorical art are “largely the creation of the sophistic period.” Cf. DeRomilly (1992) 31.

⁶¹ H. R. Immerwahr, “Book Rolls on Attic Vases,” in *Classical, Mediaeval, and Renaissance Studies in Honor of Berthold Louis Ullman*, ed. Charles Henderson, Jr. (Rome, 1964) 17–48.

⁶² On this important transformation, see Beck (1964) 71–75, Robb (1994) esp. 197ff., and Morgan (1999) 48–51 with nn.

⁶³ On this, see Too (1998) 96–8.

⁶⁴ J. D. Denniston, “Technical Terms in Aristophanes” *CQ* 21 (1927) 113–21. In an important monograph, O’Sullivan (1996) has meticulously collated the metalanguage in Aristophanes, arguing in the tradition of Kennedy and Pfeiffer that the fourth-century (?) rhetorical theory of three styles goes back to sophistic thinking. Cole (1991b) 71–2 argues that such terminology remained unsystematic at least up to the time of Theodorus.

⁶⁵ E.g. *Clouds* 140ff., 250ff., 302–5, 824; cf. Dover (1968) xxxiv, xli.

Such is suggested between the lines in the sketch of sophistic teaching of poetry given in Aristophanes *Clouds* 636 ff. Beneath the parody I believe we can discern the social value of technicality in criticism.

Strepsiades' formal instruction begins with a choice of *metra*, *épê*, and *ruthmoi*, advanced fields of study his teacher assures him he has "never before been taught." The first topic, *metra*, had been the subject of significant technical analysis in the fifth century: this was the time when *metron* "measure" was given its metrical sense, "a piece of rhythm," as part of a general effort to identify and quantify the constituent elements of poetry and song.⁶⁶ The scientific terminology had made its way into public presentations, as by Herodotus who uses such terms as *trimetron* and *tetrametron* without explanation. But in the sophistic classroom they have a social function as well: when Socrates asks his student to have an opinion about whether the *trimetron* or the *tetrametron* is "finest" (641–2), one can infer that abstruse learning could be deployed a means of displaying one's refined tastes. Scientific precision here dresses up the old archaic passtime of ἐρᾶν τὰ καλὰ.⁶⁷

The contrast between the new technical vocabulary and the world of the common man provides Aristophanes with a series of jokes: the "unsophisticated dolt" (646) takes *metra* as agricultural "measures" and is happy at the idea that he will not be cheated in buying grain. Despairing of his pupil, the sophist turns to the topic of rhythms and a new set of technical terms, *enoplion* and *dactyl* (646–7).⁶⁸ Again, Strepsiades' comic response is focused on the belly's satisfaction—"how will rhythms help me get my daily bread?"—but he raises vividly the question of the utility of such analyses (648). All Socrates comes up with to say to this burning question is that understanding what an *enoplion* or a dactyl is allows one to display one's qualities "in refined gatherings" (*kompōn en sunoisia*, 649);⁶⁹ we see that, to Aristophanes' eye, the payoff for advanced literary study was that

⁶⁶ See Dover (1968) on *Clouds* 642 and M. L. West, *Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus* (Berlin and New York, 1974) 37–8.

⁶⁷ Cf. Classen (1959) 217, with, e.g., E. Antiope fr. 198, Bdelykleon in *Wasps* 134, cf. 473, 1069–70.

⁶⁸ These terms are associated with Damon at *Rep.* 400A (37 A 9 DK) where they (along with *hêrōios*) are associated with ethical qualities: "illiberality, violence and madness" (*aneleutheria*, *hubris*, *mania*) and their opposites. Aristides attributes to Damonians (A 7 DK) a distinction between masculine and feminine *harmoniai*.

⁶⁹ *Kompōs* used of elegant language combined with refined behavior: Eupolis Fr. 172 PCG, Ar. *Clouds* 649, *Knights* 1317 (at a symposium); at *Knights* 18 a quotation

the pupil was prepared to enter the salons and symposia of the elite, as he put it in another but similar context, "to speak in an impressive manner among learned and sophisticated gentlemen" (*Wasps* 1174–1175: λόγους σεμνοῦς λέγειν/ἀνδρῶν παρόντων πολυμαθῶν καὶ δεξιῶν). One such metrical neologism, *dactyl* as the name for a rhythm, prompts, once again, an earthy misinterpretation from the comic hero, but this time in the direction of sex. Doubtless with an obscene gesture (654) Strepsiades reasserts his masculinity and underscores the worrying association of advanced musical study with effeminacy.

Lastly, we get a clear reference to Protagoras' *orthoepeia* with the study of *epê* and "correctness" in names.⁷⁰ As provocatively as his sophistic prototype, Socrates proclaims that, if one is to speak "correctly" (*orthôs*, 659, 679), one should restrict the grammatically masculine *alektruôn* to barnyard cocks, and coin *alektruaina*, "cock-ette," for hens. Again, the pupil wants to refer these newfangled ideas first to eating (668–9) and then to sex. The game of *orthôs legein* (679) goes on for some time as Socrates uses the doctrine to reassign the genders and names of a number of notable Athenians (675–93). The joking is somewhat extended and again seems to reveal that sophisticated discourse about language was also a way of building and talking about social identities.

In the scene as a whole it is notable that, when the pupil demands the "most unjust speech" from the sophist (657), he is put off by the teacher who insists it is first necessary to speak of more arcane things (658–9). The diversion prepares for comic foolery about language, but I suspect that it was also typical enough that a prominent sophist who was greeted with a request for tuition in the art of speech would have, without denying the request, changed the subject. Although sophists were not likely to discourage the idea that they possessed secret tricks or expert methods (*technai*) of winning an argument, it was enough to promise their students that they would emerge as elegant and refined in sophisticated company. In this way a professor of higher learning would have elevated himself above the merely utilitarian; at the same time, he would have profited from popular perceptions that a command of such arcana as Damon or Anaxagoras purveyed was what made Pericles into a non-pareil orator.⁷¹ Precisely

from the *Hippolytus* is pronounced κομψευριστικῶς. Cf. Pl. *Phaedrus* 227c (of Lysis's elegant speech), *Phaedo* 101c.

⁷⁰ *Clouds* 658–71 and 677–9 are printed as Protagoras C 3 by DK.

because the lines between rhetoric and other higher sciences were not precisely drawn, even a Prodicus, the most linguistically focused of the sophists, could be taken as the greatest of "those who philosophize about things on high" (*meteorosophisai*, *Clouds* 338ff., cf. *Dover* lv.).

In concluding, I return to the sophists' pupils to see the benefits of such teaching from their side. The effectiveness of sophistic education was in part due to the constant exposure to and practice in antilogy within the safely delimited context of gentlemanly conversation. In addition, we should reckon on a social and structural effectiveness: if students did not acquire a sure-fire technique for winning in courts and assemblies, they did enter into a relationship (*sunousia*) with the sophist and with their classmates and peers (*Clouds* 965, *Knights* 985 ff.), and this relationship could be at least as valuable as a speaker's manual. If a parent with the means to afford such an education should ever fall into legal difficulties, such well-connected friends would be available to help out with their advice. This is not the place to gauge Aristophanes as a social critic; it is sufficient to observe that comedy succeeds by evoking the familiar. The premise of *Clouds*, after all, is that a father who finds himself in need of legal assistance contrives to send his son to study with a sophist. The twist is that such a father, who clearly wants little to do with such matters, ends up enrolling with the wise man himself. But in the normal course of things, Strepsiades would have resembled one of the "quiet Athenians" so well evoked by Carter. Carter mentions the case of Xenophon's Crito (*Mem.* 2.9) who finds sycophants making his living a quiet life impossible.⁷² On Socrates' advice, he seeks to befriend Archdemus "an excellent speaker and man of affairs but poor and honest." Crito sends Archdemus presents from his farm and invites him to feasts. Once Archdemus came to regard Crito's home as his own, he was soon bringing Crito's accusers to trial. Antiphon was not the only person capable of helping a friend who needed to speak in public.

In such a world, I suggest, sophists could have afforded to devote

⁷¹ On Damon as "the centaur that raised Pericles" (Plato *Comicus* 191 K = 37 A 4 DK) and Anaxagoras as Pericles' teacher in oratory (*Phaedrus* 269e, cf. 59 A 13, 15 DK), see Anthony J. Podlecki, *Perikles and His Circle* (London and New York, 1998), ch. 3 and Philip A. Stadter, "Pericles Among the Intellectuals," *ICS* 16 (1991) 111-24.

⁷² Carter (1986) 112ff.

the bulk of their professing to high-flown, abstract, and non-technical discourses. For all their jargon and persiflage, they did not presume to treat mighty *logos* as masterable by mere craft, nor would such a study have attracted high-minded clients. We may accept the general picture of Plato's *Protagoras*, where a number of exalted sophists debate the meaning of an old and difficult Simonidean poem and closely examine its language; but in transferring this picture to the later fifth century we should neglect neither the playfulness of the proceedings, the easy intercourse of *spoudaiogeloion*, nor should we separate out a rhetorical or linguistic project from the announced goal of the exercise—to test a reputedly wise poet's views on *aretê*. George Kennedy hit on the matter as I see it (though he would doubtless find my account too skeptical), when he said: "men who could afford a liberal education for public life attached themselves to sophists and learned *almost incidentally* the techniques of court oratory" ([1963] 57, emphasis mine). All but the most hard-pressed pupils were likely to maintain that they were engaged in "liberal" and non-technical pursuits; and for the many who dreaded the courtroom or the speaker's platform the pretense would have been valid as they carried on the well structured ethical and poetic discussions of their youth. At the same time, the experience was undoubtedly effective and important to the students, albeit in non-rhetorical ways.

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LEGAL INSTRUCTIONS IN CLASSICAL ATHENS¹

Yun Lee Too

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to examine a particular rhetoric of socialization which has in the latter part of the twentieth century fallen from view despite its significance in Hellenic antiquity, that of Athenian law. Ancient law is generally and overall regarded as a normative discipline with principles and systematizations that are more properly characteristic of Roman law (itself, one notes, a much later construction of juristic compilers), and it is precisely for this reason that we should pay heed to Stephen Todd's argument that "Athenian law in particular cannot and should not be divorced from the study of Athenian society".² The rightness of this observation cannot be overstated, for I shall argue that Athenian law both is and presents itself in varying degrees as constituting Athenian society, for it is a discourse that purports both to produce, and then, to regulate the identity and behavior of the citizen in late fifth and fourth-century Athens.³ The "laws" are invoked in a variety of texts as the "teachers" of the classical Attic *polis*. The laws are personified by association with certain names (so and especially, "the laws of Solon") and with historical or fictional advocates, so that the community's knowledge and authority are embodied, but it is also the case that through this process of embodiment, socialization and education are reconfigured such that the city is inevitably produced as the "teacher" of the individual citizen.

¹ I would like to thank Elizabeth Meyer and Tony Corbeill for their scrupulous readings of a draft version of this paper and for their provocative suggestions.

² Todd (1993) 13.

³ For earlier treatments of this topic, see e.g. Jones (1956) 6–14 and De Romilly in Ford (1971) 227–40, who stresses the role of the laws in instructing the citizens to virtue as if virtue were a "zero-sum" concept. I take the view that the law's instruction is rather specific to the community as constructed within a particular text.

I

I begin by having my reader encounter the education of the laws as a manner of speaking. I draw attention to the verb *didaskein*, which at its most attenuated and conservative may mean "to tell/inform"; and otherwise means "to teach", a sense which I shall argue to be particularly poignant and resonant where legal discourse and representations are concerned.

According to a widespread convention of legal discourse at classical Athens, litigants repeatedly either portray themselves, or are portrayed as instructing the jury in (their side of) the case in hand. They preface their narratives with the declaration "I (shall) teach (*didaxô*)", and they characterize their audiences as "learning" with the injunctions "you will learn" and "learn (*mathete*)" or by naming them as "pupils". Andocides assumes the rhetoric of legal pedagogy extensively in oration 1 (*On the Mysteries*), instructing his audience in prior events so that they will learn of them and judge justly, that is, in his favour. In the opening sections, at 8, he deliberates whether or not to give his account of events—that is, to teach (*didaxô*)—from the beginning; at 10, he declares that he will teach (*didaxô*) the jury that he has committed no act of impiety and did not turn informer on his associates. Later in the speech, he summons other individuals to lend their support his didactic project. Witnesses are instructed to teach (*didaskete*) about the arrest of citizens following the mutilation of the Hermes (46), and citizens are invited to instruct (*didaskete*) their less knowing fellows regarding actual events connected with the mutilation (69). Andocides' final didactic posture in this speech regards his expertise in the legalities of the Amnesty (70), and in particular, in his own legal status as an innocent (72).

In the legal sphere, there are always at least two "truths", two lessons, to be taught as prosecution and defence argue their respective cases. And so Lysias can offer an instruction that differs from the one Andocides offers regarding himself. In oration 6 (*Ag. Andocides*) the speaker announces that the jury must be taught about the accused's response in order that it may judge better (cf. *anangkaiôs gar echei humas didaskein* . . ., 6.35). Andocides is, despite his own claims, responsible for creating confusion in the city as a result of offering himself as an informer. The Lysianic teacher is one who presents lessons on wrongs committed by his opponents at law. The speaker of Lysias oration 3 (*Ag. Simon*) wants to teach (*didaskein*) about the lies of Simon,

while the prosecutor in Lysias 13 (*Ag. Agoratus*) declares that he will teach (*didaxomen*) and that the jury-audience will learn (*mathesesthe*) of Agoratus' murder of the democracy's supporters during the rule of the Thirty from his narrative (13.4). The speaker of Demosthenes 29 (*Ag. Aphobos*) promises that he will easily instruct (*didaxai*) that his opponent gave false testimony in order to discredit the latter's prior case against Phanus (29.1). In Demosthenes 35 (*Ag. Lacritis*) the speaker challenges Lacritis, the supposed pupil of Isocrates, to teach (cf. *didaxon*) what is just and lawful in order to show him up.

Isocrates similarly uses didactic language to describe the legal discourse and process, associating pedagogy and law. In oration 16 (*Concerning the Team of Horses*) he has the younger Alcibiades observe that prosecutors have been spending more time slandering his father, the famous (or notorious) general Alcibiades, than *teaching* (*didaskontes*) about the oaths they have taken (2). Slightly later, he announces that he will teach (*didaskein*) about events connected with the fall of the democracy and the Four Hundred (4). This he does for the benefit of the younger members of the jury. Likewise, the jury in the inheritance suit involved in oration 19 (*Aegineticus*) is told that it will learn (*mathein*) of the matters under dispute (4). In oration 18 (*Ag. Callimachus*), a counter-charge to deflect a prior prosecution (i.e. *paragraphê*), Isocrates' client proposes that if the jury learns (*mathete*) that he has not wronged Callimachus against whom the case is brought, then it should be angry with the accused. This vocabulary is given particular poignancy when employed in the *Antidosis*. In this speech, which is a fictional defence of its author as a teacher of rhetoric at Athens, Isocrates economically realizes his defence. He instructs (for use of *didaskô*, cf. 15.29, 40, 58, 89, 178, 197) the audience-jury in the value of *logoi* to the Greek, and particularly the Athenian, community (in such a way as invites further discussion later in this paper).

II

The construction of a speaking voice in a legal case supposes the construction of authority. To assume the pose of teacher and instructor is, one surmises, a strategy to arrogate authority to oneself and one's argument, and as such, of necessity, it is one which seeks to distinguish the litigant from any other class of rhetorical teacher, including and above all, the unscrupulous sophist and his offspring,

the sycophants.⁴ Speaking of one's role in lawcourt process as "teaching" appeals to a particular view of the laws and the lawgiver which Rosalind Thomas has argued to be deliberately and emphatically archaizing in that it draws attention to the lawgiver's "moral and educational views".⁵ Thomas suggests that the educational role of the lawgiver and the orator, the former's notional representative, are to be conflated, and this move illuminates the aspects in which law and learning have a shared sociology in ancient Greece.

To found, and in the fourth-century discourses about the origins of the classical city-state, to *refound*, the community is a matter of law. Law (*nomos*) is to be viewed as being coterminous with the state: the creation of law—whether gods or only humans are involved in the narrative of this creation—is an event conventionally associated with the establishment of the community in question, while the writing of law ensures the stability of the state by fixing *nomos* as a public, and publicly available, discourse.⁶ Lysias 30 (*Ag. Nicomachus*) offers an emphatic counter example which illustrates the centrality of the legislation to the Athenian community. This speech presents us with a story of subversive counter-teaching through tampering with the laws of Athens' father-figure, Solon. After the restoration of the democracy in 411 BC, a commission of *nomothetae*, "legislators", is appointed to revise the constitution (cf. Thuc. 8.97.2 and Andocides 1.81–2). Nicomachus is appointed as a transcriber (*anagrapheês*) of the hallowed "laws of Solon", and subversively redefines his role. The son of a public slave (*dêmosios*), as Lysias claims at 30.2, he rewrites his identity as the legislator of the state and in the process also threatens to rewrite the identity of Athenian city-state as other than democracy (30.15). He displaces Solon as *nomothetês*, and establishes himself as the *kurios* of the laws (30.2). The legal scribe doctors laws for unjust, private ends, working, for instance, to get rid of Cleophon through his creative transcriptions (10–14), and inflating the number of sacrifices to be performed in such a way that the city's expenses increased (19).⁷

In a remarkable gesture which disregards historical actuality, where education is a concern of private individuals and the marketplace

⁴ See e.g. Isocrates 13.19–20 and 8.128–9.

⁵ Thomas (1995) 133.

⁶ See Thomas (1989) 32; Hölkeskamp (1982a) 79; and also Hölkeskamp (1982) 98.

⁷ For discussion of Nicomachus, see Harrison (1955) 34 and Jones (1956) 104.

(as the iconography of the greedy and unscrupulous sophist demonstrates), teaching is again and again presented as an issue of state concern. Human reproduction, rearing, socialization, and education are activities depicted as constituting the infrastructures of the ideal states in the *Republic* and the *Laws*. Plato places these activities under the care of the states' rulers and has them managed and maintained through law (cf. *Republic* 449aff. and *Laws* 804d5–6).⁸ The close identification of law and education in the fourth century becomes apparent in the *Laws* as the Athenian stranger locates the education (*paideia*) of the young somewhere between advice (*nouthetêsis*) and the laws (*nomoi*) (822d). Education is, however, not necessarily to remain distinct from and subordinate to the law: education ideally becomes the discourse of the city by being received into the laws (811c).⁹ As Andrea Nightingale observes, the lawcodes of this ideal state offer a paradigm for educational discourses, with the result that discourses, such as poetry, resembling law must be copied down in the service of the education of the state's citizens (811b).¹⁰ Law is in this construction the core "curriculum" of the orderly and virtuous state, and precisely because this is the case, the just state requires that its inhabitants are educated in virtue from childhood.¹¹

Subsequently, Aristotle rehearses the programme of legislative didactic in the *Politics*, where he makes a state's legislator (*nomothetês*) the chief educator of the state such that the authority of the individual teacher or philosopher is assumed by the former (1333b37ff.; 1334b29–30; 1337a5). Elsewhere, in the final book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, it would appear that through the intervention of the legislator the state assumes the natural parent's responsibility for the nurturing and upbringing of the child (cf. *NE* 1180a24–6). What is at stake for the Aristotelian legislator is a sense that the formation of the individual citizen as a moral being has an important bearing on the state's overall *ethos* (*Politics* 1284a and 1337a14–18), although the reader has to bear in mind that the Aristotelian citizen is almost

⁸ See Cicero *de leg.* 2.14, who suggests that Plato, following Zaleucus, Charondas, and the Pythagoreans, thought that any legislator should assume the role of teacher to justify his former position; also see Jones (1956) 8 and n. 4. Marrou (1956) 41ff. proposes that the system of education depicted in the *Republic* is one largely inspired by the harsh and totalitarian Spartan model.

⁹ Cf. Morrow (1960) 339.

¹⁰ Nightingale (1993) 289.

¹¹ *Laws* 643c and Cohen (1993) 305.

always a member of the social elite and his idealised morality is consequently constructed around an aristocratic excellence.

There are further significant accounts of legal foundation and instruction. Peter Euben has suggested that tragedy also educates the judgement of the community,¹² and it is interesting to note that the dramatic process is after all one that names itself as a pedagogical scenario—although this point is generally overlooked by scholars. The dramatic producer is *didaskalos* (teacher), and his text the *didaskalia*, that is both “instruction” and “production”.¹³ Aeschylus’ *Eumenides* is a *didaskalia* concerning foundations: most immediately, of the Areopagus Court to try homicide; then, of legal argumentation as an instruction of the city, and overall, of a “new”, democratic Athens, where civic institutions rather than individuals and their families have the greater authority.¹⁴ In this play, which predates the prose texts examined above, the language of law is central to the creation of Athens as a democratic city-state. The significant moment dramatizing political establishment in the play is the trial of Orestes in the Areopagus, and it is one which stages the pedagogy of law.¹⁵ Athena and Apollo, who both institute and oversee the legal process, are simultaneously legislators and teachers. Athena initiates legal process after the *bouleuterion* has been filled; she requires silence so that the whole city *learns* (*mathein*) her statutes (*thesmous emous*) for all time in order that justice may be recognized (570–3). The goddess then orders the trial to proceed by commanding that the prosecutor, in this case the chorus of Furies, speak first and assume the role of “teacher of the matter at hand” (cf. *pragmatos didaskalos*) (vv. 582–4).

Inasmuch as a legal hearing is one in which more than one side of the story is to be heard and considered and inasmuch as Aeschylus equates the speeches which form the litigation with instruction, there

¹² Euben, “Introduction”, (1986) 23–4; see also C. Meier (1990) 119 and Pérez in Loraux and Miralles (1998) 76.

¹³ For the *didaskalos* as trainer of the chorus, see e.g. Aristophanes *Birds* 912, *Achamians* 628, Antiphon 6.13; for *didaskaleia* as the training of the chorus, see Simonides 147.5 and Plato *Gorgias* 501e.

¹⁴ For the *Oresteia* as a work which charts the social function of language, especially of law, in the city, see Goldhill (1986) 5. Among recent scholars, Wallace (1985) 87 sees the *Eumenides* reflecting enactment of the Ephialtean reforms of 462/1 BC, which took authority from the Areopagus and gave to the people the guardianship of their own laws.

¹⁵ The founding of the Areopagus court was, in one tradition, shared by both Ares and Poseidon in the reign of Cecrops; cf. Demosthenes *Ag. Aristocrates* 65 ff. Aeschylus deliberately avoids the story of gods quarrelling. See Wallace (1985) 88.

are numerous pedagogical agents in this episode of the *Eumenides*. Invoking what the dramatic audience would have recognized as a topical vocabulary, the Furies goadingly proceed to order the defendant Orestes to *teach* (*didaxon*) the jury at 601 (cf. v. 431),¹⁶ inviting the latter's self-defence. But Orestes' teaching is superseded by that of his advocate, Apollo, who in his turn instructs the audience to *learn* (*mathe*) of the power of justice (619), in this case the law of the Father, Zeus. Apollo continues his lesson by offering instruction on the privileged position, and the power, of the male as father-figure in defence of Orestes' killing of his adulterous mother Clytemnestra.¹⁷ Instructing the chorus and jury again to *learn* (*math'*) that he speaks correctly or justly (cf. *orthô*s), the god presents a lecture on paternal authority in order to demolish the idea that a child, in this case Orestes, is the child of the "mother". The lesson consists in realizing that the true parent is the male inseminator and that a mother has only an auxiliary role to play in biological reproduction as the nurse, the host (*xene*) of the seed (658–9). The proof for this biological axiom is Zeus, the father who gives birth without a mother, and Athena, the child produced without the participation of a mother (663–73; cf. 734–43). Athena was not born from a womb but emerged as a shoot (*ernos*); moreover, she is to be identified with the city and with the army, with distinctly male concerns (662ff.).

Having surrendered the role of teacher to her brother, Athena, the goddess originally sprung from the head of Zeus and a figure associated with wisdom, sets an example to be followed by Athens. She identifies with her male parent at the close of the trial by announcing that, as her father's daughter, she will vote for Orestes (734–43). The pedagogy being inscribed in law ensures a good outcome for the male or male-identified—Athena, Apollo, Zeus, Orestes, Agamemnon—but a less fortunate one for the female—Clytemnestra and her advocates, the Furies. For the Furies in particular, it entails a loss of authority (cf. the "ancient laws" (*palaious nomous*) (808) and suffering (837); their lesson takes the form of *pathei mathein*, learning by suffering (cf. Sophocles *Oedipus Tyrannus* 1530). They may, however,

¹⁶ Podlecki regards the chorus' use of the imperative *διδάχων* at both vv. 431 and 601 as ironic in tone; see A. J. Podlecki, *Eumenides* (Warminster, 1989) 175.

¹⁷ Sommerstein notes a number of disturbing features of the new justice taught in the *Eumenides*, namely Apollo's instruction to the jurors to disregard oaths (620–1), the patriarchal biology of reproduction (657–68), and the god's use of bribery (667–73); see A. H. Sommerstein, *Aeschylus Eumenides* (Cambridge, 1989) 184.

maintain their roles as teachers of the state, provided they acknowledge the superiority of the new argument with its appeal to justice. The Furies may be recognized as “wiser” (*sophôtera*) than even Athena if they agree to stay in the new masculinist, but also more democratic, Athens and if they refashion themselves as the Eumenides or “Well-Intentioned Ones”.

The pedagogy of the *Eumenides*-trial is one which constructs the Athenian community both as a more populist but also as a patriarchal and misogynistic one, despite or perhaps precisely because of the *polis*’ association with a goddess, who excludes herself from the class of woman while redefining woman as a subordinate gender category. What it teaches in other words is the creation of a democratic identity that emphatically favours the male citizen. (Indeed, this staging of legal dogma is one which may be regarded as paradigmatic for the “teaching” of cases such as Lysias I *Against Eratosthenes*, which regards the adultery of the speaker’s wife as a threat to the authority of the *kurios* and his paternity (1.4 and 1.49–50).) There is in all this poignant and heightened pedagogical self-consciousness as the dramatic “teaching”—the *didaskalia*—contains within itself a depiction of the origins of a legal instruction.

III

Where historical, rather than mythical, figures are involved, Solon, Athens’ foremost legislator (archon 594/3 BC), fashions his own voice as that of the individual who instructs the emergent democratic state and consequently, helps in the production of a fiction about civic pedagogy.¹⁸ Here *nomos* is instrumental in the creation of a democratic identity for the community as a whole. The lawmaker-poet explicitly establishes his identity as the *Athenian teacher*. He characterizes his poetry and law as instruction in orderly government (*eunomia*), naming these discourses with the verb “to teach (*didaxai*)” (4.30–2 = Dem. 19.254ff.). Loraux persuasively argues that where Athens’ legislator is concerned, the verb *poiein* denotes both poetic activity and

¹⁸ According to Diodorus 12.11ff., Solon is the individual who established the legislation regarding education at Athens which dictated that the state should provide education for children who must receive it and which authors like Plato and Aristotle emulate in their own political programmes.

the art of the legislator, i.e. "making laws" (cf. Aristotle *AP* 9.2.; Herodotus 1.29 and Plutarch *Solon* 26.1 and 25.6.).¹⁹ Certainly, in legal discourse of the fourth century, the "laws of Solon" become the focus for the iconography of legal argument as teaching, with his name frequently invoked as a gesture of legal authority.²⁰ The speaker of Demosthenes oration 22 (*Ag. Androtion*) declares that the jury must learn (*mathein*) that in his capacity as lawgiver, Solon wrote laws regarding illegality (*paranomia*), amongst many others (22.25).²¹ The lesson the litigant has to teach is that Solonic law is in the interests of the common good, unlike the litigious activity of contemporary Athens.

In the fourth century, one of the most forceful depictions of Solonic law as a pedagogy comes from Isocrates oration 7, a speech which celebrates traditional democracy through the founding of the Areopagus lawcourt which in the fourth century dealt with cases involving homicide, wounding, arson, poisoning, and possibly matters of impiety.²² Isocrates proposes the reversion of the Areopagus to its pre-Ephialtic status, where the court was a powerful, aristocratic council in which fifty-one *ephetai*, elected for life on the basis of their wealth and background, ensured the guardianship of the laws (*nomophylakeia*) and heard cases dealing with homicide, and perhaps also crimes involving tyranny.²³ As other conservative authors in the fourth century,²⁴ the author uses the judicial institution as the focus for a political programme that is oligarchical in character, but unlike them, he uses Areopagitic ideology as the basis for a pedagogical ideal which is both distinct from and complementary to that offered in his other paideutic works (i.e. orations 13 and 15). Isocrates states that the Solonic and Cleisthenic democracies did not *educate* (cf. *epaideue*) the

¹⁹ See N. Loraux, "Solon et la voix de l'écrit", in Détienne (1988) 113; also cf. 100–3.

²⁰ See e.g. Aeschines 3.257, where Solon, the philosopher and good lawgiver", is contrasted with Demosthenes; Lysias 10.15 and 16, where the laws of Solon are actually "cited"; Cicero *pro Sext. Rosc.* 70 and Jones (1956) 107.

²¹ Καὶ μὴν κάκεινόν γε δεῖ μαθεῖν ὑμᾶς, ὅτι τοὺς νόμους ὁ τιθεὶς τούτους Σόλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς πολλοὺς, οὐδὲν ὅμοιος ὦν τούτῳ νομοθέτης, οὐχ ἐνὶ ἔδωκε τρόπον περὶ τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἐκάστων λαμβάνειν δίκην τοῖς βουλομένοις παρὰ τῶν ἀδικούντων, ἀλλὰ πολλαχῶς (22.25).

²² See Aristotle *AP* 57.3; also *AP* 60.2 and Lysias 7.11 (after 397/6 BC) for cases concerning the cutting down of olive trees; and Wallace (1985) 106.

²³ See Aristotle *AP* 4.4 and 8.4 and Wallace (1985) 4.

²⁴ E.g. Theramenes, Xenophon, Plato, Timotheus, Aristotle; see Wallace (1985) 132.

Athenians to regard licence as democracy, lawlessness as freedom, unrestrained speech as freedom under the law, and power to do everything as blessedness; rather they made—that is, following the logic which holds law as a pedagogy, educated—the citizens to be moderate (*sôphronesterous*) (20). Elsewhere in the speech the rhetorician asks his audience “learn thoroughly” (*katamathein*) what the city-state’s historical constitution was, the lesson provided by this text (see 7.28). He goes on to observe that if the conventional education of young Athenians was not rigorously regulated because they were expected to take responsibility for their own behavior, there was nonetheless the Areopagus to maintain order in the community (37). Juridical censure is a last pedagogical resort, revealing a consonance between “knowledge” and discipline.

In the *Antidosis* Isocrates uses the figure of Solon to authorize his self-fashioning as the teacher of rhetoric who benefits, rather than harms, Athens. A significant project of the speech is to re-invest the word “sophist”, which in the fourth century implies the unscrupulous professional teacher, with positive meaning. In an earlier democratic Athens, he claims, “sophist” was a term of commendation (313). The rhetorician rehabilitates the word “sophist” and the rhetorical culture of the ancient sophist, declaring that verbal ability has been responsible for many of the things which made and now continue to make Athens a great city. Athens’ original democratic founders were “sophists”, where the term denoted them as wise rulers. These are the men who freed the city-state from her various historical troubles—whether tyranny, slavery, or Persian invasion—by means of their verbal abilities. So Solon, Athens’ lawmaker, was originally known as a “sophist” (15.235 and 313). This archetypal sophist was responsible for the Athens which became the city deserving hegemony over the Greeks. As the leader of the people, he established their laws, ordered their affairs, and made them adore the city (232). He was the human agent who realizes the capacities of *logos* as a structuring medium of socio-political reality.

If Isocrates is to be regarded as a “sophist”, it is as Solon’s direct heir; he is Athens’ self-appointed political savior and political wise man, and not the disruptive political trouble-maker of present-day Athens. The rhetorician’s aetiological narratives, which trace civilized community to *logos* (cf. 15.253–6 and 3.5–9), and the nostalgic celebration of Solon in oration 15 and at 7.16 are the means of patently establishing this genealogy. In keeping with the overdeter-

mined representation of Solon as teacher, oration 15 presents Isocrates as the democratic city's ideal teacher. It is a didactic text through which the author instructs his fellow citizens in the true functions of rhetoric/philosophy and its practitioners (see 15.29, 58, 89, 197, cf. 40, 178). He is also to be regarded as the professional teacher who in his turn bequeaths the Solonic mantle upon his students. His pupils have included orators, generals, kings, and monarchs, the sort of people who ideally benefit their communities (15.30). Where Athens is specifically concerned, the rhetorician's pedagogy has been responsible for turning out men who were honoured with golden crowns for their services to the city (15.93–5). Among these pupils, the general Timotheus, son of Conon, stands out as the star pupil who increased the influence and power of Athens immeasurably through his military service (111, 121–2).²⁵ In a contemporary Athens which is ignorant of the true sophist's role an individual like Timotheus can only be unappreciated—the general is accused of being a traitor and forced to pay a fine of unprecedented sum (129).

Isocrates' performance of Solonic pedagogy in orations 7 and 15 is far from the only such performance. In oration 1 (*Ag. Timarchus*) Aeschines scripts another Solonic lesson in civic teaching, in effect re-establishing the authority of the laws in its audience's consciousness at a moment where transgression threatens their authority. Aeschines has been charged with treason by Demosthenes, with the support of his associate Timarchus, and in this speech, he attempts to discredit Timarchus by becoming the city's teacher. In particular, he teaches a lesson about the latter's lifestyle. The instruction begins: democracy is governed by law (*nomos*), which protects the citizen (4, cf. 5–6). The legislation of Solon, Draco, and other law-makers gave Athens moderation (*sophrosynê*), setting down prescriptions governing in particular the behavior of freeborn children, youths, and then private citizens and orators (*peri tôn rhêtôrôn*) (6–7). The citizens of Athens are the laws' guardians (7). In a gesture of self-consciousness, Aeschines details the legislation regarding the education of the young: the boy must be brought up to be useful (*chrêsimon*) to Athens (11), and to ensure this, legal precautions are taken lest he become the sexual victim of his teachers, and of older men who hang around the wrestling grounds (13–22).²⁶

²⁵ Too (1995) 131–2.

²⁶ For discussion of Aeschines *Against Timarchus* with regard to the regulation of

Later, Aeschines again explicitly signals the pedagogical status of the current legal proceeding—even if it might argued that every law-court speech implicitly has a pedagogical status. The orator notes that his prosecution might be discredited as it could be regarded as the beginning of “a terrible uneducation (cf. *deinês apaideusias*)” as far as Athens is concerned (132), but he defends his case as being precisely symbolic and enacting of education. The point is that Aeschines assumes the role of civic teacher, ensuring that the laws do not lose their force and that democracy is not undermined (179). The laws must be permitted to punish wrongdoers so that the laws may be rendered *kaloi kai kyrioi*, “fine masters”. It is precisely Timarchus’ actions and the possibility of his freedom which threaten to overturn the “common education” (cf. *tên koinên paideian*) with the result that Athens will have no further use for its pedagogues, the *paidotribai* and teachers (*didaskaloi*) who oversee children by maintaining the laws (187).²⁷ After all, Timarchus lives a life that is contrary to the laws (8), leaping around half-naked in the assembly where the laws rather require modest dress and deportment (25), serving as a prostitute (40), hanging around in gambling dens and dicing houses (53), consuming his patrimony, an offence which made one liable to *atimia*, i.e. civic disenfranchisement (94, 154, 195; cf. 119), and buying his way into public office (106ff.).

If Timarchus’ character and lifestyle disqualify him from being a representative and teacher of morality, let alone of Athens’ laws, so also does behavior of his associate, the orator Demosthenes. Demosthenes is a teacher who professes to teach young men skill in rhetoric, yet practises his knowledge upon the city-state as deception (cf. *apatêi*) and fraud (117). He instructs Athens to wipe out its laws, or else to ignore the case brought against Timarchus by Aeschines (119). Yet Demosthenes is the lawless individual, who squandered his patrimony and consequently hunted young men for their wealth (170). As the orator effeminately dressed in soft clothes and so implicitly setting a bad example for his audience, his notional students (131), he is also the individual who violates the traditional, i.e. Solonic, ideal of mas-

male sexuality, see J. J. Winkler, “Laying Down the Law: The Oversight of Men’s Sexual Behavior in Classical Athens”, in Winkler (1990) 45–70, esp. 54–61.

²⁷ Cf. Aristophanes *Clouds* 1040, where the “Weaker Speech” claims that its speaks against the law and what is just, and 1043, where it announces itself as a refutation of the *paideusis* of cold baths which here emblemize traditional morality.

culinity as one produced around the virtue of moderation (*sôphrosunê*).²⁸

IV

The texts and images examined so far identify originative moments for the laws, their various representatives, and series of discursive acts that have described themselves or have been described as “teaching”. Beyond these representations, moreover, are further texts which attribute pedagogical agency directly to the personified laws to make the point that the laws teach the city.

Diogenes Laertius reports that when someone asked him how his son should be best educated, the Pythagorean Xenophilus told him to ensure that the child was the citizen of a well-governed state (*ei poleôs eunomoumenês genêtheiê*, 8.16). The implied sub-texts in this conversation are: that the child should be privately instructed by professional pedagogues (the questioner’s), and that the child will be reared by the state’s own mechanisms, the laws (Xenophilus). The dialogue from a source of the Roman period reflects an earlier ideal of civic pedagogy. Indeed, when Isocrates addresses advice to Nicocles in oration 2, he observes that private citizens are educated by various means (cf. *polla ta paideuonta*)—the need to make a living, the laws which govern the community, the outspokenness of others, the poets—while rulers have no such influences and therefore require private counsel (2.2–3). The laws are a pedagogical given, no less than poetry, even in a monarchy.

Elsewhere, the rhetorician has the Spartan king Archidamus persuade his citizens to undertake war by appealing amongst other things, to the laws in which they were all educated (6.110; cf. Thuc. 1.84.3–4).²⁹ The Spartan ruler defers to law as his authority.³⁰ It is relevant that Pindar had proposed that law is “king” (cf. fr. 169),

²⁸ Masculinity does not exclude pederastic love between free males, and Aeschines cites the example of the homosexual lovers Harmodius and Aristogeiton as benefactors of Athens through their “modest and lawful” (*sôphrôn kai ennomos*) desire for one another; Aesch. 1.139–40. Prostitution of young men is anathema to this modest masculinity; cf. 1.155.

²⁹ See comments of de Romilly (1971) 232, who contrasts this teaching with the Athenian one set out by Pericles at Thuc. 2.36.4.

³⁰ Cf. also Archidamus’ comments at Thucydides 1.84.3 and de Romilly (1992) 199.

while Aristotle reports the excessive description of laws (cf. *nomous*) as the "rulers of cities (*tous tôn poleôn basileis*)".³¹ To the unlikely representative of law and order, the sycophant Meletus, Socrates ascribes the view that the laws (*nomoi*) makes the citizens better, instructing the youth with the help of judges (*hoi dikastai*) (*Apology* 24e). The laws take aside involuntary (cf. *akôn*) transgressors to teach (*didaskein*) and admonish (*nouthetein*) them (26a).

One of the most prominent professional teachers at Athens, Protagoras, is represented as subordinating his private instruction to that offered by the city. In the Platonic dialogue named for him, the sophist observes that what a community most values in its members is the presence of justice, a soundness of mind, and holiness. He observes that the authorities will teach, punish, and reform or else remove from the community anyone who does not display these qualities and its behaviors (325ab). The young child who errs is compared to a warped piece of wood which needs threats and beatings to be straightened out (325d). To the end of transforming his pupil into a governable citizen, the teacher will make him study and memorize texts which provide good examples from the past, stories of heroic deeds. The student will imitate these examples (326ab). When the sophist teaches the child to write, he will trace lines (*grammas*)—rather than the outline of letters—with his stylus (*graphis*) and force the children to write in keeping with the guidance of the lines (*kata tēn hugēgesin tôn grammôn*) (326d).³² Education is concerned with instilling social conformity and with producing the orderly citizen (cf. *eukosmias*, 325e1).

Protagoras draws a parallel between instruction in writing, which sets boundaries for what is acceptable as far as this activity is concerned, and the laws, which are to be understood as the privileged template for just behavior where the adult citizen is concerned. But the sophist also makes evident the sense in which the teaching of the child is only propaedeutic to that of the laws when he declares that when students leave their teachers, the city forces them to learn the laws and to live according to the example (*kata paradeigma*) provided by them (326c7–8).³³ As teachers of the citizens, the laws are

³¹ Cf. Plato *Gorgias* 484b and *Laws* 690b and 714e; also see Jones (1956) 71.

³² For the interpretation of *grammas* as "lines", see Turner (1965).

³³ The laws were publicly displayed, presumably for all citizens to see and consult, on revolving wooden beams called *axones* that stood in the Prytaneum, or on

disciplinary; the laws are moral; the laws are the “guardians of justice” (cf. Gorgias *Palamedes* 30 = DK 82 B11a.30). It is significant that the sophist Protagoras should offer an account of socialization which draws an analogy with legal discipline, for that the historical Protagoras served as the legislator of the panhellenic colony of Thurii deserves note here (see Diogenes Laertius 9.50).³⁴ That teaching is ultimately a mode of corrective discipline highlights its status as a mode of socialization; teaching the individual is not distinct from the larger project of instructing the community through the laws. The second is the antecedent and indeed, the larger pedagogical purpose.

The most explicit account of the laws as teachers of the city is to be found in Plato's *Crito*. In this dialogue Socrates is asked by his friend Crito to “teach” (imperative: *didaske*, 49e2) why he cannot escape from the city to avoid execution. The centerpiece of this work is an imaginary dialogue which the philosopher stages with the personified Laws (*nomoi*).³⁵ These Laws portray themselves as providing children with an education in Athenian culture (50d-e), as the “family” which bears, educates and instructs them—in this case, Socrates—in what the community deems fine (51c8-d1):

For did we bear you, raise you, educate (*paideusantes*) you, and hand over to you and to all the other citizens all the fine things which we were able to?³⁶

The Laws are, it is implied, the (Solonic) legislation which requires that Athenian children be instructed in their culture (see 50d5-e1).³⁷

tablets or pillars called *kyrbeis*. For discussion of the *axones* and *kyrbeis*, see Stroud (1979) and Robertson (1986).

³⁴ See also J. S. Morrison, “The Place of Protagoras in Athenian Public Life (460–415 BC)”, *CQ* 35 (1941), 1–16; Schiappa (1991) 12 and de Romilly (1992) 214.

³⁵ Morrow (1960) 321 suggests instead that Socrates is speaking of “customs” rather than “laws”, although the majority of subsequent understand *nomoi* to refer to “laws”. Whether the *nomoi* are to be understood as “customs” or as “laws” (as I understand them), it is mistaken to regard this text as evidence for the existence of compulsory education at Athens, which the majority of scholars now reject: see Harvey (1966) 589 n. 10; Schmitter (1975); Détienne, “L'espace de la publicité: ses opérateurs intellectuels dans la cité” in Détienne (ed.) (1988) 30; and Robb (1994) 129.

Svenbro (1993) 160–1 argues that the Laws do not have a real, external voice but that Socrates perceives an internal voice, perhaps like the daemonic voice of *Theages* 128d, *Phaedrus* 242b–c, and *Apol.* 31d.

³⁶ ἡμεῖς γὰρ σε γεννήσαντες, ἐκτρέφαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἀπάντων ὧν οἰοί τ' ἡμεν καλῶν σοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν πολίταις.

³⁷ Too (1995) 212.

They characterize education as a process of literal and metaphorical *reproduction*. The “fatherland” (*patris*) stands in place of the mere individual *patēr*, who is, according to the logic of the dialogue, a product—child, student, citizen—of this all-encompassing “father-figure”. The *nomoi* are the privileged “family” and consequently, they instruct Socrates to hand over his children to be nurtured and educated by them in turn while he devotes himself to the cause of justice, namely his own execution by the state (54b2–3).

Against Democritus’ sentiment that the wise man has no need to obey the laws (DK 68 A 166),³⁸ Plato’s *Crito* explicitly declares legal pedagogy to be the instruction which takes precedence over the traditional education offered by the biological father, and in this, the dialogue reflects aspects of Athenian legislation.³⁹ On the basis of these lines A. D. Woozley characterizes the authority of the Laws as absolute: “The use made of the law-as-parents figures is to emphasise that between law and subject, as between parent and child, the relation of justice is not one of symmetrical equality; whatever treatment the law gives to the subject, believing it to be just, will not necessarily be just for the subject to give to the law (50e)”.⁴⁰ The parent-child analogy speaks to the unquestionable authority of the laws: the state must be understood to minimize the rights of the individual.⁴¹ But the imaginary dialogue invites qualification of this reading. Socrates goes on to explain that the citizen has the option of persuading (*peithein*) the Laws to seek an alternative justice, and in failing, to acquiesce to their judgement (52a3).⁴² In the Athens of

³⁸ ἐπίνοιαν γὰρ κακὴν τοὺς νόμους ἔλεγε καὶ οὐ χρὴ νόμοις πειθαρχεῖν τὸν σοφόν, ἀλλὰ ἐλευθερίως ζῆν, DK 68 A 166 (= Epiph. *Adv. Haer.* 3.2.9).

³⁹ The constructed “biologism” of law also becomes apparent where the nurturing and education of the male orphans of the Athenian war dead is concerned: see e.g. Aristophanes *Peace* 82; Aeschines *Ag. Ctesiphon* 154; Thucydides 2.46.1; Lysias fr. 6.35–40; Plato *Menexenus* 248d–249a; *Laws* 926d7–e; Aristotle *Politics* 1268a5–11; *Ath. Con.* 24.3. See discussion in Loraux (1986) 26–7; Rahe (1992) 64–7 and 826 (for references); and Too (1995) 216–8. Also cf. Goldhill (1986) 76–7. The orphan is handed over to a civic leader, whether the *orphanophylax* (Xenophon *Poroi* 2.7; Suda s.v. *orphanistai*), or the archon (*Menexenus* 248e), until he achieves the age of majority when he resumes the identity as his biological father’s son: see Loraux (1986) 27. The city assumes, as it were, the role of *kyrios*, to ensure the son’s passage into maturity, perhaps just as Athena-Mentor, Nestor, and Menelaus amongst others provide the paradigm of male identity for the temporarily fatherless Telemachus in the *Odyssey*.

⁴⁰ Woozley (1979) 68 and Woozley (1976).

⁴¹ Woozley (1979) 72.

⁴² Panagiotou (1988) 50.

the dialogue, to attempt persuasion inevitably entails recourse to the community's shared language, which is only that prescribed by the Laws themselves; there is no point in seeking a different justice since the laws control the language of justice.

Alternatively, the philosopher has the option of fleeing the state and its Laws. This, however, is not a viable solution to Socrates' current predicament, for to flee the Laws and their justice would be to renounce his identity as a *citizen* of the state. In fleeing, Socrates would resemble a slave (53d1 and 51e4) and his children would be disinherited as strangers (*xenoi*). Being a citizen implies *consent* to the teaching and rule of law, and breaking that contract renders the individual a transgressor (cf. *diaphtoreus*), a corrupter of youths, as his opponents in the *Apology* charge.⁴³ The only other option available to the philosopher is the creation of another community where the laws are more compatible with a "true" justice. This perhaps is the project of the *Republic* and *Laws*.

V

Ideally, the practitioners of law, i.e. rhetoricians and orators, will be *like* (*homoioi*) the laws, as Isocrates proposes (*Areopagiticus* 14).⁴⁴ There is a sense in which legal pedagogy, particularly at Athens, is a solip-sistic pedagogy. Xenophon has Pericles say that "all the laws are what the common people write when they come together and take thought, to declare what they must do and not do" (*Memorabilia* 1.2.42).⁴⁵ If the laws are a consensus of the people, and if the laws are the educators of the people, then it might be argued that the people ultimately are their own teachers. The laws, whether of the

⁴³ Campbell (1984) 43: "The upshot of Socrates' dialogical soliloquy in *Crito*, then, is to recapitulate the conservative conclusion of the Greek scientists: intellectual norms must not obtrude upon the city's *voμoί*."

⁴⁴ Note that the rhetorician's instruction of the "prince" Nicocles has as its obvious goal the transformation of the addressee into a good legislator, and therefore teacher of his people by observance of moral law (cf. section 17). The prince becomes the king who speaks as the teacher of law in *Nicocles*, where the predominant tone is the work is didactic—see e.g. the imperatives "imitate" (*mimou*) (17), "seek" (*zētei*) (17), "inhabit" (*oikei*) (19), "possess" (*ktō*) (27), "observe" (*theōrei*) (35).

⁴⁵ πάντες οὗτοι νόμοι εἰσὶν, οὓς τὸ πλῆθος συνελθὼν καὶ δοκιμάσαν ἐγράψε, φράζον ὅτε δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ μὴ (Xenophon *Memorabilia* 1.2.42). Also cf. Lycophron DK 83 fr. 3 and Demosthenes *Ag. Aristogeiton* 16 and 70; and de Romilly (1992) 167–82, esp. 167–8.

Areopagus or of Draco or of Solon, become for the self-teaching *polis* a presence which authorizes, both in the senses of ascribing *nomoi* to a creator and of reverencing knowledge of oneself as a citizen and of the community as a city (cf. also Plato *Phaedrus* 258c1). The laws and their rhetorics instruct the city-state in its identity as a democratic community, the citizens in the role as responsible members of such a community, and perhaps above all, it teaches its audiences about the value of public language as a pedagogical medium. Perhaps it makes sense that Hipparchus, son of Peisistratus, inscribed on the Hermes set up along the roads to educate the citizens the Delphic saying “know thyself (*gnôthi sauton*)” among various other “teachings”—the poetry of Homer, Anacreon, Semonides, and other demonstrations of *sophia* (Plato *Hipparchus* 228e1).

Yet, the city-state’s moral pedagogy is enacted in the very discourse which renders it open to debate, question, and contradiction—namely, the language of the lawcourts and its contests. So in the interests of self-preservation, the laws must prohibit those who have violated them from standing and speaking as their teachers. In oration 1 Aeschines sets out the sexual misdemeanors—prostitution, pimping, pederasty—which disqualify an individual from public address. In noting that Solon prescribed who might address the Assembly and who might not, he refers to a “scrutiny of public men” (*dokimasia rhetorôn*), which serves to disqualify from the orator’s platform individuals who have beaten their father or mother, or otherwise disrespected them (1.27–8; also 186). Lysias 10 informs us that disqualification from the orator’s platform is to be enforced for uttering the “unsayables (*aporrhêta*)”, namely for claiming that another is a “father-beater (*patraloias*)”, a “mother-beater (*mêtraloias*)”, a shield-thrower, a clothes-thief (*lôpodytês*), or a kidnapper (*andrapodistês*) (10.8–10). From the perspective of the understanding of law as pedagogy, the slanderer is engaging in an instruction in the transgression; the behaviors named as “unsayables” are potential negative examples to the jury-pupils. Thus also, it is the case that *atimoi*, who are disenfranchised such that they lose, among other rights, the right to address the people, are precisely individuals who have acted in such a way as to call into question their entitlement to full citizenship—again, state debtors, thieves, recipients of bribes, military deserters and cowards, convicted perjurers (cf. Andocides 1.74–5).

Furthermore, the laws require that their “pupils” are obedient students. Aeschines writes that with regard to the orderly behavior of

orators (cf. *peri tês tôn rhêtôrôn eukosmias*) Solonic law permits the oldest citizen to speak to the city without hubbub and chaos from the audience so that the state may benefit from his experience, and likewise the other citizens in order of their age (3.2; also Plutarch *An res publica senî gerenda sit* 784c–d). The rhetorical teacher is characterized as father-figure, or at least, as his representative.

VI

The laws constitute a civic pedagogy that renders the scholarly debate over whether a compulsory system of education in the democratic city specious: legal pedagogy is to be viewed as the community's education system apart from and despite any other competing claims. This is why, as A. H. M. Jones observes in *The Greek City*, the laws were never the subject of private or public instruction in Greece, where "instruction" must mean the subject of teaching based on a structured curriculum—and one might argue that, after all, Athenian legal discourse is one large and *varied* lesson *solipsistically* derived from the laws.⁴⁶ The rhetoric of the Attic law court is a significant dimension of the universal education that Cynthia Farrar understands to be democracy's political education because it appeals to a particular iconography of the "teachers" of the city-state.⁴⁷

But this discourse may in turn be reframed: taken to a possible logical conclusion in the fourth century, Athens' instruction of her citizens may be viewed as teaching in the city's hegemonic status: the city's democracy and the observance of her cultural institutions and laws are what qualify her to be the teacher of all Greece. And so, Isocrates declares that all those skilled in rhetoric have been the pupils (*mathêtas*) of Athens (15.295–6), re-iterating a point made earlier in the speech that pupils come to the city's teachers, and particularly to Isocrates, from the rest of the Greek-speaking, i.e. the civilized world (15.224–5), distinguishing them from the itinerant sophist who must hunt after his students and their fees. And so, too,

⁴⁶ See Jones (1940) 224 and 253; also Jones (1956) 11. See as well Adam Smith's observation that law never became a "science" in ancient Greece with the result that legal decisions often came about through a chaotic process; Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, V. 3 art. 2, in Dickey (1993) 184.

⁴⁷ Farrar in Dunn (1992) 24.

Pericles' articulation of civic pedagogy as Hellenic in Thucydides' *Funeral Oration* makes apparent the sense in which the idea of Athens as "teacher of Greece" is a hegemonic statement. As the funeral orator, Pericles is the individual who embodies the city's didactic. As the city's appointed encomiast he displaces society's traditional teachers (cf. Plato *Republic* 606e), and thus Athens requires neither a Homer nor any other poet who writes for delight to praise it (2.41.4). The general's own speech is a political instruction, one that provides Athens with a lesson (*didaskalia*) regarding its present struggle with Sparta (2.42.1), crediting the city's power to the past deeds of the ancestors who fought in the Persian War (2.36). It is also a lesson in the city-state's own didactic authority, for Athens is cast as the "education (*paideusis*)" of all Greece (2.41.1), offering other states a paradigm for their laws rather than emulating them (2.37.1) and becoming identified with skill (*technê*) and knowledge (*epistêmê*).⁴⁸

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⁴⁸ Cf. also Nicias' speech at Thucydides 7.63.3–4 for Athens' knowledge and language as being superior to their opponents' military strength. The idea that Sparta is the teacher of all Greece as far as virtue and civic order are concerned is found at Plutarch *Lycurgus* 30. 5: . . . τοὺς μὲν ἄνδρας ἀρμοστὰς καὶ σωφρονιστὰς τῶν ἐκασταχοῦ δήμων καὶ ἀρχότων ὀνομάζοντες, πρὸς δὲ σύμπασαν τὴν τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν πόλιν ὥσπερ παιδαγωγὸν ἢ διδάσκαλον εὐσημιμονος βίου καὶ τεταγμένης πολιτείας ἀποβλεπόντες.

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LIBERAL EDUCATION IN PLATO'S *REPUBLIC* AND ARISTOTLE'S *POLITICS*

Andrea Wilson Nightingale

In this paper, I want to examine the educational systems that Plato and Aristotle designed for the "good" cities discussed in the *Republic* and *Politics*. In these texts, Plato and Aristotle set forth a *paideia* that is designed for a specific *politeia*: an educational system that will train "liberal" and "free" individuals who can serve as a virtuous governing body. Both philosophers are setting forth an ideal rather than describing existing educational programmes or even the education that each offered in his own school.¹ I will therefore not discuss the institutions of the Academy or Lyceum, or the curricula that were used in these schools. Rather, I will focus on Plato and Aristotle's detailed descriptions of the education that will produce "truly" free individuals who can rule in the "good" city. In particular, I will address the following questions: How do these educational programmes differ from traditional Greek pedagogy? What kinds of freedom does the "liberal" education aim to produce, and how does this freedom enable the students to become good citizens and rulers? What are the ideological underpinnings of the liberal education as these philosophers conceive it?

I have chosen to focus on Plato and Aristotle's discussions of education in the *Republic* and *Politics* because these are the first extant accounts of liberal education in ancient Greece and thus may be seen as foundational discourses for the institution of humanistic study in the West. To be sure, the notion of the "liberal education" was already under discussion among Athenian intellectuals in the late fifth century.² But the fourth-century writers Plato and Aristotle offer accounts that are far more clearly conceptualized and articulated than those of their predecessors. As we will see, some of Plato and

¹ On Plato's Academy and its curriculum, see Field (1930) ch. 3; Jaeger (1943, vol. 2) 305–9 and passim; Marrou (1964) 102–4. On Aristotle's school, see Lynch (1972).

² Raafaub (1983).

Aristotle's most basic principles continue to inform our modern notions of the "liberal education." A careful examination of their accounts of education will contribute to our ongoing efforts to conceive and reconceive the field of humanistic or "liberal" studies in the early twenty-first century.

I

Before turning to Plato and Aristotle, I want to discuss the ancient notion of the "illiberal" or (as they are often called) the "banausic" arts, since it is in opposition to these arts and activities that the "liberal" education was shaped and defined. Although the word "illiberal" (*aneleutherios*) is readily understood as designating any person or activity that is "unfree," the term "banausic" (*banausos*) is more difficult to apprehend. Yet these two words are regularly linked together by fourth-century writers and even used as virtual synonyms. English translators (including Liddell and Scott) often render the word "*banausos*" as "mechanic" or "base mechanic." Unfortunately, the word "mechanic" designates something very different from the "banausic" worker, and thus serves to obscure the true sense of "*banausos*" and "*banausia*." In the most general terms, "*banausoi*" is the label for people who earn a living by plying a trade or craft that involves the use of the hands. The word "artisan" (in its broadest sense) is more accurate than "mechanic," though even this term is too limited. It is important to emphasize that the term "*banausos*" generally carries a pejorative sense, since it marks a person as mercantile and servile.³ In fact, the term is virtually monopolized by aristocratic writers, and it therefore carries with it the perspective and prejudices of the leisured elite.⁴

A few examples from fourth-century writers will illustrate these

³ As Whitehead (1977) 119 rightly observes, "the 'definition' of a banausos . . . can only be articulated by someone outside banausia," i.e. by the leisured and aristocratic elite. On Greek attitudes towards labor and laborers, see Glotz (1987) 160–167; Vernant (1983) chs. 10–11; Mossé (1969) ch. 2; Burford (1972) 25–6 and 184–218, and (1993) ch. 5; Rössler (1981); Ste. Croix (1981) 179–204; and Wood (1989) 137–145.

⁴ For a useful survey of the notion of *banausia* in the fifth and fourth centuries BC, see Rössler (1981) 203–43. See also Nightingale (1995) 55–9 and (1996) 29–34, esp. 30 n. 3.

points. Aristotle classifies the banausic trades as a form of "labor for hire" (*mistharnia*); he considers banausic workers "illiberal" and unfree insofar as they must serve and cater to others for their livelihood (*Politics* I.11, 1258b20–6). Both Xenophon and Aristotle claim that *banausoi* are unfit for rule, since they do not have the "leisure" necessary for political life (*Oeconomicus* 4.2–3; *Politics* III.5, 1278a). As Aristotle believes,

the best ordered city will not make the *banausos* a citizen. And if the *banausos* is a citizen, then what we said to be the virtue of a citizen will not belong to every citizen, nor even be defined as the virtue of a free man, but will only belong to those individuals who are released from occupations which provide the necessities of life. (*Politics* III.5, 1278a6–11.)

To be sure, the banausic citizens in Athens were, at times, given temporary release from their labors because the city paid the poorer citizens to participate in the government. But the mere possession of free time did not, according to Aristotle, make the *banausoi* leisured in the proper sense. For banausic occupations, he claims, make the "mind" of the worker "unleisured and petty" and thus inherently unsuited for political affairs.⁵ Arguing along similar lines, Plato identifies *banausia* as a condition of the soul rather than merely a matter of occupation and status:

Why is it, do you think, that *banausia* and working with one's hands is a matter of reproach? Shall we not say that it is because that part which is by nature the best in a man is weak, with the result that it is unable to rule the beasts within him, but serves them, and can learn nothing but the means of flattering them? (*Republic* 590c)

In sum, *banausoi* are "illiberal" individuals who are unleisured and unfit to rule because (1) they are "servile" laborers for hire, and (2) their minds/souls are made slavish by their lowly occupations. The positive disdain for *banausoi* emerges perhaps most clearly in the Aristotelian *Magna Moralia* (II.7, 1205a): "some aspects of nature are base, such as maggots and dungbeetles and all such despised animals, but nature is not for this reason to be counted as base; likewise there are base kinds of expertise, such as the *banausic* arts, but expertise is not for this reason base."

The "liberal" man, by contrast, is leisured, educated, independent,

⁵ ἄσυχλον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ταπεινήν, *Politics* VIII.2.1337b14–15.

and “truly” fit for rule. Only a liberal education, according to its advocates, could produce virtuous and free men fit to govern a good city. Needless to say, fourth-century Greeks who had received a “liberal” education were not generally serving as the sole and rightful rulers of their cities. But the very fact that these elites did not have an exclusive claim to political power in this period made it all the more important that they find a sure way to distinguish themselves from their inferiors (especially the upwardly mobile).⁶ The possession of a liberal education served this purpose, since it identified and separated the elite by recourse to criteria other than wealth or political power. As Raaflaub has shown, the rhetoric of “liberal” and “illiberal” arts and activities was part of a larger ideology constructed by aristocrats hostile to democracy; in the later fifth and fourth centuries, oligarchs and their sympathizers “began to politicize the notion of *eleutherios* and to develop the concept of the *truly* free citizen in order to bolster their aspirations to exclusive government and power in the polis.”⁷ In short, in this period we find a new rhetoric and ideology in which the “truly free” individual was contrasted with men who were free in a merely legal and civic sense. It is in the context of this political and ideological programme that Plato and Aristotle develop their notions of the “liberal” education. As we will see, each develops a conception of “freedom” that is counterposed to political and practical pursuits; paradoxically, it is the person achieving this radical form of freedom—in which he is not a performer of good actions but a spectator of the good and the fine—who is most qualified for rule.

II

The educational system set forth in the *Republic* for the philosophic rulers of the ideal city has two stages. The first stage, which is outlined in books II–IV, is designed for youths up to the age of 20. This early education is in many ways consonant with traditional Greek educational practices. As Socrates says at 376e: “What is our

⁶ See, e.g., Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* II.7 1107b16–20, IV.2, 1122a28–33, and especially IV.2, 1123a18–27 (on these and related passages, see Von Reden (1995) 85 and Nightingale (1996) 32–3).

⁷ Raaflaub (1983) 534.

education to be? Or is it difficult to find anything better than that which been discovered over a long period of time, namely gymnastics for the body and music (*mousikê*) for the soul?" Socrates places special emphasis on the use of poetry in education, since this has the greatest impact on the formation of character. In particular, poetry produces an "imitative" response in those who perform it; this response can be beneficial or harmful depending on the content and form of the poem (in the latter case, because the imitative effect is increased when the discourse is dramatized rather than narrated). As Socrates suggests, "to assimilate oneself to another either in voice or gesture is to imitate (*mimeisthai*) the man to whom he is assimilating himself. . . ." (393c) Here, "imitation" carries the sense of "emulating" or "acting like" a given model. As Nehamas argues,

'Imitation,' as it was traditionally applied to poetry, speaking, and dancing, meant primarily *acting like* someone else. It did not carry with it the connotation of imitating only the appearance as opposed to the reality of the object imitated, or the connected notion of deceiving and counterfeiting. In fact, the crucial role that poetry played in education seems to have depended precisely on a conflation between appearance and reality.⁸

It is only in book X of the *Republic*, which is not dealing with the educational system, that "imitation" as a representation of "appearance" is first introduced. In books II–III, Plato is working with the traditional notion of "imitation" as "acting like" a given model.⁹

Although Plato does align himself with certain traditional practices in the first stage of his educational system, he departs from tradition in some crucial ways. First, Plato makes a powerful and prescient argument that women as well as men (if they are qualified) must be educated to be rulers and philosophers.¹⁰ In addition (and

⁸ Nehamas (1999) 260 (my italics).

⁹ For some useful analyses of Plato's discussion of poetry in *Republic* books II–III and the rather different account in book X, see Gadamer (1980) ch. 3, Griswold (1981), Annas (1982), Nehamas (1999, repr.), Woodruff (1982), Belfiore (1983 and 1984), Halliwell (1984), Nussbaum (1986) ch. 7.3 and passim, and Ferrari (1989)]. I am confining myself to the discussion of poetry in books II–III, since these deal explicitly with education. The account in book X deals with the performance of poetry in the city rather than its use in the educational system, and is thus less germane to my topic. I assume that the account in book X does not negate the basic points made in books II–III, namely, that only poems or passages of poems providing good models and true accounts of gods and heroes will be allowed in the educational curriculum.

¹⁰ Plato lays out this argument in book V, after he has described the first phase

lamentably), Plato recommends a strict programme of censorship in order to ensure that the youths in the ideal city imitate only good models. In books II–III, he rejects a number of famous poems (or key passages of poems) on the grounds that they misrepresent the truth about gods and human heroes. He also suggests that poems used in the educational curriculum should contain a minimum amount of dramatic impersonation (where the performer speaks in the voice of one of the characters) and a maximum amount of narration, in spite of the fact that “boys and their tutors” prefer dramatic poems (396c–398b). As a result, the teachers can harness the power of poetry and the imitative effects it produces while keeping the students from imitating bad models and contradictory types of characters.

The imitation of noble men celebrated in good poetry prepares students to “perform” virtue and wisdom in private and public life as adults. I am borrowing this term from Richard Martin, who has recently argued that the wisdom of the Seven Sages (in the archaic period) is best characterized as a “performance of wisdom”—a performance which was manifested in discourse, action, or a combination of the two.¹¹ This notion of performing wisdom, I believe, can be applied to the great majority of archaic and classical wise men. Given that there were no official institutions that offered training in wisdom and “virtue” until Isocrates and Plato founded their schools in the early fourth century (and even these were held in suspicion by many people), a man could only be recognized as good or wise by demonstrating these qualities in public (by words and/or deeds). Even the sophists, who claimed to be professional teachers of various kinds of wisdom, had to travel around Greece performing their skills in front of live audiences (both public and private). Although some few men disseminated their expertise via the written word, they were a tiny minority until the fourth century, and in this period men who relied upon the written word to convey their ideas could still only reach a small audience. Even in the fourth century, then, the performance of wisdom and expertise—which took place in the assemblies and lawcourts, at civic festivals, on military expeditions, at religious events, and in other public contexts—commanded far more

of the educational system; but he makes it clear that (gifted) girls and young women will receive the same education as the boys from the very beginning.

¹¹ Martin (1993).

influence and power than did the communication of wisdom and ideas through writing.

What, then, makes an education in the "performance" of wisdom and virtue "liberal"? On the most basic level, the students become "liberal" and truly free by imitating good and "liberal" men and actions. As Socrates says at 395c-d, "if the guardians imitate, beginning in childhood they should imitate what is fitting for them—men who are brave, self controlled, pious, free and all such things; but things that are illiberal (*aneleuthera*) they should neither do nor be clever at imitating . . . lest from the imitation they imbibe the reality." But what exactly does Plato mean by "freedom" or "liberality" (and its converse, "illiberality")? As I will suggest, Plato aims at one kind of freedom in the first stage of education, and a more radical freedom in the second stage (which is outlined in books VI–VII, 502d ff.). The first stage is designed to produce virtues such as courage, endurance, temperance, piety, and self-control, thus rendering the students free from the compulsions and enticements of the irrational parts of the soul. By imitating and imbibing good models, the student becomes free in the sense that he is able to govern the lower parts of his soul; by controlling these irrational parts, the student develops a harmonized soul, which prepares him to perform good actions in private and public contexts. The emphasis in the early educational programme is on practical and political virtue; the goal is to produce good habits and a good character. Although the youths must learn to recognize good men and good actions, they achieve this not by perfecting their intellectual capacities by rather by studying and absorbing good models. In short, they are not taught to develop their own ideas but rather to absorb and enact a specific ideology.

III

Plato sets forth a quite different mode of education in books VI–VII—a training designed to produce what he calls "philosophers."¹² This education focuses on the intellect, and it produces a far more radical

¹² For Plato's "definition" of the new discipline and social practice called "philosophy," see Nightingale (1995) chs. 1–2.

kind of freedom.¹³ It is important to emphasize that, in the *Republic*, Plato conceives of his educational system as diametrically opposed to democratic “education.”¹⁴ At 492a–b, for example, Socrates says that it is “the many” (*hoi polloi*) who are the true educators in Athens and, indeed, are the “greatest sophists” (*megistous . . . sophistas*):

When the multitude, sitting together at the assemblies or in the courts or in theaters or camps or any other public gathering, with a great uproar censure some things that are said and done and praise others, both in an excessive way. . . . in such a situation, what state of heart will a young person possess? What sort of private education will hold out against this—who will not be overwhelmed and swept away, carried by the current of such praise and censure wherever it may lead, and thus be brought to say that those things are good and evil which the crowd pronounces so, and even to do what they do and be such as they are? (492b–c)

“The many,” then, are more truly educators than the sophists; in fact, the sophists “teach nothing other than the opinions of the many—the things that they opine when they are gathered together” (493a). And the same can be said for poets and politicians:

How, then, does the man who considers it wisdom to have learned the passions and pleasures of the variegated multitude when it is assembled—whether in the case of painting, or poetry, or, for that matter, politics—differ from the sophist? For if a person associates with these people, exhibiting either his poetry or some other piece of craftsmanship or else his service to the city, and grants the multitude mastery over him beyond what is necessary, the proverbial “necessity of Diomedes” will make him do the things which these people praise. (493c–d)

In short, the leading voices in Athens—the politicians and poets—are, in essence, no different from the “wage-earning” (*mistharmountôn*) sophists (493a): all of these allegedly powerful men defer to the the

¹³ See Vlastos’ important article on slavery in Plato’s thought (1981), which discusses the metaphysical, psychological, and cosmological nature of non-freedom and the “slavish” soul, thus laying the groundwork for an understanding of Plato’s conception of freedom.

¹⁴ See Ober (1998) ch. 4 for a discussion of “democratic” discourse, education, and praxis, and the radically opposed “philosophic” political and discursive system outlined in Plato. See also Yunis (1996) chs. 5–6. For an argument that the *Republic* is not designed as a literal articulation of Plato’s political philosophy, and that the stark opposition between philosophy and democracy is undermined by the ironic and utopian discourse of the text, see Griswold 1999b. Since I am working within the discursive system of the *Republic*, the question of whether Plato meant it literally is beyond the scope of this essay.

multitude—the “true teachers” in Athens—in order to acquire money, honor, or power.

To characterize upper-class Athenians as “wage-earners” working for the multitude is a bold piece of rhetoric that collapses traditional Greek social and political hierarchies. In classical Athens, politicians and poets generally belonged to the class of people who did not have to work for a living. Nonetheless, Plato casts all men who enter into negotiations with “the many” as banausic wage-earners. It is of course the servility of the poets and politicians that assimilates them to money-makers such as sophists and artisans. For the products of their wisdom—be they poems or political speeches and actions—are offered in exchange for some kind of recompense. Because these men give the people what they want in exchange for power, honor and/or money, Plato suggests, they are as servile and illiberal as any wage-earner. And the man who is servile and illiberal is, by definition, not free. As Plato will go on to suggest, only the philosopher is truly free, since he refuses to negotiate with the multitude or anyone else in power. He is impervious to the enticements of money, honor, and political power, and thus refuses to offer his wisdom or expertise in exchange for any kind of material or cultural capital. The philosophical education, then, is dramatically opposed to the “democratic education”—it produces true freedom rather than the “anarchy” and “unbridled liberty” that characterizes democracy.¹⁵

We learn more about the radical freedom of the philosopher in the rhetorical passage at 495c–496a, where Plato juxtaposes the “true” philosophers to the “banausic” pretenders to wisdom. “Just as men run away from prison to take sanctuary in temples,” says Socrates, the pretenders to wisdom

joyously leap from the *technai* to philosophy, those that are the most clever in their little crafts. . . . For the prestige of philosophy even in her present state retains a superior dignity; and this is the ambition and the goal of that multitude of pretenders unfit by nature, whose souls are cramped and crushed by their banausic activities (*banausias*) just as bodies are deformed by arts and crafts. (495d–e)

Socrates concludes this passage with an *eikōn*, comparing the banausic pretender to a baldheaded tinsmith who has recently been freed

¹⁵ On Plato's conception of democratic “freedom,” which he associates with anarchy and lawlessness, see *Republic* 555b–562a and *Laws* 698a–701b.

from slavery. Having made money at his craft, this lowly individual puts on his best clothes and comes to woo the daughter of his impoverished master (495e). Plato could not have gone further in his emphasis on the illiberal nature of the non-philosophers: they are compared to prisoners, slaves, psychic defectives, and scheming social climbers. Let me emphasize that this passage describes *all* non-philosophic individuals who lay claim to wisdom.¹⁶ Paradoxically, the insulting rhetoric of *banausia*—which was traditionally used by aristocrats to elevate themselves above the lower classes and the *nouveaux riches*—is now turned against the upper and lower classes alike: all occupations and actions and discourses are “banausic” except those of the philosopher.¹⁷

It is the characteristic of “servility” that brings these (allegedly) disparate classes of people under one heading. The philosopher is the only person who escapes this designation, since he engages in an activity that is in fundamental opposition to the servile and the mercantile: he alone will not exchange his wisdom for material or symbolic capital. It is for this reason that Plato insists that the philosophic rulers in the ideal city cannot touch gold or silver or have private property—anything that would allow them to enter into traditional systems of exchange, be they economic, social, or political. Adeimantus even compares these rulers to “hired mercenaries”¹⁸—as though they were working for a foreign city! Socrates’ response is telling: “yes, and what is more, they serve for food and receive no wage in addition, as other [mercenaries] do” (420a). But a mercenary who is not paid for his services is no mercenary at all. The philosophic ruler is a new kind of man: an independent outsider who serves his foreign charges (i.e. the multitude in the city) free of

¹⁶ Cf. Adam (1902) 28, who claims that “. . . Plato is describing a familiar phenomenon of his own times, when clever and ambitious young men were in the habit of forsaking their handicrafts and devoting themselves to ‘culture.’” But the passage is clearly a highly rhetorical depiction of counterfeit philosophers rather than an allusion to an actual group of artisans who have overstepped their station. Note in particular the extraordinary number of potent metaphors mixed together in less than a single Stephanus page (495c–496a): the escaped criminal taking refuge in the temple, the base suitors courting an abandoned maiden, the bald-headed tin-smith just free from slavery getting all dressed up to marry his impoverished master’s daughter, and the bastard children that issue from such a marriage. In this overheated denunciation of philosophic pretenders, Plato even moves into the diminutive mode: they are “little men” (ἀνθρωπίσκοι; 495c) practicing some “little art” (τεχνίον; 495d).

¹⁷ Nightingale (1995) 55–9.

¹⁸ ἐπικούροι μισθωτοί (419a).

charge. It is this extreme "outside" position that defines the freedom of the philosopher.

IV

What sort of education will produce this radical kind of freedom? The second stage of Plato's educational system is quite different from the early education outlined in books II–III.¹⁹ As we have seen, the first stage of education trained the students to perform the discourse and actions of a good person, both in private and in public affairs. The second stage, by contrast, trains the students to look down on practical and political activities and to journey via dialectic to a higher reality. Rather than producing individuals who can "perform" wisdom and good actions, this kind of education makes its pupils into spectators—"lovers of the spectacle of truth."²⁰ To be sure, Plato insists that this contemplative "vision" will eventually lead to virtuous action in the practical and political world. But this is only achieved when the philosophers leave the intelligible realm, turn away from the "spectacle of truth," and reenter the dark space of the city. As such, the second stage of education trains the intellect to exit from "this world"; indeed, it is only by departing from the performative and active political life and, indeed, the entire sensual realm that true knowledge can be achieved.

Let me emphasize that this education is not simply a training of the rational faculty, for it also inculcates a specific set of desires and values. In particular, the philosophic soul must renounce all desire to participate in politics. As Socrates says after describing the banau-sic pretenders to philosophy:

There is a tiny group remaining which consists of those who consort with philosophy worthily, whether it be a noble and well-born individual constrained by exile who, in the absence of people who would corrupt him, remains true to [philosophy] in accordance with its nature, or when a great soul who is born in a small town disregards and disdains

¹⁹ For more detailed and nuanced discussions of the two stages of Plato's educational system and the psychological and metaphysical theories in which they are embedded, see Irwin (1977) 191–248; Annas (1981) 79–101, 217–93; and Gill (1996) ch. 4.

²⁰ τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας . . . φιλοθεάμονας (475e).

the affairs of the city. And perhaps some small group of an excellent nature might turn to philosophy from another art, which they justly look down on. And the bridle of our friend Theages may provide a restraint; for all of the other conditions for falling away from philosophy were at hand in his case, but his sickly constitution restrained him by keeping him out of politics. (496a–c)

In existing, non-ideal cities, then, true philosophers will refuse to participate in politics. Recall, for example, the condition of the man described in the Allegory of the Cave who has achieved the vision of true reality: according to Socrates, this man has no desire to return to the human world inside the cave, which is compared to Hades. For, according to Socrates, the philosopher would choose, as Achilles did (belatedly) in Homer's underworld, "to live as a landless man on earth, working as a serf for another, and to endure anything rather than to opine as [the humans in the cave] opine and to live as they live" (516d–e). This allusion to *Odyssey* XI cleverly assimilates the Hades from which Achilles longs to escape with the cave to which the philosopher must return. The philosopher who reenters the cave is thus journeying (metaphorically speaking) from life to death, from the true world to the underworld.

In these passages, Plato is dealing with the relation of the philosopher to non-ideal cities, but recall that even in the ideal city, the founders will have to "compel" (*anagkasaî*) the philosophers who have achieved a vision of the Forms "to journey back to the men in bonds and to share their labors and their offices" (519c–d). As Socrates asserts, the "life" (*bios*) of the philosopher "looks down with scorn on political office."²¹ Clearly, this view of politics is not a random opinion or attitude, but rather integral to the philosophic way of life. As Plato indicates, the philosophers living in the ideal city would prefer to carry on contemplating reality, but they will agree to return to the city and serve as rulers in order to "offer recompense for their upbringing."²²

Plato describes the aim of the second stage of education at 518b–d:

²¹ πολιτικῶν ἀρχῶν καταφρονούντα (521b).

²² As Socrates observes, men who live in ordinary cities and do not receive from them a good education need not be "eager to offer recompense for their upbringing" (μὴδ' ἐκτίνειν τῷ προθυμείσθαι τὰ τροφεῖα, 520b). The philosophers in the ideal city, by contrast, have been given a good education and thus owe a debt to the city. For detailed readings of this passage, see Gill (1996) 301–7 and Ober (1998) 241–244.

education, says Socrates, "is not what some people in the profession proclaim it to be. They say that, though knowledge does not exist in a soul, they can implant it there, as if they were implanting sight in blind eyes." On the contrary, Socrates argues, education is an art of "turning or converting the soul, which will turn it in the easiest and most effectual way—not an art of implanting vision in the soul but rather, assuming that it already possesses vision but is not turned in the right direction or looking where it should, an art of bringing this [turning] about."²³ Whereas other virtues can be produced in a soul in which they do not pre-exist—via habit and practice—reason has a permanent place in the soul. It becomes helpful or harmful depending on the direction in which it is turned (518d–e). Note that, in describing the cultivation of reason and intellection, the metaphor of the soul's capacity for "vision" or "sight" recurs again and again. The second stage of the educational programme is explicitly said to develop and train the "eye of the soul."²⁴ According to Socrates, most humans direct their gaze "downwards" towards feasting and other physical pleasures, but it can also be directed "upwards" towards truth and reality (519b). It is only the philosophic education that can "draw the soul away from the world of becoming and towards true being" (521d), thus turning it in the proper direction.

Let me briefly describe the second stage of Plato's educational system, which begins when the students are twenty, commencing with ten years of studying disciplines that are designed to direct the soul towards "true being." The first of these is number and calculation, which serves to draw the mind towards "reality" (*ousia*, 523a). For when the soul receives confusing messages from the senses—when, for example, the same thing appears to be both great and small—the art of "number and calculation" enables the mind to "view" (*idein*) the great and the small in themselves, abstracted from their concrete manifestations (524c). Ultimately, the students must "come to the vision (*thean*) of the nature of number by pure thought" (525c). The second area of study is plane geometry, which "enables one to see (*katidein*) the form of the good... since it compels the soul to be turned towards that region in which the most blessed part of

²³ τέχνη ἂν εἴη τῆς περιαγωγῆς, τίνα τρόπον ὡς ῥᾶστα τε καὶ ἀνυσιμώτατα μεταστραφήσεται, οὐ τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι αὐτῷ τὸ δρᾶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔχοντι μὲν αὐτό, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ τετραμμένον οὐδὲ βλέποντι οἱ ἔδει, τοῦτο διαμηχανήσασθαι (518d).

²⁴ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄψιν (519b).

reality lies"—a region in which the soul can "gaze upon the spectacle (*theasasthai*) of being" (526e). Geometry, in short, will make us "direct upwards the [faculties] which we now direct downwards" (527b). The third area of study is solid geometry (stereometry), which investigates the nature of three-dimensional entities. And the fourth is astronomy, which Glaucon claims will clearly force the soul to "look upwards" (*eis to anô horan*, 529a). But Socrates interjects that the mere act of "gazing up" at the stars is in no way a study of higher realities. In fact, when one looks with one's bodily eyes at the physical heavens, he says, "the soul is not looking (*blepein*) upwards but downwards" (529a–b). True astronomy is a discipline that deals with the mathematical principles that govern the motions of the heavenly bodies: it involves "gazing with the mind and not the eyes."²⁵ Here, Plato reminds the reader that the numerous descriptions of the philosopher "looking upwards" are meant metaphorically rather than literally. The philosopher, then, is a spectator, but his "vision" is not sensual or physical.

Note that, in this entire passage, Plato is arguing for the "usefulness" of philosophic vision and contemplation: it is contemplative, rather than practical, activities that are most truly "useful." For example, Socrates claims that the art of number and calculation will, of course, be a necessary skill for generals in war and military endeavors, but that "no one puts it to its more correct use (*chrêsthai . . . orthôs*), which is to lead the mind to reality" (522c–523a; cf. 525c). Likewise, plane geometry will be beneficial in military endeavors, but its greatest boon is to prepare the soul for the vision of the good (526e). And when Glaucon claims that astronomy will be useful in agriculture, navigation, and the military arts, Socrates responds: "apparently you fear that the multitude may think that you are proposing useless studies" (*achrêsta mathêmata*, 527d). The very opposite is the case, Socrates argues, since the right employment of astronomy will "make the intelligence which is natural to the soul be useful instead of useless."²⁶ Finally, Socrates says that the study of harmonics, if investigated correctly, will be "useful (*chrêsimon*) for the inquiry into the beautiful and the good, but if investigated wrongly will be completely useless (*achrêston*)" (531c). In these passages, Plato insists on the usefulness of the activities of the intellectual "specta-

²⁵ νοήσει ἄλλ' οὐκ ὀμμασι θεωρεῖν (529b).

²⁶ . . . χρήσιμον τὸ φύσει φρόνιμον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐξ ἀχρήστου ποιήσιν (530b–c).

tor." Though he never denies that the performance of practical and political activities is useful, he makes it clear that these latter endeavors are less useful and important than contemplation: the act of speculating takes precedence over performance. Here, the entire notion of "usefulness" is radically reconceived.

At the age of thirty, the students who have successfully mastered these disciplines will come to the pinnacle of their education. For the next five years, they will study "dialectic" which, though it operates only in the intelligible realm, progresses along the path depicted in the Allegory of the Cave (532a). As Socrates describes the "journey" of dialectic in book VII:

There is first the release from bonds, and the turning away from the shadows to the images that caused them and to the light of the fire and then the ascent out of the cave into the sunlight and, there, the inability to look at the plants and animals and the light of the sun, though one can see the phantasms of these reflected in water and the shadows of real things, not the shadows of images cast by a light which is quite different from the true sun—all this labor in the disciplines we have mentioned has the power to lead the best part of the soul up to the vision (*thean*) of the best among realities. (532b–c)

Socrates makes it clear that dialectic is the only discipline that enables the philosopher to give "an account of the essence of each thing" (534b). The earlier studies serve as auxiliaries which help to lift the "eye of the soul" (*to tês psychês ommâ*) out of the mud (533d). But it is dialectic alone that "does away with the hypotheses [used in other disciplines] and advances to the first principles" (533c). I will not attempt to offer a technical definition of dialectic, since Plato himself neglects to do this.²⁷ Rather, I would like to examine the visual metaphors that surround the entire discussion of the second stage of education and to investigate the link between philosophic "vision" and the kind of freedom that makes this education truly "liberal."

As we have seen, the second stage of education leads the student to "view" the essence and reality of each thing with the "eye of the soul" separated from all of the physical senses. The soul must look "up" into the intelligible region, which can only be accomplished by

²⁷ There are numerous discussions of the precise nature of "dialectic" and Plato's puzzling suggestion in *Republic* 533b–c that it "does away with the hypotheses" and thus leads to knowledge of "first principles." See, e.g., Robinson (1953) chs. 6, 7 and 10; Crombie (1963) 548–62; White (1976) 95–104; Annas (1981) 277–93; Reeve (1988) 71–9 and *passim*; Mueller (1992); and Kahn (1996) ch. 10.

turning away from the physical world of "becoming" together with the political and social life of ordinary human beings. It should be clear that this intellectual journey offers a radical freedom not available to worldly individuals. For the philosopher is "free" from the seductions of political power and honor, from the enticements of money and bodily pleasure, and from the entire physical world of "becoming," which disrupts the soul with bodily sensations and prevents it from achieving stable and true knowledge. Although the first stage of education served to free the individual from bondage to the irrational parts of the soul (as well as from false *logoi*), the second stage frees it from the external influences of all human affairs and all physical phenomena. Dialectic and the "contemplation" of truth confers complete knowledge and freedom even as it denigrates "our" world with its manifold enticements.

Let us investigate further the metaphor of the "eye of the soul," since Plato is at such pains in this passage to introduce an epistemology based on "vision." It is important to stress that there was no talk of "vision" (physical or intellectual) in the first stage of education. On the contrary, Plato placed exclusive emphasis on the oral and aural activities involved in learning and performing poetry and music. According to Havelock, in traditional Greek education the memorization and performance of poetry and music created a "sympathetic self-identification" between the performer and the heroes or poets that he imitates; this kind of identification, he claims, had the effect of "fusing" the subject (i.e. the performer or imitator) with the object (i.e. the songs and heroes he is imitating).²⁸ As I have argued, Plato endorses this traditional practice of training the young to "imitate" and identify with good models in the first stage of his educational system. But he introduces a very different kind of pedagogy in the second stage—one designed to lead the soul to an apprehension of the Forms. Havelock contends that Plato is aiming here to detach the philosopher from the concrete, sensual realm and to train him in logic and abstract thinking: "the net effect of the theory of Forms is to dramatize the split between the image-thinking of poetry and the abstract thinking of philosophy."²⁹ Although this thesis is, in certain ways, accurate, Havelock has a difficult time dealing with the numerous references to the "eye of the soul" and its

²⁸ Havelock (1963) 266.

²⁹ Havelock (1963) 266.

vision of the Forms. As he himself notes, the word "*eidos*" designates the "form" or "shape" or "look" of something, and thus "as it seeks to objectify and separate knowledge from opinion it also tends to make knowledge visual again."³⁰ According to Havelock, it is unfortunate that Plato did "not always succeed in shielding himself rigorously against this visual contamination."³¹ But, as the quotes above reveal, so far from "shielding himself" from the "contamination" of visual imagery, Plato positively revels in it. To be sure, Plato is careful to distinguish the "eye of the soul" from the physical eyes. And his conception of "dialectic" is, after all, based first and foremost on on verbal analysis and discussion.³² But his extensive use of the phenomenon of vision as an analogue for the apprehension of the Forms is clearly a deliberate attempt to articulate a new model of knowledge as well as a new system of education designed to turn the philosopher into a "spectator" of truth.

V

How, then, can we correlate the first stage of education, which is based on oral/aural activities geared towards ethical and political praxis, with the radically different aims and claims of the second stage—with an education which is directed towards intellectual "vision" or contemplation achieved by dialectic? Clearly, to "see" the Forms involves at least temporarily blinding oneself to the practical and physical world (just as to focus on physical "sights and sounds" is to blind oneself to the "spectacle of truth"). To be sure, Plato suggests that the philosopher will in fact have more accurate vision than others when he returns to the cave (at least after his eyes have adjusted to the darkness of that region), since he alone will understand the difference between image and reality (520c; cf. 516e–517a, 518ab). But the philosopher has no desire to enter the darkness of

³⁰ Havelock (1963) 268.

³¹ Havelock (1963) 268.

³² As Annas rightly observes (1981) 284: "The visual metaphors stress the directness of the knowledge concerned; but this is the directness not of certainty but of complete and unmediated understanding of the subject-matter in its own terms, and there is no reason why this should exclude argument and discussion. One can articulate one's understanding of a subject. So the verbal and the visual descriptions of dialectic do not clash. . . ."

the cave with its less-than-real sights, and clearly places little value on life as it is lived "below." The very suggestion that the philosopher will agree to return to the city and report his new insights to the benighted populace seems surprising; certainly in any less-than-ideal city, this would be a dangerous enterprise (516e–517a).

As I will urge, the journey that Plato's philosopher makes outside the city to witness a vision or spectacle and his return back home to convey these novel discoveries conjures up a specific social practice in Classical Greece: that of *theôria*, which in its traditional sense meant an official legation sent to a religious event such as a festival or an oracular consultation.³³ The *theôros* was an official "spectator" whose role was to visit a festival or sanctuary and view the events or activities that transpired there. He was then required to return to his native city and give a complete and honest account of what he had witnessed. One of the most common forms of *theôria* was the consultation of an oracle. As Nagy explains, "the word *theôros* means literally 'he who sees a vision'.... Thus the god Apollo of the Oracle at Delphi, when he *sêmeinei*, 'indicates,' is conferring an inner vision upon the *theôros*, the one who consults him."³⁴ In my view, Plato's philosopher is a new kind of *theôros*, an intellectual ambassador who brings back a vision of a divine world to those back at home.³⁵

This notion of the journey of the philosophic *theôros*, I believe, helps to elucidate some of the peculiarities of Plato's janus-faced educational system. As I have suggested, the second stage of education demands that the student depart (for a time) from the practical and political "performance" of wisdom and engage in the activity of "spectating" or gazing on the Forms. It is only by way of this contemplative activity that the student becomes a true philosopher and comes into the vision of absolute reality. According to Plato, the knowledge of this reality will enable the philosopher to rule the city in the best and most just fashion when he returns; only a person who has achieved the wisdom and radical freedom of the philoso-

³³ For detailed and useful discussions of the cultural institution of *theôria*, see Koller (1957) 277–288, Rausch (1982) 22–3, and Nagy (1990) 164–167.

³⁴ Nagy (1990) 164.

³⁵ Note also Plato's occasional use, in his discussions of the apprehension of the Forms, of the discourse of mystery religions such as the Eleusinian Mysteries, whose central event involved the unveiling of the vision of a specific symbolic object (the *epopteia*). See, e.g., *Symposium*, 209e–210a *Phaedrus* 250b–c.

pher can rule in a disinterested and impartial way and consider at all times the best interests of the city and its citizens.³⁶ The philosopher is "free" because he is not self-interested and will never negotiate with the citizens for money, honor, or power. But the philosopher is not entirely devoid of self-interest: for he does desire to remain in the realm of the Forms, in a state of blissful and (to the extent possible) continual contemplation. He certainly is not eager to return to the world of praxis and "performance," even though he has been trained to be a ruler as well as a contemplative. As I will argue, as a *theôros* the philosopher must, for both civic and religious reasons, return to the city and bring his "vision" back home.

According to Irwin and Annas, Plato's privileging of contemplation and his denigration of the practical realm is an unfortunate aberration from the task of the *Republic*, which is to define justice and demonstrate why the just life (with all its practical exigencies and activities) is the happiest and best for human beings. Annas argues that Plato refused to fully acknowledge that practical and contemplative wisdom "ever could conflict"; the philosophers' knowledge will invariably lead them to rule the city because they will necessarily do "what is impersonally best." As she suggests, the fact that the philosophers may suffer "real loss, because their own prospects of happiness are sacrificed"—which means that "justice is not in their interests"—is simply not addressed by Plato.³⁷ Irwin argues that Plato "*mistakenly* suggests that the philosopher will want to stay contemplating the Forms and will not voluntarily undertake public service." What Plato must really have meant, according to Irwin, is that the rational evaluation of ends that is the task of dialectic will produce in the philosopher a conception of himself as a rational agent who "has reason to include just [and practical] action in his life."³⁸

Gill has recently introduced a different approach to this question, arguing against theories that ascribe to Plato's philosophers either a Kantian (or neo-Kantian) sense of "duty" or an ethic of altruism. According to Gill, it is an "ethics of reciprocity"—which, as he rightly

³⁶ See Griswold (1999a) 129–146 and *passim* for a discussion of "the impartial spectator" and its relation to the "love of virtue" (though this argument is developed in the context of enlightenment thinking, especially that of Adam Smith, its juxtaposition with Plato's notions of impartiality and the love of the good is especially instructive).

³⁷ Annas (1981) 267–9.

³⁸ Irwin (1977) 237–45 (my italics).

argues, forms the basis of the entire Greek ethical and political tradition—that drives the philosophers to return to the city and become rulers. As Gill suggests,

... the philosopher-rulers' acceptance of the 'just demand' made of them is presented as an act of reciprocal exchange. Unlike philosophers in other communities, the philosopher-rulers in the ideal state should 'be keen to pay back the cost of their upbringing' [520b4–c1], which has made them uniquely capable of looking after themselves and the city by developing the dual capacities for dialectic and government. This response seems better explained as an attitude associated with a *polis*-centred version of the (mutually benefiting) relationship of generalized reciprocity than as an attitude which expresses the desire to benefit others for its own sake.³⁹

I agree with Gill that what is operating here is an ethics of reciprocity rather than altruism or (universalizable) duty. But what is the precise nature of this reciprocity? This notion, of course, implies a certain kind of exchange: according to Gill's line of argument, the philosophers are "paid up front" (as it were) by receiving a special rearing and education, and they will therefore want to pay their *city and community* back for this privilege by returning to the city to rule. But what Plato explicitly emphasizes is that the philosophers are paying back the founders and teachers of the city (rather than the populace as a whole) for the education they have received (520b–c); the reciprocity that the philosophers exhibit is therefore not as "generalized" and "polis-centred" as Gill suggests.⁴⁰

Let us recall that the freedom of the philosophers is predicated on their refusal to negotiate with the "many"; they will not exchange their wisdom for material or cultural capital (i.e. honor, power, prestige) because this kind of exchange would place them in a "banau-sic" and "illiberal" position defined by the willingness to cater to others. The reciprocity at work here, then, is not a matter of an exchange of philosophic wisdom for power or special privileges—certainly the philosophers are not entering into negotiations with the people they rule—but rather a gift-exchange in which they repay

³⁹ Gill (1996) 303.

⁴⁰ Gill (1996) 303. Socrates' suggestion that the philosophers are offering recompense for τὰ προεῖα (520b) might be taken to imply that they are paying not only for their education but also for the physical sustenance (food) and leisure provided for them by the labor of the lower classes. But Socrates makes no explicit claim of this kind (520b–c).

their teachers and rulers by becoming teachers and rulers themselves. As Socrates says at 520d–e: “Will our nurselings (*trophimoi*) disobey us when we tell them [to rule in the city], and are they going to be unwilling (*ouk ethelêsousi*) to share in the labors in the city, each in his turn, though they dwell for long periods of time with one another in that purer realm? This is impossible . . . since we will be imposing just tasks on people who are just.” The “nurselings,” in short, will not be “unwilling” to allot part of their time to ruling because their just and good teachers have required this from students whom they have made just by way of the philosophic education that has been bestowed upon them.

In my view, Plato's (re-)conception of the institution of *theôria* as a philosophic endeavor involves the mature philosophers in several kinds of reciprocity. This institution, as I have suggested, helps to explain Plato's emphasis on (metaphysical) vision as well his insistence that the philosopher (as *theôros*) must to return to the city to communicate his vision to the people back home. The *theôros*, as I have suggested, occupies an official civic position which is generally associated with visits to religious festivals and oracular centers. In the case of an oracular consultation, the *theôros* (literally “he who sees a vision”) is charged with the task of communicating to the city what the god has communicated to him. The task, then, is religious as well as civic: it is the god who reveals the truth and sends it to mankind through a special ambassador. As Theognis puts it:

A man who is a *theôros* must be more straight . . . than a carpenter's pin and rule and square—a man to whom the priestess of the god at Delphi makes a response, as she indicates the sacred pronouncement from the rich shrine. For you would not find any remedy if you add anything [to the pronouncement], nor would you escape from wrongdoing in the eyes of the gods (*pros theôn amplakiên prophygōis*) if you take anything away.⁴¹

The philosopher as *theôros*, then, is carrying out a transaction with divine as well with human beings: this is a mission that involves divinity, and thus must be done with religious correctness. To be sure, Plato's philosopher is not being granted a vision by a god but rather coming into the vision of the “divine” Forms via dialectic (a vision which the gods enjoy at all times, but which they are not at

⁴¹ Theognis 805–810.

liberty to hand out to humans). But the Form of the Good, after all, is described as “the most blessed (*eudaimonestaton*) part of reality” (526e), and Plato describes the Forms throughout his entire middle period as “divine” and “blessed.” The philosophic “vision” of the Forms is thus both an intellectual and a religious experience.

In sum, although the philosopher is, in his true essence, a “spectator” of the truth, his *theôria* of the divine spectacle of reality enjoins him to take his place as a “performer” of wisdom in the good city for delimited periods of time. This role as “performer”—which means “returning” to the city and using his vision of truth to rule and protect it—does not compromise the philosopher’s freedom, since he “negotiates” and interacts only with his peers and with the “divine” reality. It is only *qua* radically free wise man that the philosopher is enabled and allowed to rule the good city. The second stage of Plato’s education, then, demands that its students develop a radical form of freedom which is, paradoxically, based on a devaluation of the very region that they must rule. This is a “liberal” education for a tiny number of elite men and women—an education which makes all other activities and studies banausic by comparison.

VI

Aristotle’s conception of the liberal and illiberal arts emerges in two quite different contexts. First of all, he discusses the liberal and the banausic education in the eighth book of the *Politics*, where the training of the ruling class in the good city is outlined in detail. But Aristotle also recurs to the notion of liberal and illiberal pursuits in his discussions of philosophy and contemplation, which activities are depicted as the most free and liberal of all human pursuits. As we will see, although the education outlined in the *Politics* is designed to produce rulers and not philosophers, the “liberal” education and activities of this elite group are defined in terms very similar to those used for the contemplative activity of philosophers.

The discussion of the education of the young men of the ruling class occupies all of *Politics* book VIII.⁴² As I will suggest, this book

⁴² It is possible that book VIII as we have it is not complete; I will confine myself to the material that is extant and refrain from speculating about what may have

contains two different accounts of the liberal education—accounts which endorse two quite disparate goals. The first account defines the liberal education as a necessary and useful tool for producing virtuous citizens who will participate in the government of the good city. As Aristotle says at the opening of book VIII, “education ought to be adapted to the particular form of [the city’s] constitution . . . since a better *ethos* always produces a better constitution” (*Politics* VIII 1, 1337a14–18). In fact, he goes on to suggest, “it is necessary that there be a common and public education and training in matters that concern the commonwealth. And, at the same time, we ought not to think that each of the citizens belongs to himself, but that all belong to the city, for each is a part of the city . . .” (VIII.1, 1337a26–9). Later in book VIII, after having established that music is the cornerstone of a liberal education, Aristotle addresses the nature of its “potency and goal” (VIII.5, 1339a14–16). He argues that music is productive of virtue since, just as gymnastics affects the quality of the body, music affects the quality of a person’s character (VIII.5, 1339a21–4). Music, says Aristotle, contains “imitations of character,” and this is true in the case of both “melodies” and “rhythms” which can produce psychic “motions” that are either “vulgar” or “liberal” (VIII.5, 1340b9–10). As the most important element of the liberal education, then, proper training in the right kind of music serves to render the young virtuous and free rather than vulgar and “banausic.”⁴³

Taken by itself, the notion that education should produce virtuous men for the good of the city as a whole is straightforward enough. Indeed, it is very much in keeping with Greek tradition. According to this view, education is useful for training men to perform virtuously on the political scene when they become adults. But this is not the only conception of education that Aristotle endorses in the *Politics*. For, paradoxically, Aristotle will also argue that the essence of the liberal education is in no way “useful” or practical.

This latter account of the liberal education commences in the

been left out. A larger question is the philosophical coherence of the *Politics* as a whole; there has been a long scholarly debate over (alleged) inconsistencies between books IV–VI and the other books (well summarized by Rowe 1977). Since I am not dealing with books IV–VI, this debate is not pertinent to my argument.

⁴³ I analyze Aristotle’s conception of *banausia* in detail in Nightingale (1996) 29–34 and *passim*. See also Lévy (1979) and Rössler (1981) 226–31 on *banausia* in Aristotle’s *Politics*.

second chapter of book VIII, where Aristotle explicitly distinguishes the liberal from the illiberal and banausic arts:⁴⁴

It is clear that one must teach only those of the useful arts which are absolutely necessary; but it is obvious that not all of [the useful arts should be taught], since liberal activities must be distinguished from illiberal, and it is therefore necessary that students partake of those useful arts which will not make the person who participates in them banausic. One must consider an activity and also an art or science banausic if it renders the body or the soul or the mind of a free man unable to perform the tasks and activities of virtue. Hence we call 'banausic' all such arts as damage the body, as well as the wage-earning occupations; for these make the mind unleisured and petty.⁴⁵

It might seem that training in an art or craft or, indeed, in any sort of wage-earning occupation is what defines the banausic education. But the situation is not this simple. For Aristotle goes on to say that "even in the case of the liberal sciences it is not illiberal to partake of some of them up to a point, but to apply oneself to these things too much, and to the point of perfection" can actually render a person banausic rather than liberal (VIII.2, 1337b15–17). The liberal arts, in short, can be pursued in the wrong way, with deleterious effects. And just as the liberal arts can be engaged in for the wrong reasons, thus making a person illiberal, so also the illiberal arts can be pursued in a liberal way. As Aristotle says in book VII, "hence many of the activities that are considered menial can be performed even by free men in their youth, since in relation to what is fine and not fine activities do not differ so much in themselves as they do in their ends and objects" (VII.4, 1333a7–11). As these passages reveal, while any *person* who is working for a wage is, by definition, illiberal, the *activity or art* which he engages in may or may not be illiberal.

With this backdrop in place, Aristotle proceeds to outline the liberal education, putting a special emphasis on training in music. The curriculum has four areas—reading and writing, drawing, gymnas-

⁴⁴ Since the first account is adumbrated in VIII.1, the second account actually interrupts the discussion of the first.

⁴⁵ ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δεῖ διδάσκεισθαι τῶν χρησίμων, οὐκ ἄδηλον· ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα, διηρημένων τῶν τε ἐλευθερίων ἔργων καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθερίων φανερόν, (καὶ) ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων δεῖ μετέχειν ὅσα τῶν χρησίμων ποιήσει τὸν μετέχοντα μὴ βάνανυσον. Βάνανυσον δ' ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν (*Politics* VIII.2, 1337b4–11).

tics, and music—each of which has a different orientation. Aristotle suggests that “writing and drawing [are taught] as being useful for life and very servicable, and gymnastics as contributing to courage” (VIII.3, 1337b25–7). But what, he asks, is the purpose of music? Nowadays, he observes, people pursue music for the sake of pleasure, but “those who originally included it in education did so because nature herself seeks to be able not only to engage rightly in unleisured activities, but also to be at leisure in the proper fashion” (1337b28–32). Here, Aristotle eliminates pleasure as the purpose of musical education, for pleasure is a frivolous and base goal.⁴⁶ If it is to be a truly liberal activity, music must be something that is at once serious and able to be pursued for its own sake as an end in itself. As Aristotle concludes, “it is clear that one must learn and be educated in some things with a view to the leisure in the pastime, and that these studies and these branches of learning are ends in themselves, whereas those oriented towards unleisured activities are studied as necessary and as means to other things” (VIII.3, 1338a9–13).⁴⁷

Aristotle now insists that music actually meets these requirements. For he proceeds to assert that

our predecessors included music in education not as something necessary (*anagkaion*)—for there is nothing necessary about it—nor as useful (*chrēsion*), as writing is useful for business and for household management and for learning and for many political activities, and as drawing is useful for making us good judges of the works of artists. Nor does it aim at health or strength, as gymnastics does (for we see neither of these things produced by music). It remains, then, that music is oriented towards the time spent in leisure. (VIII.3, 1338a13–22)

Music, then, is not a “necessary” or a “useful” pursuit. Aristotle clearly thinks this claim is disputable and in need of support, for as he goes on to say:

It is evident, then, that there exists a form of education in which we train the young not because it is useful (*chrēsīmēn*) or necessary (*anagkaian*) but because it is free and noble (*eleutherion kai kalēn*). Whether there is one such subject or several, and what these are and how they are to be pursued, must be discussed later. But now we have made this

⁴⁶ He also eliminates “play,” since it is “for the sake of work” rather than oriented towards leisure (VIII.3, 1337b35–1338a1).

⁴⁷ “ends in themselves”: ἐαυτῶν . . . χάριν; “as necessary and as means to other things”: ὡς ἀναγκαίως καὶ χάριν ἄλλων (VIII.3, 1338a12–13).

much progress, namely, that we have some evidence even from the education which the ancients instituted. For the point is proved by music. (VIII.3, 1338a30–7)

Note that, in this passage, the demonstration of the “uselessness” of music is taken to prove the existence of a larger class of useless pursuits. If music is neither necessary nor useful, then it is likely that there are other such activities. Clearly, Aristotle is thinking here of philosophy and contemplation, which, as we learn from the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Metaphysics*, are completely useless in the practical sphere.

In the last three passages quoted (1338a9–13, 1338a13–22, 1338a30–7), Aristotle links together “useful” and “necessary” pursuits, which he identifies as non-liberal or illiberal, and he sets these in opposition to “useless” and “unnecessary” pursuits, which are the only ones which qualify as liberal. Clearly, the “useless” and “unnecessary” activities, as Aristotle conceives them, are in no way worthless or trivial; on the contrary, they are supremely important and fine. The English word “useless,” of course, has negative connotations that are completely at odds with the words “useless” (*achrêston*) and “not useful” (*ou chrêsimon*) in these passages. For the lack of a better alternative, I will translate these terms as “useless” with the caveat that this must not be taken to signify “worthless” or “unimportant.” The “useless” pursuits that characterize all truly “liberal” activities, in fact, are eminently important and valuable, since they enable a person to achieve happiness.⁴⁸

VII

The notion of “useless” activities that are carried out “for their own sake” is articulated elsewhere in Aristotle. As he claims in both the *Metaphysics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, philosophic contemplation (*theôria*), which is the highest and most perfect human activity, is in no way “useful,” never pursued for the sake of anything else, and is only conducted in complete leisure. To be sure, Aristotle is talking about musical/cultural pursuits and not philosophy in the *Politics*

⁴⁸ One might argue that liberal pursuits are “useful” for the happy life, but this terminology is not Aristotelian: Aristotle almost invariably uses the word “useful” for activities which are productive and therefore not pursued for their own sakes or for the sake of happiness alone.

VIII; the education he outlines is not designed to produce philosophers. But his insistence in the *Politics* that "war is for the sake of peace, unleisure for the sake of leisure, and the necessary and useful for the sake of the fine" (VII.14, 1333a35–6) makes it clear that political activities, which by definition are not leisured, are not the final end for the citizens in the good city. Indeed, Aristotle explicitly says that the good city must educate its young with an eye to leisure (VII.14, 1333a41–b5, 1334a9–10). The educational system, in short, must reflect and communicate the notion that leisure is an end which is higher than political praxis. One should remember that a liberal education is designed to produce truly "free" men; in Aristotle's view, men are more free when they are at leisure than when they are at work. It is for this reason that the liberal education must train men not only to be good citizens and rulers—good, in short, when they are not at leisure—but also to make a good employment of leisure.

What, then, are the proper leisure activities? Aristotle addresses this question in book VII, where he divides the virtues into three categories: 1) virtues oriented only towards unleisure; 2) virtues oriented only towards leisure; and 3) virtues oriented towards both leisure and unleisure. The specific virtues are categorized as follows: "courage and endurance are oriented towards unleisure, philosophy towards leisure, and temperance and justice towards both" (VII.15, 1334a22–25). Unfortunately, Aristotle does not explicate the principles according to which he makes this threefold division, but he does offer some clues. Note, first of all, that Aristotle treats "philosophy" as a virtue—as the sole virtue which is oriented only towards leisure. Second, and even more important, he describes the virtues in category 3—those which are oriented towards both leisure and unleisure—as being "*useful* for leisure and pastime",⁴⁹ but he makes no such claim for the virtues in category 2. We may infer, then, that not all virtues which are "oriented towards" leisure are necessarily "useful" for leisure—that some virtues, in short, are appropriate for leisure not by dint of being useful. Clearly, philosophy must be one such virtue. Both in its broadest sense—as intellectual cultivation in general—and in its technical Aristotelian sense as the activity of the theoretical intellect, philosophy is not "useful" for leisure or for anything else. The practical virtues, by contrast, are necessary for leisure, but they are not the ultimate leisure activity.

⁴⁹ χρήσιμοι . . . πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν καὶ διαγωγὴν (VII.15, 1334a16–17).

It is worth noting that Aristotle mounts a similar argument in the *Nicomachean Ethics* X. There he contrasts all “practical” activities with that of contemplation (*theôria*). As he says in chapter 7,

[the activity of contemplation] seems to be the only one which is loved for its own sake; for nothing comes into being from it beyond the activity of contemplating, but from practical activities we *produce something, be it greater or smaller, beyond the action*. And happiness seems to involve leisure; for we are unleisured for the sake of being leisured, and we wage war for the sake of peace. Now the activity of the practical virtues (*praktikai aretai*) is exercised in politics and in war. But the actions that concern these things seem to be unleisured—those of war in fact entirely so. . . . The activity of the political man is unleisured, and it *produces something beyond* the mere activity of politics—be it positions of power and honor or the happiness of the man himself and the citizens, which are separate from the political activity. . . . (X.7, 1177b1–15)⁵⁰

This passage, even more clearly than the one in *Politics* VII, identifies practical/political activities and virtues as unleisured (at least to some extent) and theoretical ones as leisured. For Aristotle explicitly says that all the activities of the practical virtues *produce a byproduct beyond the action*, however small. And productivity is a sure marker of unleisured activity.

This passage is, of course, famously problematic, since it seems to contradict Aristotle’s claims elsewhere in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that the activities of practical virtue are chosen for their own sakes (see, e.g., I.7, 1097b2–5; X.6, 1176b6–9).⁵¹ In particular, one should note Aristotle’s claim in book VI that “ethical action” (*praxis*) and “productive activity” (*poiêsis*) are in different classes, since “productive activity” aims at and creates something beyond itself, whereas “ethical action” is not productive since “doing well is itself the goal” (VI.5, 1140b6–7). Here, the exercise of the practical virtues is chosen for its own sake and is not geared towards an end beyond itself.

⁵⁰ “we produce something, be it greater or smaller, beyond the action”: ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἢ πλεῖον ἢ ἔλαττον περιποιούμεθα παρὰ τὴν πράξιν (1177b2–4); “the activity of the political man is unleisured and produces something beyond the mere activity of politics”: ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἄσχολος, καὶ παρ’ αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι περιποιούμενη (1177b12–13).

⁵¹ For discussions of the relation of *Nicomachean Ethics* book X to the earlier books (a problem which has received a huge amount of scholarly attention), see Hardie (1980), Akkrill (1973 and 1980), Cooper (1975 and 1987), Heinaman (1988), Kraut (1989), Broadie (1991), and Reeve (1995).

In book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, then, Aristotle *contrasts* the activities of practical virtue with technical and productive ones, whereas in book X he seems to be *assimilating* them.

Although I cannot discuss this problem in detail here, I would like to emphasize that one can make the practical virtues themselves one's goal—one can choose them for their own sake—but nonetheless produce something by way of one's actions. What Aristotle seems to indicate in book X is that, *even if* one chooses the practical virtues for their own sake, one nonetheless produces something by one's action. *To this extent*, the "ethical action" deriving from the practical virtues is similar to "productive activity": it is "useful" insofar as it creates beneficial results. The activity of *theôria*, by contrast, never produces anything beyond itself, and is thus the only truly leisured activity. This does not mean that philosophers will not need to exercise the practical virtues in their leisure time—temperance, for example, is a crucial prerequisite for the activity of contemplation. But the practical virtues which one uses in leisure are not themselves fully leisured. Ideally, they should be used for the sake of *theôria*, which is a higher end. But they can also be chosen as ends in themselves, as long as one understands that their inherent productivity prevents them from being leisured in the fullest sense. The practical virtues, in short, are *useful* even if chosen for themselves, whereas contemplative activity is inherently useless since it never aims at or produces anything beyond itself. Let me note, finally, that in the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle is using the term "*theôria*" in a technical sense that is now divorced from the traditional notion of *theôria* that Plato took over and reworked (i.e. the cultural institution of *theôria*). But, as we will see, this traditional notion is still at work in Aristotle's thought, for it explicitly emerges in exoteric works such as the *Protrepticus*.

VIII

Let us return to the *Politics*. It should be clear by now that the arguments in book VIII concerning the "useless" and "unnecessary" nature of music create a number of problems for the interpreter. First and foremost, they appear to contradict the assertions elsewhere in book VIII that education is necessary and useful for moulding good citizens for the sake of the city. As Carnes Lord observes,

... [Aristotle] is so anxious to show that musical education is in no way 'necessary' or 'useful' that he will not even describe it as being 'for the sake of' *diagôgê* [pastime]: the education in music must be understood as being 'for its own sake' (1338a9–12ff.). Since music is said not to be useful even with a view to 'political actions' (1339a15–17), and since it can hardly be denied that virtue is useful with a view to a great many political actions, one is forced to wonder whether Aristotle's two accounts are finally even compatible.⁵²

Lord is surely right in suggesting that Aristotle's two accounts of education are disparate if not contradictory. But his solution to the apparent contradiction is, I believe, erroneous. For he simply rejects the argument that music is a useless and unnecessary pursuit, suggesting that this view belongs to "the ancients" and not to Aristotle.⁵³ By dealing off the argument in this way, he can thus conclude that Aristotle's true position is that music is one of the proper activities for leisure only insofar as it produces and reinforces a virtuous character. It is not engaged in "for its own sake" but rather for the sake of practical virtue which, in turn, serves the end of politics.⁵⁴ In fact, there is no evidence in the text that Aristotle disagrees with the ancients whom he has invoked as witnesses to the existence of a serious activity which is pursued for its own sake. As we have seen, the notion of an activity which is pursued "for its own sake" is of vital importance for Aristotle and should not be simply dealt off to the ancients.

What Lord suggests, then, is that we must choose between the two kinds of education discussed in the *Politics*. Either the liberal education is designed to produce civic virtue and practical/political "performance" or it aims to promote activities that are completely "useless" and nonproductive. Lord claims that the former is Aristotle's "true" view, and he completely discounts the latter. The same move is made by Nichols, who argues that Aristotle equates "pastime" (*diagôgê*) with "prudence" (*phronêsis*) and, therefore, that the musical activities which "contribute to pastime" must necessarily "contribute to prudence."⁵⁵ Thus musical activity can never be pursued "for its own sake," since it will always serve the virtue of prudence which, in turn, produces good action in practical and political life. As Nichols

⁵² Lord (1982) 76.

⁵³ Lord (1982) 77.

⁵⁴ Lord (1982) 103.

⁵⁵ Nichols (1992) 160.

puts it, "musical activity gives way to political activity" as the boys grow into men; in short, "music is a central element in education because it fosters the moral and intellectual virtue (character and judgment) that make possible political participation. . . ." ⁵⁶ Like Lord, Nichols posits as the "end" of education the noble performance of political actions. The suggestion that the students must engage in music as a nonutilitarian leisure activity and an end in itself is completely eclipsed.

Solmsen, by contrast, takes seriously the claim that "leisure" is the goal of education. ⁵⁷ His attempt to resolve the inconsistencies in Aristotle's argument in *Politics* VIII, however, is not successful. Solmsen rightly observes that leisure (*scholē*) is, in traditional Greek thinking, conceptualized in opposition to political and civic activities; Aristotle, he claims, is advancing a radical idea in making "leisure" the telos of the lives of the citizens and rulers. Surprisingly, Solmsen goes on to argue that an education in music is meant to contribute to the ethical improvement of the citizens: it fosters a good character and is "productive" of practical virtue. ⁵⁸ But then he concludes his argument by claiming that, even though music may make men "better citizens," Aristotle's educational programme is in fact geared towards "the *private* happiness of the citizens." ⁵⁹ Unfortunately, Solmsen never explains what is meant by the "private happiness" of the citizens and how this squares with their practical and political activities. He certainly does not mean that the musical education is geared towards *theōria* (which is the highest form of private happiness), for he explicitly asserts that Aristotle's educational system is directed towards the virtues of character rather than intellectual cultivation. But why should the practical virtues (with their inherent productivity) lead to the happiness that flowers under the conditions of leisure? Solmsen, I think, has not succeeded in making Aristotle's account self-consistent.

As I have suggested, Aristotle sets forth two quite different notions of education in *Politics* VIII. It is tempting to ignore this fact or explain it away, as these scholars attempt to do. But this can only be achieved by arguing that music is always "useful" and productive, and never an end in itself. I believe that both of the notions

⁵⁶ Nichols (1992) 162.

⁵⁷ Solmsen (1968); see also Demont (1993).

⁵⁸ Solmsen (1968) 24.

⁵⁹ Solmsen (1968) 27.

of education need to be taken seriously, in spite of the discrepancy between them. In fact, the discrepancy is itself very revealing. For it shows that Aristotle was wrestling with two different ideologies of education—a traditional one based on the performance and imitation of good models via musical activities (one quite similar to the first phase of Plato's educational system) and a new programme designed to make students "spectators" and "judges" of the good and the fine. The former mode of education is geared towards the development of practical and political actions, the latter towards nonutilitarian activities enacted in a condition of leisure.

Let me emphasize that these two different conceptions of liberal education in the *Politics* are grounded in two different notions of freedom. Aristotle says in the *Metaphysics* I that "a man is called free if he 'exists for himself and not for the sake of another.'"⁶⁰ But what kind of person does not "exist for another"? What characterizes the free man?⁶¹ Consider the passage at *Politics* III.4 (1277a33–b11), where Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of rulers and two kinds of subjects. First, there is the "rule of a master" (*archê despotikê*, 1277a33), whose subjects are slaves (which include *banausoi* and wage-earners). Second, there is "political rule" (*archê politikê*, 1277b9), in which free men govern and are governed by other free men who are their peers. In the latter case, a citizen is subject to rule but nonetheless remains free and not servile, since he is ruled by his equals and will have his own turn to rule over the same group. This person does not "exist for others" in spite of the fact that he is subject to the political rule

⁶⁰ *Metaphysics* I.2, 982b19–27: "the [early philosophers] pursued knowledge for the sake of knowing, and not for the sake of anything useful (οὐ χρήσεως τινος ἕνεκεν). . . . It is clear, then, that we practice philosophy not for any external use (χρείαν), but just as we call a man free who exists for himself and not for the sake of another (ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος, φαιμέν, ἐλευθέρος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ἄν), so also we say that [philosophy] is the only free science, since it alone exists for itself (οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴν ὡς μόνην οὖσαν ἐλευθέραν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν)." In this passage, freedom is explicitly connected with "uselessness." Just as philosophy is free because it "exists for its own sake," a man is free if he "exists for himself and not another." As Aristotle says in the *Politics*, "to seek utility everywhere is completely inappropriate for great-souled and free men" (VIII.3, 1338b2–4).

⁶¹ For a useful analysis of the complexities of Aristotle's notion of freedom and the free man, see Muller (1993). Note that in book III, Aristotle asserts that the people who "exist for others" are slaves, wage-earners, and *banausoi*. Here, the latter two classes, which consist of free men, are assimilated to slaves precisely by virtue of the fact that they work for others. These freeborn men are not "truly" free, since their occupations render them subservient to others.

of his associates.⁶² But even this person must be on his guard, since the wrong kinds of activities can diminish his freedom. As Aristotle goes on to say, the good man must never occupy himself with the tasks carried out by slaves, wage-earners, and *banausoi* "except if he does this on occasion for his own sake alone, for then it will not turn out that one becomes a master and another a slave" (III.4, 1277b3–7). Here, Aristotle suggests that if a man engages in work that is done for others rather than for himself, he puts himself in the position of a slave. His claim to true freedom is thus attenuated.

The free man, then, is characterized by the fact that he rules and is ruled by free men who are his peers as well as by his avoidance of activities and occupations that are done "for the sake of others." One should note, however, that a more complicated notion of freedom is set forth in book VII, in the passage where Aristotle compares the political to the contemplative life. He begins this discussion by reporting that some advocates of the contemplative life "look down on political rule, since they believe that the *life of a free man* (*ton tou eleutheron bion*) is different from that of the man who engages in politics" (VII.3, 1325a18–20). Aristotle challenges this claim by suggesting that, while the exercise of the "rule of a master" may not be especially dignified, the exercise of "political rule"—rule over free men rather than slaves—is in fact both free and noble.

Thus far Aristotle corroborates his earlier claim that the free man is defined by his participation in "political rule." But he qualifies this position when he turns around and defends the contemplatives against their political antagonists. There is a great deal of truth, he suggests, in the view advanced by the contemplatives. Those advocating the political life against the contemplative, Aristotle reports, argue that the political man is better off because "it is impossible for the man who is not actively engaged to do well, and doing well is the same thing as happiness" (VII.3; 1325a21–3). Aristotle proceeds to attack this argument by insisting that the contemplative life is in fact more fully "active" than the political life:

⁶² Although the virtue of the good man *qua* subject is not the same as the virtue of the good man *qua* ruler, "the virtue of the citizen consists in understanding the rule over free men from both positions [i.e. from the position of the ruled and of the ruler]" (III.4, 1277b13–16). Clearly, the good man is not made servile by virtue of submitting to the rule of free men.

the active life is not necessarily active in relation to others (*pros heterous*), as some people think, and those thoughts that come into being for the sake of the things that result from practical action (*tôn apobainontôn charin . . . ek tou prattein*) are not the only ones that are active, but much more [active] are the speculations (*theōrias*) and thoughts that are ends in themselves and that are pursued for their own sake." (VII.3, 1325b16–21)

Here, Aristotle indicates that the political life is "active in relation to others" and oriented towards results beyond the activity itself, whereas the contemplative life is active only in relation to itself. In this passage, then, the political life emerges as less free insofar as it is "active in relation to others." Only contemplation is fully free, since it is never done for others. As in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle both elevates political activity over productive activity on the grounds that it is not "for the sake of others" and yet at the same time argues that, in comparison with contemplative activity, political activity produces results beyond itself and is to this extent "active in relation to others."

In sum, Aristotle identifies two different kinds of freedom in the *Politics*: one which enables a man to rule over free and equal men and keep clear of menial or banausic activities, and one which is grounded in an activity which is completely "useless" and nonproductive and never done for the sake of anyone or anything beyond itself. The latter, of course, is a fuller and more radical freedom than the former, but both are articulated as true types of "freedom."

IX

Which of these two kinds of freedom is the goal of the "liberal" education? The answer, I believe, is both. For although Aristotle clearly wants his educational system to produce the free men who will rule and "perform" virtue in the city, he also wants these men to experience the more radical freedom that accompanies activities which are "not for the sake of" anything or anyone. It is for this reason that Aristotle's educational system aims at the practical virtues necessary for the un leisured activities of politics, but also at true leisure activity, which is explicitly defined in opposition to political and productive pursuits. It is in the times of leisure, of course, that the citizens can experience a freedom that goes beyond the act of

ruling and being ruled by equals. This radical freedom is, of course, more fully attained by contemplatives, but the average citizen can, in his leisure hours, certainly get a taste of—and develop a taste for—such freedom. By learning to value this kind of freedom and to engage in the “useless” activities that define it, the citizens can at least approach the highest form of human happiness. Thus the city as a whole is possessed of the right values and priorities, even if only a few men can “be at leisure” in the best and fullest sense (i.e. as philosophers).

A closer look at the arguments in *Politics* VIII will bring this into better focus. At VIII.4 (1339a), Aristotle raises the question whether music is used in education (1) “for the sake of amusement and relaxation,” (2) “in order to create a good character,” (especially by “accustoming the students to love and hate the correct things”), or (3) “as contributing to the activity of pastime (*diagôgê*) and wisdom.”⁶³ The word “pastime” is, unfortunately, quite vague, and can have a wide range of connotation. As Lord suggests:

When Aristotle speaks of ‘the leisure associated with pastime’ [1338a21–2], he does so . . . precisely in order to distinguish the leisure that is associated with political activities from leisure in the proper sense of the term—the leisured ‘pastime’ that constitutes the end of the best life or the true source of happiness for the best regime.⁶⁴

In short, *diagôgê* or “pastime” is connected with philosophy and other cultivated pursuits that demand complete leisure and freedom from practical and political activities. Which of these three goals, then, is the proper aim of education?

Aristotle proceeds to argue that “amusement” cannot be the primary aim of education, and adds that “it is not fitting to assign pastime (*diagôgê*) to boys and youths, since that which is an end (*telos*) is not suitable for that which is imperfect (*ateleis*).” In other words, because youths are “imperfect” (in the sense of immature), they cannot participate in activities in a manner that is fully perfect and end-like. At this point, then, it looks as though Aristotle will adopt the second goal—the cultivation of character—as the exclusive aim of

⁶³ (1) “amusement and relaxation”: παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀναπαύσεως; (2) “creating a good character”: τὸ ἥθος ποιεῖν τι ποιεῖν; (3) “contributing to pastime and wisdom”: πρὸς διαγωγὴν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν (VIII.4, 1339a) 16–17, 24–26.

⁶⁴ Lord (1982) 56–7.

his educational system. But he goes on to say that in fact music is directed towards all three of the goals he has set forth, "since it appears to participate in them all" (VIII.5, 1339b). It is clear, he says, that music does give pleasure and offer relaxation, and thus can serve in education so long as it is not taken to be an end or primary goal. More honorable, he claims, is the fact that music can help to form a good character (VIII.5, 1340a). He argues for this latter point in some detail, and is clearly convinced that music does serve the second category of educational goals. At this point, we expect Aristotle to turn to category three—that of leisure and "pastime." But he now appears to change the subject, raising the question whether the students should participate in singing and playing instruments or whether they should simply watch others perform music (VIII.6, 1340b). He discusses this issue for the rest of the treatise, and never explicitly addresses the contribution that music makes to "pastime and wisdom."

As I would urge, he does in fact deal with the education in "pastime" indirectly in this final passage (i.e. the one dealing with the students' participation in musical activities). Since "pastime" is associated with leisure rather than political or practical affairs, an education geared towards pastime must teach students the activities that are appropriate for leisure. Aristotle addresses this very issue when he says that the purpose of teaching youths to sing and play music is to make them good "judges" when they reach adulthood.:

since it is necessary to take part in these activities [i.e. singing and playing instruments] for the sake of judging (*krinein*), people must, when they are young, engage in [singing and playing instruments], though when they grow older they should be released from these activities but be able to judge things (*krinein*) that are fine and to rejoice in them properly on account of the education they had in their youth. (VIII.6, 1340b)⁶⁵

Aristotle makes it quite clear that the young are not meant to learn how to play instruments in order to become good performers or professional musicians; this, in fact, would render them banausic (VIII.6, 1341a9–11). According to this argument, one performs music in youth in order to be a good spectator and judge as an adult. As Aristotle says at 1340b25, "it is difficult if not impossible to become

⁶⁵ τοῦ κρίνειν χάριν . . . τὰ καλὰ κρίνειν . . . (VIII.6, 1340b35–8).

good judges (*kritas* . . . *spoudaious*) for those who do not participate in musical performances." This chimes with Aristotle's earlier claim that "pastime" should not be assigned to the young since "that which is an end (*telos*) is not suitable for that which is imperfect (*ateleia*)." Since the young are not ready to participate in activities that are fully end-like, they must be prepared and educated to do this later on in life. In short, young people must learn music in order to be able to be at leisure in the proper fashion when they grow up. They practice and master music as youths for the purpose of becoming good judges and spectators as adults (in periods of leisure). They cannot be at leisure in a full way as students, but they can be educated in this kind of pursuit.

It might seem that the capacity to "judge the things that are fine" is geared towards *praxis*, since the recognition of what is good is an important part of performing good actions. But this is not the claim that Aristotle makes in this passage. Rather, he suggests that judging what is fine is an end in itself. In short, in this section he is not aiming at making the students good actors (i.e. good at doing fine actions) but rather at turning them into good spectators. He is explaining how education in music can prepare students for leisure activities (rather than for performing practical or political actions). To engage oneself as a good spectator and judge is an activity suitable for leisure—it is not done for the sake of anyone or to produce some action or event beyond itself. This is not, then, identical to the activity of practical reasoning, which involves the application of universals to particulars; as Aristotle says in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in the case of practical reasoning the understanding of the particulars is perhaps even more important than the grasp of universals (VI.7.6–7, 1141b). As spectators, Aristotle's citizens have no need to deliberate or to choose a specific course of action; in viewing and listening to musical performances, they can focus on the good and the fine as universals. Insofar as practical and political actions are suspended, the viewers of musical spectacles need only engage in the activity of contemplating what is fine and good.⁶⁶ Aristotle makes a similar point

⁶⁶ Cf. Depew (1991), who argues that the education in the *Politics* is aimed at *phronêsis*, which has both intellectual and practical components. Depew claims that the educational system aims in part at training the intellect (which other scholars have ignored or denied). But he emphasizes the intellectual aspects of practical reasoning, whereas I argue that Aristotle is offering training in an activity that is akin to *theôria*.

earlier in the *Politics* VIII, in a discussion of drawing: though drawing may be useful for purchasing furniture and implements, a student should study it not for these reasons but "because it makes him a contemplator (*theôrêtikon*) of the beauty of bodies."⁶⁷ Correlatively, the viewer of a musical spectacle can be a "contemplator" (*theôrêtikos*) of the beauty of events and characters and actions, as well as of the beauty of artistic forms and structures.

To be sure, Aristotle does not use the terminology of *theôria* in the passage dealing with the performance of music, but there is a direct link between the viewing that takes place in philosophic *theôria* and that which takes place in a musical spectacle. In fact, Aristotle forges this link quite explicitly in the *Protrepticus*:

It is not surprising, then, that wisdom is not useful or advantageous; for we say that it is not advantageous but good, and it should be chosen not for the sake of any other thing, but for itself. For just as we travel to Olympia for the sake of the spectacle, even if we got nothing more out of it—for the spectacle (*theôria*) is more valuable than a large sum of money—and just as we are spectators (*theôroumen*) at the Festival of Dionysus not so that we will gain anything from the actors (in fact we spend money on them), and just as there are many other spectacles that we would choose over a large sum of money, so too the contemplation (*theôria*) of the universe must be honored above all things that are considered to be useful. (fr. B44)

Here, Aristotle draws a direct parallel between the spectator (*theôros*) at the Olympian or Dionysian festivals and the philosophic contemplator of the universe. In particular, the activities of both of the spectator and the contemplator are chosen "not for the sake of any other thing"; they are not useful or productive but rather ends in themselves. Being a spectator at a musical performance, provided that one is capable of judging "the things that are fine," is an activity that is analogous to philosophic contemplation. Since the majority of the citizens in Aristotle's good city will not become philosophers (VII.14, 1333a27–30), they must spend their leisure time in the activity of watching and judging musical performances in the correct fashion. In this way, they come as close as they can to the activity of philosophic contemplation.

As this discussion has indicated, the "liberal" education was a contested issue in fourth-century Athens, and neither Plato nor Aristotle

⁶⁷ ὅτι ποιεῖ θεωρητικὸν τοῦ περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους (*Politics* VIII.3, 1338b1–2).

offers a perfectly coherent account of what this comprises. Each outlines a different kind of education designed to produce a mix of practical and contemplative virtues (and the disparate kinds of freedom that accompany these different virtues). Plato advocates a philosophic education that, if successful, results in "true" wisdom and a radical kind of freedom that enables the philosopher to be completely disinterested and impartial in political and earthly affairs. Aristotle sets forth an education that does not produce philosophers but nonetheless privileges the freedom achieved in leisure over that achieved in political activity. It is clear, I think, that both Plato and Aristotle posit the activity of *theōria* as the pinnacle of the good life and that each has attempted to make "contemplation" (or, in Aristotle's case, a non-philosophical version thereof) the goal of an educational programme. This produces tensions and problems in both of their educational programmes because each is explicitly designed to produce virtuous citizens and rulers for the "good" city.⁶⁸

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THE DEBATE OVER CIVIC EDUCATION IN CLASSICAL ATHENS

Josiah Ober

Introduction

Civic education aims at teaching the citizen how he ought to behave and how he ought to expect others to behave towards him: in contemporary parlance what his “rights” and his “duties” amount to in principle and in practice. My argument runs as follows:

I want to claim first that strongly democratic regimes (like Athens) are confronted with a civic education dilemma in that democratic citizens must learn both to “think alike” and to “think differently.” On the one hand they must be taught to agree to carry out their civic lives according to a set of more or less clearly articulated general principles even while recognizing that consistently adhering to these principles may require a high level of personal sacrifice. Yet democratic citizens must also retain the capacity to challenge accepted conventions—or at least to listen attentively to those who do so. The dichotomy between conformity to established norms and respect for genuinely original thinking renders it difficult to imagine the design of a formal curriculum of democratic civic education. How is it possible systematically to teach individuals to be good democratic citizens in both senses: to be consensual and dissident at once and in turn?

My second point is that the democratic Athenian *polis* regarded education in democratic values as extremely important to social and political flourishing, and especially as a counterweight to the “standard” reciprocal and competitive values that characterized Greek aristocratic culture. But the Athenians did not establish a formal set of institutions designed to teach citizens about their rights and duties until the reform of the *ephebeia* in the later fourth century BC. Rather, as Too suggests, the Athenians expected that governmental and legal institutions, along with the public discourse characteristic of the democratic polity, would offer an adequate instruction in civic values.

Next, I hope to show that intellectual critics of the democracy (my primary example will be Plato) shared with the democrats a conviction that "standard (aristocratic) Greek values" were misconceived and that education of citizens was necessary if superior alternative values were to be promoted. But, as Nightingale suggests (chapter 4) Athenian intellectual critics of democracy regarded the relatively informal democratic Athenian approach to civic education as fundamentally inadequate. Athenian critics of democracy devised theoretical models of formal educational institutions designed to teach each resident of the *polis* to act in ways that were appropriate to his or her station—that station to be determined by his or her moral capacities. Curricular models designed to reflect and reinforce a moral hierarchy were (implicitly or explicitly) offered as alternatives to the egalitarian Athenian approach, which sought to teach the same values to each citizen, without regard to his particular moral capacity. Critical approaches to education were concerned with producing consistently ethical behavior that would support a unitary conception of "the good." From this moral perspective, the very existence of citizens who might think both "alike" and "differently" was an affront. It was taken by critical writers as symptomatic of democracy's incoherent commitment to making unequals into equals and to doing so under the banner of freedom-as-license.

Finally, I hope to bring the arguments developed by Too and Nightingale into a dialectical relationship by arguing that there was a real debate between the democracy and its critics over the question of civic education, and that this debate was ultimately a productive one: it led to improvements in the classical Athenian democratic polity, and it can help us to think more seriously about the problem of civic education in our own, decidedly post-classical, societies.

Value-consensus v. free speech

Athenian democracy was intimately associated with "public voice"—with the capacity and the willingness of citizens to speak up about public concerns and to do so in public. The practice of democracy assumed that citizens had a capacity to reason together, in public (as well as in private), via frank speech, and that the results of those deliberations would (in general and over time) conduce to the common good. Deliberating meant listening as well as speaking; accept-

ing good arguments as well as making them.¹ As Aristotle suggests (*Politics* 1281a40–b10, 1286a24–31, in the so-called “summation argument”), democratic judgments may be superior to those made in oligarchies or tyrannies because judgments made in democratic assemblies aggregate the perceptions of many diverse people. The understanding of a collectivity can be superior to that of each of its parts because of the tendency of open democratic deliberations to draw upon the insight of many individuals, each with his own distinctive point of view.² Thus it was not only the *principle* of freedom of speech (as a defense of negative freedoms) but also the constant and positive *exercise* of free speech (in deliberations about the common good) by persons with diverse ideas that was essential for the flourishing of the democracy. If all those within the citizen body think and were to say just the same thing about the same issues, then public deliberation would be of no substantial benefit in that there would be no testing for better arguments and no meaningful aggregation of multiple viewpoints. In this case the view of the collective whole is no better than the view of any individual, and so practicing democracy becomes a waste of time.

Yet if multiplicity of viewpoints is a precondition for the effective practice of democratic deliberation, it is equally true that Athens could not operate without some agreed-upon postulates and common ground rules. A democratic society centered on deliberative decision-making is dependent on shared assumptions, since there can be no independent way for citizens to judge the relative worth of arguments that arise from radically different postulates. And so it is not surprising to find that Athenian democracy did indeed assume that citizens would ordinarily share certain premises: in addition to a commitment to freedom of speech, key Athenian assumptions included the equality of citizens’ potential political worth, and the importance of preserving the personal security of each individual against outrageous treatment by powerful individuals or syndicates. Any argument made in an Athenian deliberative assembly that included among its premises the fundamental inequality of individuals

¹ Deliberative practice: Gutmann and Thompson (1996). Frank speech (as a translation for *parhêsia*): Monoson (2000).

² Summation argument: Keyt, “Aristotle’s Theory of Distributive Justice,” in Miller and Keyt (1991) 238–78; cf. Ober (1998), 319–26.

or the irrelevance of protecting weaker citizens against outrage was unlikely to gain support.

If some consensus about basic values was essential to democratic deliberation, too much consensus would preclude innovative responses to changes in the external (foreign policy) or internal (social, cultural, political) environment. Athens confronted the omnipresent danger that its governing assumptions would become too elaborate, too entrenched, too fully "naturalized"; this would inevitably limit the society's capacity for making best use of genuinely original thinking and thus would constrict its capacity to respond creatively to emerging opportunities and challenges. The tension between the need to foster heterogeneous viewpoints and homogeneous premises, and the impossibility of ever definitively fixing the "right" place to draw the line between diversity and sameness, sets up a dilemma that lay at the heart of Athenian civic education and the failure to resolve that dilemma animated Athenian democratic culture.³ Democracy could not flourish at Athens (nor, I think, elsewhere) without social critics—any more than vocal critics could flourish in a society lacking democracy's core commitment to free speech. But how might future citizens be taught to respond appropriately (speaking and listening at appropriate times in public fora, voting as assemblymen for better rather than worse policies, judging as jurors or as lotteried magistrates in ways that were more rather than less just) within the ambiguous conceptual terrain laid out by that necessarily unresolved dilemma?

A vibrant democracy depends on the efforts, not only of citizen-advocates dedicated to promoting its continued existence, but of citizen-dissidents who advocate its revision or even its replacement.⁴ Yet establishing and maintaining a dialogue between the consensus that guided the democracy at any given point in time and its critics is no simple thing. To the extent that critics reject the currently operative value-assumptions that governed democratic discourse, they will not gain a hearing in deliberative assemblies. And so the dialogue between the democracy and its critics could not be carried on according to ordinary principles of democratic public debate. Indeed, it is

³ Conflict between difference and sameness as core features of Athenian political thought: Euben (1990).

⁴ Cf. Walzer (1988), for the distinction between valuable "internal" and dangerous "external" modern critics of democracy: I do not think that this distinction holds for the Athenian experience, at least in the fourth century BC.

at first glance difficult to see how such a dialogue could have taken place at all: the most important critical voices often belonged to those with no expressed interest in improving the existing regime, and the democracy never acknowledged, in any explicit or officially sanctioned way, that its critics were anything but pests. Returning to civic education: teaching tolerance for pests might be possible, but that was not enough. How could an educational system teach someone when it made sense to be attentive to pests and when it was best to ignore them?

I would like to suggest, first, that there actually *was* a dialogue between Athenian democracy and its critics, in that each side did address a common set of concerns and did attend to the arguments (explicit and implicit) made by the other side; and, next, that the dialogue, especially as it was carried out in the fourth century BC, did in fact remain, on the whole, a fruitful one, in that critical speech remained free and the democracy was bettered thereby. One key part of that dialogue centered on the education of citizens. The issue of education was particularly salient for Athenian democracy and its critics in that it necessarily asks what premises should be common to the members of a political community, whose responsibility it should be to teach those common premises, and in what institutional framework they should be taught. On the whole, those who claimed to speak for the Athenian democracy contended that an adequate civic education emerged from democratic processes, from “working the machine” of democratic government. The critics of democracy, for their part, contended that process alone was inadequate, that without a special system of education, devised and run by experts, the diversity of viewpoints among citizens would inevitably lead to catastrophic civil conflict.

Socrates v. Meletus

I begin my story about the Athenian debate over civic education in the middle, at the trial of Socrates in 399 BC—a pregnant moment at which the dialogue between democracy and its critics might seem to have broken down, and in a way that must be particularly disturbing to anyone concerned with free speech and the status of the dissident citizen in a democratic polity. In a well-known passage from Plato’s *Apology* (24c–25c, cf. Too, above p. 124), Socrates seeks to

demonstrate by cross examination that his accuser, Meletus, has given no serious thought to the question of the education of the youth of Athens. Prompted by Socrates, Meletus readily asserts that it is "most important" that "the youth be the best possible." Socrates then demands that Meletus declare precisely *who* improves the youth. Repeatedly nudged along by his interrogator, Meletus replies with the following list of "improvers": the state laws (*nomoi*), the body of potential jurors (i.e. 6000 registered *dikastai*), those who voluntarily attend law courts (presumably referring to "bystanders": *periestekotes*), the 500 members of the Council (*bouleutai*), the Assemblymen (*ekklê-siastai*: potentially all citizens in good standing). And so, in short, "all of the Athenians"—except Socrates. Socrates then proceeds to show why this is a silly sort of answer (cf. Too's discussion of "solipsism," above p. 127), claiming, on the analogy of horse-training, that the capacity to improve any given creature is limited to "one person" or to "a few." By contrast, when "the many" associate with creatures in an attempt to improve them, they invariably end up by corrupting them. And so, "although it would be a great happiness for the youth if one person alone corrupted them, while the others benefit them, in fact, Meletus, you have sufficiently displayed that you never yet gave any thought to the youth."

It is obviously impossible to say just how a real Athenian jury might have responded to this interchange between Meletus and Plato's Socrates.⁵ But I suppose that most jurors would have readily agreed with Meletus' assertion that the improvement of the youth was indeed a matter of utmost importance, and with his attempt to identify the institutional bodies that benefited the youth of Athens. Conversely I think that Athenian jurors would have been put off by Socrates' equine analogy, which sought to show that the efforts of "the many" to educate the youth must necessarily lead instead to their corruption, and that only "the one" or "the few" were possible candidates for true educators.

Reduced to its basics, Meletus' list of "improvers" comes down to a claim that "it is first the laws and public institutions of the *polis*, and then those who participate in their use, who educate and thereby improve the youth of Athens." Such claims would not have

⁵ The actual historicity of the exchange is not important to the argument I am developing; the point is that Plato's Socrates elicits answers which an ordinary, non-philosophical, Athenian might be expected to give.

rung odd in the ears of an experience Athenian juror. Other litigants in preserved Athenian courtroom orations make similar and explicit claims about the important educational role played by decision-making bodies in the democratic state. Aeschines (3.246) argued to an Athenian jury in 330 BC that the wrestling grounds (*palaistrai*), formal educational institutions (*didaskaleia*) and poetry (*mousikê*) do not, in and of themselves, adequately educate (*paideuei*) the youth of the *polis*. More important, claimed Aeschines, was the educational function of the decisions of democratic assemblies (*ta dêmosia kêrygmata*). And in the same year the orator Lycurgus (1.10) opined that the jurors he was addressing knew perfectly well (*eu iste*) that their votes to condemn the defendant would not only serve the momentary purpose of punishing a wrongdoer, but would be an incentive to the youth (*neôteroi*) to pursue the path of civic virtue. He asserted that there were two primary elements involved in the education of the young (*ta paideuonta tous neous*): the punishment of wrongdoers and the rewards granted to honorable men (*andres agathoi*). The youth, beholding these two alternatives (i.e. the stick of punishment and the carrot of reward), would turn away from wrongdoing out of fear, and be attracted to right behavior out of a desire for good reputation (*doxa*). Examples could be multiplied, but the basic point is clear enough: Meletus' opinion on the subject of the role of Athenian democratic institutions in the moral education of the Athenian citizenry was not idiosyncratic nor should it be regarded as a "straw-man" fabrication on the part of the author of the *Apology*.⁶ Rather it was a reflection of a core ideological conviction, openly celebrated by public speakers and presumably cherished by ordinary Athenians, regarding the values of the democratic state and the educational mission of democratic institutions.

The sort of education that Plato's Socrates, Meletus, and the Athenian litigants whose courtroom discourse is preserved in the oratorical corpus had in mind was not instruction in arts and letters *per se*. Rather, they all referred to the general area I have been calling "civic education": public morality, civic virtue, and normative ethics. What did Meletus and his (fellow non-philosophical) Athenians suppose that democratic civic education amounted to? What political and ethical values were taught by the jurors and other

⁶ Ober (1989) 160–3 for other examples.

educators cited by Meletus? And can we be any more precise about the institutional loci of Athenian civic education?

Rights and duties

I would like to claim that there was in fact quite a clear Athenian ethical code and that it was indeed taught in Athens' legal and governmental institutions, by Athenian jurors, councillors, Assemblymen, and so on. The code that emerged from Athenian political and legal practices embraced a strong sense of consequentialist duties: i.e. a responsibility to sacrifice individual interests, when called upon, to promote the greater good of the whole. The Athenian conception of the citizen's duty to participate with his fellows in furthering the public good was implicit in (inter alia)

- mandatory military service and (for the well-to-do) mandatory payment of taxes and liturgies.
- a Solonian law enabling a voluntary prosecutor to bring legal charges against a malefactor on behalf of an injured third party.
- incentives to public service: The state made it possible for every citizen to participate in all major deliberative assemblies, and in various magistracies, through pay for service on juries, and (by the end of the fifth century) in the citizen Assembly. Ordinary citizens, even those without a "*polis*-wide" reputation were encouraged to serve as magistrates through the mechanism of filling most state magistracies by lot.
- disincentives to avoidance of public service: The most obvious of these was the "ruddle-dipped rope" that was used to clear the agora during meetings of the Assembly: citizens marked with the red dye of the rope (i.e. those who continued to hang about the agora rather than attending the assembly) were subject to fines.
- promotion of self-sacrifice and euergetism through public commemorations (notably honorific inscriptions and the rituals associated with state funerals for the war dead).
- social sanctions upon selfish behavior. These are most obviously manifest in the discourse of the lawcourts, where opponents were typically castigated for a failure to perform an expected level of public duties.⁷

⁷ Fuller discussion of these relatively well known features of Athenian public life can be found in Ober (1989); Hansen (1991).

The Athenian ethical focus on duty and public responsibility was counterbalanced by a strong commitment to deontological immunities, i.e. a general (although not inalienable) right of non-interference that was manifest in (inter alia)

- the (possibly Solonian) law forbidding *hybris*: It was forbidden to "outrage" anyone: man or woman, free or slave, adult or child. This law reflects a concern with ensuring the integrity of the body and the personal dignity of each Athenian.
- the oath taken by the Athenian magistrate upon taking up his office, promising that he would not use his public authority to arbitrarily redistribute private property.
- the basic law forbidding the passage of any law against an individual (i.e. all laws must be generally applicable to all Athenians).
- the core Athenian commitment, reiterated time and again by public speakers, to maintaining the freedom, political and legal equality, and security of the individual citizen.⁸

Finally, Athenian duties and rights were sustained by a highly robust conception of personal accountability. Among the institutions ensuring accountability were

- the Solonian law allowing the indictment before the people of a magistrate on grounds of misuse of power.
- formal procedures for the preliminary scrutiny (*dokimasia*) and final financial accounting (*euthyna*) for magistrates.
- the procedures of *graphê paranomôn* and *graphê nomôn mê epitêdeion theinai* whereby the proposer of a decree in the Assembly or a law to the *nomothetai* could be indicted for having proposed a measure inimicable to the established values of the Athenians.
- the risk assumed by the prosecutor in public legal actions (e.g. the disabilities suffered if he were to gain less than one-fifth of the votes cast).⁹

Athenian public culture (both institutions and discourse) "taught" each Athenian the extent of his duties and rights, and how they were to be kept in balance. That ethical code never became rigid or dogmatic because the public practices through which young Athenian learned democratic ethics tended to evolve over time, in part as a result of a fruitful engagement with critical voices. One reason that the engagement *was* ultimately productive is there *was*

⁸ For a fuller discussion of Athenian rights (or "quasi-rights") see Ober (2000).

⁹ In addition to the works cited in note 7 above, see Todd (1993); Hansen (1975); Roberts (1982).

some common ground between democratic Athenians and critical philosophers, at least in a negative sense: they shared a refusal to accept, in any unmediated way, the values that are ordinarily thought of (by modern classicists and political theorists) as constituting "standard" Greek ethics.

Standard Greek ethics v. democratic/critical ethics

The standard ethical code exemplified by much of the preserved canon of Greek literary culture may be roughly summed up as reciprocal and agonistic, focusing on conjoined values of "tit-for-tat reciprocity" and "zero-sum competition." Thus, the standard ethical code enjoined a Greek first to seek to help his friends (those who had done him good) and then to harm (or at least avoid helping) his enemies (those who had done him wrong). Greek standards of reciprocity demanded that help and hurt received from others be paid back in a measure that was at least equal, and preferably greater than, the help or hurt received. Next, the standard code enjoined the Greek to seek to gain preeminence over his rivals in an ongoing round of agonistic contests. In these manifold contests, which ranged from drinking games at symposia, to inter-family feuds, to inter-state warfare, the gain by the victor was more or less directly proportionate to the loss on the part of the loser(-s). It is obviously impossible to say whether or not most classical Greeks, across all social categories, would subscribe to this "standard" ethical code. But it is, I believe, certainly true that this code, or something very much like it, characterized a variety of interpersonal relations and educational institutions favored by an influential and vocal segment of aristocratic Greek society. It is perhaps not too much to say that insofar as Greek literary culture was didactic in purpose, it focused on teaching the aristocrat (and especially the young aristocrat) to value reciprocal and competitive ideals. Moreover, the reciprocity/competition matrix defined a substantial part of inter-state relations among the classical *poleis*. In the generally anarchic Greek international environment, the "standard code" remained largely unchallenged.¹⁰

¹⁰ Standard Greek ethics: Dover (1974); Blondell (1989); Cohen (1995); Allen (2000) 59–65. Anarchic Greek international scene Lebow and Strauss (1991). It is

It has, however, been rightly noted that the "standard" reciprocal, agonistic code of ethics was counter-balanced, at least in certain spheres of Greek life, by a set of ethical norms which might be called "cooperative values." These focused on the virtuousness of seeking a common good (common to the *polis*, the *dêmos*, or some relatively substantial subset of *polis* or *dêmos*) through moderation of appetite, restraint on self-aggrandizement, and the willing contribution of one's personal fortune, one's time, and even one's own life. These cooperative values are especially associated with the public realm, with the intra-*polis* and explicitly political "world of the citizen." And they seem to be especially to the fore in the public discourse of the democratic *polis*. As Meletus' response to Socrates suggests, practices related to the public space of "citizenship" were seen as having a meliorative role in educating each member of society, and especially sub-adult "potential citizen males" in cooperative values. That civic education took cognizance of the "standard" code of reciprocal and agonistic ethics, but sought to regulate and delimit its operative sphere.¹¹

Within the Greek world, cooperative values were certainly not unique to democracies. The concern with educating the youth in cooperative values through public institutions may well be a general feature of the Greek *polis*: the Spartan *agôgê* (upbringing) can be seen as one, remarkable and extreme, manifestation of this general concern in a non-democratic context. The *agôgê* was a formal institution, aimed at teaching Spartan youths aged seven to twenty how to live and fight as warrior-citizens. The Spartan youths were reared apart from the rest of society, and the *agôgê* was marked off from (although congruent with) the rest of Sparta's public institutions. The goal of this education was to teach each Spartan to conform precisely to the military ethos that defined Spartan society: to serve as a fully cooperative soldier, taking and giving commands as befit his station; never shrinking back or advancing beyond his assigned place in the ranks. The presumption was that having graduated from the rigorous civic and physical training of the *agôgê*, the young Spartan was now fit to take up his public role as a hoplite in the phalanx

worth noting that the "standard code" was potentially contradictory, in that "helping a friend" might come into conflict with seeking personal victory.

¹¹ The *polis*' focus on the importance of cooperative behavior in the service of the collectivity may be traced back to the "*metrios* values" that emerged in the archaic period; for a survey see Morris (1996). Cooperative values in Athens: Herman (1993); Herman (1994); Herman (1995).

and as a citizen in the Spartan assembly. The *agôgê* taught the young Spartan to collectivize the values implicit in the standard code: the friends he would seek to help and the enemies he would harm were the friends and enemies of the Spartan state. Enemies were internal as well as external: they included, especially, the subject helot population whose labor provided the warrior class with the leisure to concentrate primarily upon military training. The individual warrior might seek to gain a reputation for excellence, but that reputation was gained not by standing out from the crowd, but by being an exemplary "Similar" (*homoios*).¹²

In Athens, as the Socrates/Meletus exchange suggests, the education of the citizen in cooperative values was quite different; there was no *agôgê* or other formal system of state-supported civic education (at least until the reform of the *ephebeia* in the mid-330s; see below). In Athens public institutions ostensibly designed to achieve other ends (justice, public policy) carried an additional burden of educating the young Athenians in civic values. Plato's Meletus and actual Athenian litigants claimed that ordinary public institutions were in fact well suited to educating the youth, at least so long as those citizens who manned those institutions were fully cognizant of their role as educators, took their duties seriously, and kept a watchful eye upon the lessons being taught by the decisions they made (see Too, above p. 128). Plato's Socrates and actual philosophers scoffed at the notion that this sort of informal approach could perform the arduous task of ethical training.

A major burden of Athenian civic education was offering an attractive alternative to the problematic values exemplified by the "standard code." The influence of those traditional values could never be obliterated, nor would it have been socially desirable to do so. The "standard code" remained operative within aristocratic Athenian society and was manifest in various aspects of aristocratic private education and behavior.¹³ Close regulation of public behavior potentially informed by the reciprocal and agonistic code was imperative to the survival of Athenian democratic government. It would not do for an Athenian who regarded himself as superior to his fellows by dint of (e.g.) his great wealth to seek to assert his superiority over those of

¹² Spartan *agôgê*: Cartledge (1987); Kennell (1995). Spartan "similarity" v. Athenian "equality": Cartledge in Ober and Hedrick (1996) 175–85.

¹³ See, for example, Kurke (1999).

his fellow citizens whom he regarded as his inferiors and class enemies. For the democracy to flourish, the claims of equality among citizens must ordinarily prevail. Overt manifestations of the standard code must normally be restricted to private life, and could be regarded as problematic even within the private sphere.¹⁴ Yet suppression is only one part of the story. Athenian public life depended on the persistence of rightly manifested reciprocal and competitive values—e.g. on competitions between speakers in the Assembly to devise and present to their fellows the best policy. The incorporation of reciprocal and agonistic values into an overarching framework of cooperative values and their revaluation by the political community was essential to the long-term workability of the Athenian political order.¹⁵

As I have argued elsewhere, Athenian democratic culture was predicated on the three closely interrelated political values of equality, freedom, and security. And respect for these values was, consequently, the foundation of the ethical system “taught” by Athens’ informal approach to civic education. For the Athenians, equality meant legal and political equality, equal access to justice, equal votes, and an equal option to exercise public speech. Legal and political equality did not entail equal access to material goods, but legal and political equality were sustained by a limited redistribution of material goods (via pay for public service, welfare benefits to the handicapped and orphans, distribution of food at public festivals, etc.). Freedom meant the independence of the *polis* from foreign domination, the “positive” freedom of the citizen to participate in various aspects of governance and public life, and the “negative” freedom of the individual to do more or less as he wished in his private life. Security meant that the weaker citizen (especially a poor man, one lacking formal education or powerful friends) was in principle immune from being subjected to unanswerable physical assault or verbal humiliation by his stronger neighbor, whereas all citizens (and especially wealthy citizens) were protected from certain forms of the arbitrary exercise of majority power, especially as regards private property.¹⁶

The relationship between the “value triad” and democracy was

¹⁴ For surveys of the mechanisms of Athenian social control, see Hunter (1994); Cohen (1991).

¹⁵ This is the burden of Ober (1989). See also Whitehead (1983); Whitehead (1993); Cohen (1995).

¹⁶ Equality, freedom, security: Ober (1996); and see also the essays by K. Raalfaub, E. M. Wood, and M. H. Hansen in Ober and Hedrick (1996).

itself reciprocal: maintenance of democratic institutions (with their implicitly educational role) and the general hegemony of democratic ideology assured the continued freedom, equality, and security of each individual citizen and of the citizenry as a collectivity. Conversely, it was the consistent tendency of each citizen and the citizenry as a collectivity to act as free, equal, and secure entities that assured the maintenance of the democracy.¹⁷ The issue before us is to understand how these core Athenian political values were supported, explicitly and implicitly, by a code of civic ethics visible in the public language and institutional practices sanctioned and fostered by the democratic polity.

I would suggest that Meletus' response to Socrates did more than proclaim a cultural ideal; it was quite an accurate portrayal of lived social reality: Athenian public practices (notably those listed above) did in fact educate (and indeed "improve") the citizens by promoting a code of normative ethics that was sufficiently clear and coherent to allow for "social reproduction" of patterns of behavior consistent with the freedom, equality, and security of the individual and the community. It was the reliability of this process of social reproduction via informal civic education that ensured the practical stability of the democracy over time, that allowed democracy to recover from the oligarchic interludes of the late fifth century, and that sustained the democracy through the crises of the Peloponnesian War era and the tumultuous fourth century.¹⁸

Democracy's critics on civic education

Like the demos of Athens, classical philosophers confronted the problems of what principles might serve to regulate "standard" reciprocal and agonistic ethics and how to transform those traditional aristocratic values into patterns of conviction and behavior aligned with richer conceptions of justice and the common good.¹⁹ But the

¹⁷ Ober (2000).

¹⁸ Concept of social reproduction: Gutmann (1999).

¹⁹ Nehamas, "What did Socrates Teach?" in Nehamas (1999), offers an insightful assessment of the first steps in the history of the philosophical confrontation with what I have been calling standard ethics (as codified in the teaching of the so-called sophists).

philosophical response to this challenge was very different from that of the Athenian democracy. Socrates' criticism of Meletus in Plato's *Apology* sets the stage. In Socrates' argument, because Athens *lacked* a formal system of public education to inculcate excellent values, that is to say a system designed and implemented by competent experts, it followed that no Athenian (except Socrates himself) took any care at all for the improvement of the youth. Or, if "the many" did seek to "train" the youth, they would necessarily end up corrupting them. And thus (given Athenian intransigence to learning the sort of lessons offered by Socrates) the Athenians remained dismally ill-educated.

The putative failure of the democratic state to offer a substantive education in values is an important contextual aspect of various detailed proposals for systems of civic education developed by philosophically-minded Athenian writers in the course of the fourth century, e.g. by Xenophon (*Memorabilia*, *Cyropaedia*), Plato (*Republic*, *Laws*), Isocrates (*Areopagiticus*) and Aristotle (*Politics*; and cf. see Too and Nightingale, above). In each case, the philosopher (I am using the term broadly) was concerned with establishing (in theory) a formal educational system that would ensure that experts were responsible for inculcating the youth with the "right" ethical and political values. And in each case that substantive education in values was intended to yield consistently good social outcomes by ensuring that potential citizens embraced a unitary notion of "the good" and possessed the intellectual capacities and special skills adequate to achieving that unitary good. By contrast, the democratic *polis* never offered its citizens a unitary conception of the good. Just as the democratic *polis* refused to assign the task of civic education to a separate educational institution or to educational "experts," it avoided the attempt to instruct citizens about the final ends of human life.

The Athenians "failed" to create a formal educational system along the lines envisaged either by the Spartans or by the philosophers, not only because they recognized the useful dichotomy between "thinking alike" and "thinking differently" and the educational effectiveness of their own public practices in instructing citizens in that dichotomy, but also because doing so would have had distinctly anti-democratic implications in terms of limiting the freedom of each citizen to identify and pursue somewhat different conceptions of his (individual) good. This is not to say that Athens was self-consciously "liberal" in a way that would have pleased a strong modern liberal

dedicated to the priority of individual choice-making in the hierarchy of values (e.g. Isaiah Berlin). But it is to say that despite hegemonic tendencies implicit in democratic political discourse, Athens was (at least potentially) much more open and flexible in allowing for the individual pursuit of happiness than was a Spartan-style education in virtue or the theoretical, philosophical projects that are often identified as the only meaningful examples of "Greek civic education."²⁰

The philosophical critics of democracy were convinced that political regimes lacking a unitary, well defined, and carefully articulated conception of the good, along with a formal, institutional curriculum for teaching the youth to pursue that unitary good, faced catastrophic problems with social cohesion. The specter of civil war (*stasis*) loomed over fourth-century philosophical projects concerned with civic education: the fear was that citizens who had not been convinced as youths to support a unitary, state-sanctioned, conception of the good would too readily fall into violent conflict with their fellows, as competing conceptions of the good were actively promoted and as friends to be helped and enemies to be hurt were variously defined.²¹ Diversity among conceptions of the good was regarded as especially problematic in the absence of any final and definitive means to arbitrate amongst diverse goals. That final and definitive means might, in the view of the philosophers, be provided even in sub-utopian regimes by a detailed and substantive code of law—it is no accident that discussions of civic education and state law are closely intertwined in classical political philosophy (as Too and Nightingale have shown in their discussions of Plato's *Crito*, *Republic*, *Laws*, and Aristotle, *Politics* books 7–8).

The Athenian solution to the relationship between law, education, and the "diversity of goods problem" was quite different from the solutions proposed by classical philosophers. As Too has demonstrated, Athenian public speakers frequently and vociferously expressed their respect for the lawcode; it is hardly surprising that Meletus' first response to Socrates' demand for the names of "improvers of the youth" is simply "the laws." This sort of response presumably

²⁰ At this point my argument seeks to bring Too's conception of Athenian "education by law" and Nightingale's analysis of the complex political/contemplative goals of Platonic and Aristotelian education into a productive relationship through the mediating practices and ideology of Athenian democracy.

²¹ Cf. Ober (2000).

came quite naturally to an Athenian: it is mirrored in various forensic speech appeals to "the authoritative laws."²² And in Plato's *Crito* Socrates imagines the "laws of Athens" themselves as dissuading him from any thought of escaping prison. They do so in part by reminding Socrates of the reciprocal obligation he owed to the laws on the grounds of the education (*paideia*) they, the laws, had provided for him.²³ But Socrates of the *Apology* does not regard "the laws" as an adequate description of the "educators" of the youth. He demands that Meletus tell him *who* improved the citizens: "I am not asking this, best of men, but rather what human being is it who knows first of all this very thing, the laws?" (24e).

Socrates' refusal to accept Meletus' first answer ("laws") is, of course, imperative to the development of his argument dismantling the case against himself as a solitary corrupter of youth. But it also points to the fact that "the laws of Athens," in and of themselves, were indeed inadequate either to educate the youth of Athens in civic values or to decide between disputes about diverse goods. This inadequacy is a product of the origins and nature of the Athenian lawcode. Unlike many other ancient legal systems, which assumed a supra-human authorship for fundamental law, and then developed from that foundation a detailed body of substantive law, the Athenians knew that their law was the product of fallible human activity. Their lawcode was relatively simple and highly procedural. In the absence of an unassailable foundation and a detailed code of substantive law, it was legal and governmental processes—"working of the machine" of law and government—that (contingently) settled disputes about the good and educated future citizens. The Athenians expected that citizens would be educated, not just by the spirit or the wording of the law, but by engaging in (and observing others engaging in) political and legal processes: by serving as jurors, magistrates, Assemblymen and so on. The Athenians assumed, I believe rightly, that a clear code of ethics arose not only from a public discourse centered on freedom, equality, and security, but also from the logic inherent in fair and consistent public practices. And they supposed that "practices in use" could be effective educators.

²² Authoritative laws: Hansen (1991) 173–4.

²³ Socrates' obligation to Athenian laws in the *Crito*: see Kraut (1984), Ober (1998) 179–83. Cf. Nightingale, above, p. 152, for the importance of reciprocity in Plato's *Republic*.

If the argument I have developed above is along the right lines, we should expect a distinction to be drawn (at least implicitly) by the classical philosophers between a "proper" system of education, with a formal curriculum and a particular institutional locus within society, and an informal Athenian education by everyday discourse and practice. In a memorable passage of the *Republic*, cited by Nightingale (above, p. 140), Plato directly addresses the potential of democratic institutions and discursive practices to miseducate young people, even those with a "naturally" philosophical character. Although Plato's Socrates does not state explicitly that he is referring to Athens in this passage, it is clearly Athens that lies behind his description. Socrates warns his interlocutor, Adeimantus, against supposing, as do the many, that it is certain private educators (*sophistai idiōtikoi*) who corrupt the youth (492a). Socrates is referring here, of course, to the so-called sophists, who offered to teach young Athenians (and especially the aristocrats would could pay their fees) a particularly strong and "naturalized" version of what I have been calling "standard ethics," along with the practical techniques (especially rhetoric) for securing victory over their rivals. Rather, says Socrates, it is "the many," those who accuse the private teachers, who are themselves the "great sophists" who educate most completely and mold the young and the old, men and women, making them just as they want them to be (492a-b). Adeimantus, who imagines education to be a formal affair with a particular social locus, wonders when it is that this education by the many takes place. Socrates emphasizes the omnipresence of democratic education, replying that it is

when many gathered together sit down in assemblies, courts, theaters, army camps, or any other common meeting of the multitude (*plēthos*), and, with a great deal of uproar (*thorybos*), excessively blame some of the things said or done and just as excessively praise others, shouting and clapping; and, besides, the rocks and the very place that surrounds them echo and redouble the uproar of blame and praise. Now in such circumstances, as the saying goes, what do you suppose is the state of the young man's heart? Or what kind of private education will hold out for him and not be swept away by such blame and praise and go, borne by the flood, wherever it's headed so that he'll say the same things are noble and shameful as they do, practice what they practice, and be such as they are? (*Republic* 492b-c)

Socrates goes on to explain that the education of the young carried on in public assemblies is reinforced by legal norms and practices,

since he who is not persuaded by the clamor of public meetings to conform to a demotic code of behavior is disciplined though disenfranchisement, fines, and death. Such education is, in Plato's view, totalizing and hegemonic: no mere sophist or private arguments (*idiotikoi logoi*) can hope to prevail (*kratesein*) against these forces. And so no human *ethos*, however educated, can, or has, or shall prevail against this sort of *paideia* (492d-e).

In light of the argument that I have been developing here, someone might suppose that Socrates of the *Republic* is contrasting democratic "cooperative values" with the "standard ethics" taught by the sophists. But this is hardly the case: for Socrates of the *Republic*, democratic values and the techniques taught by the sophists are cut from the same cloth. He claims that democratic education-by-practice is so effective that the so-called sophists themselves, who are generally thought to be the rivals of the many, in fact teach nothing but the opinions (*dogmata*) of the many—the very things that the many proclaim (*doxazousin*) when they are gathered together in assembly.

Socrates' lesson equating democratic values and sophistic technique is reinforced by a vivid metaphor: the sophists call what they teach wisdom (*sophia*). But it is nothing more than the "wisdom" that is learned and might be transmitted by the keeper of a great and ferocious beast. The keeper is quickly trained to cater to the beast's needs, its infernal bellowing, and its response to different sorts of speech. In the end he will learn to provide the beast with whatever it wants. Having been well trained, the keeper, although self-evidently the beast's servant, then claims to have mastered (and to be able to teach others) the secrets of beast-management (493a-b). Moreover, Socrates concludes, the basic point can be generalized: the painter, poet, and politician—like the sophist—merely learns to accommodate himself to the angers and pleasures of "the many and various foregathered folk"; they make the many their masters, and of necessity produce what the many praise (493c-d).

This is, of course, a hostile description of democratic civic education, and meant first to conflate democratic values with sophistic rhetorical techniques and then to draw a sharp contrast between the casual but all-pervasive democratic practice and the carefully thought-through educational regime that trains the Guardians and leads to the production of philosophers in Kallipolis. I certainly do not think that Plato is correct to make an easy association of sophism with

democratic values. But stripped of its rhetorical trappings, Plato's description of the implicit *processes* of education in the democratic city is not, I think, so far off the mark. Nor is it very far from what most ordinary Athenians thought should and did take place in the public space of the *polis*. Plato asserts, in essence, that the normative claims implicit in Athenian political and legal institutions (including accepted/sanctioned forms of public discourse) constitute and teach the ethical system which arises from and reproduces over time the prevailing political and social structure. Thus, once again, it is the "working of the machine" that it said to educate the citizens in ethical values and that education-through-practice is regarded as effective in reproducing citizens obedient to a distinctive ethical code. Put in more positive evaluative terms, we may say that the practice of democracy is a form of civic education, and it is the success of Athenian civic education that sustained the democratic system over time, provided its resilience, and drove out (or incorporated) competing ethical systems.²⁴

Democratic responses to the critical challenge

Plato's critical account of democratic education focuses our attention on a key aspect of Athenian civic education: ethical claims arise not only from substantive (content) values, for example the values explicitly asserted in the oath of the ephebes, or in judgments of juries on particular cases, but also from accepted forms of public discourse, and finally, pervasively and importantly, from what we may call "process values" or the "implicit ethics of procedure." Among the educative processes of the democracy, as Plato quite rightly suggests, are the rules and customary practices governing deliberative and judicial assemblies: the Council, the Ecclesia, and the people's courts. But he also suggests (and again rightly) that the education of democratic citizens took place in military venues: in the army camps. And, we might add, on the triremes.²⁵ And in the formal gatherings of Athenians at religious festivals. And during infor-

²⁴ Cf. Macedo (1998).

²⁵ Educational values of hoplite and trireme service: see essays of V. Hanson and B. Strauss in Ober and Hedrick (1996).

mal meetings in the civic space of the Agora.²⁶ Plato seems to me tendentiously wrong to claim that the values taught in each of these venues arise from nothing more than the unexamined and ill-informed opinions of "the mob." In his account, democratic civic education becomes ideological in the worst sense of the term: seeking to enforce conformity with a crude form of "standard" ethics, the lowest common denominator of popular prejudices. I would maintain quite to the contrary, that Athenian institutions taught a complex lesson that integrated cooperative with reciprocal/agonistic values, and moreover that those educating institutions themselves changed in response to social criticism. If we approach each of the various Athenian "civic-educational" venues historically, it is possible to trace institutional changes that may reasonably be linked to the capacity of the democratic order to respond (at whatever remove, and in terms that remained fundamentally egalitarian) to concerns raised by democracy's critics.

Particularly striking examples (each of which has been analyzed in detail in recent scholarship) of democratic reforms enacted from the late-fifth through the mid-fourth century BC include

- the establishment, beginning in the late fifth century, of a formal lawcode (answering the charge that democratic law was internally inconsistent)
- formalized processes in the late fifth and continuing into the fourth century, for distinguishing processes of lawmaking from the everyday establishment of state policy-making through decrees of the Assembly (responding to the claim that democratic lawmaking in the Assembly was arbitrary and driven by momentary passions)
- mid-fourth century reforms in the method of military recruitment (an attempt to address issues of fairness in respect to consequentialist duties potentially demanding self-sacrifice)
- establishment (beginning in the 350s) of financial magistracies which gave more scope for expert management of state funds (a move to allow expertise to have a more substantial role in the processes of governance)
- the elaboration (in the mid-330s BC) of the formal training of 18 and 19 year-old citizen-soldiers in the *ephêbeia* (discussed in more detail below: an explicitly "educational" reform answering the charge that democratic education lacked substance).²⁷

²⁶ Religious festivals: see essays by Arnaoutoglou and Millett in Cartledge, Millett et al. (1998).

²⁷ Detailed list of changes: Rhodes 1979/80; update in Rhodes, "Judicial Procedures

In no case is it possible to claim that there was a *direct* relationship between dissident criticism and democratic reform. But I think that there is a close enough match between “critical challenges” and “democratic reforms” to justify the assumption that (at a remove) the democracy acknowledged that valid concerns had been raised by its critics. Moreover it responded, in measured and responsible ways (if not in ways that the critics would regard as satisfactory), to those concerns.

So far I have suggested that

1. ordinary citizens of democratic Athens and Athenian intellectuals critical of democracy agreed in rejecting some aspects of the “standard” reciprocal/agonistic ethical code but had quite different views about the values that should be established in its place, and how and by whom those alternative values should be taught
2. because of democratic dependence on diversity of viewpoints for effective deliberations, an engagement with critical discussions of (e.g.) civic education was essential to the capacity of the democracy to adapt to changing circumstances
3. the engagement between democracy and its critics contributed to significant institutional innovations
4. institutional innovations, even those not obviously to do with education, were directly relevant to the question of Athenian civic education because Athenian civic education operated through public practices.

In sum, the dialogue that took place between democracy and its critics meant that the Athenians organized their public practices somewhat differently (and somewhat better) and the ethical lessons learned by the Athenian youth via public practices therefore changed for the better over time. The question remains: where and how did the salutary engagement between the democratic many and the critics of democracy take place, given that critics did not deliberate in public assemblies?

In the passage cited above from the *Republic*, Plato associates the educational public processes of the democratic *polis* with theatrical

in Fourth-Century Athens” in Eder (1995) 303–19. I differ from Rhodes’ conclusion that these innovations represented some sort of falling off from the fullest flower of radical democracy; it seems to me that they are each fully consistent with and furthered core democratic principles, and especially with the democratic commitment to constant innovation. Allen (2000) 44–5, argues, on the basis of democratic limitations on the punishment powers of civil and military magistrates, that “[i]t was in the fourth century that Athens was truly a radical democracy.”

and oratorical discourse. I do not think that he was wrong to do so. The central tenets of the civic ethics taught to each Athenian by the procedural rules of Athenian public institutions were (more or less clearly) formulated and contested in the texts of plays presented in the Athenian theater and in preserved Athenian orations. But Plato is wrong, I think, when he claims that the discourse of the theater and the civic assemblies was no more than a distillation of the lowest common denominator of demotic sensibilities, nothing but the articulation of the "great beast's bellowings." Instead, I would suggest that dramatic and oratorical discourse were primary sites at which contrasting voices advocating the values currently pertaining among the democratic majority and those promoted by its critics were brought together and articulated in an idiom that made the dialogue between them usefully accessible to the citizenry.

Plays and major speeches were written by playwrights and orators who necessarily bridged the gap between critical and democratic discourse: Aristophanes was famously featured by Plato as a participant in a "critical-intellectual" symposium and yet he obviously had to remain closely in touch with demotic sensibilities if he hoped to win prizes at the dramatic contests. The same familiarity with both contexts—"aristocratic, critical, and intellectual" on the one hand, "demotic, democratic, and ordinary" on the other—can be assumed for Athens' highly-educated, elite public orators.²⁸ My point then, is that Athenian playwrights and orators were familiar with, and indeed may have participated in, discussions within what I have elsewhere characterized as Athens' "critical community."²⁹ And that familiarity sometimes led them to incorporate critical notions into plays and speeches presented to the Athenian public.

If this line of thought is correct, then at least some passages in Athenian plays and public speeches will have been informed by critical arguments: plays and speeches served as public "carriers" for critical ideas developed by dissident thinkers. As noted above, the original authors of those critical ideas may not have had any conscious intention of improving democracy.³⁰ Yet I would suggest that whatever their original intentions, the force of critical ideas was transformed by the shift in context. When critical thinking was carried beyond

²⁸ Backgrounds of Athenian rhetors: Ober (1989) 112–8.

²⁹ Critical community: Ober (1998).

³⁰ Intentions of critics: *ibid.*

“private” discussions among intellectual elites into the deliberative public arena it became a resource for the betterment of the democracy. When ordinary Athenians attended plays and listened to public speakers, they were indirectly exposed to the thinking of critical intellectuals, but that thinking was reconfigured to suit democratic purposes. In the process of reconfiguration, critical thought became a valuable “heterogeneous” resource, one that helped to counterbalance the potentially deadening tendency of democratic ideology to seek a homogeneous consensus.

The civic focus and critical content of much Athenian drama is by now fairly well known and has been discussed in a wide array of specialty studies.³¹ But the idea that public rhetoric could manifest a critical (as well as a democratic) function has received less attention.³² I will therefore conclude this discussion of the debate between the democracy and its critics over civic education by looking at a few passages from two famous speeches delivered before (or at least composed as if for delivery before) Athenian audiences: Thucydides’ account of Pericles’ Funeral Oration (dramatic date 431/0 BC) and Demosthenes’ speech 21, *Against Meidias* (346 BC). In each case, the speaker replies cogently and dialectically to searching criticisms, including (at least implicitly) criticism of the democratic reliance on teaching civic values through participative political processes.

The Funeral Oration, given by Thucydides to Pericles in book 2 of his *History* is today the best known ancient account of Athenian democracy. The speech alludes directly to the relationship between free speech, effective deliberation, and the capacity to aggregate the judgment of a large body of citizens (2.40.2). It presents as clear a snapshot of democratic Athenian ethics as one could ask for: at once consequentialist and deontological, concerned with personal responsibility and with refuting alternative ethical conceptions. Pericles presents his celebration of Athens and its democratic culture in the context of the war against the Spartans; he explicitly juxtaposes Athenian values, learned through voluntary participation in life of the city with the Spartan alternative, based on a mandatory, stan-

³¹ Theater as a critical resource: see Cartledge 1990; the essays collected in Euben (1986); Winkler and Zeitlin (1990), Goldhill and Osborne (1999); Monoson (2000); Allen (2000); further references in Ober (1998) 50 n. 72.

³² But see Farrar (1988) on Pericles; Yunis (1996) on Demosthenes.

standardized system of education. Sparta is the overt critical foil, but rebutting the arguments of such Athenians as might prefer to see Athens embrace Spartan values informs the speech's polemics. Pericles is careful to draw a clear distinction between Athenians, who live their lives public freely and in the open, to the dour and secretive Spartans, whose military efficiency was bought with the coin of endless and laborious practice (2.39.1). Pericles celebrates the Athenian capacity to embrace both thoughtful public deliberation and decisive action, noting that among all other people, deliberation and decisiveness were regarded as antithetical (2.40.3). Pericles' Athenians are committed to equality of public opportunity, which is said to lie at the core of the democratic approach to governance (2.37.1). They are free in public life and they feel no need to keep track of their neighbors' private affairs (2.37.2).

But for all the distinctiveness he attributes to Athens, Pericles also appropriates what democracy's critics might claim as specifically Spartan virtues, notably the central Spartan value of obedience to the law. Pericles' speech is framed by introductory and concluding appeals to the absolute responsibility of the citizen to obey the law (2.35.1, 3; 2.46.1). Pericles specifically denies that Athenian liberty leads to lawlessness. Quite to the contrary, obedience to written law, magistrates, and unwritten customs is what ultimately provides for the Athenian determination to defend the injured. That is to say, a "Sparta-like" dedication to lawfulness underwrites the quintessential Athenian commitment to the defense of individual immunities (2.37.3). Throughout the speech, Pericles emphasizes that individual self-sacrifice is at once a duty and, for Athenians, a voluntary choice; willingly embracing one's duty to sacrifice is what leads to glory, for the individual and for the *polis* as a community (e.g. 2.43.1). Finally, the "standard" agonistic and reciprocal code is at once appropriated (2.41.1–3; 2.42.4) and refuted as an adequate stimulus to truly appropriate behavior (2.40.4–5; 2.45.1).

Eighty-five years, much political history, much critical writing, and a number of institutional reforms separate the dramatic date of Pericles' funeral oration from that of Demosthenes' speech *Against Meidias*: the democracy had been twice overthrown and twice restored; Plato and Xenophon had flourished, written much, and died; Isocrates was near the end of his career but still very active; and Aristotle was at the height of his powers. The Athenian legal system had been put on a more systematic basis. Like Thucydides' Pericles, Demosthenes

emphasizes the essential bastions of democratic culture: the fundamental importance of the freedom, formal equality, and security from outrage of each citizen.³³ But Demosthenes is more explicit than Pericles about the ways in which working the machine of democratic public practices, especially the legal system, maintained those essential qualities.

Demosthenes claims that the primary threat to democratic freedom, equality, and security originates with the agonistic desire of the powerful individual to demonstrate his superiority to all others and in every sphere of life: not only in private relations, but in public. Demosthenes' Meidias bears a striking resemblance to Plato's character Callicles of the *Gorgias*: like Callicles, Meidias is impatient with restraints on his capacity to assert his superiority, restraints that were imposed upon him by the rules and ethical standards established by the democratic many. Plato's Callicles detects something unnatural in this situation. He believes that he has seen through the artificial, deceptive culture established through the assertion of collective power by a mass of those who were individually weak. He is consequently optimistically and arrogantly confident of his own ability to return to what he supposes is a proper "law of nature."³⁴ Demosthenes wastes no time in trying to establish a counter-claim for the naturalness of the rule of the many. Instead he implicitly accepts the "Calliclean" assumption that the democracy was sustained only by the collective determination of numerous, individually feeble, citizens to maintain a set of conventions that would restrain the natural tendencies of powerful individuals to dominate others. At the center of the formal system of constraints was the Athenian code of law, notably the law forbidding outrage (*hybris*).³⁵ But one of Demosthenes' major points is that the law in and of itself is insufficient to restrain the behavior of those who rejected the values of freedom, equality and individual security. Rather, it was the law-abiding behavior of the citizens, and their willingness to "work the machinery" of the law, as voluntary prosecutors and as jurors, that keeps the likes of Meidias and Callicles from successfully flaunting the values espoused by democratic ethics.

As Too has noted (above, p. 125), in the *Crito*, Plato's Socrates

³³ Freedom, equality, and security in Dem. 21: Ober (1996) chapter 7.

³⁴ Plato's Callicles: Ober (1998), 197–213.

³⁵ Athenian law against *hybris*, Ober (2000).

had discussed the relationship between education, law and appropriate individual behavior, positing that for him to escape from prison after having been convicted would constitute an injury to the *polis* because the *polis* could not survive if the laws were without force (50a–b). Socrates' position grounds the maintenance of legal authority on an individual's private decision to behave ethically. The basis of the Socratic ethico-legal order is a just contract between the laws and the individual citizen. According to the terms of that contract, Socrates had agreed to abide by the procedural forms of Athenian law and to obey the judgments rendered by the *polis* (in the form of the decisions of jurors who abide by the procedural rules), even though those judgments might be substantively incorrect and so do him harm. His voluntary obedience was given in exchange for having received from the Laws specific goods: his birth (because of the laws regarding marriage), his nurture (*trophê*), and his education (*paideia*). But, in the course of the dialogue Socrates had opened the door to an alternative conception of legal authority, noting that "a good deal might be said, especially by a *rhêtôr*, on behalf of that law (*nomos*), now to be broken [by the proposed escape], which requires judgments judicially rendered to be authoritative" (50b).

Demosthenes, a *rhêtôr* in fact, walked through that open doorway in *Against Meidias*, by providing a detailed brief for why the laws must remain authoritative if the dignity of ordinary citizens is to be protected from attacks by powerful, wealthy, clever men. His speech returns time and again to the educational aspect of legal decisions. Demosthenes assumes that the powerful will always desire to demonstrate their superiority in agonistic fashion by harming and shaming the weak. He does not suppose that they would be restrained by any internal concern for abstract justice: the dangerous and powerful are assumed to be proponents of what I have been calling "standard ethics" and they do not regard their ordinary fellow citizens as "friends." Nor are the laws themselves, mere inscribed letters, capable of guaranteeing compliance with democratic ethics. Rather, the appropriate insurance of legal authority and the democratic values promoted by the law is the collective judgment of the citizenry when they are gathered as jurors. Vigorous public punishment of outrageous behavior will serve to teach the many the source of their own power and will intimidate powerful individuals, forcing them into compliance with the will of the many. It is thus the mass of citizens "working the machine," acting as jurors on the initiative of

a voluntary prosecutor, that is the collective agent that preserves the authority of law and educates the citizenry in democratic values.³⁶

In both speeches briefly considered here, I would suggest that we can hear a debate being carried on in at least three discursive registers: an assertion of a specifically democratic set of ethical assumptions, a critical challenge that seems to threaten those assumptions, and a thoughtful response to that challenge. In each case the response takes the critical challenge seriously and seeks to answer it. Those Athenians who listened to such speeches, and responded to them in their turn, became active participants in the debate. And that, I suppose, is how and where a productive dialogue between democracy and its critics took place. Because of the established structures of democratic society, that dialogue was incorporated into the informal processes of civic education—as well as eventually contributing to the creation of formal educational institutions.

We must resist the tendency to imagine that we can know the workings of the dialogue I have sketched above in great detail. I would certainly *not* want to claim that Thucydides meant the readers of Pericles' Funeral Oration to recall some particular Laconophile tract. Nor, a fortiori, that Demosthenes had a copy of Plato's dialogues in hand when he composed his speech against Meidias. Aligning particular passages in critical texts with corresponding arguments in public orations is a way to illustrate the debate in broad strokes; it cannot prove direct intertextuality among the works we happen to have preserved, nor that this critic was in contact with that orator. But it is precisely the lack of specificity of the debate over civic education that rendered the ideas developed in critical circles capable of being reconfigured in ways that were accessible and palatable to democratic audiences.

Envoi: Civic education after the loss of Athenian independence

My story has focused on the fifth and early-to-mid-fourth centuries—the “classical” period during which (except for two brief intervals in 411/10 and 404) Athens was a democracy. The loss of full independence after the battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC was certainly a

³⁶ Demosthenes 21: Demosthenes and MacDowell (1990); Greek edition with commentary; Erbse, “Midiana” in Erbse (1979); Harris (1989); Wilson (1991).

blow to the seamless Athenian conception of liberty, one that had correlated national freedom in the realm of foreign policy with the political agency of the *dêmos* and the individual freedom of the citizen. But the end of national independence did not terminate the Athenian commitment to teaching democratic civic values. The cultural and institutional history of Athens in the last decades of the fourth-century anticipates some aspects of Hellenistic approaches to education and should warn us to avoid the over-simplistic distinction between a "civic" classical era and an "individualistic" Hellenistic period.

The first Athenian steps towards squaring a commitment to democratic culture with the realities of Macedonian power were taken in the mid-330s, with the program of civic renewal associated with the Athenian orator and financial magistrate, Lycurgus.³⁷ That program included the reform of the *ephêbeia* in 335/4, an institutional innovation that represented democratic Athens' first major concession to the idea that it might be desirable to teach the youth of the city about their civic obligations in a structured and state-sponsored setting. Before the 330s, the Athenians had employed as border-guards young citizens, who were probably called *ephêboi*.³⁸ But beginning in 335/4, the *ephêbeia* came to include a stronger educational component. Upon turning eighteen, Athenian citizen-males were now inducted into a two-year program that conjoined military training and moral education. The supervisors of ephebes were called *sôphronistai*. As such, they presumably were expected to ensure that their charges learned the value of *sôphrosynê*, a cardinal virtue according to democratic conceptions of citizenship and critical Athenian political philosophers alike.³⁹ Ephebes who learned their lessons well were honored in public inscriptions praising their "orderliness and discipline."⁴⁰ It would be very nice to be able to specify the educational practices that lie behind the epigraphic encomia. Unfortunately, although Ps-Aristotle describes the weapons training offered the ephebes, he records nothing of the actual content of the civic and moral education they received *qua* ephebes (*Ath. Pol.* 42).

³⁷ S. C. Humphreys, "Lycurgus of Butadae" in Eadie and Ober (1985), offers an overview of Lycurgus' program.

³⁸ Ephebes as border-guards before 335: Ober (1985) 90–95.

³⁹ On *sôphrosynê* and democratic citizenship, see Allen (2000); as a philosophical concept: North (1966).

⁴⁰ Inscriptions collected by Reinmuth (1971). Lycurgan reforms and the Athenian *ephêbeia*: Marcellus (1994) 123–69.

Critical-philosophical ideas surely had something to do, at least indirectly, with the new educational emphasis of the *ephêbeia*, initiated with the reform of 335/4.⁴¹ Should we go further, to say that the reformed institution is evidence for the capitulation of democratic ideology to a philosophical educational agenda? Had the Athenians, in effect, admitted that Socrates had been right to scorn Meletus' opinion on the sources of civic education in the democratic *polis*? Surely not.

The reformed *ephêbeia* was markedly democratic in its institutional structure. The key officials, the *sôphronistai*, were selected in a two-step process: First three men over age 40 were chosen from each of the ten Athenian tribes; the electors were the fathers of the year's ephebic class. Next, ten of these men were elected as tribal *sôphronistai* by the *dêmos*. The selection procedure recalls well established democratic procedures for electing generals.⁴² Making the education of ephebes a responsibility of elected magistrates demonstrates Athenians concern for educating the youth, but it surely would have been regarded by Socrates of the *Apology* as a far cry from the desirable goal of restricting the training of the youth to "one" or "a few" genuine experts. Whatever the ephebes learned about civic values was taught to them under the direct supervision of officials chosen by and ultimately accountable to the *dêmos*. And it was the *dêmos* that decided whether the deportment of each year-class of ephebes was worthy of public, epigraphic, commemoration. The new educational focus of the *ephêbeia* augmented, without replacing, the Athenian conviction that public institutions should bear the primary burden of civic education. It is notable that the two clearest surviving rhetorical expressions of that conviction (by Lycurgus and Aeschines, cited above) both come within a few years *after* the reform of the *ephêbeia*.

Rather than seeing the institution change as an admission that democracy was incapable of reproducing itself over time, the *ephêbeia* reform of 335/4 BC points to the future of Athenian democracy, a future in which democratic ideals would be carried forward by cultural media which might have surprised both Meletus and Socrates. After 322 BC many of the public institutions that had served to educate previous generations of citizens were overthrown or drastically altered by oligarchic governments. And yet Athenian democratic cul-

⁴¹ This is argued in detail by Marcellus (1994) 85–169.

⁴² Procedures for electing generals: Hansen (1991) 233–8.

ture remained vital through these oligarchic interludes, as demonstrated by the Athenians' determination to restore democracy whenever they regained some measure of political autonomy. The processes and the media by which Hellenistic Athenians remembered and learned to cherish democratic values have only recently begun to receive serious scholarly attention. The story of how a philo-democratic code of behavior survived the eclipse of democratic governmental institutions would be a desirable sequel to this chapter in the history of Athenian civic education.⁴³

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⁴³ For Athenian political history after 322, see Habicht (1997). On the continued vitality of democratic ideology after 322 and New Comedy as one key medium for the transmission of an evolving conception of democratic citizenship, see Lape (1998). Rhodes and Lewis (1997) collects decrees that demonstrate the flourishing of democratic institutional and discursive forms, esp. in Athens, after 322.

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BASIC EDUCATION IN EPICUREANISM

Elizabeth Asmis

Epicurus begins his *Letter to Menoeceus* (122), a summary of his ethics, by urging both young and old “to do philosophy” (φιλοσοφεῖν): for it is never too early or too late, he says, to achieve mental health. This exhortation announces a new type of philosophy in Greek antiquity. Epicurus’ philosophy is addressed to anyone at all—not only to both young and old, but also to both male and female, slave and master, educated and uneducated, rich and poor. It is defiantly non-elitist.¹ Distinctions of age, wealth, sex, education, social standing, are all eliminated in favor of the one distinction that does matter: between those who want to do philosophy and those who do not—that is, between those who want to achieve happiness and those who do not.

How did Epicurus attempt to educate this unrestricted range of people? No one who is willing to learn is excluded.² The idea of

¹ Writing about Hellenistic philosophical education in general, Marrou (1965, 6th ed., p. 308) states: “La culture philosophique ne s’adresse qu’à une minorité, à une élite d’esprits qui, pour la préférer, consentent à faire l’effort nécessaire.” What needs to be added is that, in the case of Epicureanism, the students were drawn from all layers of society. Marrou (pp. 309–11) views Hellenistic philosophical education as a tertiary type of education and suggests that it normally began with a course on the history of philosophy. Neither of these characteristics applies to Epicureanism. Marrou (p. 310) himself notes that the Epicureans did not insist on a prior secondary education. Indeed, as I discuss below, the Epicureans reassured their students that they were better off without such an education.—This paper is a fuller version of a paper delivered at the conference “Relire le Marrou” at Toulouse in November 1999 (forthcoming in the conference proceedings, edited by Jean-Marie Paillet and Pascal Payen).

² Diogenes Laertius 10.117 (= U 226) mentions two restrictions: “[Epicurus held] that one cannot become wise on the basis of every condition of the body, nor in every race” (οὐδὲ μὴν ἐκ πάσης σώματος ἕξως σοφὸν γενέσθαι ἂν οὐδ’ ἐν παντὶ ἕθνει). The first consists of physical handicaps; although they may include sensory deprivation (such as loss of sight or hearing), it is significant that Epicurus excludes intellectual prerequisites as such. As for race, Epicurus reportedly also said that only Greeks can philosophize (U 226). I suggest that his general position is the same as for the institution of justice: just as not every race of human beings was able to form social compacts so as to develop a system of justice (KD 32), so not every race of humans is capable of philosophy. If he did say that only Greeks can philosophize, we might include Romans and others as honorary Greeks.

educating even the old was a well-established comic theme: one thinks of the reluctant ambition of old Strepsiades to learn some philosophical tricks from Socrates in Aristophanes' *Clouds*.³ Plato carefully signals the comic aspects of his proposal to educate women as philosophers. While religious associations welcomed members from the whole range of society, philosophical training was normally restricted to a select few. Intent on making happiness available to all, Epicurus restructured philosophical education as an alternative type of education that could be mastered by all. Like the system of education proposed by Plato in the *Republic*, Epicurean education was intended to take the place of all other types of education, from the elementary memorization of texts to the most advanced skills. Unlike Platonic education, it took its students at any age and from any social group.

In this paper, I shall examine how Epicurean education was intended to serve as an alternative system of education. I shall first examine the Epicurean policy of admitting anyone at all to the study of philosophy, then consider how the Epicureans sought to initiate this range of people into the pursuit of philosophy. Epicurean education may be divided roughly into two main stages, basic and advanced. In this paper I shall deal only with the basic stage, in order show how the Epicurean system of education was designed to suit the needs of anyone at all, regardless of social status or previous education. What characterizes the basic stage is the joint emphasis on memorization and personal guidance. This emphasis, which is unique in ancient philosophical education, produced new contributions to the psychology of education.

1. *Policy of Admission*

In the first place, it is important to note that, although the Epicureans proposed to educate any one at all, they did not aim their teaching at the masses. While non-elitist, Epicurean education is aimed at the individual, not the crowd. Epicurus has nothing but contempt for the "many"; and he was at pains to dissociate his philosophy from

³ The question that was entertained seriously is whether philosophy should be continued past one's youth into old age, not whether one should start it late in life; see Plato's *Gorgias* 485a-488b.

demagoguery.⁴ Unlike the politician, the wise person will not "give public speeches". Instead, he or she sets up a school.⁵ The difference between the public speaker and the philosophical teacher is that the teacher shows the student how to test for himself or herself the truth of what is said. It is a basic principle of Epicureanism that all doctrines are verifiable by each and every individual. A person does philosophy by calculating what must follow from the sensory evidence that is available to all. Even though Epicurus shows the way to the truth, each student must work out every inch of the way by using his or her own judgment.

Epicurus' own school served as a model for Epicurean education throughout antiquity. It consisted of a "small" house, as Cicero describes it, which nonetheless welcomed "large flocks of friends".⁶ Epicurus' close associates were: his closest friend, Metrodorus; Metrodorus' common law wife, Leontion; a beloved slave called Mys, "most distinguished" of the slaves who studied philosophy with him;⁷ three brothers; the mathematician Polyaenus; Epicurus' successor Hermarchus, the son of "a poor man" and a former rhetorician;⁸ young students such as Pythocles and Apelles; students who "grew old" studying philosophy with him, such as Nicanor;⁹ and other common law wives.¹⁰ Epicurus, Metrodorus, Polyaenus, and Hermarchus were venerated as the four founders of the school.

In addition to the house, Epicurus acquired a Garden, κήπος, outside the city, which gave its name to the school. Friends are said to have come from everywhere to "spend their life with [Epicurus] in the Garden".¹¹ It has been conjectured that people took up residence in "hutments" (as Farrington puts it) in the Garden.¹² However, there

⁴ PHerc. 1232, fr. 8. col. 1.12-15 (Clay 1986, pp. 13 and 17; reprinted in Clay 1998, pp. 81 and 86). See also Philodemus *On Frank Speech* col. 1b.5-6.

⁵ Diogenes Laertius 10.120.

⁶ Cicero *De finibus* 1.65: ... *Epicurus una in domo, et ea quidem angusta, quam magnos quantaque amoris conspiratione consentientes tenuit amicum greges*. In his will (Diogenes Laertius 10.19), Epicurus envisages that the son and daughter of Metrodorus and the son of Polyaenus will live in the house with his successor Hermarchus.

⁷ Diogenes Laertius 10.10.

⁸ Diogenes Laertius 10.24.

⁹ Diogenes Laertius 10.20.

¹⁰ At 10.7, Diogenes names the concubines Mammarrion, Hedia, Erotion, Nikidion.

¹¹ Diogenes Laertius 10.10.

¹² Farrington (1967), p. 12. See further Asmis "Epicurean Economics", forthcoming in *Philodemus and the New Testament World*, ed. by John T. Fitzgerald, Glenn Holland, and Dirk Obbink (Leiden).

is no evidence that any buildings were constructed in the Garden; and nothing prevents us from supposing that Epicurus' friends spent their life by associating with him in the Garden, while having their residence elsewhere, just like Epicurus. The house had the capacity to hold just a small number of permanent residents, together with a few guests. Others, we may suppose, came to the Garden during the day to talk, listen, learn, and enjoy each other's company. The house and Garden remained the headquarters of Epicureanism until the late Roman empire.

Epicurus set up schools in Mytilene and Lampsacus before he founded his school in Athens in 307/6 or 305/4 BC.¹³ After he moved to Athens, he kept in contact with these schools by letter. In time, other schools sprang up around the Aegean. We hear of schools at Cos and at Rhodes toward the end of the second century BC.¹⁴ In the second century BC, Epicureanism also spread to Italy. Cicero speaks of an invasion that "occupied" all of Italy.¹⁵ This is hyperbole; there was no mass movement.¹⁶ As Cicero says, Epicureanism appealed to uneducated "villagers".¹⁷ In his eyes, only the rabble was taken in. In reality, we may suppose, Epicureanism had some success among the rural population, who would ordinarily have no access to a philosophical education. The leading Epicurean teacher was a certain Amafinius, who translated Epicurean texts into Latin. Cicero says that his books and those of his successors were so bad that nobody could read them except the converted.¹⁸

By Cicero's own time, Epicureanism had made an inroad into high society. Prominent politicians of the late Republic, including Caesar and his assassin Cassius, as well as Cicero's closest friend Atticus, became Epicureans.¹⁹ They learned Epicureanism by going

¹³ Diogenes Laertius 10.15. Lampsacus remained an important center; Leontius and his wife Themista were members, as were Idomeneus and Colotes.

¹⁴ See Longo Auricchio 1981; and Sedley 1989, pp. 112–17.

¹⁵ *Tusculan Disputations* 4.6–7.

¹⁶ This is pointed out by Momigliano (1941, p. 151), against Farrington (1939, p. 192).

¹⁷ *De finibus* 2.12.

¹⁸ *Tusculan Disputations* 2.6–7, cf. *Academica* 1.5. At *Tusculan Disputations* 4.6–7, Cicero speculates that the writings of Amafinius and those after him caught on because they were easy to understand, or because of the appeal of pleasure as a goal, or because there was nothing better.

¹⁹ See Momigliano 1941, pp. 151–53. Cicero uses as characters in his philosophical

to Greece to study or taking instruction from Greek philosophers in Italy.²⁰ Some Romans acquired house philosophers. The Epicurean Philodemus, for example, lived with L. Piso Caesoninus., father-in-law of Caesar. Other Epicureans set up schools. Siro, for example, set up a school in Naples; his students included Virgil. Lucretius' immensely ambitious poem on Epicurean physics marked a huge leap in the quality of Latin instruction in Epicureanism. Dedicated to the Roman aristocrat Gaius Memmius, the poem addresses a wide audience by sweetening the bitter medicine of Epicurean physics with the honeyed words of poetry.

Another impressive attempt at proselytizing came about some 150 years later. It took the form of an enormous stone inscription, some 80 meters long. Diogenes of Oeneanda set up the inscription, engraved with Epicurean doctrines, in his home town in Asia Minor about 120 AD.²¹ The inscription was addressed to anyone at all who might pass by, citizen or foreigner. As Diogenes proclaims, he put up the inscription out of pity for the false beliefs of his fellow human beings.²² His service, he says, is in lieu of political action.²³ So-called "foreigners", he states, are not really so; for they are part of the human race, joined in a universal human community.²⁴ His aim, therefore, is to teach anyone at all, without regard to national borders. Displayed in a public space for the benefit of all humans, Diogenes' engraved text takes the place of political speech-making and civic laws. As a philosopher, Diogenes insists that he does not "snatch up" people quickly, without investigation.²⁵ His readers are to ponder his message and judge it for themselves.

Epicurean philosophy, then, is aimed at individuals from any segment of society; and each person is expected to engage intellectually

works a number of aristocrats who were converted to Epicureanism, such as Torquatus (in book 1 of *De finibus*) and Velleius (in book 1 of *De natura deorum*).

²⁰ Cicero, for example, went to study with members of various philosophical schools in Greece, including Zeno, head of the Epicurean school at Athens and his successor Phaedrus (Cicero *De finibus* 1.16). Phaedrus subsequently visited Italy.

²¹ See Smith 1993, 38–48.

²² Fr. 2 col. 2.4–11.

²³ Fr. 3, col. 1.4–7.

²⁴ Fr. 30, cols. 2.14–3.11.

²⁵ Fr. 30, col. 2.11–14. I suggest that εὐσύγκριτοι (fr. 2, col. 2.14, a word which is apparently found only in this fragment) means "discriminating" (by analogy with εὐσύνετος), instead of "well-constituted" (as translated by Smith 1993, pp. 367 and 436).

with its teachings. Although the Epicureans had a distaste for mass conversions, they welcomed individuals to their group. Contrary to modern misconceptions, the Epicureans did not live apart from the rest of the society; for the most part, they lived and worked with non-Epicureans. The Epicurean catch-word *λαθὲ βιώσας*, "don't attract attention to your life", does not imply that they concealed their beliefs; rather, it is an injunction to blend in with the rest of society.²⁶ What set the Epicureans apart from others is their attitude, not their behavior. Thus, Epicurus advised his followers to attend the established religious festivals; for their philosophical training would protect them from any corruption.²⁷ Non-Epicureans, therefore, could learn about Epicureanism from the Epicureans in their midst. They could also consult Epicurean writings. None of the writings was secret and many were aimed directly at the unconverted.²⁸ The Epicureans were notorious for the frequency of their festivities and common meals; presumably non-Epicureans were among the people of "good will" whom Epicurus invited to these events.²⁹ Epicureans in general were eager to enlighten their friends. In the case of Diogenes, this was the whole world.

Just as Epicurean education was intended for all, so it was intended to take the place of all other education. It was conceived as an alternative education, replacing both the traditional curriculum and any

²⁶ This advice was denounced by critics such as Plutarch in his essay on this subject (1128b–1130e). See further Asmis, "Epicurean Economics", note 12.

²⁷ Epicurus himself is said to have participated "in all the traditional festivals and sacrifices", and to have used the common oaths and titles of the gods; see Philodemus *On Piety* I, 793–97 and 820–25 (Obbink). According to Plutarch (*A Pleasant Life* 1095c, = U 20), Epicurus also said the wise man enjoys the sights and sounds of the Dionysiac rites as much as anyone.

²⁸ These writings were perceived as a threat by some. Lucian (*Alexander* 47), for example, tells that the pseudo-prophet Alexander incited his followers to burn the *Κύρια Δόξαι* of Epicurus. Although Farrington (1967, pp. 122–7) seems to me to exaggerate the missionary zeal of the Epicureans, he is right to emphasize that from the very beginning the Epicureans reached out to the unconverted, through both writings and personal contact. Against Farrington, Frischer (1982, pp. 74–83) argues unconvincingly, in my view, that the Epicureans relied primarily on the transmission of images from the Garden in order to recruit converts. Even though images emanate from Epicureans, along with everyone else, they need to be interpreted by the recipients; and this could be done correctly only by those who had already received instruction in Epicureanism. The statues and paintings of Epicurus, as well as the portraits of Epicurus in cups and on rings, as mentioned by Cicero *De finibus* 5.3, served the special purpose of reminding the Epicureans of the presence of Epicurus in their lives; see below, n. 133.

²⁹ See Clay 1986, pp. 13–7 (reprinted 1998, pp. 81–6).

other attempt at reform, such as Plato's curriculum.³⁰ The Epicureans claimed that their education was the only real education. All the rest, they said, is harmful to the natural aim of all humans: the pursuit of happiness, in other words, the pursuit of pleasure. In a saying that was to reverberate throughout antiquity, Epicurus urged his young student Pythocles: "Flee all education, hoisting sail".³¹ He advised another young student: "I call you blessed, Apelles, because you set out for philosophy, pure of all education."³² Like Odysseus sailing past the Sirens, the Epicurean must avoid the lure of an education that destroys. Epicurus agreed with Plato that traditional poetry is full of deception.³³ Those who have been infected by the tales of the poets need to "purify" themselves of them. "Don't worry", Metrodorus said in his work *On Poems*, about admitting that you don't even know "on whose side Hector was, or the first lines of Homer's poetry, or the middle".³⁴ Being utterly ignorant of Homer is an advantage, not a source of shame.

To do philosophy, then, it is best to start with a mind that is untainted by any education. If a person was already educated, like

³⁰ As Plutarch reports (*A Pleasant Life* 1092d–1094d), the Epicureans rejected both traditional forms of inquiry, such as the study of poetry, and the mathematical studies of geometry, astronomy, and harmonics. The latter subjects formed part of the higher education of Plato's guardians.

³¹ Diogenes Laertius 10.6 (= U 163): παιδείαν δὲ πᾶσαν, μακάριε, φεύγε τὰκάτιον ἀράμενος. Quintilian (12.2.24) also quotes this advice. PHerc. 1012, whose author was conjectured by Crönert to be Demetrius the Laconian, contains an address to Pythocles, together with an attack on Homer, as follows (fr. 70 of Puglia's 1980 edition, p. 49): "Ὅμηρος μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν πλῆρον/περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διέ/γνωνεν ἤπερ οἱ [λοιποὶ] ἂν/θ[ρω]ποι, ἡμεῖς δὲ [ἐ], ὦ Πυθόε/κλ[ε]ις . . ." ('Homer recognized nothing more about such matters than the rest of mankind, but we, Pythocles . . .'). The claim that Homer knew no more than the rest of mankind also occurs in the arguments against grammar which are attributed by Sextus Empiricus "especially" to the Epicureans (*Adv. math.* 1.285 and 299).

³² Athenaeus *Deipnosophistae* 13, 588a (= U 117), including καθαρὸς πάσης παιδείας. Athenaeus adds that Epicurus was himself "uninitiated in the educational curriculum". According to Plutarch (*A Pleasant Life* 1094d), Epicurus' entire entourage urged Pythocles not to "envy the so-called liberal education" and praised Apelles for having kept himself entirely "pure" (καθαρόν) of learning. They are echoing Epicurus' own words.

³³ Heraclitus describes Epicurus as "purifying himself (ἀφοσιούμενος) from all of poetry at once as a destructive lure of fictitious stories" (*Homeric Problems* 79 and 4, = U 229). Athenaeus (*Deipnosophistae* 5, 187c, = U 228) associates Epicurus with Plato as someone who expelled Homer from cities. Plutarch (*A Pleasant Life* 1086f–87a, = U 228) attributes to the Epicureans the expressions "poetic confusion" (ποιητικὴ τύρβη) and "the foolish statements (μωρολογήματα) of Homer".

³⁴ Plutarch *A Pleasant Life* 1094d–e.

the mathematician Polyaeus, then Epicurean education was to purify the mind of this corruption. How was this goal accomplished?

2. *Basic Education*

As previously mentioned, Epicurean education may be divided into two stages, basic and advanced. The basic stage consists in learning the main doctrines; the second consists in working out the details. The student is expected to memorize the basic doctrines, both in the form of short sayings and as propounded in rather lengthy summaries. The advanced student uses this core of doctrine to work out the details of Epicurus' doctrines. If the advanced student has not already memorized the basic doctrines, as we shall see, memorization will help him or her to clear up remaining problems.

Memorization not only provides a foundation for further learning, but also, more importantly, shapes a student's moral attitude from the very beginning. For it is not simply a process of learning, but a process of appropriating what one learns. The student appropriates the doctrines in such a way as to be fully convinced of them and have them ready to use at every moment. To help with this appropriation, the student needs a personal guide. While the Epicurean relies on the help of friends throughout the entire course of an education, the need for a guide is particularly urgent in the earliest stages. It is the task of the guide to make sure that the memorization of texts accomplishes its purpose of purifying the mind. Memorization and personal guidance thus form the twin pillars of Epicurean education.

(a) *Memorization*

The Epicureans assigned new importance to memorization as the basis of a philosophical education. Plato regarded memorization as the antithesis of philosophical inquiry—a mindless exercise that numbs the mind rather than stimulates philosophical discovery. In its place, he demanded dialectical examination. At the same time, Plato believed that memorization had a powerful effect on the formation of young minds. For this reason, he demanded that the young should be exposed only to philosophically correct poetry from the earliest age. By learning to imitate only good character traits, he proposed, the young could acquire the beginnings of a philosophic disposition. As

Havelock emphasized, what makes memorization such a powerful formative influence is that the young student participates actively in the events that are called to mind; children appropriate the right kind of behavior by enacting it themselves.³⁵

In contrast with Plato, Epicurus proposed to begin philosophical investigation with memorization. Instead of regarding it as a mindless routine, however, he conceived of it as a process of philosophical discovery. The student reenacts the discoveries made previously by Epicurus by going through a similar process of reasoning. Memorization becomes in this way a rational exercise. The student appropriates Epicurus' doctrines in the first place by engaging in a process of verification.³⁶ Subsequently, she keeps reiterating these truths in such a way that they are constantly at hand, ready to produce the correct response to anything that may happen. Thoroughly appropriated, the principles dictate the correct attitude and conduct. As Rabbow observed, Epicurus was the first European to develop a system of ethical training on the basis of memorization, anticipating in this way the spiritual exercises prescribed by Ignatius of Loyola.³⁷

The process of learning begins with a grasp of the basic rules of investigation, which Epicurus placed at the very beginning of his philosophical system. In place of logical training, Epicurus demanded the acceptance of two basic epistemological principles: the use of words in their ordinary sense, and the use of sense perception as a means of inferring what is not observed.³⁸ These two principles, which form the foundation of Epicurean "canonic", allow the student to confirm Epicurus' previously made discoveries. The student

³⁵ 1963, pp. 157–60.

³⁶ At *Letter to Pythocles* 84, Epicurus refers to both particular arguments and a complete survey as *διαλογισμοί* (*διαλόγισματα*) that were to be memorized. The term occurs also in Epicurus' deathbed letter (U 138) in the phrase "rejoicing in the memory of the arguments (*διαλογισμῶν*) that occurred to us". On the basis of these uses, Rabbow (1954, p. 338) proposed that *διαλογισμός* was used by Epicurus as a technical term designating any text that was to be memorized. Schmid 1965, pp. 744–45, rejects this proposal. My own view is that any Epicurean text is or involves *διαλογισμός*, "discursive reasoning", whether or not it was intended to be memorized. It is possible that Epicurus used the term deliberately to indicate an alternative to Socratic dialectic: the Epicurean practices *διαλογισμός*, discursive thinking, though not *διαλεκτική*.

³⁷ 1954, p. 130: "Epikur ist der erste Europäer, der die Psychagogik durch methodische Beherrzigungsakte aus der Übung des Memorierens entwickelt und in seiner Gemeinde geübt hat".

³⁸ *Letter to Herodotus* 37–38; see Asmis 1984, esp. 19–34.

begins the study of philosophy by taking words in their ordinary sense, then verifies the statements by means of calculations based on personal experience.

From the beginning, therefore, Epicurus makes philosophical investigation accessible to the ordinary person. Using everyday language to begin with, the student takes nothing as given except the need to rely on the evidence of sense perception. Technical terms are introduced gradually as they emerge from the argument. All along the path of investigation, the student verifies each conclusion in turn by reference to previously verified doctrines. The student does not take over any of Epicurus' discoveries simply on Epicurus' authority. Epicurus conceived of his entire system of philosophy as a science, rigorously worked out by means of a method that is set out at the beginning. Just as he used this method to discover the truths that are necessary for human happiness, so every student can rediscover these truths in turn by using the same method.

Even though, then, the student was expected to use her own powers of rational inquiry, there is a crucial constraint: it was also expected that the student would follow the very path of Epicurus, reaching the same conclusions by the same methods. While the demand for rational inquiry may be considered philosophical, the demand for a commitment to the same beliefs as those of the teacher looks anything but philosophical. In the latter respect, Epicurean philosophy takes on the aspect of a religion: the student accepts, with deep commitment, the revelations passed on by another. The very process of verifying Epicurus' doctrines becomes a process of appropriating these truths in such a way that no one, and nothing, can wrest them away. The student's mind becomes a fortress, to use Lucretius' image, which can repel the onslaught of fortune and people alike.

Epicurus placed canonic before physics, and physics before ethics, in the order of philosophical inquiry. Presumably, therefore, he required the student to learn some canonic and some physical doctrine before going on to the study of ethics. There is no reason, however, why the beginning student should not become acquainted with the goal of philosophical studies by memorizing some ethical precepts along with studying canonic and physics.

By far the most easily memorized Epicurean texts were the forty *Κύρια Δόξαι*, *Authoritative Opinions*. Consisting of forty short sayings devoted to Epicurean ethics, the collection was famous in anti-

quity.³⁹ Diogenes Laertius ends his entire work on the lives of the philosophers by quoting the full collection as the “crown” (κοροφών) of the philosophic life.⁴⁰ Although none of the sayings deals with physics, one of the *Opinions* (12) points out that a person needs to know physics in order to be free of fear about the universe and so enjoy unmixed pleasure. Three of the *Opinions*, 22–24, set out basic epistemological doctrine insofar as it applies to ethics. Many of the *Opinions* contain an argument, even though it is normally stated in a rhetorically incomplete form. The first *Opinion*, for example, not only provides a short description of god, but also supplies a reason why we should not think of god as bestowing punishments or favors: the gods don’t have or bestow trouble, which is a mark of weakness. The first four *Opinions* make up the so-called *tetrapharmakos*, four-fold remedy. They concern god, death, the good, and pain; and together they are a distillation of Epicurean ethics. By memorizing the remedy and keeping it constantly in mind, the student might cure himself of anxiety and achieve mental health. The same remedy was also available in an even more concentrated form. Stripped to its bare essentials, it forms the jingle: “god is not to be feared; death is not to be suspected; the good is easy to acquire; and terrible things are easy to endure.”⁴¹

The *Letter to Menoeceus*, a summary of Epicurean ethics, begins with an exhortation to do philosophy, as quoted at the beginning of this paper. As a protreptic discourse, it is eminently suitable for the beginning student to memorize. Even though it is a continuous text of some length, it has clearly been designed for easy memorization. Consisting of detachable sections, it is replete with balanced phrases

³⁹ There has been some debate as to whether the *Opinions* were put together by Epicurus himself or by a later compiler; see Bailey 1926, pp. 344–7, for a review of the problem. It seems reasonable to suppose that Epicurus is responsible for the collection as a whole, even though there may have been some accretions later. Another collection of eighty sayings, the so-called *Vatican Sayings*, is a compilation of excerpts from the writings of Epicurus, Metrodorus, and other followers; see Bailey 1926, pp. 375–6. It includes some of the *Opinions* and likewise focuses on ethics.

⁴⁰ 10.138.

⁴¹ PHerc. 1005, col. 5.9–13 (Angeli): ἄφοβον ὁ θεός, ἀν[ύ]ποπτον ὁ θάνατος καὶ τὰ γὰρ μὲν εὐκτετον, τὸ δὲ δεινὸν εὐεκα[ρ]τέρητον. The carefully contrived style (with homoioteleuton, alliteration, balance of adjectives and nouns) marks this text as part of the Epicurean repertoire of memorable sayings; it is not just a summary by Philodemus.

and aphorisms. Epicurus commands the student both at the beginning and at the end of the letter to "practice" (μελετᾶν) what he has proclaimed. The term "practice" is used here in the special sense of "rehearsing" a text, as described at the end of the letter (135): "Practice (μελέτα) this, and what is related to it, both with yourself and with someone like-minded, both day and night." The student is to rehearse Epicurus' words at every opportunity, both alone and with others. As Epicurus commands at the beginning of the letter, the student is to join this practice with action: "Both do and practice (καὶ πράττε καὶ μελέτα) these principles of living well" (123). Calling to mind Epicurus' doctrines goes hand in hand with applying them. The result will be that "you will live like a god among humans" (135).

Framed by the imperatives μελέτα, Epicurus uses other imperative locutions, such as "believe" (123), "accustom yourself in your thinking" (124), "one must remember" (127), "one must calculate" (127). He also commands the student indirectly by including her in first person statements such as "we think" (129, 130), "we choose" (129), "we say" (131). When memorizing the text, the student internalizes Epicurus' imperatives as directives addressed by herself to herself. She appropriates the doctrines in this way as a personal creed or catechism. Just as though she were reenacting a dramatic scene, she tells herself, as well as her companion, that she must believe what Epicurus has propounded. She is part of a chorus of believers, all of whom appropriate Epicurus' doctrines as a personal standard of conduct.

In addition to the *Letter to Menoeceus*, we have two summaries of physical doctrines that were intended to be memorized. The *Letter to Herodotus* is a summary of the basic principles of physics, as prefaced by a short summary of his epistemology or so-called "canonic". In his preface to this letter (35–37), Epicurus explains that it is useful both for elementary students, who cannot study the details of his physics, and for more advanced students to memorize this survey. The elementary students will have basic doctrines ready to apply on each occasion; and the more advanced students will be able to discover the details on the basis of the summary. The details, Epicurus says, are not as important. At the end of the letter (83), Epicurus promises the student, that even if he does not go on to all the details, a memorized grasp of the complete summary will give him "incomparable force" in relation to the rest of mankind. By going over the

principal doctrines continuously and voicelessly in his mind, he will achieve peace of mind.⁴² Similarly to the *Letter to Menoeceus*, the *Letter to Herodotus* is full of imperative expressions such as "it must be thought" (νομιστέον) and "it is necessary to think" (δεῖ νομίζειν).⁴³

The *Letter to Pythocles* offers a summary of meteorology and astronomy. The letter is a reply to the young Pythocles, who had confessed to Epicurus that he had trouble memorizing his writings on the heavens even though he was trying all the time. Wouldn't Epicurus please send him a more concise text, which would be easier to memorize? Epicurus replies, with some tact, that he is delighted to oblige with a summary that will be especially useful to beginners and to those who are busy with everyday tasks.⁴⁴ He ends (116) by promising Pythocles that, by memorizing the summary, he will escape from "myth" and be able to acquire new understanding. At the same time, he urges Pythocles to give special attention to the basic principles of physics and canonic, as well as the goal of these studies. Epicurus, it seems, is a little worried that Pythocles may be too intent on learning astronomy. As Epicurus insists at the outset of his exposition (85–86), the only purpose in learning about the heavens is to achieve peace of mind; moreover, the study of the heavens does not require the same precision as the discernment of the basic principles of ethics and physics.

The two physical *Letters* show a basic division of Epicureans into those who master only the basic doctrines and those who go on to advanced study. While the mastery of basic doctrines is essential to happiness, a knowledge of the details is not. When Pythocles shows himself eager to know details about the heavens, Epicurus kindly obliges him with a summary that he can memorize, but at the same time sends him back to the basics; knowledge of the heavens is of secondary importance. In order to master the basics, the Epicurean

⁴² With Bollack, Bollack and Wismann (1971, p. 165) and others, I take ἀνευ φθόγγων and ἄμα νοήματι as signifying a mental rehearsal, accomplished without speaking the text aloud. The term περίοδος (83, cf. περιόδεα at 83 and 36), "cycle", suggests going over the text again and again, in cycles that join the beginning to the end; see also περίοδευε at *Letter to Pythocles* 85.

⁴³ 49, 53, 54, etc. Lucretius punctuates his poem with the same kinds of expression, for example, "fatare neccessest" and "putandum".

⁴⁴ 84–85. The phrase εἰς ἀσχολίας βαθυτέρας τῶν ἐγκυκλίων τινὸς ἐμπεπλεγμένοις has been interpreted in a number of ways; see Angeli 1988, p. 38, n. 57. Following Bignone, Bailey, and others, I translate: "involved in keeping too busy with everyday tasks".

requires just a tiny amount of leisure, σχολή, unlike Aristotle's philosophical citizens. Even slaves have sufficient time to memorize the necessary principles of Epicureanism and keep them in mind constantly. Epicurus in effect shifts the time devoted to philosophy from a leisure-time activity to full-time application: learning the doctrines requires a bare minimum of time; keeping them in mind so as to apply them continuously is a process that occupies all one's time.

Memorization had a comparable importance in traditional education. In the first place, children were required to memorize large sections of Homeric and other poetry. This foundation remained with them in adult life; but memorization did not stop here. After graduating from the grammarians, students continued to memorize speeches as part of their rhetorical training.⁴⁵ Throughout adulthood, people continued to memorize and draw on the previously memorized store of knowledge. Epicurean memorization takes the place of this core of knowledge. It takes the place of "myth" along with all other established beliefs. The Epicurean may indeed become highly familiar with the false beliefs of others. So long as he does not derive more trouble from this pursuit than pleasure, there is no harm in it. What allows him to escape harm is that he has previously fortified himself with the doctrines of Epicurus.

One type of spiritual exercise that the memorized core of doctrine will not permit is the anticipation (*praemeditatio*) of misfortune. Other philosophers, especially the Cyrenaics, proposed that a person can eliminate present distress by contemplating the possibility of misfortune in advance; for in this way one will not be caught off guard.⁴⁶ Epicurus thought that this type of contemplation was wholly useless, or rather harmful: it was to add pain unnecessarily. His method of protection consists in the memorization of doctrines: by always keeping firmly in mind the true goal of life, the Epicurean can repel even the greatest blows that fortune may inflict. Fortified by the ever-present memory of sound doctrines, the Epicurean trains his mind on pleasures, whether past, present or future.

⁴⁵ This is well illustrated by Phaedrus' attempt to memorize (μελετῶν at 228b) a speech of Lysias in Plato's *Phaedrus*.

⁴⁶ See esp. Cicero *Tusculan Disputations* 3.28–35.

(b) *Personal Guidance*

Memorization, then, is the basic method of acquiring philosophical knowledge. But it is not enough for the student simply to have texts to memorize. In order to appropriate the texts fully, the student must be guided by a personal mentor. It is the task of the mentor to aid the reception of doctrines and make sure that the student applies them in daily life. While mentors supervise the entire process by which truth replaces error, their guidance is especially important in the early stages of a philosophical education when errors are most firmly entrenched. The fact that the students come from all parts of society poses a special challenge. The mentors must be carefully attuned to the psychological differences among a very diverse body of students. In taking account of these differences, the Epicureans advanced the psychology of education.

Philodemus' *On Frankness* (περὶ παρησίας) is our main source for this system of personal guidance. As the title announces, it is part of an epitome of Zeno's work *On Moral Habits and Lives* (περὶ ἠθῶν καὶ βίῳν). Zeno, the head of the Epicurean school in the early first century BC, was Philodemus' own beloved teacher. Although Philodemus' epitome holds up Epicurus' own community as a model for the training it proposes, there is little doubt that Zeno was himself responsible for the highly systematic, detailed development of the topic. The preserved text consists of a long series of columns whose continuity has been broken not only at the end of the columns but also, in many cases, in the middle.⁴⁷ Despite the discontinuity, the passages are numerous and substantial enough to yield much valuable information. They offer a remarkable insight into a system of education which is unique not only among philosophers, but also in ancient education as a whole.

On Frankness aims to show how persons should use frank speech in their interactions with one another. This appears to have been a

⁴⁷ The extant text consists of some hundred so-called "fragments", many of which seem consecutive, together with 24 consecutive "columns"; the latter were cut horizontally through the middle, resulting in a loss of the middle lines. The most recent text available is that of Konstan et al. (1998), which is based on the seriously inadequate edition of Olivieri (1914) together with some suggestions made by Philippson in his review of this edition (1916) and by Gigante in his extensive treatment of the text (1983, cf. 1972, 1974, 1975). A new edition is much needed. In addition to the papyrus fragments, we have a transcription of the text ("disegno") made at Naples in 1808.

common topic in Hellenistic ethics. Quite apart from its political function, frank speech poses an urgent problem in one's personal relationships: a defining characteristic of friendship, it can be used both to hurt and to help. Plutarch calls it the "special armature of friendship" and warns that one must be subtle (φιλοτεχνεῖν) in its use "insofar as it is the greatest and most powerful drug (φάρμακον) in friendship".⁴⁸ Philodemus likewise treats it as a potent drug among friends and warns that it must be used with great care. His main focus of attention is on the pedagogic use of frank speech to cure others of their shortcomings. At the same time, he views frank speech as a means of uniting Epicureans in friendship with one another. What emerges is a philosophy of education that takes account of the psychological effect of frank speech on individual students. Education is viewed not simply as a way of imparting truths but as a method of communicating them in a sympathetic interaction between teachers and students.

This approach to education has antecedents. Most notably, Plato previously adumbrated in the *Phaedrus* the ideal of a philosopher teacher who sows seeds of learning into the soul of a companion by first becoming familiar with the particular psychological disposition of the student. The Epicureans developed further the notion of a spiritual guide who promotes the well-being of a friend by carefully diagnosing the friend's spiritual needs and adapting his words to them. Plato would have repudiated the Epicurean development as a total travesty; for the Epicurean guide is primarily concerned with the appropriation of a doctrine rather than the growth of new ideas. Nonetheless, the Epicureans helped to fashion a new educational philosophy according to which the teacher is not a strict or impersonal taskmaster, but adapts his or her teaching to the needs of the individual student. Although this method is particularly appropriate to moral education, the Epicureans may be seen as precursors of educators such as Quintilian, who proposed a more humane way of teaching children even at the most elementary level.⁴⁹

The Epicurean approach is reflected in the pair of terms used by Philodemus in *On Frank Speech* to designate the educators and those whom they educate. The former are "leaders" or "guides" (καθ-

⁴⁸ *How to Tell a Flatterer* 59b (ἐξαιρέτων βάσταγμα φιλίας) and 74d (φιλοτεχνεῖν ὅσῳ μέγιστόν ἐστι καὶ κράτιστον ἐν φιλίᾳ φάρμακον).

⁴⁹ *Institutio* 2.2.5-7.

ηγηταί,⁵⁰ καθηγούμενοι);⁵¹ the latter are those “who prepare themselves” (κατασκευάζόμενοι) under their guidance, or “trainees”.⁵² The trainees are also referred to as “fellow trainees”, συγκατασκευάζόμενοι.⁵³ Leaders and trainees alike are συσχολάζοντες, “fellow school members”, joined in a community of Epicureans.⁵⁴ Although there are gradations of progress among the trainees as well as differences of ability among the leaders, Philodemus does not demarcate levels of advancement within either group.⁵⁵ At the top is the wise person, who is “perfect” (τέλειος) and serves as a model for all.⁵⁶

⁵⁰ Frs. 45.5, 52.6–7, 80.2–3; cols. 7a3, 20a3–4. The term occurs in the same sense at Philodemus *On Anger* col. 19.14.

⁵¹ Frs. 39.2, 42.10, etc.; cols. 5a9–10, 5b1–2. The term καθηγόμενος seems to have been reserved for the four founders of Epicureanism; see Longo Auricchio (1978, pp. 22–23).

⁵² Frs. 2.3, 25.6–7, 55.3–4, 71.2–3, 76.9–10; and col. 12b7. As the use of the middle future at col. 12b7 indicates, κατασκευάζόμενος is used in the middle voice to designate the trainee as someone who “trains himself”; cf. the colloquial “preppie”. At col. 18a5–6, the term also appears to occur in the active sense of “training”. At *Rhetoric* vol. 2, pp. 264–65 Sudhaus, Philodemus speaks of the rhetorical art as “training” (κατασκευάζουσα) politicians.

⁵³ Fr. 53.4–8. The term occurs also at Philodemus *On Anger* col. 19.16–17.

⁵⁴ Fr. 75.4–5. I suggest that κάκε[τ]ινοι in line 8 refers, not to the Epicurean συσχολάζοντες, but to others who were previously mentioned, possibly in a μέν construction (which is answered by δέ in line 4). This entails a break after ἀγαθῶν (line 6). The point is: the Epicureans submit themselves to correction because they are aware of the many benefits they enjoy; but even others (those not yet Epicureans?) submit to correction.

⁵⁵ As Gigante (1983, pp. 110–13) has shown, De Witt’s distinction (1936, pp. 207–11) among full professors (the wise), associate professors (φιλόσοφοι), assistant professors (φιλόλογοι), and advanced students (συνηθείς) does not hold. The descriptions φιλόσοφος and φιλόλογος, which are used conjointly at cols. 8a8–9 and 10a3–4, seem to be used in opposition to “laypersons” (ἰδιωτῶν at col. 11b1–2, cf. ἰδιωτικὴν at col. 8b3). The two terms may apply to both wise persons (cf. the conjunction of σοφός and φιλόσοφος at fr. 1.7) and non-sages.

⁵⁶ For the perfection of the wise person, see esp. cols. 8a–9a. Beginning at col. 7b11, Philodemus treats the topic of how the perfect person, or sage, responds to frank speech from others, both sages and non-sages. One complication (treated in columns 8 and 9) is whether the sage recognizes that the other person is a sage. Another question (raised at col. 8b1–5) is how the sage responds to the frank speech of non-philosophers when this is prompted by love or the desire to love. The sage will not get angry at the foolishness of others (col. 10a7–12), and he “will tolerate and accept” (col. 10b8–9) their good will. In particular, he “will love the good will” (φιλήσει τῇ[v] εὐνοίαν, col. 11b9–10) of non-philosophical parents (and surrogates) out of respect and gratitude for them. On the other hand, he will not put up readily with frank speech from the people who train under him (col. 12b6–9). The wise person, it seems, will put up with recriminations from all sorts of people, but not his trainees. Philodemus announces a new topic at col. 14b7, dealing with the cause of frank speech.

Epicurus is the undisputed leader whom all must follow. As Philodemus stresses, the “constant, most authoritative” principle of instruction is: “We will obey Epicurus, according to whom we have chosen to live”.⁵⁷ This statement is in effect an oath of allegiance. Philodemus’ reference to eminent “off-shoots” of leaders might apply to any prominent follower of Epicurus, including Philodemus himself.⁵⁸ Philodemus cites both Epicurus and Metrodorus as wise persons.⁵⁹ Throughout the treatise, they provide him with examples of the correct use of free speech. Whether or not Philodemus knew of Lucretius (and it seems to me highly implausible that he did not), Lucretius must surely also be counted among the off-shoots. He is a preeminent example of a faithful follower, guiding others to follow in Epicurus’ foot-steps in turn.

The joint use of the terms “leader” and “trainee” in place of “teacher” and “student” appears to be unique to Epicureanism. The image of the teacher as a “leader” is indeed unexceptional. Plato set an example for later usage when he referred in the *Symposium* to the person “leading” the initiate.⁶⁰ The reference to the student as a “trainee”, κατασκευαζόμενος, on the other hand, seems peculiar to Epicureanism. The expression is closely akin to the use of the verb in the middle voice to mean “set oneself up” in a profession. The student “trains himself” to become a philosopher. Although the verb does not seem to occur in the sense of “student-in-training” in any text except Philodemus’ *On Frankness*, its pervasive use in this text suggests that it is firmly established in Epicureanism.

Philodemus sums up the qualifications of the leader as follows: he must “be pure”, “love” (στέργειν) the student, be “better” than the student, and know how to “heal”.⁶¹ In general, the use of frank speech must come from a good disposition. This requires, in detail, that a person should have good will, philosophize continuously and

⁵⁷ Fr. 45.7–10.

⁵⁸ Fr. 45.4–6.

⁵⁹ Fr. 15.6–10. Metrodorus is also cited in col. 5b3–4 as a leader. The supplement [Κλε]άν[θου]ς (5b2–3) seems to me highly unlikely. Cicero calls Metrodorus “almost another Epicurus” (*paene alter Epicurus*, *De finibus* 2.92) and reports that Epicurus called Metrodorus a wise person—a compliment that Metrodorus did not reject, even though, as Cicero surmises, Metrodorus himself did not regard himself as such (*De finibus* 2.7).

⁶⁰ 210a6–7 (ἡγήται ὁ ἡγούμενος). To give just one later example, Seneca uses the term *dux* in *De vita beata* 1.2.

⁶¹ Fr. 44.6–9.

with insight, be "great" in mental outlook and indifferent to reputation, be free of demagoguery and envy, say only what is pertinent, not let himself be carried away into abuse or strutting or into putting down or harming another, not use flattery, not be fault-finding, not provoke another, nor be harsh or sharp (πικρός).⁶²

These attributes may be assigned to three categories: personal commitment to an Epicurean way of life; skill in training others; and affection for the trainee. In his own person, the leader must be "pure" as well as "better" than others. The comparative form of the adjective suggests that, even though the leader must be exempt from the mistakes he attempts to correct in others, he need not be perfect; that is, he need not be a wise person. Philodemus holds up the ideal of the wise leader throughout the treatise; but this is a goal, not a prerequisite.

In analyzing the skill of the leader, Philodemus relies heavily on the analogy between the philosophical teacher and the doctor. He infuses new life into this well-worn trope by drawing on contemporary medical methodology and focusing on the special aims of an Epicurean education.⁶³ In common with other philosophers, he diagnoses the disease as consisting of errors, and he assigns to the teacher the task of healing the student's disposition, διάθεσις, by purging it of errors.⁶⁴ The errors may manifest themselves as passions, which may rise to a peak, then abate.⁶⁵ On the basis of this common ground, Philodemus adds a detailed analysis of the therapeutic use of frank speech. The leader uses frank speech to purge the trainee of error in the same way as a doctor uses purges to rid a patient of disease. Just like any purge, frank speech is a potentially dangerous drug. Its administration must therefore be carefully controlled. As in all practical skills, the watch-word is: κατὰ καιρόν, "at the right time".⁶⁶ Just

⁶² Cols. 1a1-2a7. In the expression μέγας ἐν ἑξεί (1b4-5), the qualifier ἐν ἑξεί specifies what makes a person "great": this is nothing other than one's mental disposition. By contrast, the unqualified use of μεγάλοι at fr. 73.10 appears to signify "great" in the ordinary sense of simply standing out above others.

⁶³ Gigante (1983, esp. pp. 69-78, cf. 1975, pp. 56-61) offers a detailed analysis of Philodemus' use of the medical analogy.

⁶⁴ On the need to heal a "disposition", see fr. 30.5-6 and De Witt (1936, p. 207). Purification is mentioned in frs. 16.3-4 and 46.4-5.

⁶⁵ Fr. 65.8-11. The text will not construe as it stands. Instead of ἀπειθήσας, I propose ἀπειθής, [εἰ]ς νῦν. I translate: "Being unpersuasive at that time, when the passion was at its height, now when it has abated he will be called back". (I have not been able to check the papyrus here.)

⁶⁶ Col. 17b3.

as a doctor must adjust his treatment to the special circumstances of the patient, so the leader must adapt his speech to the particular needs of the student.

Philodemus concedes that the philosophical leader is fallible. For even though he possesses a general knowledge of healing, he may err in a particular diagnosis and treatment. Just like a doctor, the leader relies on "reasonable signs" (σημείων εὐλόγων) to make an inference. His science is "stochastic": it aims for a result without having any certainty of attaining it.⁶⁷ As Philodemus explains, the failure is not due to an error of reasoning, but results from the fact that it is not possible to guard against every eventuality. Using a distinction that is especially prominent in Stoicism, Philodemus points out that a person may use perfect reasoning (λογισμός), or practical wisdom (φρόνησις), and yet fail to achieve his goal.⁶⁸ Thus, the use of frank speech may miscarry through no fault of the leader. Just as the unsuccessful prescription of a clyster does not prevent the doctor from using a purge in future, so the leader may use frank speech a second or third time.⁶⁹ Conversely, even if there are reasonable signs that the student will not be healed, the leader may nonetheless give it a try, imitating the doctor.⁷⁰

The leader must also know when to refrain from using frank

⁶⁷ Gigante (1983, pp. 62–9) has shown in detail, by reference to frs. 1 and 57, that the leader practices a "stochastic" skill. Gigante, however, identifies frank speech itself as the stochastic skill. Rather, it seems to me, just as medicine is a stochastic skill, so the healing of the soul is a stochastic skill; and just as a doctor uses treatments such as purges, so the healer uses frank speech as a remedy or treatment. As Philodemus points out (col. 1a4–7), frank speech can come from a good or a bad disposition. Just like a drug, therefore, it is neither good nor bad in itself, but can be used well or badly depending on the skill of the user. Like any drug, as Philodemus shows throughout his treatise, it can be misapplied. It follows that frank speech is not itself an art; nor is it a virtue, as proposed briefly by Philippon, 1938, cols. 2470 (and opposed by Gigante 1983, esp. pp. 60–1). As Gigante points out, the term τέχνη does not occur in the fragments. Gigante (1983, pp. 72–3), however, claims that the occurrence of φ[ιλο]τεχνία (fr. 68.1–2), used in conjunction with διαφ[ι]λοτεχν[ή]σει (fr. 10.2), implies that frank speech is a "skill". In my view, these compound terms connote "ingenuity", "subtlety" (cf. English "being crafty") without implying that the activity in question is a proper "skill". Nonetheless, the absence of the term "skill" does not throw any doubt on the claim that Philodemus views the leader (just like the doctor) as having a skill.

⁶⁸ Fr. 56. The term προειλημμένοις is used both at line 3 (as supplied) and at 5–6 in the sense of "being outstripped".

⁶⁹ Fragments 63–65; see Gigante (1983, pp. 69–70, cf. 1975, pp. 57–8).

⁷⁰ Fr. 69.

speech. Philodemus points out that is not necessary to speak with frankness in every case.⁷¹ Moreover, it is sometimes necessary to stop quickly. Just as the swelling of a passion may intensify through the persistent use of frank speech, so it may diminish if the leader "quickly turns away from [seeking] the aid of something that fails to work".⁷² Here the continued use of frank speech turns out to be harmful to the trainee. Philodemus reminds us that the passions provoked by frank speech can also be harmful to the speaker. Numerous people have perished miserably because of their inclination to converse frankly with others.⁷³

Just as a doctor may be ignorant of the circumstances of an ailment and yet succeed in healing the patient, so some students are healed "more pleasantly and easily" when the leaders are ignorant of the circumstances in which the students succumbed.⁷⁴ Just as a doctor relies both on autopsy and inquiry (ἰστορία), the leader will extend his knowledge through inquiry, with the result that he will use frank speech more abundantly.⁷⁵ As an Epicurean who is intent on promoting pleasure as well as friendship, Philodemus prefers that the teacher should heal pleasantly, without inflicting unnecessary pain.

This brings us to our third type of requirement, friendship. The doctor, of course, must also have good will toward the patient. But the Epicurean therapist goes further. Motivated by love for the trainee, he uses frank speech not only as a healing device, but also as a means of solidifying a friendship between himself and the trainee.⁷⁶ Philodemus highlights the special link between frank speech and friendship:

⁷¹ Col. 2b11–13.

⁷² Fr. 67.1–9. I suggest emending συνειδησάντων (a form that seems to occur nowhere else) to συν[ο]ιδησάντων. (I have not been able to check the papyrus on this point.) I translate literally: "... and the swelling [i.e. of the passion] that comes from, among other things, the very things that swell up conjointly with the persistence [i.e. of free speech]". The point is: through its persistence, frank speech swells up the already swollen passion by swelling up other passions. The entire section from frs. 65–74 deals with passions, particularly anger.

⁷³ Fr. 72.4–9.

⁷⁴ Fr. 8.4–9. The verb συνεμπίπτειν (lines 7–8), which is related to σύμπτωμα, is another medical term. [πρ]οσχαρακτηρικῶς (3–4), as supplemented by Olivieri, is not found elsewhere and seems to me very doubtful; I would prefer to keep the simple form χαρακτηρικῶς.

⁷⁵ Col. 5b6–12.

⁷⁶ Philodemus signifies strong personal affection by using the terms ἀ[γ]άπη (col. 13a3), ἀγάπησις (fr. 80.9–10), and στέργειν (fr. 44.7), along with εὖνοια ("good will", fr. 36.3 etc.) and φιλία ("friendship", col. 5a6 etc.).

... among the many beautiful things that belong to friendship, nothing is so great as to have someone to whom to tell what is in one's heart and who will listen. For our nature yearns strongly to reveal to some people what one thinks.⁷⁷

It is noteworthy that Philodemus here rejects a purely utilitarian view of friendship: he proposes that the longing to share confidences with friends is not only a powerful natural drive, but also the best thing about friendship. By contrast, "to act in secret is most unfriendly".⁷⁸ The Epicurean therapist and his patient are bound to each other by the goal of a philosophical friendship; and this demands reciprocal candor from leader and trainee. Just as the leader manifests his love for the trainee by the selective use of candor, so the trainee must reciprocate by revealing himself frankly to the leader.

The leader fosters friendship by bestowing both praise and blame. Philodemus raises the question: "Which should the wise person be more prone [to use]?"⁷⁹ The text breaks off without supplying an answer; but it is doubtful whether Philodemus ever supplied a precise answer. For Philodemus goes on to say, after a lacuna of a few lines, that there is a clear answer to the question: "What does he like more?" The answer is that teacher takes extreme pleasure in using the one, but "endures the other without pleasure, like wormwood". It seems that there is no clear answer to the initial question. Philodemus then restates this question by asking: "Which should preponderate?" His answer is abrupt: neither.⁸⁰ Philodemus, it appears, will not be pinned down to one method or the other. The reason, we may surmise, is that the choice of method depends on the circumstances. The leader must be prepared to use either, even though he would always greatly prefer to give praise. Interestingly, Philodemus transfers to the teacher the pain imposed on the student. This is a striking example of the empathy that Philodemus demands between teacher and student.

In his use of frank speech, the leader makes it his aim to heighten a trainee's good will toward him by his very candor.⁸¹ His admonitions will therefore range from the most gentle reminders to blunt

⁷⁷ Fr. 28.4–12.

⁷⁸ Fr. 41.2–3: τό τε λαθραιοπραγεῖν ἄ[φ]ιλώτατον.

⁷⁹ Col. 2a10–12.

⁸⁰ Col. 2b2–11. Similarly, at *De ira* col. 44.15–22 Philodemus notes that punishment is extremely unpleasant for the person who imposes the punishment, like drinking wormwood or having surgery.

⁸¹ Fr. 25.3–8.

reprimands. In agreement with Plutarch, Philodemus requires "elaborate subtlety" (ποικίλη φιλοτεχνία). He will therefore insert lavish praise into advice that is protreptic.⁸² In difficult cases, whenever he still has hope in a trainee or gives vent to great personal annoyance, he will not forget to use expressions such as "dearest", "sweetest".⁸³ When correcting others, a leader may have recourse to "a second sailing" for the reason that "it is necessary to make no mistake".⁸⁴ Presumably, this safe course is in lieu of a direct confrontation.

If the trainee won't listen, on the other hand, the leader will "risk" being frank without qualification.⁸⁵ Straight talk of this sort is beset by all kinds of dangers; and Philodemus distinguishes carefully among them. They include sharpness, abuse, derision, belittlement, irony, and so on.⁸⁶ Philodemus observes that those who "consider themselves most understanding" use gentle rebukes aimed at giving pleasure, whereas the young tend to rebuke "rather sharply".⁸⁷ Neither approach, it appears, is correct: a wise leader does not intend either to give pleasure by the mildness of his reproaches or to inflict pain by being sharp. There is a difference, Philodemus notes, between caring admonition and irony that stings.⁸⁸ The latter, it seems, has no place in an Epicurean education. Instead, the wise person will sometimes transfer an "out-of-control mistake" to himself by imputing it to the days of his youth.⁸⁹ By implicating himself in this way, the teacher mitigates the force of his criticism.

As a basic rule, the leader will not overlook resistance, but will deal with it "moderately" (μετρίως).⁹⁰ We previously noted Epicurus' very mild reproof to Pythocles in the letter he sent to him. In *On Frank Speech*, Philodemus provides another example of how Epicurus had to rein in Pythocles. Pythocles, it turns out, caused Leonteus to go astray about the gods, with the result that Epicurus rebuked Pythocles "moderately" and sent a letter to Leonteus.⁹¹

⁸² Fr. 68.1-10.

⁸³ Fr. 14.5-10.

⁸⁴ Col. 15b3-7.

⁸⁵ Fr. 10.3-7.

⁸⁶ At fr. 60.4-7, Philodemus observes that "bitter" (πικρά) candor has a similarity to abuse.

⁸⁷ Col. 16a5-12. In *How to Tell a Flatterer* 60b-d, Plutarch castigates the flatterer who uses frank speech to give pleasure.

⁸⁸ Fr. 26.4-10.

⁸⁹ Fr. 9.6-9.

⁹⁰ Fr. 71.4-6.

⁹¹ Fr. 6.4-8.

Pursuing the medical analogy, Philodemus offers a comparison of frank speech to a stinging eye salve applied prior to surgery.⁹² Although the context is difficult to make out, the treatise as a whole indicates that Philodemus rejects this kind of treatment as a mistake. Plutarch explicitly warns against using frank speech on a friend who is already in distress; this is like putting a stinging eye salve on inflamed eyes.⁹³ Instead, Plutarch likens the therapeutic use of frank speech among friends to the application of honey, which purges even though it stings.⁹⁴ Philodemus demands the same kind of mildness. Sages, he says, will take pleasure in being reminded by one another, while experiencing "the most gentle sting".⁹⁵ Others suffer more; but the treatment must yet be tender. Philodemus' mildness, it may be noted, is in contrast with the much sterner attitude of the Stoic Epictetus, who compares the philosophical school to a hospital which the patient should leave in pain.⁹⁶

However much the various uses of frank speech may differ from each other, they are unified by the friendship of the leader for the trainee "according to his worth".⁹⁷ This common feature distinguishes the therapeutic skill of the philosophical leader from such skills as being a chorus-master: one chorus-master is ferociously angry, like a dog, toward all, another is always gentle; one uses frank speech "well in every respect", another "deficiently in some respect". Unlike the medical analogy, this contrast reflects the fact that philosophical leaders do not always deal with trainees on a one-to-one basis, but often treat them in a group. Philodemus argues that whereas the

⁹² Col. 17a7. According to Celsus (6.6.18), smilion is an eye salve used in severe cases of eye inflammation. Galen (*De comp.* 3, chap. 2, Kühn vol. 12, p. 667) classifies it as a "harsh drug" (δριμεῖ φαρμάκω). Following Gigante (1983, pp. 85–86), Konstan et al. (1998, p. 117) translate ζυγίλιον as "scalpel", a meaning which is well attested (for example, in Plutarch's *How to Tell a Flatterer* 60b), but does not fit the verb δῶσι. Philodemus refers to surgery in lines 5–6, then mentions the eye-salve; both treatments are extreme. Gigante interprets the fragment to mean that when students engage in excessive, stinging candor (thinking that they are not erring or will escape notice), teachers must cut out this candor as though by the scalpel. The interpretation is complicated by the uncertainty of the text in line 8. I am more inclined to impute the stinging candor to misguided leaders; even though it is a mistake, "they think they won't make a mistake" (lines 11–12) by applying it or won't be noticed.

⁹³ *How to Tell a Flatterer* 69a; cf. 72b–c.

⁹⁴ *How to Tell a Flatterer* 59d.

⁹⁵ Col. 8b6–13.

⁹⁶ *Discourses* 3.23.30.

⁹⁷ Col. 3a3–14.

methods of chorus-masters differ in the extreme, philosophical leaders treat all trainees alike on the basis of the proportionate love they have for each. With a possible allusion to Plato's auxiliaries in the *Republic*, Philodemus indicates that the wise leader must not treat his trainees with the ferocity of a watch-dog.

As a therapist and friend, the philosophical leader must pay special attention to individual differences among the trainees. First, the trainees differ in age and sex. Philodemus points out that a woman differs from an adolescent (μειράκιον), and that both women and young men (νεανίσκοι) differ from old men.⁹⁸ Throughout the treatise, he gives special attention to the young. They pose a special challenge because they tend to balk; many are likely to "rear their necks".⁹⁹ It should be emphasized, however, that the training is designed for all ages, not just the young.¹⁰⁰ It follows that some leaders are younger than the trainees, as Philodemus appears to point out when he says that "[we] will sometimes obey the younger".¹⁰¹ Likewise, we may suppose that some of the leaders are women, although there is no mention of this feature in the extant text.¹⁰² It is noteworthy that Philodemus distinguishes women from adolescents rather than from some other group, as though they belong to a similar intellectual or emotional level.

Trainees also differ according to social standing. In one section of the treatise, Philodemus focuses on three main groups: women; the old; and the rich, famous and powerful. All three groups are easily offended by frank speech. Women quickly dissolve into tears because they think that they are despised; they also think their natural

⁹⁸ Col. 6a.4–8.

⁹⁹ Fr. 71.6–8; cf. frs. 31.2 and 87N (with its reference to colt-tamers).

¹⁰⁰ It has become commonplace in modern scholarship to refer to the trainees as young people. De Witt (1936, p. 207) identifies the "trainees" with the "youngest recruits"; and Gigante regularly refers to the students as "the young". This inaccuracy obscures the fact that an Epicurean education is intended to serve equally the young and the old. Konstan et al. (1998, p. 12) try to save the modern inaccuracy by suggesting that Philodemus used the term "young" in the sense of "beginning students of philosophy generally, irrespective of their age". In my view, every use of νέος in Philodemus' text has the ordinary sense of "young in age".

¹⁰¹ Fr. 36.4–7. The complete text is: ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ νεωτέροις κατὰ τὴν δ[ι]άθεσιν παιδαρχήσαι π[ο]τε. I prefer to understand κατὰ τὴν δ[ι]άθεσιν as "in accordance with their disposition", that is, on the basis of their disposition as accomplished leaders, even though the phrase might also be taken as "rather young in disposition".

¹⁰² Philodemus could have used the example of Leontion (wife of Metrodorus), who wrote a treatise against Theophrastus (Cicero *De natura deorum* 1.93); see further Erler (1994) p. 287.

weakness deserves pardon. In general, Philodemus appears rather misogynist: he blames women for being impulsive, vain, suspicious, tempestuous.¹⁰³ The old do not fare much better in his judgment: they also think that their weakness invites rebuke. In addition, they believe that time has made them smarter, and they do not want to be deprived of the respect they claim to deserve.¹⁰⁴ The rich and famous don't bear criticism well, partly because they think it is due to envy, partly because they are accustomed to receive deference from others, and so on.¹⁰⁵ Kings construe rebuke as insubordination.¹⁰⁶

Cutting across age, sex, and social rank are differences in temperament. Philodemus divides the range of temperaments into three main types. Just as medical patients may have a weaker or stronger constitution, so trainees may be "delicate", "stronger than the delicate and somewhat more in need of attention", and "strong and scarcely about to change if shouted at". The leader will match the softness or toughness of the temperament with his words. He will intensify frank speech in the case of the middle group, and he will use "a tough form of frank speech" against the strong.¹⁰⁷ At the far edge of the spectrum, some trainees are "exceedingly strong" both by nature and because of previous progress.¹⁰⁸ In addition, some trainees are more sociable, others less so. Some are sententious, as Polyaeus was.¹⁰⁹

Overall, trainees vary greatly in their ability to make philosophical progress. Some are both unaware of their errors and ignorant of what can help them.¹¹⁰ Some gladly admonish others as an act

¹⁰³ Col. 22a-22b9.

¹⁰⁴ Col. 24a7-24b9.

¹⁰⁵ Cols. 22b10-23a6. At col. 4b6-11, Philodemus seem to credit some offspring of the socially prominent, together with persons "reared with" them, as making a correct use of frank speech to people who are "more humble". At fr. 73.9-12 the "great" are said to approach with the attitude of "suffering undeservedly" (ἀν[α]ξ-ιοπαθήσαντες).

¹⁰⁶ Cols. 23b12-24a3. As Diogenes Laertius (10.120) reports, the wise person "will attend (or "treat", θεραπεύσειν) a king upon occasion". Philonides, an Epicurean who lived in Antioch in the first half of the second century BC, did just that. He is said to have converted Demetrius I Soter (160-152 BC) to Epicureanism (Erlr 1994, pp. 251-52).

¹⁰⁷ Fr. 7, including (lines 9-10) σκληρῶι . . . τῆς παρησίας εἶδει. At col. 15b8, Philodemus mentions the difficulty of being "hard to move" (δυσκίνητον).

¹⁰⁸ Fr. 10.7-11. I suggest that πα[ν]τὶ θυμῷ (lines 10-11) should be taken to describe the trainees rather than the leaders; for it is not suitable for anyone ever to be fully angry (see fr. 74.2-3 and col. 10a7).

¹⁰⁹ Col. 6a8-13.

¹¹⁰ Fr. 1.2-5.

of friendship, but when they are rebuked, they are unhappy, thinking that they are exempt from error.¹¹¹ Some previously see the benefit that comes from frank speech, then fail to do so for a variety of reasons.¹¹² Some won't put up with frank speech because they think they are smarter than the leaders, particularly in practical matters; they go so far as to think that they are leaders themselves.¹¹³ Some trainees become "too exact" as a result of "being deprived of resources for good will and friendship" and "because of a long-standing imitation of the leaders".¹¹⁴ These people are lonely sticklers; through misguided training, they fail to achieve the ultimate goal of friendship.

Drawing on the commonplace distinction between external advantages and one's own mental attitude, Philodemus notes that a trainee may "still be very much in need of externals", while opposed to "the remedies that come from one's disposition".¹¹⁵ A person will heed an admonition only when he has been relieved of the passions that have puffed him up or, in general, have checked him.¹¹⁶ Some respond to frank speech with embarrassment,¹¹⁷ others with anger.¹¹⁸ As Philodemus points out in *On Anger*, the refusal to tolerate the reproaches of leaders or fellow-students makes philosophical progress impossible. These students act just like wild animals who won't tolerate even the mildest remedies for their wounds; full of suspicion that everything said about them is unreasonable, they are deprived of "the

¹¹¹ Col. 19b6–10.

¹¹² Col. 17b8–13.

¹¹³ Col. 20a.

¹¹⁴ Col. 5a3–10 (including ἀ[κρι]βέστεροι).

¹¹⁵ Fr. 30. I suggest emending Olivieri's reading <ᾠς> τις (line 5) to τ[οῖ]ς. There is a break in the papyrus between T (preserved only as an upper horizontal stroke in both the Naples transcription and the papyrus) and C (preserved in the transcription alone as belonging to a detached fragment), which permits the insertion of both O and I. Neither O nor I appear in the papyrus or the transcription. On my reading, the dative τ[οῖ]ς, which goes with ἀ[κρι]βοῖς, is governed proleptically by ἀν[τι]παρ[ο]ν[ο]ν (with a change to the accusative going with καταποδ[ι]ζ[ων]). The literal translation is: "To the remedies that come from the disposition, he is opposed to the one, while impeding the other". It is not clear what the two kinds of remedy are. Self-awareness might fit the second kind. An example of the first type might be obedience to the leader, or (as a prerequisite for this) freedom from passions (see fr. 66.6–10).

¹¹⁶ Fr. 66.6–10.

¹¹⁷ Fr. 71.3 and col. 13a8. At col. 13a10 I propose the reading ὁ[ν]σ[ι]ν instead of ο[ν]σ[ι]ν: the embarrassed trainee nonetheless looks ahead to the benefit he has observed in his friends and keeps imitating the wise person.

¹¹⁸ Fr. 70.7–13.

good of joint inquiry".¹¹⁹ Importantly, personal correction is part of a joint effort at philosophical investigation.

Trainees have an obligation to confess their errors to their leaders.¹²⁰ Epicurus' own students, Heraclides and Polyaeus, provide examples. Heraclides, we are told, revealed his errors to Epicurus because he considered the reproaches of less consequence than the benefits.¹²¹ Among people who know each other, many will offer revelations voluntarily, without being asked by the leader.¹²² Students must beware, however, of revealing their ignorance to "fellow trainees", who may not have a deep enough understanding to be of help.¹²³ Revealing the mistakes of fellow-trainees also requires curbs. A person who wants a friend to be corrected is not necessarily a slanderer, but may be acting as a true friend—a friend of a friend (φιλόφιλος).¹²⁴ Tattling, on the other hand, is wrong. Philodemus warns against running off to the leaders to tell them what someone has done or said against them.¹²⁵

Frank speech can run to excess on the part of both leaders and trainees. Philodemus points out that persuasion is produced not only by frank speech but also by action.¹²⁶ Some people talk instead of acting: the reason is that they "do not have desires opposed to speaking, so that they speak with full sincerity whatever they think, but are ravaged bitterly by desires that are opposed to action, so that they cannot implement what they praised."¹²⁷ A mania for reputation causes people to talk endlessly, without ever acting, until they are exposed.¹²⁸ Another type of hypocrisy is that of failing to speak "from one's whole soul" while trying to give the impression of being "lovers of frankness". This pretense is exposed when a rebuke escapes the speaker.¹²⁹

¹¹⁹ *On Anger*, col. 19.12–27 (Indelli).

¹²⁰ Fr. 76.7–10.

¹²¹ Fr. 49.

¹²² Fr. 42.6–10.

¹²³ Fr. 53.6–12.

¹²⁴ Fr. 50.3–8.

¹²⁵ Fr. 52.6–11.

¹²⁶ Fr. 16.5–7.

¹²⁷ Col. 18a7–15. Both datives, τῷ μὲν λαλεῖν and τῷ δὲ πράττειν, are governed by ἀντιτεχνούσας (which, together with ἐπιθυμίας ἔχουσι, must be understood with the latter).

¹²⁸ Col. 18b2–10. Gigante (1983, pp. 95–97) takes these people, as well as those mentioned in the first half of the column, to be politicians.

¹²⁹ Col. 16b2–9. Interestingly, Philodemus compares this situation (lines 9–12) to being forced to participate in a celebratory dinner; the guest, who puts on a show of being perfectly frank in his praise, reveals himself by uttering a correction.

Some people, including some lovers, love to talk about their sufferings.¹³⁰

On Frank Speech lays out a theory, together with some examples. For a detailed illustration of the theory, we may go to Lucretius. Even though he dedicates his work to a particular student, Memmius, Lucretius aims to train students of all kinds. As a writer, Lucretius is not in a position to monitor the efforts of individual students. But he comes as close as possible to a direct involvement by imagining many different types of students and using a full panoply of encouragement, cajoling, rebuke, and so forth. He clearly relishes his use of frank speech when, in his arguments against the fear of death, he puts nature on stage and has her call the antagonist "stupid" (*stulte*, 3.939). Against the old person who will not be comforted, nature raises her voice more stridently, calling him a "buffoon" (*balatro*, 3.955). If Lucretius appears rather too sharp, we might exonerate him on the ground that he is confronting opponents, as well as Epicureans-in-training. As he adapts his teaching to different types of hearers, Lucretius assumes different roles himself. He is angry, kindly, compassionate, stern in turn. Seneca will use the same method later in his philosophical writings. As a character in his essays as well as his letters, he serves as mentor to many different kinds of individuals.

Even without a personal mentor, an individual can profit from the guidance of another. As Seneca tells us, Epicurus advised everyone to "cherish some good man and keep him before the eyes continually, so that we may live and do everything as though that person was looking on".¹³¹ This person is, in the first place, Epicurus himself. Seneca points out elsewhere: "Do everything as though Epicurus was looking on".¹³² The Epicurean custom of putting images of Epicurus in their cups and on rings, which is derided by Cicero, helps to implement this advice.¹³³ Epicurus serves as a personal savior, whether as a real-life companion to his own friends or as an inspiration to later followers.

In conclusion, it is appropriate to ask: How far has the student progressed at the end of this basic education? By an Epicurean measure,

¹³⁰ Fr. 48.2-5.

¹³¹ *Ep.* 11.8 (= U 210).

¹³² *Ep.* 25.5 (= U 211): *sic fac omnia tamquam spectet Epicurus.*

¹³³ *De finibus* 5.3.

he or she has acquired the fundamentals of a philosophical education, consisting of both theoretical knowledge and its practical application. Liberated from traditional social norms, the student becomes committed to the norms of a new kind of society. Even though Epicurus denied any influence to the gods in human life, this new commitment is strongly religious. For Epicurus takes over the role of divine helper; and his followers perpetuate this role by both revering Epicurus and acting as his helpers. The new student is initiated into a new religion, dedicating himself or herself to the truths revealed by a personal savior. As emphasized previously, this commitment is conceived as a rational endeavor; but it is rooted in a deep sense of personal salvation.

The religious nature of Epicureanism was already in full force in the first generation. In one famous episode, Colotes is said to have fallen before Epicurus, embracing his knees; Epicurus reciprocated by doing reverence to Colotes in turn.¹³⁴ Metrodorus spoke of turning from a lowly life to the "divinely revealed rites" (θεόφαντα ὄργια) of Epicurus.¹³⁵ On the negative side, Metrodorus' brother Timocrates tells of the difficulties of quitting the cult. After he managed to leave, he had his revenge by exposing the Epicurean way of life in lurid detail. Among the details he cites are "night philosophies" and "mystical society".¹³⁶ Although we may discount much of this as polemical exaggeration, heterodoxy remained a serious concern. In the ensuing centuries, Epicurus' followers vied with each other in offering an exegesis of Epicurus' teachings. In one case, Philodemus responds to what he considers a mistaken exegesis by calling its authors "parricides".¹³⁷

In sum, Epicurus proposed an alternative system of education that gathered in its sweep all subjects of learning, including religious beliefs. Intended for all, it aimed to replace an erroneous traditional belief system by the newly discovered truths of Epicurus. To achieve this end, the Epicureans refined the traditional method of memorization as well as developed a detailed system of personal guidance. The result was a new method of shaping conduct through the appropriation of philosophical doctrines.

¹³⁴ Plutarch *Adv. Colotem* 1117b (= U 141).

¹³⁵ Plutarch *Adv. Colotem* 1117b.

¹³⁶ Diogenes Laertius 10.6.

¹³⁷ *Rhetoric* Book 1 col. 7.27 (Longo Auricchio).

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THE GRAMMARIAN'S CHOICE:
THE POPULARITY OF EURIPIDES' *PHOENISSAE* IN
HELLENISTIC AND ROMAN EDUCATION

Raffaella Cribiore

I

A fundamental aspect of education in antiquity is that the same literary texts were often used at successive levels of instruction, from the elementary to the rhetorical stage. A student had a taste of authors such as Homer, Hesiod, Euripides, or Menander from the time when he practiced copying a line of poetry and memorized its content. He used passages from the same authors when he started to read by slowly decoding a text syllable by syllable. Under the tutelage of the grammarian, students, who also approached writers such as Pindar or Callimachus, learned to distill with relentless care texts they had encountered at the beginning of the process of acculturation.¹ Though prose writers started to acquire increasing importance, the same poets kept on haunting students at the rhetorical level. The preliminary rhetorical exercises in particular rested heavily on poetry: Achilles, Ajax, or Medea defined the horizon of the student whose first serious compositions praised or impersonated a mythological figure. Thus the educational circle started and ended in many respects at the same place. The term *engkyklios paideia* referring to the whole course of education may hint at this aspect of the process. While *engkyklios* is usually rendered as "complete, encompassing," referring to the totality of the disciplines that encircled a student and made him an all-round cultivated person, the cyclic revisiting of the same texts is perhaps also implied and deserves attention.

One of the most popular texts studied at various levels of instruction was the *Phoenissae* of Euripides. In what follows, I am going to

¹ The traditional division of education into three stages—elementary, grammatical, and rhetorical—supervised by different teachers may not have been always operative. Cf. Booth (1979); Vössing (1997) 563–74. Grammarians sometimes may have taught students from their earliest years. In what follows, however, I shall maintain the traditional division which applies to the material covered at the various stages.

use this tragedy in order to show the type of work students did on a literary text, particularly under the tutelage of the grammarian.² I shall draw primarily upon the school papyri from Greco-Roman Egypt—exercises written by students and teachers and, in some cases, books meant for educational contexts—which allow us to verify the contents of ancient education.³ The papyri show that Euripides, who was by far the favorite tragedian in ancient schools, was approached preferably through this play. *Phoenissae* was used as copybook, as when a student in the second or first century BC engaged in a clumsy exercise of penmanship and copied on an ostrakon—a pottery sherd—line 3 of the text transmitted by the medieval manuscripts, apparently the original first line.⁴ And as will be seen, the play continued to be read and studied as students progressed in their education to the point where they engaged in exercises of composition under the guidance of a grammarian or a rhetor.

But the popularity of *Phoenissae* in education corresponds exactly to the strong favor it enjoyed among the cultivated public. *Phoenissae* is the text most represented among the literary papyri of Euripides, with about thirty witnesses from the third century BC to the seventh century AD.⁵ Moreover, quotations by ancient writers such as Plutarch, Lucian, or Athenaeus also reveal that *Phoenissae* was most admired.⁶ The drama was then included in the Byzantine triad with *Hecabe* and *Orestes*. The two questions of the popularity of *Phoenissae* in schools and among educated readers are strictly connected. First of all, even more school papyri might hide among the rest of papyri of this play, since texts written and used at advanced levels of education cannot be easily distinguished from those that circulated among the general public. More importantly, the tastes of ancient readers were inevitably shaped by texts they had encountered during their school years. When scholars consider the question of the strong favor enjoyed in antiquity by a drama that does not particularly appeal to our modern sensibility, they do not take into account its use in

² Marrou (1975) 246 only considered in passing the question of the use of classical drama in education. Morgan (1998) 115–6 also did not cover the subject thoroughly: she remarked that the popularity of *Phoenissae* in schools was difficult to explain.

³ See Criore (1996).

⁴ Criore (1996) no. 130. Cf. Haslam (1975).

⁵ Cf. Bouquiaux-Simon and Mertens (1992) 102–4; Bremer (1983); Bremer and Worp (1986). Add *P.Oxy.* LX 4012, fifth century.

⁶ Cf. Bremer (1983) 286. Cf. the earlier parodies and quotations of Aristophanes, *Ra.* 1185–86; Strattis, *Phoen.* (Athenaeus 160b); Plato, *Phdr.* 244d.

education but vaguely invoke the change in literary taste or try to restore a much slimmer text than the one transmitted by making bold cuts. I shall attempt in what follows to show that ancient teachers may have privileged this play for sound pedagogical reasons, on account of its themes and treatment of the Oedipus legend, or the abundant gnomic material. The *Phoenissae* could be aptly used by the grammarian to expand on the background of the myth, to refer to other literary treatments of similar material, and also to foster the enrichment of a student's vocabulary. Exploring the reasons why the grammarian so often chose to study *Phoenissae* in his class will in turn illuminate the appeal which this drama continued to exercise on ancient readers when the school years were over.

II

It is appropriate at the start to evaluate a reason sometimes put forward to account for the popularity of *Phoenissae* in and out of school: its presumed frequent revivals on stage.⁷ The archaeological, pictorial, and epigraphical evidence is mute in this respect. Moreover, even evidence for the revival of other classical dramas in the Hellenistic and Roman period is not completely unambiguous.⁸ Physical remains of theaters, which were built in Egypt not only in Alexandria but also in large centers (*mêtropoleis*), show the great interest of the public in theatrical performances. These, however, were not necessarily revivals of whole classical plays but more often reworkings of detached scenes or detached roles. Even though a Roman papyrus containing an excerpt from Euripides *Cresphontes*—not the text of the whole play—is considered an actor's copy for a production in the theater of Oxyrhynchus, this is far from a proof that the whole tragedy was actually revived on stage.⁹ Students were greatly attracted by theatrical performances, but these entertainments did not always win

⁷ See Morgan (1998) 116 note 99, who reports the opinion of P. Easterling. Cf. Bremer (1983a) 283–4. The hypothesis of revivals is necessary to those scholars who believe in extensive histrionic interpolations. But besides the long passage of the *exodus*, an examination of most short interpolations such as those of lines 51, 357, 428, 756, and 1136 point to readers, students, or teachers providing explanatory glosses and marginal notations. Cf. Mastronarde (1994) 41.

⁸ See Bieber (1961) 190–226 and 239–43; Jones (1993); and Green (1994).

⁹ *P.Oxy.* XXVII 2458, Turner (1963).

parents' and teachers' approval. A papyrus letter addressed to his father by a young man who studied rhetoric in Alexandria shows that he had been implicated in some disreputable events at the theater together with his brother, who was the student of a grammarian.¹⁰ Libanius, moreover, ranted against theatrical shows that students attended (*Or.* I 5 and III 12). If these were live performances of classical plays, we may surmise that he would not have been so indignant about his students' behavior. In the Roman world it was rather mimes and pantomimes that were vastly popular. The pantomime dance in particular, where an actor danced the individual roles, became the real heir of tragedy and was often characterized with the adjective *tragikos*.¹¹ In extolling the praises of pantomimes in the dialogue *De saltatione*, Lucian numbered among the themes of pantomime dances "Cithaeron, with all that befell the Thebans and the house of Labdacus" and "the story of Oedipus" (41). He also criticized the limited role of actors in tragedies who only lent their voice to the poets of the past (27)—a remark that shows that tragedies were no longer considered a great form of spectacle but something that could equally be enjoyed through reading.

It is impossible to know with certainty whether and how often *Phoenissae* was actually performed on stage, but it is reasonable to assume that the general public and students in particular were familiar to a degree with its myths and themes through other channels, such as pantomime dances, and through personal reading and copying of the text. Euripides was by far the most popular of the tragedians in the Greco-Roman world.¹² Though Aeschylus and Sophocles were read much more infrequently, the papyri show that *Septem* is the most attested of the former's extant dramas, as the Oedipus cycle is of Sophocles'. The myths centered on the royal house of Thebes must have aroused a special interest. The much stronger favor that Euripides, and the *Phoenissae* in particular, enjoyed was due to several reasons. First of all, this tragedy was linguistically much more accessible. In the Greek East a student was exposed to more than one language, and the various linguistic layers created inevitable

¹⁰ *P.Oxy.* XVIII 2190, Rea (1993).

¹¹ Cf. in Roueché (1993) the inscriptions at Aphrodisias nos. 51, 52, 53, and 88 that contain references either to new plays or to pantomimes. About evidence for a tight-rope dancer in the theater at Aphrodisias, see inscription 8; about performances of acrobats and bears in Egypt, see *P.Oxy.* XXVII 2470.

¹² See Cavallo (1986) 107–13; Tuilier (1968) 108–9.

problems: he functioned in everyday life in the local regional language and in the contemporary common form of Greek called *koine*, but in school had to learn Attic Greek, which became the vehicle of his writing endeavors. Moreover, a knowledge of Euripides was fundamental for those who learned and practiced the art of rhetoric, and the education of elite students was directed toward this final goal: it was extremely hard to integrate the recondite and monumental diction of Aeschylus in a rhetorical discourse.

III

But another aspect of *Phoenissae* must have greatly appealed to people interested in this myth and particularly to the grammarian who wished to compare its treatments by other writers. *Phoenissae* presented the whole panorama of the royal house of Thebes, from the foundation of the city by Cadmus and its initial glories under Oedipus to the final ruin. All the characters of the original myth were present: the living ones who suffered, debated, and died on the scene; the dead, who mainly appeared in the lyric rehearsal of the myth; and new figures such as Menoeceus, a creation of the poet. The colossal figure of Oedipus moved half-seen through the devastating course of events. His life, like that of Jocasta, was prolonged, and both parents lived to see their sons kill each other. It was a drama full of pathos, remarked the scholiast of the second *Hypothesis* who punctiliously listed all the people who ended up destroyed by inescapable events, an overfull drama, in which one could enjoy Euripides the "pyrothecnician" at his best.¹³ The grammarian could not let such an occasion pass by.

The tendency of ancient readers and students to enjoy sequels of traditional stories, savoring once more characters that were supposed to be dead or had somehow disappeared, is also visible in the choice of the books of the *Odyssey* read in Greco-Roman Egypt and probably elsewhere. This poem always maintained a secondary place with respect to the *Iliad*. While it appears that the grammarian started to expound in detail the first part of the *Iliad* but covered the whole poem—even though more cursorily—with his most advanced students, not many school exercises can be shown to contain passages

¹³ See Podlecki (1962) 356.

from the *Odyssey*. It should be taken into account, however, that since this poem was not part of the regular curriculum, and parts of it were probably studied only by advanced students, it is very likely that some of the papyri that do not exhibit special signs of school provenance were actually written—in capable handwriting—or read by students at advanced levels. Significantly the papyri show that ancient readers strongly favored two books of the *Odyssey*, 4 and 11.¹⁴ Both books were very popular with writers of the Second Sophistic who preferably quoted from them.¹⁵ Books 4 and 11 brought back key figures of the *Iliad* either met by Telemachus during his journey or by Odysseus in the underworld. A public eager to hear more was satisfied.

Other reasons for the wide acclaim of *Phoenissae* are found in some of its themes. Dominant ideas that run through it are those of exile, love for one's fatherland, and power.¹⁶ The woes of exile are viewed especially through the eyes of Polyneices, but the same theme also emerges in the choice of the chorus composed of exiles, in the arrival of Cadmus at Thebes, in the episode of Menoeceus who refuses an exile that he considers cowardly, and in the final scene where Antigone and Oedipus leave their country forever. The Greeks who enjoyed this tragedy in the Hellenistic and Roman period were to some degree exiles of an ideal country—Greece—and aspired to become part of a world with which they had become acquainted through their readings. Education provided people with a Greek identity to be used as a badge of belonging to a world of culture and privilege. While these Greeks in the Eastern world could not claim to be born in Greece and had very distant connections with it, nevertheless they could speak a common tongue, read and write in an artificial Greek of the past, and follow the same aesthetic and ethical ideals promoted by the schools of grammar and rhetoric. This attitude is reflected by the geographical terms that occur in lists of words compiled in schools.¹⁷ In these, there was a perceivable change from the Hellenistic to the Roman period: in Hellenistic times the lists revolved around the conquests of Alexander—mainly in Asia but also in areas of the West that he had planned to invade—but

¹⁴ Cf. Pack (1965) and Mertens (1985).

¹⁵ Kindstrand (1973) 53–4; 82–3 and *passim*.

¹⁶ Rawson (1970) considers this tragedy as an investigation of the relationship of the various characters to their family and country.

¹⁷ See Legras (1994). The results of this investigation are however limited by the small number of lists with geographical terms.

later they rather hinged on classical Greece and the geography of Asia as revealed by the Homeric poems. Paradoxically the world of a student was defined by boundaries such as the rivers Ismenos and Scamander, and the source of Dirke rather than by the country where he lived.¹⁸ It was for this ideal fatherland that students and educated people in the provinces longed: they could appreciate the quest and claims of Polynices.

In *Phoenissae* Polynices' yearning for his fatherland is tangible. He weeps as he sees "the halls, the altars of the gods, the gymnasia where I was nurtured, and the stream of Dirke" (367–68). His decision to assault and eventually destroy Thebes is unjust, but Polynices is like a passionate and abusive lover who will annihilate the object of his desire rather than leaving it to someone else. The poet who gives him a speech as he is dying at the end, when he reveals that at least he would like to be buried in his fatherland, seems to forgive him. So probably did his audience, at least in Greco-Roman times.

But a purer, untainted hero ready to sacrifice for his country can be identified in the character of Creon's son, Menoeceus. It was remarked that in *Phoenissae* a role can shift from one character to another.¹⁹ This seems one such case. Unable to acquit Polynices entirely, the poet found a younger and selfless hero. In Menoeceus, a character created by Euripides and not oppressed by the weight of the myth, the negative aspects of Oedipus' son were obliterated, and his positive qualities were emphasized. In the words of Teiresias, Menoeceus was a "colt," young, somewhat wild, but also innocent and implicitly unbound by the conventions of the adults: for this reason "by his death he could save his native country" (947–48). In the relatively brief speech he addresses to the chorus after Creon leaves, words such as country, city, and land figure prominently, thirteen times in all (985–1018). Menoeceus was a hero with whom a young audience could easily identify. He uses strong words, naive to some degree, as when he envisions himself as a "betrayers of his country," an "evil" man guilty of "cowardice," if he flees—the passionate words of a young man unconcerned with the consequences of his gesture.

¹⁸ It is possible that the Sphinx somehow bridged these two worlds for people living in Egypt. The sphinx-story is often recounted or alluded to in the play. It was part of the traditional myth, but its actual majestic presence in Egypt may have made more real a distant world of the past

¹⁹ Said (1985) 510.

A young man saving his city—wasn't this one of those dreams of youthful idealism? The students of the grammarian must have applauded Menoeceus' deed. Other voluntary sacrifices occur in the tragedies of Euripides,²⁰ that of the daughter of Heracles in *Heracleidae*, the daughter of Erectheus in *Erectheus*—both taking place in an invaded or besieged city—Polyssena in *Hecuba*, Iphigenia in *Iphigenia Taurica*, and also Antigone at the end of *Phoenissae*, a bloodless but self-annihilating sacrifice. These were all female characters, young and brave heroines. But it is likely that the gender itself of Menoeceus mattered in the eyes of his audience: not only did the death of a young man have a stronger significance for a family's future, but students of grammarians were mostly males.

The contrast between the selfless idealism of Menoeceus and the callousness or self-interest of the other three main male characters was striking. While both brothers were motivated by the desire to rule Thebes, Euripides indicted primarily Eteocles for his lust for power, determination not to share it, and disregard for justice. The theme of the legitimacy of power and of the dangers it carries, which emerges in the *agôn* between the brothers, runs through the rest of the drama until the final fratricidal duel. In the first part of the play it is primarily developed through maxims, *gnômai*.

IV

The fact that *Phoenissae* was particularly rich in *gnômai* caught the attention of the scholiast of the second *Hypothesis*, who remarked, "The drama is full of many beautiful *gnomai*", an observation that was amplified in the argument of Thomas Magister, "the drama blooms with many beautiful and multicolored *gnomai*".²¹ The heavy presence of maxims is probably one of the reasons why the grammarian selected this play for study. Maxims played a fundamental role in education. This is another area in which one can observe the phenomenon discussed above of the periodic returning to the same material at successive levels. Students memorized these lapidary statements, which were mostly of ethical content, throughout their education. They copied them over and over in exercises of

²⁰ Mastronarde (1994) 393.

²¹ See the Teubner edition, p. 14.

penmanship; wrote down collections of *gnomai* when their handwriting became more secure; and at a more advanced stage wrote their first compositions developing the subject of maxims and sayings. Gnostic anthologies often compiled by teachers were used in rhetorical schools presenting the favorite themes of the rhetorician conveniently arranged by subject.²²

An examination of the few *gnomologies* on papyrus that appear to have been surely used in education²³ and of maxims written down as school exercises reveals that major topics covered were wealth, virtue, letters and education, women, old age, fate, family, and friends. It was recently remarked that students learned almost nothing from these texts about the large structures of society and that "the world presented to the pupil is largely confined to the people and relationships immediately surrounding him".²⁴ But these *gnomologies* and the maxims preserved in exercises seem to have been used mostly in elementary educational contexts.²⁵ A confined world suits well a younger student who has to master it before exploring larger subjects. But the student of the grammarian was able to approach a range of more demanding concepts. In order to have a complete view of the educational function of maxims it is necessary to also examine them in the context of works popular in education, such as *Phoenissae*.

Only one *gnômê* in this drama revolves around the favorite Euripidean theme of female inferiority and insignificance. At the end of the *teichoskopia* the servant comments on the gossiping nature of women, a remark that is in sharp and ironic contrast with the grave problems caused by men's strife and ambition (198–200). There was no place in *Phoenissae* for the misogynistic thoughts that abound in other Euripidean plays—a favorite of elementary schoolmasters. Another popular subject of sententious remarks—wealth—is also underplayed. Polyneices reveals that the acquisition of wealth is part of his motivation

²² See Barns (1950–51); on Menander's maxims, see Easterling (1995). The exercises from Greco-Roman Egypt do not testify to this advanced use of maxims.

²³ Very few *gnomologies* can be identified as educational with some certainty, and these show in their simple, repetitive structure and somewhat elementary content that they were used in early education. *Gnomologies* appealed greatly to the general public and many are present among the papyri. It is likely that some of them were used in schools, but there is not a sure way to identify them.

²⁴ See the comprehensive examination of maxims in Morgan (1998) 120–51, particularly 141.

²⁵ Most of the isolated maxims appearing in school exercises were written down by students with limited skills.

for assaulting Thebes—a *gnômê* emphasizes this point (439–40)—and Jocasta answers with a maxim praising a modest life (554–55). But since the poet considers Polyneices' greed insignificant in comparison to his longing for his fatherland, desire for power, and feelings of having suffered injustice, the *gnômai* fail to stress this point. But these are the themes that maxims underline as the play progresses. When Jocasta meets her son for the first time, the first half of the *stichomythia* between her and Polyneices is occupied by *gnômai* that emphasize the theme of exile, which dominates the first third of the play. Both Jocasta and Polyneices utter maxims on justice and truth, when Eteocles is present (452–53; 469–70). Eteocles' sophistic speech in response is opened and closed by *gnômai* on strife and the legitimacy of unjust actions for the sake of *tyrannis* (499–502; 524–25). Jocasta plays the part of the judge in this debate, and her long rhetorical speech emphasizes themes of wisdom versus folly, the equity that binds together cities and allies, and the injustice of arbitrary power. The *gnômai* in her speech underscore powerfully all these points. It is interesting that afterward, in the rest of the drama, very few maxims are present: the action itself develops with sufficient clarity the larger themes underlined previously by *gnômai*. If *Phoenissae* is a school text par excellence, it appears that far from covering only the world immediately close to a pupil *gnômai* in texts selected by the grammarian fostered a student's understanding of larger themes, emphasizing that a just and responsible civic behavior was the only one acceptable.

V

But besides isolating maxims in a text for a variety of exercises, there were other activities in which the grammarian engaged his students, and to these I turn next. Even though its themes must have been the primary reason for the favor *Phoenissae* enjoyed, the grammarian did not spend much time discussing the subtleties of ideas. He rather focused on targeted exercises through which students learned to dissect a text but which, by modern standards, hampered a deep comprehension and appreciation of the whole.

Reinforcing students' reading skills was the initial concern. Even though it is not completely clear what a standard elementary edu-

cation covered, and contents must have changed according to circumstances, it is likely that in many cases a student's reading ability was still inadequate when he entered secondary education: not only was it hampered by prevalent bilingualism but also by the absence of books that addressed the difficulties encountered by beginners. Ancient books did not make many concessions to readers: they presented texts in continuous blocks of writing, without separations of words (*scriptio continua*) and with almost non-existent lectional signs.²⁶ An ancient teacher who lacked the most basic teaching aids tried to overcome this difficulty by preparing "user friendly" texts for his students. The school papyri show numerous examples of passages from Homer, Euripides, or Isocrates written down by teachers with words and/or syllables separated, apostrophes invariably marked, and occasional accents.²⁷ One of these, which preserves lines 529–34 from the *Phoenissae*, is contained in the so-called *Livre d'écolier*, that in spite of its name was rather a book written for or by a teacher.²⁸ In this passage not only were words divided into syllables by spaces and double dots, but each verse was split at the caesura and occupied two lines. A reader badly in need of assistance could thus enjoy the words of Jocasta proclaiming the injustice of *philotimia* (ambition).

Other exercises addressed metrics. Students, particularly at an elementary level, often wrote verses in continuous lines, without observing colometry.²⁹ This practice, which in school apparently resulted from the desire to use the entire surface of a papyrus or tablet, was observed very rarely by professional copyists and then, primarily for lyric verses, which had a complex metrical structure. But while students also wrote hexameters and iambs as prose, sometimes in doing so they added marks of separation between them. It is interesting that such marks occasionally appear at the end of verses even when they were written one per line. It is conceivable that students were sometimes required to articulate into its verses a text that was either dictated or written out as prose. A fragmentary exercise containing part of the prologue of *Phoenissae* seems to suggest just that:

²⁶ On this and on a few papyrus books meant for beginners, see R. Cribiore, *Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt* (Princeton, 2001) chapter 6.

²⁷ Cribiore (1996) 121–8.

²⁸ Cribiore (1996) no. 379; Marrou (1975) I 233.

²⁹ On this practice, see Cribiore (1992).

this student, who appears to have been relatively advanced and added oblique marks at the end of each verse, failed once and committed a misdivision.³⁰

In a fragment from the *Banqueters* of Aristophanes a father sternly asks his son the meaning of some difficult words appearing in the Homeric text: the son is totally baffled (233 *PCG*). Naturally Homer caused more problems than Euripides: words had to be explained one by one and “translated” into an easier form of Greek for students. The papyri preserve many examples of *scholia minora*, where *lemmata* taken from the text were written down together with the corresponding glosses.³¹ These *scholia* cover almost each word in the first books, when a reader needed to become familiar with Homeric lexicon and phraseology, but become more sparse as the text proceeds. But even though systematic glossographical analysis survives only for the Homeric poems, explaining the unfamiliar terms of any text was part of school routine. In Euripides the choral odes in particular abounded in rare terms that could put a student in difficulty. A Roman school exercise, for instance, concentrated on the second stasimon of *Phoenissae*.³² The student who copied the text used his best formal handwriting, adding serifs and decorations at the end of strokes—an earnest performance with awkward results. But even though he wrote the text rather accurately and committed only venial mistakes in the process, sometimes reproducing the phonetic spelling of a word, he must have struggled to understand the richly allusive and rare terminology. Like other Euripidean odes, this one piled up a wealth of relative clauses, appositions, verbal repetitions, and unusual compound epithets. That “snowy delight” of Kithairon with “heavenly foliage” and “rich in wild beasts” that nurtured a royal baby “marked with pins bound with gold” was a concentration of rare terms that occurred exclusively in Euripides or very occasionally in later literature (801–805). A student in the provinces would have been unable to appreciate this virtuoso performance without the help of his teacher.

³⁰ See *P.Oxy.* LIII 3712: the hypothesis of M. Haslam appears attractive.

³¹ See Criore (1996) nos. 325–43 written in school, and pp. 50–1. It is likely that many more of the examples appearing in papyri were used in school contexts, but there is not a sure way to distinguish them. Common readers also needed help with Homer.

³² Criore (1999) no. 282. This papyrus, which is fragmentary and mutilated, also includes the end of the previous speech of Eteocles.

The details of the myth provided further difficulty. The choral odes emphasized the distant past in the history of the royal family and of Thebes, interweaving allusions to the myth with a commentary on the present events. In the second stasimon for instance, the chorus, which started with an invocation to Ares and focused then on the army of the Argives at the city's gates and the story of Oedipus and the Sphinx, moved afterwards back to the remote past: the dragon and the race of the Spartoi born from its blood, the marriage of Cadmus and Harmonia, Io as an ancestress of the Cadmeans, and the alternative foundation myth of Thebes of Amphion and Zethus. A very important layer of the grammarian's activity was the treatment of *historiai*, which involved commenting on and expanding points of a text concerning people, places, and mythological³³ and historical events. This was a field where the grammarian displayed his exquisite erudition and love for minutiae. The passion with which he explored the meanders of a myth and the myopic precision with which he scrutinized a detail to some degree meant that the student was at risk of losing the general contours of a story and of drowning in a pool of small points. Both Quintilian and Sextus Empiricus warned the grammarian about excesses that would jeopardize a student's comprehension.³⁴ Nonetheless, games of erudition were basically unavoidable: they formed the quintessence of the grammarian's profession.

An interesting codex on papyrus preserves a commentary to *Phoenissae* 344–1108 where passages or expressions are explained in unsystematic order.³⁵ Since these notes are not very learned, do not employ refined language, and often do not correspond to the erudite *scholia* preserved by the medieval manuscripts, it is likely that a grammarian made excerpts from an elementary commentary, probably written on a papyrus roll, choosing what he needed for his class and maybe adding explanations on his own. This, for instance, seems to be the case for the note commenting lines 1019–20 on the origin of the Sphinx. While the explanations that she was born from the earth or from Thyphon and Echidna were taken from the Euripidean

³³ Mythographical material also circulated independently in handbooks such as the *Bibliotheca* by Apollodorus in the first-second century AD. On mythographical notes to Homer, see Montanari (1995).

³⁴ *Inst.Or.* 1, 8.18; *M I* 145–47; 149–51, and 257–62.

³⁵ *P.Würzb.* 1 from the sixth century AD. Cf. Maehler (1993) 109–11.

text and also appear in the medieval scholia, the observation "some say that the Sphinx was born from the blood of Laius" is otherwise unknown. It was an altogether logical—albeit a bit simplistic—explanation, grounded in the general comprehension of the myth.³⁶

When school papyri preserve passages from a text without any specific signs of how they were used, only content itself can provide some clues. Two excerpts from the *Phoenissae* singled out by students in Ptolemaic and early Byzantine Egypt seem to offer ideal material for minute observations of "historical" content. The first consists of part of the *teichoskopia*, with Antigone and the servant looking down from the wall on the warriors who are preparing to attack the city.³⁷ Through the eyes of the young, naive girl and the explanations of the old man, the seven leaders of the army parade surrounded by an air of mystery and danger. This student, who wrote the passage on an ostrakon from dictation, stumbled on encountering difficult words and occasionally lost the sense of the whole. While it has been remarked that the *teichoskopia* had close literary precedents,³⁸ it is likely that the student of the grammarian found a somewhat familiar parallel in the Catalogue of Book 2 of the *Iliad* that he had approached at an early stage of his education. The same might be true for another passage written down on a tablet on which a student of higher level reproduced quite efficiently part of the fourth episode with the long *rhêsis* of the messenger and the Catalogue of the Seven at Thebes' gates.³⁹ Together with Book 1, Book 2 of the *Iliad* appears to have been the favorite in school. While one of the reasons for this preference can be found in the tendency of teachers—and scholiasts too—to read and comment very closely on the beginning of a literary work, Book 2 also seems to have been liked in its own right and to have been selected for memorization.⁴⁰ In the Catalogue of the Ships, as in the *teichoskopia* and in the Catalogue of the Seven, the grammarian could give proof not only of his knowledge of historical and mythological events and genealogies but also

³⁶ Another papyrus, a codex of Pindar, preserves annotations that are likely to have been added by a grammarian who explained a difficult passage with parallels from *Phoenissae*, see McNamee (1992).

³⁷ Criore (1996) no. 241, second century BC.

³⁸ On these see below.

³⁹ Criore (1996) no. 303, which contained verses from Callimachus' *Hecale* on the other side.

⁴⁰ See Criore (1994); Criore (1996) nos. 193 and 201.

of geographical details. Geography was not a subject that had an independent life in ancient schools, but its teaching was strictly connected to a literary text. While a general audience may not have been particularly interested in the topography of *Phoenissae*, the grammarian could use profitably in class the information provided by Euripides with regard to the streams surrounding the city, the spring of Dirke, the plains, and specific sites such as the tomb of Amphion and Zethus or that of the daughters of Niobe, which had a mythological significance. The famous gates themselves, moreover, could elicit explanations regarding their etymological meanings.

The *teichoskopia* and other parts of *Phoenissae* also offered the grammarian the occasion to expand on the literary ancestry of some scenes. The debts of Euripides to *Septem* in particular were many, and *Phoenissae* can be interpreted as an answer to that tragedy born out of a conscious will to build on the expectations engendered by it.⁴¹ It is likely, however, that only the most advanced students of the grammarian could appreciate that directly: most of them had to content themselves with an indirect knowledge of Aeschylus gained from their teacher.⁴² Thus the grammarian might have remarked that the anxiety of Antigone as she surveyed the warriors from the walls recalled the panic of the women in the *parodos* of *Septem*.⁴³ Likewise, both the account and descriptions of the individual warriors in this scene and in the Catalogue given by the messenger could be viewed with Aeschylus in mind. The diction itself in *Phoenissae* often recalled *Septem*, as in the second stasimon where the accumulation of compound epithets gave the whole a majestic Aeschylean tenor.

But naturally the grammarian cannot have failed to point out to his students the reminiscences of the Homeric text, since Homer was the poet par excellence whom they had encountered from their most tender years. The most obvious ancestor of Antigone looking down from the walls was a very different female character, Helen in Book 3 of the *Iliad*, who did not depend on someone else for clarifications but was sorrowfully conscious of the identity of figures emerging from her past. Epic reminiscences also abounded in the final fratricidal

⁴¹ Said (1985).

⁴² Only two exercises contain passages from Aeschylus: Cribiore (1996) nos. 244 and 250. Other passages written or read by advanced students might be included among papyri that do not show specific signs of educational use.

⁴³ See Foley (1985) 117.

duel: the grammarian could point to numerous Homeric parallels regarding similes, the reaction of the spectators, and moments of the fight. The description of the duel, moreover, could be particularly appreciated by an audience familiar with athletic contests in the theater.

Quotations from *Phoenissae* in ancient authors unmistakably show that it was primarily the first part of the tragedy that left permanent traces in their memory. Plutarch's quotations, for instance, cluster around the initial meeting of Jocasta and Polyneices, the *agôn* of the two brothers, and the following speech of Jocasta.⁴⁴ This was the most rhetorical part of the play with its sophistic disquisition on the justice and injustice of power and the benefits inherent in *isotês* (equality): generations of readers relished it. We have seen that the exercises from Greco-Roman Egypt show that naturally the grammarian gave his students less freedom of choice, since they had to learn to wade their way through this text by covering various parts of the play. It is to be expected, however, that the *agôn* of *Phoenissae* attracted the attention of teachers when they wanted to show their advanced students Euripides at his most rhetorical. It is not entirely clear at which educational stage the first notions of rhetoric were given, and when students engaged in *progymnasmata*, that is, preliminary rhetorical exercises. Quintilian shows that in Rome they were commonly the province of the grammarian, but in the East Libanius himself taught this stage, leaving rhetorical theory to his assistants.⁴⁵ Even though it is possible that the limits of the territory covered by teachers in the West and in the East were not identical, it seems likely that circumstances could dictate varying arrangements: a grammarian in an Egyptian town may have sometimes felt the obligation to introduce to rhetoric the student who was later to pursue a complete rhetorical education, say in Alexandria.

An intriguing text written in the third century AD in Oxyrhynchus shows that *Phoenissae* continued to maintain its place in rhetorical education: the *agôn* was chosen for an exercise of imitation, a much shorter reworking in iambic trimeters of the debate between Eteocles and Polyneices in front of their mother.⁴⁶ This text belongs to some

⁴⁴ See Hembold and O'Neil (1959). See also the quotations from the *Peri phuges* of the second-century rhetor Favorinus, *P. Vat. Gr.* 11.

⁴⁵ Quintilian 2.1–6. On Libanius, see Petit (1956) 88 and 90–1.

⁴⁶ *PSI* XIII 1303.

degree to the category of *progymnasmata*, which were often written in verse in Egypt, despite the fact that handbooks of rhetoric invariably developed examples in prose.⁴⁷ Since *progymnasmata* reworked poetic material that a student had encountered in his previous education, a teacher must have felt the need to engage his students in exercises that were not only loosely based on Homer or Euripides but also imitated their poetic forms. Even though Jocasta and Eteocles are present, this exercise centers on Polyneices. Power, the theme around which this exercise revolves, is represented by a *diadēma* that was the symbol of regal authority for Alexander the Great: Polyneices asks to share it, Eteocles appears a *tyrannos* in refusing.

This text was variously judged by scholars. The original editor thought of a student or, more likely, of a schoolteacher; others maintained that it was a fragment of an original classical tragedy in spite of the clumsiness of the whole;⁴⁸ others again, who recognized the great limitations of the piece, nevertheless refused the attribution to a student or a teacher on the grounds that the text might have been much longer, and that the innovation of Polyneices handing his sword to his mother was too bold to take place in school contexts.⁴⁹ The text consists of 34 lines in all. At the end a large unwritten space shows that it ended abruptly,⁵⁰ and there is little evidence upon which to base the supposition that another column preceded the preserved text. A teacher in fact may have explained the antecedents and asked the student in question to start "from the moment when Jocasta asks her sons to give her their swords." Rhetorical exercises were often very short. Quintilian, for instance, did not appreciate excessively long compositions: he strongly disapproved of one of his students who used a tablet that was too large and ended up writing too much because he measured his compositions by the number of lines (10, 3.32). Innovations, moreover, were far from unwelcome in rhetorical schools. A student who departed from a given text gained progressive

⁴⁷ About prose examples, see, e.g., Libanius *Prog.* Foerster VIII. About *ethopoiiai* in verse, see Fournet (1992).

⁴⁸ D. L. Page, *Select Papyri* III (Cambridge, 1970) no. 33. But see the opinion of Körte in *Archiv für Papyrusforschung* 13 (1938) 102 that this text was similar to a reworking of a tragedy of Shakespeare for the "Puppentheater".

⁴⁹ Garzya (1952).

⁵⁰ Sudden interruptions are a common mark of an exercise, see Cribiore (1996) 59–60.

confidence in his ability and often tried to vie with the original in an attempt to show his cleverness.⁵¹ Fabrications and anachronisms also abounded in rhetorical pieces composed outside of school.⁵² This mini-*agôn* with its appalling concentration of so much into so little and its mistakes of phonetic spelling cannot but represent the ambitious endeavor of a student.

At the end of the large educational circle, therefore, a student often dealt with the same material he had first encountered at the beginning of the process of acculturation. Through exercises of increasing sophistication that fragmented a text into short units to be approached at various levels, he reached some understanding of the work of an author, or at least of some of its aspects. The final goal was to be able to master a text so thoroughly as to attempt to appropriate it by competing with it. Thus a text such as *Phoenissae* ended up permanently engraved upon the mind of a student who kept on revisiting it even when the school years were over. This was not simply the result of nostalgia for school days when the grammarian was the master to please but reflected tastes shaped by early training. For all its limitations and narrowness, education was deeply ingrained into the texture of the ancient world. The popularity of *Phoenissae* in and out of school is a further demonstration of the powerful ties that existed between *paideia* and ancient culture.

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⁵² See Russell (1983) 113-20.

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EDUCATION IN THE ROMAN REPUBLIC: CREATING TRADITIONS*

Anthony Corbeill

Like many Ciceronian dialogues, *On the Republic* presents a Greek legacy overlaid with Roman ideas. At its most basic level this treatise, a pragmatic rendering of Plato's dialogue of the same name, embodies a conflict between the theoretical Greeks and the practical Romans. Scholars since antiquity repeat this dichotomy: the Greeks created drama and metaphysics, while the Romans perfected sewer systems and legal codes. In a fragmentary section of Cicero's discussion, we hear the speaker Scipio Aemilianus as he recounts the wise provisions that allow Romans to live in a state of blessedness and honor (*beate et honeste vivendi societatem*). First on the list is the Roman model for learning, which is also the only feature of Roman society receiving disapproval from Polybius, companion of Scipio and transplanted Greek. Unlike its Greek counterpart, Scipio says proudly, Roman education is neither fixed by law, nor set forth publicly, nor uniform.¹ Scipio proceeds to defend the Roman model—and it is at this point that our text breaks off: "Well, you see . . ." (*nam . . .*).

I propose to fill this lacuna, not by speculating over what Cicero's speaker might have argued, but by showing the ways in which the Romans selectively fashioned Greek educational principles into a uniquely Roman form of citizen training. Employing recent scholarship, I shall challenge Marrou's account by arguing that the Romans of the Republic did not so much adopt the Hellenistic model of education as naturalize it, absorbing the attractive aspects into their own

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¹ Cic. *Rep.* 4.3: *principio disciplinam puerilem ingenuis, de qua Graeci multum frustra laborarunt, et in qua una Polybius noster hospes nostrorum institutorum negligentiam accusat, nullam certam aut destinatam legibus aut publice expositam aut unam omnium esse voluerunt. nam . . .* (compare Polybius' remarks on this system at Polyb. 31.31.2). For the characteristics of public education in the Hellenistic Greek world, see Marrou (1956) 112–3, Morgan (1998) 25–6.

developing society while discarding those less pleasing. Hence I shall concentrate not on what was taught and in what settings, but on who did the teaching, who was being educated, and for what selective ends knowledge was used.² Roman education emerges not as the archaic throwback perceived by Polybius (and later, Marrou), but as a hybrid of Roman institutional myths and Greek pedagogical systems. I close by speculating on how this hybrid form served to create and validate those characteristics that constituted a proper Roman male of the urban elite.

Basis of Roman Education

The deficiencies Polybius identifies were real and were felt beyond the sphere of pedagogy.³ Lack of state support also accounts for the absence of public libraries until 38 BC, with the result that even men of learning such as Cicero needed to rely on friends and a cadre of personal copyists for texts; the situation for the less prominent must have been proportionately more difficult.⁴ The majority of the plebs, for example, seems to have acquired its knowledge of historical events and political institutions not from formal instruction, but from attendance at public spectacles such as theater and oratory.⁵ But lack of a formal system of education at the level of the state does not mean the state does not control education. For education in Roman society—as perhaps in every society—serves not to democratize the population, but to replicate or re-produce the already existing social system.⁶ This form of social reproduction through pedagogy, moreover, does not simply entail the acculturation of citizens. For accompanying any acculturation that does occur is a lack of acknowledgment of how education replicates social structures, a lack of acknowledgment theorists have termed “mis-recognition.” Extant texts of the Republic, for example, place great stress on an individual’s *ingenium*, the inborn quality guaranteed by nature

² Bonner (1977) provides a thorough overview of the Roman curriculum and the settings of education.

³ The critique in Bonner (1977) 328 parallels that of Polybius to a remarkable degree; see too Pseudo-Apollonius *Ep.* 54.

⁴ First public library: Suet. *Jul.* 44; Marshall (1976) 253–4.

⁵ Horsfall (1996).

⁶ Bourdieu and Passeron (1990).

which, when combined with training, can create the perfect citizen.⁷ Perhaps the modern notion of a “gifted” student conveys best the idea of a promising *ingenium*, provided that “gifted” is understood in its fullest, most literal sense. It should come as no surprise that it is most often the elite who receive the “gift” of an able *ingenium*.⁸ The importance of an individual’s *ingenium* in providing insight into a person’s potential offers a particularly clear example of how the Roman system “tends to transform social privileges into natural privileges and not privileges of birth.”⁹ Yet this conception of *ingenium* is occasionally contested in passages where it is claimed that *ingenium* can in fact be trained, and is not merely the gift of nature and province of the elite.¹⁰ Such passages constitute rare examples of mis-recognition recognized. In the following pages, I shall be concerned here particularly with the influence of Greek models on the development of education in the Roman Republic and how the absorption of these models helped affirm the inevitability of natural privilege. The limited access to learning that the Greek Polybius critiqued coexists in apparent contradiction with the willful absorption of other elements of Hellenic education into the Roman model. What prompts Scipio to suspect a uniform and clearly articulated educational system? What are he and his fellow Romans actively mis-recognizing?

Convivial Education

Greek influence on education can be traced back to archaic Rome. Cato, Varro, and Cicero nostalgically recall heroic poetry sung at banquets, “songs sung by individual diners about the praises of famous men.”¹¹ The tradition has debatable historical value; analogies with

⁷ E.g., Cic. *Lig.* 10: *homo cum ingenio tum etiam doctrina excellens*; *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* 7:1.1527.27–78 (J. B. Hofmann).

⁸ I use the term “elite” throughout as a convenient, if not entirely satisfactory, shorthand for the political and cultural elite of the Republic, whose membership can for our purposes be viewed as predominately identical; for the difficult question of whether Rome was dominated by a “governing class” or “aristocracy” or “elite,” see the recent remarks of Millar (1998) 4–7.

⁹ Bourdieu and Saint-Martin (1974) 346 (original emphases); see further Harker (1990) 92–6 and, for Greece and Rome, Morgan (1998) 240–70.

¹⁰ Cic. *De orat.* 2.262, with discussion in Corbeil (1996) 37–9; see too Cic. *Quinct.* 12.

¹¹ Cic. *Brut.* 75: *atque utinam exstarent illa carmina, quae multis saeculis ante suam aetatem in epulis esse cantitata a singulis convivis de clarorum virorum laudibus in Originibus scriptum*

earlier Greek discussions of banqueting customs cast doubt on the sources of the few Roman accounts that we do possess.¹² Nevertheless, recent archaeological discoveries have begun to offer new perspectives on this textual evidence, indicating that banqueting practice represents the Romanization of a Hellenic sympotic tradition.¹³ This new assessment has prompted scholars to consider afresh how these songs may have influenced the Roman historiographic and mythographic traditions. Unfortunately, none of these songs survives, and our sources do not elaborate on their complexity; described as songs of praise, they likely offered limited accounts of the virtuous deeds of Roman ancestors.¹⁴ Yet regardless of their content or complexity, these songs do provide evidence for the moral training of youths; a lament for the loss of such instruction is what prompts Cicero to mention them in his *Brutus*. The symposium of the Mediterranean world is indeed commonly recognized as a site where elite values and stories were propagated—the site for communal gathering becomes the natural site for promoting collective values. Furthermore, as Zorzetti has pointed out, “*sapientia* contains in its etymology a clear reference to its social matrix;” the banquet provides the appropriate venue for acquiring “taste.”¹⁵ In the first century AD Valerius Maximus envisions the songs as a means for the young to emulate the older singers, thereby allowing the community’s values to be reproduced for another generation.¹⁶ This form of socialization will continue as an important element in the educational process. Quintilian seems to allude to the practice in his treatise on oratorical training: proper delivery, or *actio*, he asserts, is impossible without a knowledge of music (1.10.26). His need to clarify the point is telling: he refers not to the corrupting music of popular culture, but to the context “in

reliquit Cato!; Cic. *Tusc.* 4.3; Varro *fig. Apud Non.* pp. 76–7M. Momigliano (1957) offers the most convenient exposition of the ancient evidence and scholarly opinions.

¹² Horsfall (1994) 70–5, following Dahmann (1950).

¹³ Zorzetti (1990) and Zorzetti (1991) 322–3; Wille (1967) 140–2 and Wille (1989) places these banquets in the context of music in archaic Rome. Rathje (1990) offers a concise survey of the archeological evidence.

¹⁴ Niebuhr’s theory that the songs were richly detailed ballads has been discredited; see Momigliano (1957). Cole (1991) 379 aptly compares the songs to Greek *skolia*; see too Wiseman (1994) 30–2.

¹⁵ Zorzetti (1990) 301.

¹⁶ Val. Max. 2.1.10: *maiores natu in conviviis ad tibias egregia superiorum opera carmine comprehensa ꝑ pangebant, quo ad ea imitanda iuventutem alacriorem redderent. quid hoc splendidius, quid etiam utilius certamine? pubertas canis suum decus reddebat, defuncta [viri] cursu aetas ingredientes actuosam vitam fervoris nutrimentis prosequabatur.*

which praises for the brave were once sung and in which the brave themselves sang.”¹⁷

Ironically, in light of their Hellenic antecedents, it seems likely that the Roman *carmina* were rendered obsolete by the influx of Greek literary influences in the late third and early second centuries and by the attendant creation of a literary tradition written in Latin. Such an inference begins from consideration of a well-known fragment of Cato: “The art of poetry (*poeticae artis*) was not held in honor. If anyone was zealous in this or attached himself to banquets, he was called a highway robber (*grassator*).”¹⁸ The transition in Cato’s remarks from the Greek loan word *poetica* to the abusive Latin of *grassator* suggests the antagonistic Roman reception of a borrowed poetic craft. These zealous poets, deprived of Roman privileges (*honos*), are depicted as thieves who wander the roads.¹⁹ Their thievery resides in their activity, demeaning for a wealthy Roman, of receiving pay for services, services that seem to have included compositions flattering the achievement of elite contemporaries.²⁰ Cato’s words, then, make best sense in the context of a dichotomy between traditional banquet songs and itinerant Greeks, who made a profession of their “poetic art” by charging a fee to perform songs at the banquet. As a result of such professionalism, the convivial songs of ancestral praise, produced from motives neither of art nor financial gain, fell into disuse. Further support for the claims that these disdainful remarks on certain types of poetry mark for Cato a change in traditional Roman practice can be found in the earlier part of this same fragment: “It was customary to clothe oneself with dignity in the forum, with moderation at home. Horses used to cost more than cooks.” The context shows Cato pointing up a distinction between private and public appearance. In the past, simplicity was stressed in the home—unelaborate

¹⁷ Quint. *Inst.* 1.10.31: <music> qua laudes fortium canebantur quaque ipsi fortes canebant; on the contrast between corrupting and salutary influences in music, see Wille (1967) 455–6, Horsfall (1996) 9–12.

¹⁸ Cato *Mor. frag.* 2 (= Gel. 11.2.5): *vestiri in foro honeste mos erat, domi quod satis erat. equos carius quam coquos emebant. poeticae artis honos non erat. si quis in ea re studebat aut sese ad convivia adplicabat, grassator vocabatur.* For the interpretation offered in the text, see Zorzetti (1991) 321–2, followed by Habinek (1998) 38; cf. Cole (1991) 380. Gruen (1992) 71–2 offers a different reading of Cato’s remarks.

¹⁹ For this root meaning of *grassator* (from *gradior*), see *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* 6:2.2198.45–84 (*de iis qui praedandi causa vagantur*, G. Burckhardt).

²⁰ Préaux (1966) 712–3; on connotations of flattery, see Paul. *Fest.* p. 97M: ‘*grasari*.’ antiqui ponebant pro adulari. Zorzetti (1991) provides a broader cultural context for the activities of these poets.

clothing and food—, whereas expense was more properly used to embellish a public appearance in the forum, with appropriate dress and horse. The change Cato sees in the professionalization of banquet song mirrors his concern regarding the recent emphasis placed on personal versus civic display. This nostalgia for the symposium tradition is further informed by the songs' presumed content. Although our sources know them only as songs of praise, examples of oral transmission in other cultures demonstrate that, in praising virtue, the songs would present "a blueprint of the political system, not as it is, but as it should be."²¹ This formulation also provides an accurate description of Roman educational structures. Just as the tradition of banquet songs depends on misrecognition to achieve what "should be"—in other words, just as a forum for propagating Roman aristocratic values arises by absorbing non-Roman sympotic practice, only to reject any subsequent Greek influence—, so too does nearly every other aspect of Roman education succeed by exploiting, and then concealing, its Greek model.

The Roman Curriculum

Roman education was citizen training. In adapting the Greek system, the Romans exclude numerous elements in the process of adoption and do not hesitate to justify those choices. For example, Cicero argues that Rome's inferiority to Greece in literature, art, and music should be attributed not to inferior talent, but to Roman unwillingness to support such endeavors unduly.²² He provides as an example geometry which, he maintains, was to be studied not as an abstract science, but only for its utility in measurement and calculation. In fact, those skills attendant upon mathematical training for which the Romans are best remembered, such as engineering and architecture, were not formally taught in this period. Instead the knowledge necessary was passed on within the trades by direct example or through manuals.²³ To study the arts of music, dance, and

²¹ Vansina (1985) 120, as quoted in Ungern-Sternberg (1988) 247.

²² Cic. *Tusc.* 1.4–5. For Roman neglect of mathematics—which would include geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music—, see Rawson (1985) 156–69.

²³ Horsfall (1991) 62–4; Horsfall (1996) 35–6 and n. 258; the theoretical study of mathematics, however, remained in Greek: Clarke (1971) 48–9.

gymnastics was also discouraged among the elite; in this case numerous sources from the period testify that such activities can lead only to moral corruption.²⁴ In these contexts, not surprisingly, it is the Greek element that receives repeated emphasis. With the arts and sciences discarded, words alone remain to train the citizen: "instead," Cicero tells us, "we quickly embraced the orator."²⁵ It is within the context of oratorical study that attitudes toward Hellenic precedents begin to be modified. Mathematics, astronomy, and music, it is admitted, can be used to sharpen and train the intellect of children.²⁶ In fact, Cicero regards their study as a way of sharpening inborn *ingenium*. Greek training complements natural gifts.²⁷ And indeed in the Late Republic any advanced theoretical study of these specialties was only available in the Greek language, thereby restricting access to those children possessing a knowledge of literary and philosophical Greek. In a public context, Cicero points up respective differences in the aims of Greek and Roman education: sure the Greeks are witty, learned in many arts, and producers of great literature, but they cannot be trusted.²⁸ Although the delineation is clearly exaggerated, the dichotomy of the pragmatic and honest Roman versus the sophistic Greek shares features with numerous other analyses and anecdotes from the Republican era.²⁹ Roman learning, these accounts imply, is subjugated to the quest for practical truths. But as I noted in the case of Rome's banqueting traditions, this implication rests on a misrecognition of historical influences. In the choice of curriculum, the very subjects publicly ridiculed as useless or even morally corrupt are appropriated by the elite in the training of children. The ambivalence continues as one moves from curriculum to classroom, where the converse occurs. As teachers, Greeks, both enslaved and free, dominate. The expansion of Roman culture relies on a culture rejected.

²⁴ Marquardt (1886) 117–9 offers a concise list of the relevant ancient sources. Wille (1967) 406–93 surveys the role of music in Roman education.

²⁵ Cic. *Tusc.* 1.5: *at contra oratorem celeriter complexi sumus*.

²⁶ Cic. *de Orat.* 3.58 (cf. *Fin.* 1.72); a century later Quint. *Inst.* 1.10.34 cites this as a common belief (*vulgaris opinio*).

²⁷ Cic. *Rep.* 1.30.

²⁸ Cic. *Flacc.* 9: *verum tamen hoc dico de toto genere Graecorum: tribuo illis litteras, do multarum artium disciplinam, non adimo sermonis leporem, ingeniorum acumen, dicendi copiam, denique etiam, si qua sibi alia sumunt, non repugno; testimoniorum religionem et fidem numquam ista natio coluit, totiusque huiusce rei quae sit vis, quae auctoritas, quod pondus, ignorant*. See too Cicero's advice to his brother on governing a province in the East (*Qfr.* 1.1.16).

²⁹ Gruen (1984) 1.260–6.

Greek Teachers in Rome

Teacher, rhetorician, geometer, painter, trainer,
 Augur, rope-dancer, doctor, magician—they do it all,
 Those hungry little Greeks.
 —Juvenal, 3.76–8

The elder Seneca believed that before the age of Augustus all teachers of rhetoric were freedmen: “by a custom hardly to be approved, it was shameful to teach what it was honorable to learn.”³⁰ The paradox that supplies Seneca with his neat epigram would not have been so apparent to a citizen of the Late Republic. The predicament of rhetorical education is easily paralleled: just as the third century BC witnessed Rome’s first extensive contact with Greek art and literature via enslaved intellectuals, so too did the same conquests introduce the Romans to formal education.³¹ Extant evidence largely confirms Seneca’s impression. Those teachers before the empire for whom we have significant testimony were in the majority freedmen, who often had decided on teaching after failing in previous pursuits.³² Exceptions to this tendency would probably not have affected Seneca’s assessment, as these consist primarily of disreputable or unfortunate freeborn citizens—citizens, in other words, admirably suited for a “shameful” (*turpe*) occupation.³³ The public sentiment resulting from these associations informs Cicero’s well-known censure of those arts that “require some learning and contain not a little bit of usefulness, such as medicine, architecture, and the teaching of honorable subjects; these pursuits are honorable to those of the appropriate class.”³⁴ Certainly this declaration is prompted by historical contingencies—medicine, architecture, and education need not be intrinsically inferior pursuits—, but Cicero’s dogmatic

³⁰ Sen. *Con. 2 praef. 5*: *ante illum <sc. Rubellium Blandum> intra libertinos praeceptores pulcherrimae disciplinae continebantur, et minime probabili more turpe erat docere quod honestum erat discere.*

³¹ Gruen (1984) 1.250–72 provides a useful survey of Roman contact with Greek culture in the third to second centuries BC.

³² Treggiari (1969) 113–25, to which account Christes (1979), esp. 192–201, offers important correctives.

³³ Bonner (1977) 58–9; see however Kaster (1995) 123, who notes that Suetonius, our principal source for Roman *grammatici* and *rhetores*, “specified status only when the man had been, or was thought to have been, a slave.”

³⁴ Cic. *Off. 1.151*: *quibus autem artibus aut prudentia maior inest aut non mediocris utilitas quaeritur, ut medicina, ut architectura, ut doctrina rerum honestarum, eae sunt iis, quorum ordini conveniunt, honestae*; see too Cic. *Orat. 144*; Treggiari (1969) 129–38; Dyck (1996) 336.

tone indicates that the situation was not to be questioned. Factors in Rome assisted in perpetuating the historical accident to which he attests. A summary of the situation of those engaged in education will help explain their odd social status.

According to tradition, both Roman parents took responsibility for instructing their children in the rudiments of mathematics and in Latin reading, or at a later time had used private tutors when the parents were unable to participate directly in instruction.³⁵ This tutorial form of elementary education became accessible to a fee-paying public for the first time probably in the mid-third century.³⁶ Concurrent with the availability of this instruction—that is, with the arrival of Greek-speaking non-citizens to Rome—the wealthiest Romans began to supplement the education of their own children through native Greek speakers, originally slaves and later freedmen, as nurses and pedagogues to teach the fundamentals of the Greek language.³⁷ There seems to have been little resistance among the elite to this move toward bilingual education—even Cato, associated with traditional father-son upbringing, retained at home a Greek tutor for his son.³⁸

At least as early as the 160s BC, Greek-speaking tutors also privately offered instruction on Greek literature.³⁹ The masters of this intermediate stage of education, between basic language proficiency and the later teaching of rhetoric, were designated by the Greek term *grammatici*. The evidence for publicly available education at the level of the *grammaticus*, either Greek or Latin, is uncertain. Suetonius tells us that Sevius Nicanor was the first “famous teacher” at this level. It seems that around 100 BC Nicanor took up business as a Latin instructor publicly available for a fee.⁴⁰ Suetonius also implies a boom of twenty schools opening in Rome some time during the first century, but his chronology is unclear; even if one were to accept that each of these schools existed simultaneously, the number of

³⁵ Parents as educators: Plut. *Cat. Ma.* 20; Plut. *Aem.* 6.9; Nep. *Att.* 1.2; Suet. *Aug.* 64.3 (for Gaius and Lucius); Tac. *Dial.* 28. Tutors in the home: Bonner (1977) 20–33.

³⁶ Bonner (1977) 34–5 assesses the available evidence. His claim that these schools “had to cater for the ordinary working population” (165) is not substantiated.

³⁷ Bonner (1977) 20–33.

³⁸ Plut. *Cat. Ma.* 20; Gruen (1984) 1.257.

³⁹ Polyb. 31.24.6–7; Suet. *Gram.* 1.2; Plut. *Aem.* 6.9. Cicero views this decade as introducing a new stage in rhetorical education: see Schmidt (1975) 183–4.

⁴⁰ Suet. *Gram.* 5 (*primus ad famam dignationemque docendo pervenit*), with Kaster (1995) 107–9. Nicanor is otherwise unknown.

students being educated beyond basic literacy and numeracy would remain very small.⁴¹ The school curriculum for this period covered the study of poetic texts in both Latin and Greek and classes seem to have included, not uncommonly, girls alongside boys.⁴² And yet in terms of social and economic class these schools must have been of limited use to any but the most wealthy of the Romans: no systematic teaching of the Greek language existed to prepare students for the study of its literature, so students would need to have been taught at a younger age by personal nurses and pedagogues.⁴³ As a result, children of members of the non-elite are doubly disadvantaged: at home they lack the atmosphere for assimilating the Greek elements of Roman culture, while in public the attitudes toward acquiring these elements is ambiguous, even openly hostile. The difficulties modern scholars have faced in attempting to determine precisely what the attitudes were toward the Greeks during this period surely is a function of contemporary debates and uncertainties.

We are better informed about private *grammatici*: of the thirty-nine *grammatici* and *rhetores* of our period known from literary sources, thirty seem likely to have been slaves or freedmen of the highest elite, and epigraphic evidence yields similar conclusions.⁴⁴ The best tutors were, not surprisingly, difficult to come by and, once acquired, they seem to have been guarded jealously. Little evidence is available for tutors being shared outside of a family, and the fact that *grammatici* come to be associated with particular masters among the elite indicates that their ownership was a mark of status.⁴⁵ Similarly, there is no indication that slaves were permitted by their masters to open schools and, even after obtaining freedom, former slaves remained under strong obligations—sometimes, but not always, on a legal basis—to their patrons or former owners.⁴⁶ The correspondence of Cicero provides insight into Roman attitudes toward slaves or freedmen with a reputation for effective teaching. Cicero expresses con-

⁴¹ Suet. *Gram.* 3.4, with Kaster (1995) 80–2.

⁴² Teaching of Greek: Hor. *Ep.* 2.2.41–2 (simply a reference to the wrath of Achilles); of Latin: Hor. *Ep.* 2.1.69–71; instructors in both languages: Kaster (1995) 309; girls at schools: Marquardt (1886) 110 n. 8; Bonner (1977) 135–6, with remarks of Booth (1978) 167.

⁴³ Kaimio (1979) 195–6. Nurses and pedagogues: Quint. *Inst.* 1.1.4–5, 11–2; Tac. *Dial.* 29; Marquardt (1886) 112–3.

⁴⁴ Christes (1979) 179–80.

⁴⁵ Bonner (1977) 21–2.

⁴⁶ Christes (1979) 181–3; 184–92.

siderable concern over how to retain Atticus' freedman Dionysius as the tutor of his young son Marcus; the frequent shifts in moods and concern reflected in Cicero's letters over the course of a five-year period demonstrate the value in retaining a good teacher.⁴⁷ Further competition among the elite for prized teachers is manifested in the high prices paid for their services.⁴⁸ Greek learning was a commodity recognized as a mark of status.

The study of rhetoric marked the final stage of formal education. Training in the art of public speaking would originally have been undertaken by Greek tutors in the home, teaching from the Greek rhetorical tradition, then followed by apprenticeship in the courts to an experienced Roman orator. Greek oratory and rhetoric quickly gained popularity in Rome. In 155 BC crowds of Romans went to the forum to listen to the Greek philosopher and rhetorician Carneades declaiming in his own language. The level of Greek must have been high to follow Carneades' arguments.⁴⁹ And yet schools offering rhetorical practice in either Greek or Latin were probably not available until the first decade of the first century BC.⁵⁰ Carneades' Roman audience would have comprised those with the means of being privately trained in the home. During the remainder of the second century, then, facility in the Greek language would have included only those wealthy enough to afford learned slaves.

The conditions restricting the available pool of fully-trained orators are further exacerbated by the public resistance to Latin as a medium of rhetorical training. The teachers of rhetoric whose careers are narrated by Suetonius in his treatise *On Teachers of Grammar and Rhetoric* all carried on instruction primarily in the Latin language.⁵¹ An analysis of the source material for this work reveals a sentiment largely inimical to such teachers. Negative anecdotes distinguish the surviving biographies of *rhetores*: before teaching, Otacilius Pitholaus was a doorman bound in chains; bad taste characterizes Sextus Clodius, who publicly mocked a physical peculiarity of Marcus

⁴⁷ Bonner (1977) 30–1.

⁴⁸ Suet. *Gram.* 3.5.

⁴⁹ Gruen (1984) 1.257–8.

⁵⁰ Schmidt (1975) 192–4 argues strongly against the existence of either Greek or Latin schools of rhetoric before 93. The previous schools (*ludi*) referred to in the consular edict of 92 are, by this account, schools of *grammatici*, not implied Greek schools of rhetoric—Kaster (1995) 274. See too Bonner (1977) 65–6 and Gruen (1990) 171–4 on the *senatus consultum* of 161.

⁵¹ Rawson (1985) 78–9; Kaster (1995) 51, 309.

Antonius' wife Fulvia.⁵² The negative sentiment that preserved these stories received concrete form in an edict of 92 that is preserved in the same work of Suetonius. In this edict the censors Lucius Licinius Crassus and Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus register their disapproval over a new type of teaching technique practiced by a group who call themselves the "Latin rhetors." This edict has received much scholarly attention, largely over whether or what kind of political motivations lay behind the decree.⁵³ The emerging scholarly consensus finds the impetus for the edict in cultural, not factional, politics: the edict originates in a struggle between a Grecizing dominant class and a popular group that views Latin rhetoric as providing swifter access to social advancement.⁵⁴ Two aspects concerning the edict have direct bearing on the nature of Republican education. First, this school makes training in the practical aspects of rhetoric accessible to Latin speakers. Quintilian, using Cicero as his authority, relates that the "Latin teachers of speech" used practice material designed to imitate real legal and deliberative issues.⁵⁵ Such pragmatic training in their native language would enable emerging members of the non-elite to receive widespread recognition through public speaking.⁵⁶ Previously, complete rhetorical training could be gained only through private tutors and through apprenticeship in the courts (*tirocinium fori*), which demanded a presumably significant financial outlay as well as preexisting elite connections.⁵⁷ Second, since the Latin rhetors for whom we have information were marked by their independent natures, they were not, as one would typically

⁵² Kaster (1995) xlv–xlviii, esp. n. 37.

⁵³ Principal ancient sources, in decreasing order of importance, are Suet. *Rhet.* 25.2 and 26.1, Cic. *De orat.* 3.24.93–4, Gel. 15.11.2, Tac. *Dial.* 35.1. To the scholarly bibliography in Gruen (1990) 179–91 add Narducci (1989), Pennacini (1989), and Kaster (1995) 273–5, 292–4.

⁵⁴ Manfredini (1976) esp. 141–8 sees pedagogical motivations behind the edict; Gruen (1990) 186–7 offers persuasive objections to this view.

⁵⁵ Quint. *Inst.* 2.4.41–2: *nam fictas ad imitationem fori consiliorumque materias apud Graecos dicere circa Demetrium Phalerea institutum fere constat. . . . Latinos vero dicendi praeceptores extremis L. Crassi temporibus coepisse Cicero auctor est: quorum insignis maxime Plotius fuit.* No extant text of Cicero states precisely what Quintilian claims here (the closest possibility is *De orat.* 3.43); perhaps this occurs in the lost letter to Titinius that Suetonius cites at *Rhet.* 26.

⁵⁶ David (1979), David (1980) esp. 187–91; Schmidt (1975) 209–16; Kaimio (1979) 197–8.

⁵⁷ Schmidt (1975) 193, 195; Narducci (1989) 548. On *tirocinium fori*, Bonner (1977) 84–5; *RE* 6A, 1450–3 (J. Regner); Gel. 1.23.4 claims that before the time of Cato it was common for senators to bring sons into the Curia.

expect of freedmen, under the potential influence of their elite former owners.⁵⁸ Both these aspects of the Latin rhetors contribute to explaining the censorial pronouncement.

The edict, if successful at all, appears to have been limited in its power to affect public access to rhetorical education in Latin, since Latin treatises like Cicero's *On Rhetorical Invention* (and perhaps the anonymous *Rhetorica ad herennium*) were produced in the decade following its promulgation.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, the edict may have had less direct influence. As late as the end of the Republic, when Cicero sends his son Marcus to the East for the final step in his education, the best rhetorical training was still considered to be found in Greece.⁶⁰ Rhetorical training in Italy had not yet achieved prominence. In addition, sentiment regarding the deficiencies of these Latin teachers remained prevalent long after 92. Cicero chose to repeat the incident through Crassus, his principal interlocutor in the treatise *On the Orator* (completed in 55 BC), and the precise wording of the edict survived up to the time of Suetonius in the second century AD. Yet the paradox remains: the censors, the overseers of traditional Roman *mores*, chose to voice disapproval of Latin practice in favor of a Greek rhetorical tradition. Our discussion of other aspects of Republican education has, however, prepared us to accept this paradox. I opened this chapter with Cicero depicting Scipio Aemilianus proudly asserting in 129 BC the lack of uniform education in Rome. This lack was not soon to be made up.

In the period subsequent to Scipio the only clear example of affordable mass schooling for the non-elite in Rome is that provided by Staberius Eros during the period of Sulla.⁶¹ This exception provides a rigorous test to the rule: Staberius' most well-known students were Brutus and Cassius, and he accepted without pay students whose fathers were victims of Sulla's proscriptions. Even if this latter anecdote is not true—and Suetonius shows skepticism with his introductory "there are those who say" (*sunt qui tradant*)—, its mere existence is telling. The one example of an instructor violating the precept so beloved of Scipio Aemilianus is also our sole example of a teacher

⁵⁸ Rawson (1985) 78–9.

⁵⁹ Fantham (1996) 30; further discussion in Schmidt (1975) 211–3, Gruen (1990) 191; note however Rawson (1985) 78: "Suetonius' list of 'famous professors of rhetoric' in Latin is very short, and he claims it could not be made longer."

⁶⁰ Cic. *Brut.* 332, Treggiari (1969) 117–8; Rawson (1985) 10–2.

⁶¹ Suet. *Gram.* 13 and Kaster (1995) 169–70.

adopting an implicitly political stance.⁶² Staberius' actions become suggestive for the profession as a whole. The mechanisms of the Republic prevented Greeks from exercising any power as educators, since they were either slaves or recently freed and so under the influence of a patron. A similar lack of influence affected the free-born citizen: if part of the non-elite, the possibility of teaching in Latin was discouraged at the level of the Roman censor; if elite, the attendant social status discouraged participation in educating anyone outside of family and friends. It is not surprising, then, that Suetonius portrays the teachers of the Republic as a class that has freed itself from servitude, placed value on individual achievement, and as a result has questioned the social cohesion of the state.⁶³ Latin education threatens elite society.

These observations return us to our sociological model. The conquered Greeks flowing into Rome are used to further education, that is, to continue the reproduction of the upper classes. Their relegated social status, however, ensures that they cannot translate this potential into political power—that is, they are prevented from adversely affecting the maintenance of the elite. The Romans having access to these valued slaves and freedmen profit from the intellectual achievements of Greece, whereas the best these Greeks can hope for is a successful career as an instructor and, if they obtain freedman status, a good relation with their elite patron.⁶⁴ Mastery of things Greek becomes part of being Roman—but only for certain Romans.⁶⁵

One particular example demonstrates how Roman culture absorbs Greek learning as its dangerous but necessary supplement. Cicero's speech on behalf of Archias posed a tricky problem: how may one justify giving Roman citizenship to a Greek intellectual and poet? The rhetorical solution parallels the ways in which the Greeks con-

⁶² Kaster (1995) 169–70. For the scanty evidence concerning the availability of schooling outside Rome during the Republic, see Suet. *Gram.* 3.5–6; Rawson (1985) 34–7; Kaster (1995) 84–6, 132. Bonner (1977) 149–54 evaluates the available evidence for wages.

⁶³ Kaster (1995) xlv–xlv.

⁶⁴ Christes (1979) 179–201, esp. 198–201.

⁶⁵ Cic. *Tusc.* 1.1; Bonner (1977) 76; Habinek (1998) 64–5. Habinek's conclusion about the Greek character of the earliest Latin literature applies also in the associated case of education: "by importing outsiders, the aristocrats who fostered the development of Musaïc [i.e., Hellenic] culture effectively guaranteed that it would be their unique possession" (68). For similar remarks on Roman culture more generally see Habinek (1994) esp. 60.

tribute to Roman education: through poetry Archias extends the virtues of Roman conquest throughout the Greek world (*Arch.* 20–2). Hence poetry becomes a trait valuable for the toga-wearing race: “in the city of Rome, where conquerors, recently under arms, have honored the glory of poets and shrines to the Muses, in this place judges, wearing togas, ought not shrink from honoring the Muses and supporting poets.”⁶⁶ By calling attention to the oxymoron of togate Romans honoring the Greek *Musae*, Cicero stresses their co-existence. Greek culture has become more than merely an addition to the Roman world. It now functions as part of a tradition that supports Roman military and civic virtue.

The Twelve Tables and Roman Education

Seemingly contradictory attitudes also surround the status of legal training in Roman society. No formal instruction in the law existed during the Republic. Evidence indicates that a student obtained the requisite knowledge by personal observation of distinguished practitioners, both at their homes and in the forum.⁶⁷ Once again training is reserved for those with the leisure time and connections to allow this type of instruction. The Twelve Tables, the basic law-code that Roman tradition dated to the mid-fifth century BC, formed the basis for this legal education. Cicero tells us that memorization of these laws was standard procedure among young boys, but that the practice had recently fallen into disuse.⁶⁸ Cicero presumably laments this neglect, for passages of his work *On the Orator* make it clear that he believes a public speaker must have thorough knowledge of the law.⁶⁹ Other texts and anecdotes further illustrate the centrality of law to Roman political life, so that one recent study of the Republic can characterize the subject as “the intellectual activity most common among, and held in the highest respect by, the Roman upper class (and probably by a good many lower down the social scale too).”⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Cic. *Arch.* 27: *in qua urbe imperatores prope armati poetarum nomen et Musarum delubra coluerunt, in ea non debent togati iudices a Musarum honore et a poetarum salute abhorrere.*

⁶⁷ Cic. *Orat.* 142, *Brut.* 306; Marrou (1956) 290; see further Rawson (1985) 211–2.

⁶⁸ Cic. *Leg.* 2.59: *discebamus enim pueri duodecim ut carmen necessarium; quas iam nemo discit.*

⁶⁹ E.g., Cic. *de Orat.* 1.159: *perdiscendum ius civile, cognoscendae leges*; 1.175. See further Quint. *Inst.* 12.3.1; Bonner (1977) 88–9.

⁷⁰ Rawson (1985) 200.

Yet despite this centrality, tradition finds inspiration for the Twelve Tables not in venerable Roman custom but in an embassy to Greece to examine the legislation of the Athenian Solon. Since the relative chronologies for such a visit do not harmonize, modern scholars debate whether Greek influence on the Twelve Tables consists of anything more than a few isolated verbal borrowings.⁷¹ The questionable historicity of Greek antecedents makes the Roman tradition all the more interesting. Law was one intellectual pursuit during the Republic that could claim virtual immunity from Greek superiority—all the practitioners we know of were elite Romans.⁷² Why then might the fiction of Greek influence on Roman law code have been invented? One plausible argument dates the creation of the legend of Greek origins to the first quarter of the second century, that is to the same period when Greeks are beginning to influence dramatically the course of Roman education and Latin literature.⁷³ Over time, however, the nature of Greek influence becomes modified in a paradoxical and yet—as we can now see—typical fashion. The Greeks come to be perceived as being appropriated into a better Roman culture. In his treatise *On the Orator*, Cicero, who elsewhere acknowledges Rome's debt to the Solonic code (*Leg.* 2.59), has his interlocutor Crassus remark on how the first duty of the citizen of Rome is to study its spirit, customs, and constitution “either because our fatherland is the parent of us all or because we must consider there to have been as much wisdom involved in framing our laws as in establishing the great resources of our empire.”⁷⁴ Rome's legal and military accomplishments are given equal weight. And if you need proof of the greatness of Roman law, Crassus continues, simply “compare our laws to those of Lycurgus, Draco, and . . . Solon.”⁷⁵ Just as Roman military might can be portrayed as using the Greek poet Archias as its encomiast, so too does the Roman law code, when put in the broader context of Roman civilization, easily outstrip its Hellenic source of inspiration.

⁷¹ Ogilvie (1970) 449–50 concisely summarizes, with bibliography, this hotly contested issue. Among more recent discussions, Toher (1986) 301–10 argues strongly for Greek influence; cf. Watson (1975) 179 n. 15.

⁷² Rawson (1985) 200–13.

⁷³ Ducos (1978) 22–4, who also surveys alternative dates.

⁷⁴ Cic. *de Orat.* 1.196: *primum nobis mens, mos, disciplina nota esse debet, vel quia est patria parens omnium nostrum vel quia tanta sapientia fuisse in iure constituendo putanda est, quanta fuit in his tantis opibus imperi comparandis.*

⁷⁵ Cic. *de Orat.* 1.197: *quantum praestiterint nostri maiores prudentia ceteris gentibus, tum facillime intellegitis, si cum illorum Lycurgo et Dracone et Solone nostras leges conferre volueritis.*

Physical Education

Scipio's strictures regarding restricted access to education extends to the training of the body. In significant contrast with common Greek practice, the Romans of the Republic neglected to provide youths with an organized system of physical education. Yet an analysis of contemporary attitudes reveals a familiar willingness to borrow selectively from Greek institutions, while at the same time camouflaging these borrowings in the guise of Roman tradition. The resulting misrecognition of the importance of exercise and sport to Roman society continues to inform modern accounts of Roman education. Consider, for example, Marrou's encapsulation of the topic: "If physical exercise came into the life of Rome at all it was as a matter of hygiene, ancillary to the use of steam baths."⁷⁶ It is possible to refine this statement.

A convenient start can be made from word origins. The commonest Latin word used for places of instruction presented a challenge to ancient grammarians: why did *ludus* denote both "school" and "playtime?" They reasoned that this phenomenon provides an instance of etymology from opposites: "the word for 'school' [is derived from] the fact that it is very far from 'play.'"⁷⁷ Recent studies reach a conclusion more in keeping with both common sense and Roman culture. *Ludus* appears originally to have described military training in imitation of actual battle, and from this notion of artificiality derives the sense of "playtime." From denoting martial exercise, the meaning easily expanded to cover all forms of instruction and then the place in which instruction occurs.⁷⁸ In accordance with this parallel development of *ludus* to cover both physical and intellectual training, the Romans recognized two principal provinces of instruction as potential paths to fame, depending upon whether a young man's skills lay in the use of the body or the mind.⁷⁹ From these alternatives Cicero recommends military affairs as the most convenient path by which a young Roman may acquire glory.⁸⁰ Just

⁷⁶ Marrou (1956) 249; Bonner (1977) also does not treat the subject in any detail. For general discussion, see Booth (1975); Eyben (1993) 81–7.

⁷⁷ Quint. *Inst.* 1.6.34: '*ludus*' quia sit longissime a *lusu*; Fest. p. 347M.

⁷⁸ Yon (1940); Bonner (1977) 56–7; Kaster (1995) 104–5. Despite apparent similarities, the Greek *scholē*, meaning both "leisure time" and "school," seems to have developed differently; see Yon (1940) 390.

⁷⁹ Cic. *Off.* 1.79–81; 2.45–6.

⁸⁰ Cic. *Off.* 2.45: *prima igitur est adulescenti commendatio ad gloriam, si qua ex bellicis*

as the *ludus* of letters and rhetoric leads to elite training in oratory and to the creation of verbal leaders, so too can physical training produce a brilliant military career.

Yet the physical accomplishments through which this glory is achieved had precise boundaries. In adopting Greek games, the Romans deemphasized competitive events that stressed individual achievement.⁸¹ Two complementary reasons explain this omission. First, in order to maintain balance among the elite, Roman aristocratic ideology demands that communal needs be considered more important than individual accomplishment.⁸² Second and more pessimistically, the resultant reluctance to highlight individual achievement prevents members of the non-dominant classes from achieving prominence through athletic prowess. Instead of individual athletic competition, spectator sports come to dominate in Rome.⁸³ As is well-known, practitioners of these sports usually have non-citizen status and exhibit lack of dignity by the very practice of their profession.⁸⁴ Only select forms of physical exercise were deemed proper, and these only to members of the elite. The rest of the populace was content to watch, like the cynical observer in Varro's satire: "You hunt for entertainment? It's a lot better to sit as a spectator in the circus with unscathed ankles than to run around cutting them up in the woods."⁸⁵

The Campus Martius outside the walls of Rome became the center of physical exercise for elite urban youths. Yet authors maintain a careful distinction between the activities that take place there and those associated with the more formal Greek ephebia. Scipio Aemilianus' fragmentary remarks in Cicero's *Republic* offer a clear explanation: the activities of Greek gymnasia and the ephebia encourage sexual relations between young men.⁸⁶ As in this same Scipio's

rebus comparari potest, on the importance of military success to the Roman aristocracy, see Harris (1979) 17–36.

⁸¹ Poliakoff (1987) 102–3; Sen. *Ep.* 88.18–9; so too Plut. *Mor.* 8D (*De liberis educandis* 11): "it is for the contests of war that boys must be practised, by exercising themselves in throwing the javelin, shooting with the bow, and in hunting."

⁸² Earl (1967) 11–43; Corbeill (1996) 3–6, 174–217.

⁸³ An apparent exception is the *ludi Romani*, the oldest games in Rome, but DH 7.73.3–4 identifies the athletic events held there as Greek in origin; Scullard (1981) 184–5. Liv. 39.22.2 records that the first athletic competitions were held at the *ludi Tauri* of 186, and occurred only once during the Republic.

⁸⁴ Ulp. *Dig.* 3.2.4. See Gardner (1993) 130–1; Edwards (1997) esp. 72, 75.

⁸⁵ Varro *Men.* 296: *sin autem delectationis causa venamini, quanto satius est salvis cruribus in circo spectare quam his descobinatis in silva cursare.*

⁸⁶ Cic. *Rep.* 4.4.

praise for the exclusive nature of Roman education, the attitude is not simply an isolated opinion. By the second century AD, Plutarch records it as a general consensus: the gymnasium and palaestra led the Greeks to slavery and effeminacy, since these venues seduced them into being "elegant and lovely gymnasts" rather than warriors and horsemen.⁸⁷ Yet the difference that the Romans perceived in their chosen forms of training does not simply depend on either a greater sensitivity to morality or a lessened sense of aesthetics. Other Roman accounts remark on how excessive attention to athletics detracts youth from more pragmatic pursuits.⁸⁸ In his speech *On behalf of Caelius*, Cicero concurs on the potentially corrupting influences of military training. The passage is interesting in that it charts out two separate career paths for the Roman youth, in either oratory and politics or the military: "in my day there used to be a year set aside for checking the arm in the toga [sc. to practice oratory] and, in tunics, for taking part in exercise and games on the Campus."⁸⁹ The context makes clear how this training differed from that found in the Greek ephebia. As with literary education and the subsequent oratorical apprenticeship, this pre-military training is not operated directly by the state, but depends upon fathers entrusting their sons to fellow members of the elite.⁹⁰

The exercises on the Campus Martius, therefore, were represented as assuming a practical and collective goal. The earliest traditions find Italian youths training for war in the fields outside the city: the future soldiers in Latinus' army rode horses and chariots, practiced archery and the javelin toss, ran races and boxed.⁹¹ Not accidentally did the seventy-year old Marius choose the Campus as the site to

⁸⁷ Plut. *Mor.* 274D (*Quaest. Rom.* 40).

⁸⁸ Cic. *Off.* 1.79; Sall. *Cat.* 8.5; cf. Sen. *Ep.* 15.1–8. Mähl (1974) 40–54 offers a full discussion.

⁸⁹ Cic. *Cael.* 11: *nobis quidem olim annus erat unus ad cohibendum brachium toga constitutus, et ut exercitatione ludoque campestri tunicati uteremur*. Marrou (1956) 299 appears to misconstrue this passage; Cicero is here contrasting the *one* year of training of his youth with the three years that Caelius had undergone. He does not imply that physical exercises on the Campus Martius "seem to have been given up in [his] time;" see Richardson and Richardson (1966) 253–4, who examine the meaning of *ad cohibendum brachium toga*.

⁹⁰ *RE* 6A, 1450 (J. Regner).

⁹¹ Verg. *Aen.* 7.162–5, youths before city of Latinus: *ante urbem pueri et primaevae flore iuventus/exercetur equis domitanique in pulvere currus,/aut acris tendunt arcus aut lenta lacertis/spicula contorquent cursuque ictuque lacessunt*. For the use of the *campus* in cities other than Rome during the Republic, see the studies of Devijver and van Wonterghem (1984) and (1985) and works there cited.

demonstrate his fitness for military command; in the presence of the Roman youth, we are told, he displayed his skill at riding in full armor.⁹² When the lovelorn Sybaris abandons exercise on the campus, Horace says he must leave his "soldierly friends."⁹³ The mention of horses commonly recurs in these descriptions. Again, their association with the military boasts a long heritage. The festival of the Equirria, associated with Romulus and dedicated to Mars at the beginning of the military season, featured equestrian contests, as did the *ludi Romani*, which closed the season of campaigning.⁹⁴ Horses also feature in the paramilitary maneuvers that are best known from Vergil's description of the equestrian exercises led by Aeneas' son Ascanius.⁹⁵ These military maneuvers, to which Suetonius ascribes a venerable age (*Aug.* 43.2: *prisci moris*), featured prominently in the dictatorships of Sulla and Julius Caesar.⁹⁶ It is unclear whether the exercises were practiced more regularly than our sources tell us—similar equestrian displays were certainly maintained in the Italian municipalities.⁹⁷ Either option, however, points up the importance of this military exercise: either the event was so important that it was continually practiced throughout Italy, or prominent individuals such as Sulla and Caesar recognized it as an appropriate way of asserting their military might within the context of Roman tradition.

One particular form of training was prized by the Romans: the hunt. In choosing the hunt as a form of exercise appropriate to the elite, a familiar pattern recurs: adopted Greek practice becomes Roman tradition. As with literary education, the Roman ideal depicted the father taking the initiative in teaching hunting and other physical exercise.⁹⁸ Plutarch tells us that in the early second century BC Aemilius Paullus provided his sons with teachers from Greece, and

⁹² Plut. *Mar.* 34.3–4.

⁹³ Hor. *Carm.* 1.8.5–6 (*militaris . . . aequalis*). See further Cic. *Fin.* 1.69, Hor. *Ars* 162 (with Brink ad loc.), Bonner (1977) 99. Strabo describes the *campus* in the 20s CE as a site for equestrian activities, wrestling, and playing with balls and hoops (5.3.8).

⁹⁴ Scullard (1981) 82, 184–5.

⁹⁵ Verg. *Aen.* 5.545–603.

⁹⁶ Sulla: Plut. *Cat. Min.* 3; Julius Caesar: Suet. *Jul.* 39. Weeber (1974), while conceding that the exercises predate Sulla, argues that the term normally used to describe them—*lusus Troiae*—likely does not. Veg. *Mil.* 1.13 attests to the military efficacy of such exercises.

⁹⁷ Taylor (1924) 165–7 argues for continuity in the training; cf. Ginestet (1991) 87–9, who sees the renewal under Sulla and Julius Caesar as isolated incidents.

⁹⁸ Val. Max. 2.7.6 (fifth century BC: Postumius trained son in weapons); Plut. *Cat. Ma.* 20.4 (javelin, combat, horse riding, boxing, swimming); Plin. *ep.* 8.14.5–6; Suet. *Aug.* 64.4 (swimming).

included in their number were instructors in the hunt.⁹⁹ A contemporary source informs us that one of these sons, Scipio Aemilianus, introduced the hunt to Italy from the East as a form of both physical exercise and moral training.¹⁰⁰ Through means conspicuous for being non-Roman, Polybius says, Scipio successfully gained the respect and recognition of his fellow citizens. However, the hunt as a means of instruction did not long remain the exclusive province of foreigners. Within a century, hunting has become identified as an honorable Roman sport, on a par with youthful activities on the Campus Martius, and is viewed as particularly suitable for military training.¹⁰¹ The hunt comes to carry such noble connotations that it even works to transform traditions that predate the foundation of the city. The Italians who faced Aeneas in battle enhanced their military abilities by means of the hunt, and Romulus' men, we learn, owed their success in war to the paired pursuits of hunting and farming.¹⁰² By the end of the Republic, Horace can describe Scipio's alien pursuit of the previous century as "a traditional feat for Roman men, useful for reputation, life, and limbs."¹⁰³

In the area of physical education, the Romans again consciously react to Greek practice. Eschewing athletic competition and gymnastic sport, they concentrate on physical exercise that will best serve military goals while at the same time reserving the best training for the children of the elite. In the 20s BC, as Augustus is attempting to "reinstate" Republican values, Horace laments how contemporary youths have deviated from earlier ideals. In so doing he succinctly describes the desired end of Republican training of the physique: "the freeborn boy, untrained, doesn't know how to cling to his horse and he fears the hunt. He's better at playing, either at the Greek hoop or in illegal dice-games."¹⁰⁴ The pattern is familiar: contemporary Greek practice threatens to corrupt Romanized Greek practice.

⁹⁹ Plut. *Aem.* 6.9; cf. Cic. *Rep.* 1.36.

¹⁰⁰ Polyb. 31.29, with Green (1996) 244–54; on Scipio's educational background see further Astin (1967) 15–6.

¹⁰¹ Cic. *Off.* 1.104; on the hunt as military training see, e.g., Cic. *N.D.* 2.161, Hor. *sat.* 2.2.9–11, Plin. *pan.* 81.1–2. For Sallust's apparent condemnation of hunting as an activity befitting slaves (*Cat.* 4.1), see Aymard (1951) 57–63; Syme (1964) 44.

¹⁰² Verg. *Aen.* 9.603–6; Col. 1 praef. 17. Green (1996) 226–35.

¹⁰³ Hor. *Ep.* 1.18.49–50: *Romanis sollemne viris opus, utile famae/vitaeque et membris.* Varro *Men.* 296, quoted above, further indicates that the hunt was considered the province of the elite.

¹⁰⁴ Hor. *Carm.* 3.24.54–8: *nescit equo rudis/haerere ingenuus puer/venarique timet, ludere doctior,/seu Graeco iubeas trocho,/seu malis vetita legibus alea.*

Conclusion

In each of the areas here surveyed—sympotic poetry, instruction in grammar and rhetoric, law, military training, the hunt—the Romans appropriate Greek custom to enrich their educational practice, creating in the process something uniquely, if somewhat paradoxically, Roman. Without having what one might strictly call an educational system, the Romans used educational circumstances to reproduce social hierarchies within their own society. The means employed are more effective than those produced by an openly restricted system of education since, unlike open exercise of political power, which “is always confronted with the problem of its own perpetuation (succession),” the political function of pedagogy is more easily disguised.¹⁰⁵ I certainly do not, however, wish to claim that the Romans ever pretended to offer an egalitarian system, one which was then manipulated. It is commonly recognized that in Roman society, preference is given not to personal development and individual improvement, but to training youth for the community of the elite through replication by example.¹⁰⁶ What is shared by each of the aspects of education I have covered is their ability to adapt in a tradition that constantly engages in creating itself. In the Roman context, reproduction of social structure succeeds by incorporating new, Greek, elements and then subsequently identifying these once foreign elements with Roman tradition.¹⁰⁷

The public voice of the orator Cicero demonstrates some of the ways in which the biases of education could be manipulated. Cicero offers a particularly suitable example since, although originally born in an Italian municipality, he became most skillful at absorbing all the apparent contradictions involved in what it means to be an elite Roman of the Late Republic. In 70 BC, at an early stage in his oratorical career, Cicero must prove himself the speaker most suited

¹⁰⁵ Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) 33.

¹⁰⁶ Maslakov (1984); cf. Harker (1990) 98 on the contrasting perceptions of the goal of education in France and in the English-speaking world.

¹⁰⁷ The resultant misrecognition of influence may explain the peculiar fact that Suetonius' account of the evolution of *grammatici* and *rhetoires* virtually ignores Greek contributions (see Kaster [1995] xlv). Compare Cicero's judgment of Gaius Titius, uttered seemingly without concern for the apparent paradox: “he achieved about as much as a Latin orator could without Greek learning and extensive experience” (*Brut.* 167: *eo pervenisse videtur quo potuit fere Latinus orator sine Graecis litteris et sine multo usu pervenire*).

to lead the prosecution against the corrupt administrator Gaius Verres. Cicero points out to Quintus Caecilius, his principal competitor for the assignment, that Caecilius does not have what it takes for such an important case: Caecilius has no natural ability, and has not been strictly and appropriately educated since boyhood. What is the education appropriate to a Roman orator? Cicero tells Caecilius he would have difficulties "even if nature were to help you a lot, and if you had learned Greek literature in Athens rather than Lilybaeum, and had learned Latin literature in Rome rather than Sicily."¹⁰⁸ This brief passage highlights some of the deficiencies of an allegedly ineffective education: what one learns (which includes here Greek literature) is not enough; it is also important where it is learned and to what extent natural talent was there to assist from the very beginning.

In this context, "knowledge" becomes something more than the collection of facts and the development of an expertise. It also provides the means for preserving elite privilege. Parallels survive in the twentieth century. According to the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's assessment of twentieth-century education, children of non-dominant groups "can only acquire with great effort something which is *given* to the children of the cultivated classes—style, taste, wit—in short, those attitudes and aptitudes which seem natural in members of the cultivated classes and naturally expected of them."¹⁰⁹ Recent studies in Classics suggest how the Roman elite also maintained its ascendancy by promoting "natural" types of behavior, behavior to which primarily the elite have access: proper pronunciation, grammar, and humor.¹¹⁰ A reading of the Latin educator Quintilian's *Institutes of Oratory* reveals other aspects of Roman education that are necessary for a Roman man to be fully trained and yet can be inculcated only from earliest youth: his knowledge of vocabulary must be impeccable, since the misuse of one word can reveal a non-Roman (8.1); his ear must be attuned to the intricate niceties of prose rhythm

¹⁰⁸ Cic. *Div. Caec.* 39: *si te multum natura adiuvaret, si optimis a pueritia disciplinis atque artibus studuisses et in his elaborasses, si litteras Graecas Athenis non Lilybaei, Latinas Romae non in Sicilia didicisses, tamen esset magnum tantam causam, tam expectatam et diligentia consequi et memoria complecti et oratione expromere et voce ac viribus sustinere.*

¹⁰⁹ Bourdieu (1974) 39 (original emphasis); see too Stray (1998) esp. 11–2, 46–82, on the role of Latin in education in Edwardian England.

¹¹⁰ Pronunciation: David (1980); grammar: Sinclair (1994) (see too Varro *fig.* 268 [Funaioli]: when grammar is impenetrable even to an accomplished orator, one must rely on the abstract concept of *auctoritas*); humor: Corbeil (1996). On the teaching of rhetoric more generally, Narducci (1989) 545–53.

(9.4.45–115); his use of gesture must be refined (11.3.65–183, which Quintilian boasts as the first written treatment of the subject); his manner of dress must be flawless (11.3.137–49). These features, in addition to those I have sketched out in this chapter, constitute an undifferentiated unity of knowledge that unites the aristocracy and underlies notions such as that of Cicero's ideal orator; at the same time, they explain the Roman disdain for specialization that we have mentioned above.¹¹¹ As a result of the importance of this image of an educated Roman, transgression on any of these counts reveals not simply inferior training, but morally suspect character. To cite one example: in expressing his disdain for improper speech, Quintilian equates the use of incorrect Latin diction with the destruction of Roman morality.¹¹²

Each of these elements I discuss, even when not explicitly acknowledged as parts of the Roman curriculum, constituted an integral part of acculturation for the Roman youth. With Greek contact, the challenge arises of continuing to meet two goals of education: preserving the prized wisdom of the Roman ancestors while at the same time assimilating the new knowledge that results from this contact. The willingness of Roman education to assimilate Greek elements, elements difficult for the non-elite to access because of their inherent foreignness, serves to maintain the Roman status quo.¹¹³ At the same time, this elite culture is enriched by the incorporation of Greek culture. The appropriation of Greek learning as a part of Roman tradition is then effectively disguised by a process that has been aptly named "genesis amnesia."¹¹⁴ Greek culture unquestionably played an enormous role in shaping the Roman traditions of the Republic. Expanding knowledge did not, however, meet with expanding opportunities.

¹¹¹ Narducci (1989) 543.

¹¹² Quint. *Inst.* 1.6.44–5.

¹¹³ Compare the assessment of the Greek contribution to the origins of Latin literature in Habinek (1998) 34–68, esp. 36: "Even when written by non-Romans (as it usually was) Latin literature remained deeply implicated in the maintenance of a specifically Roman aristocratic ideology." In general, see Bourdieu (1974) on education as "one of the most effective means of perpetuating the existing social pattern" (32).

¹¹⁴ Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) 9.

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THE *PROGYMNASMATA* AS PRACTICE*

Ruth Webb

Introduction

As their name suggests, the *progymnasmata* were a series of preliminary exercises in composition which were a prelude to the study of rhetoric, that is, to the dominant form of education available to the elites from the Hellenistic period to the end of antiquity and beyond. The type of individual this education produced is perhaps epitomised by the heroes of the Second Sophistic as portrayed by Philostratos in the *Lives of the Sophists*: relentlessly eloquent, able to compose a declamation on any theme, often at a moment's notice, thoroughly imbued with the classical past. The period defined by Philostratos represents the high point of this education, the point at which an educational practice came close to being a form of (relatively) popular entertainment. But the education itself both preceded and survived the Second Sophistic. Its workings can be gleaned from the distinctly less glamorous rhetorical handbooks, including *progymnasmata*, composed under the Empire which take us behind the sophistic stage and reveal some of the underpinnings of the sophists' art, and of ancient rhetorical education in general.

The *progymnasmata* ranged from the simple retelling of an episode from mythology, to the discussion of some witty or moralising anecdote or a fully elaborated argument for or against a proposition like 'one should marry'. They formed the transition from the study of grammar and the reading of texts—the domain of the grammarian—to writing and speaking. The poets were the raw material for many of the exercises, which demanded that the student make active use of the grammatical and other knowledge acquired in the earlier stages and, most importantly, begin to write and to perform his own compositions.

* I would like to thank Bob Kaster for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

The *progymnasmata* were therefore crucial in laying the foundations for elite discourse, and must have helped to inculcate certain modes of thinking about language, about the classical texts which served as models, and about the relation of the individual to those texts and to language in general. At this moment of transition the students' souls were still conceived as soft and malleable. The authors of the handbooks use images of shaping, or imprinting students, whether they are speaking of teaching rhetorical techniques or morally edifying fables.¹ They are therefore most interesting to us when seen in this light, as part of a wider process of formation of the rhetorically literate individual, and if we look at the surviving handbooks not as sets of rigid 'rules' or definitions of fixed types of discourse,² but as the archaeological remains of part of a broader educational process.

The relation of the *progymnasmata* to the more advanced stages of the curriculum, like declamation and epideictic, and thus to full-scale, adult oratory, is therefore a complex one.³ In some cases, the *progymnasmata* might represent ready-made parts of a longer discourse to be memorised then cut and pasted in at will.⁴ Ancient critics certainly complain about this practice.⁵ But the relation of part to whole is by no means the only or even the most important way in which the *progymnasmata* could be reflected in a finished composition. The preliminary exercises furnished speakers with a store of techniques of presentation and argumentation, with flexible patterns on which to model their own compositions, and a set of common narratives, personae and values to appeal to. When authors of more advanced treatises appeal to their readers' knowledge of the *progymnasmata*, their words suggest that they saw the exercise as a source of techniques

¹ See for example Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 61.32–3; ps.-Hermogenes, *Progymnasmata* 1.3–5. On the image of education as moulding see Morgan (1998) 259–60, Plutarch, *Moralia* 3 E.

² Baldwin (1928) 38 caricatured the *progymnasmata* as follows: 'Arid, impersonal as arithmetic, pedantically over-classified, sometimes inconsistent, these rules are nevertheless illuminating. They expose sophistic oratory. The patterns set forth for boys are recognizably the patterns of the public oratory of men.'

³ On declamation, see Kaster in this volume, Kennedy (1983) and Heath (1995); on epideictic see Pernot (1993); Russell (1998).

⁴ Baldwin (1928) 18 conceives the relation of *progymnasma* to finished speech as follows: 'Apparently a boy could carry this peacock [composed as an example of the exercise of *ekphrasis*] from school to the platform and continue to use it with merely verbal variations'.

⁵ Quintilian complains of the insertion of ready-made common places at *Institutio oratoria* 2.4.28–9. Ps.-Dionysios of Halicarnassus, *On Mistakes in Declamation*, 372 and 370.3–12 criticises misplaced *ekphraseis*, and over-lengthy, irrelevant narrations.

and material to be adapted to the task at hand.⁶ And the effects of the training they offered are naturally seen not just in speeches but in various type of literature. Theon, the author of the earliest surviving handbook, was keen to point out that the training he described was also useful for poets, prose writers or anyone wishing to exploit the power of words.⁷ In particular, *ekphrasis* (description) was a useful skill for the historian while *prosôpopoia* (characterisation through speech) was used in history, dialogue and poetry, even, he adds in a rare reference to more banal interactions, in everyday life.⁸ Much of his introduction reads like a manual on how to persuade sceptical fathers to hand over money for the training he described, but his claims are a reminder of the pervasiveness of the influence of this rhetorical education which was the only training in composition that most of the elite would receive.⁹

As Theon's reference to the use of characterisation in everyday interactions reminds us, the *progymnasmata* were not just exercises in written prose composition but a first step towards rhetorical performance, and specifically the competitive culture of declamation. Students were taught the art of delivery,¹⁰ and there is evidence of competitions in which students recited their compositions.¹¹ Most importantly the *progymnasmata* prepared students to be able to structure a speech, providing a first training in the type of set patterns which are essential for structured improvisation in any art, and also helped to form critical listeners, as well as speakers. The effects of such training on audience response, as well as the performer's output, are pointed out

⁶ Ps.-Dionysios of Halicarnassus, *Art of Rhetoric* 261 (translated in Menander Rhetor *On Epideictic* 365) notes the *thesis* topic on marriage furnishes arguments for the desirability of marriage for use in wedding speeches. Cf. Sopater Rhetor, *On the Division of Questions* 249.20–1 on the utility of the *koinos topos* against an adulterer.

⁷ Theon, *Progymnasmata*, p. 70, ll. 24–8: πάνυ ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον ἡ τῶν γυμνασμάτων ἀσκησις οὐ μόνον τοῖς μέλλονσι ῥητορεύειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ τις ἡ ποιητῶν ἢ λογοποιῶν ἢ ἄλλων τινῶν λόγων δύναμιν ἐθέλει. See also Patillon (1988) 9; Reardon (1971) 165–70; Bompaire (1958) 161–221; Sabot (1976) 243–81.

⁸ Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 60.19–31.

⁹ The simple narrative exercises would also have provided an effective preparation for low level careers in administration. See the remarks of Morgan (1998) 197.

¹⁰ Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 72.25–7.

¹¹ A prize-winning verse *êthopoia* (Zeus' speech to Helios upon the death of Phaethon) was inscribed on the tombstone of the boy who wrote it, see Kaibel (1878) no. 618 and Hardie (1983) 75. Augustine, *Confessions* 1.17 also mentions a competition in what seems to be the same exercise. Quintilian 2.7.1–3 doubts the utility of the public recitation of boys' compositions, which were popular with fathers, but it is unclear whether he is referring to the preliminary exercises as Clarke (1993) 121 suggests.

by Bob Kaster in his article in this volume. What may seem sterile to a modern reader steeped in post-romantic ideals of authenticity and originality was a highly practical and creative process, involving speaker and listener in a shared code. As with many traditional art forms, themes and structures were gradually internalised through imitation and repetition so that, as James Murphy has pointed out, the elementary exercises, like the rest of rhetorical training, worked to make the young man 'a habitual user of language'.¹² In this sense, the *progymnasmata* were a gymnastic training for the mind, true to the root sense of the verb *gymnazô*, shaping it for certain activities just as athletics shaped the body.¹³

So these texts are a precious source of insight into the most basic level of rhetorical training: the moment when students began to compose for themselves and to make active use of the linguistic and cultural knowledge they had acquired from the grammarian. Precisely because they are elementary, they reveal the lowest common denominator of that training and reveal the basic conceptions of language, categories of composition, and modes of thought which informed both the production and the reception of rhetorical and other texts. These ideas are mostly left implicit, often making the *progymnasmata* an initially unpromising and obscure source to use. When we read the textbooks in their stark, printed form we are missing the oral explanations, demonstrations and practical activities which must have accompanied them. Some taste of this background can be gleaned from the impressive body of scholia and commentaries which were composed from Late Antiquity onwards to elucidate their often laconic statements.¹⁴ And, fortunately, the growing interest in later Greek rhetorical theory, particularly over the last two decades, has provided us with the essential background to the *progymnasmata* through fundamental studies, translations, and editions.¹⁵

¹² Murphy (1998) 147.

¹³ The analogy is noted in the anonymous scholia to Aphthonios in Walz, *Rhetores Graeci* 2, 566.

¹⁴ Several of the editions of individual *Progymnasmata* textbooks reproduce a selection of scholia, others are printed in Walz, *Rhetores Graeci*, 2. There are two substantial Byzantine commentaries to Aphthonius: Ioannes Sardinianus, *Commentarium ad Doxapatres' Homiliai*, Both use material from Theon and elsewhere.

¹⁵ See for example, Heath (1995), Pernot (1993), Patillon (1988), Kennedy (1983), Russell (1983) and the edition of Menander Rhetor by Russell and Wilson.

Sources

Our information about the *progymnasmata* comes from a number of sources: remarks in Quintilian and Suetonius and authors of other rhetorical treatises, and from the surviving Greek manuals which set out the exercises for students and teachers and which date from the 1st to the 5th century AD. The texts of Theon (1st century),¹⁶ ps.-Hermogenes (probably third century), Aphthonios (fourth century) and Nikolaos (fifth century) are in the form of instruction manuals describing each exercise, with model examples of each appended in the case of Aphthonios. Theon clearly wrote his handbook with the teacher in mind. His introduction contains reflections on the value of these exercises, and on pedagogical practice in general, which are in parts as full and interesting as Quintilian's treatment of the subject.¹⁷ Libanios (fourth century) and other anonymous rhetors have left model compositions.¹⁸ As a balance to this relatively high-level output there are also fragments of Egyptian schoolmasters' or students' attempts at the exercises on papyrus.¹⁹ Quintilian and Suetonius also refer to preliminary exercises, although the only surviving Latin handbook dedicated to the *progymnasmata*, Priscian's *Praeexercitamina*, is a sixth-century translation of ps.-Hermogenes.

The practice of using small, discrete compositions as a preliminary to full-scale speeches is evident in the generic reference to *progymnasmata* (or simply *gymnasmata*) in the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (1436a 23–7). But the first evidence for the specific exercises preserved in the handbooks concerns the first century BC. Suetonius' discussion implies that certain of the exercises described by Theon were known in Rome then, and derived from earlier Greek sources.²⁰ (Theon

¹⁶ On Theon see Stegemann (1934).

¹⁷ On the parallels see Lana (1951) 113–9.

¹⁸ All the handbooks have now been translated by Kennedy (1999). A translation of Aphthonios by Malcolm Heath is available online at <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/classics/resources/rhetoric/prog-aph.htm>. For earlier English translations of Aphthonios and ps. Hermogenes, see Nadeau (1952) and Baldwin (1928) 23–38 respectively. Theon's introduction is translated in Matsen and Rollinson (1990). Patillon's edition of Theon has a facing French translation, ps.-Hermogenes *Progymnasmata* are translated in Patillon (1997); Theon, ps.-Hermogenes and Aphthonios have been translated into Spanish by Reche Martínez (1991); Libanios' model exercises remain mostly untranslated.

¹⁹ See Morgan (1998) 199–223; Cribiore (1996) 44–52.

²⁰ Suetonius, *De grammaticis et rhetoribus*, 25.4 with Kaster's commentary ad loc. Clarke (1957) 179 discusses this and other sources on the prehistory of the *progym-*

himself implies that he is presenting his own version of an established practice.)

The exercises

In the form which became standard in Greek handbooks these exercises begin with fable (*mythos*), usually using animal characters to illustrate a moral, and then a simple narrative (*diêgêma*) often taken from mythology. These are followed by the *chreia*, a discussion of a saying and/or action attributed to some famous figure like Diogenes the Cynic, Isocrates or Alexander, and the closely-related *gnômê* (or aphorism),²¹ *kataskeuê* and *anaskeuê*, the confirmation or refutation of a story on the basis of a set of criteria like probability, or possibility, *koinos topos* (common place), a rehearsal of the commonly held opinions about a certain type of stock character, like a murderer, tyrant, or temple-robber. Next come exercises in praise (*egkômion*), which is practically a panegyric speech in miniature, and its opposite, blame (*psogos*), then comparison (*synkrisis*) a systematic comparison of the qualities of two things, which is often used within panegyric. After this sequence the student turned to the more imaginative exercises: *prosôpopoiia* or *êthopoiia*, a speech in the words of a character in a certain situation (like Ajax on losing the contest for the arms of Achilles, or Niobe's lament for her children),²² and *ekphrasis*, a vividly detailed account of some person, place, time or event which aimed

nasmata and traces the *progymnasmata* back to the fourth century on the basis of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*. It is not clear though that the term, which may in any case be a corruption, is being used there to refer to the sequence of exercises described in the later sources, rather than to 'preparatory exercises' in general.

²¹ While the *chreia* was always attributed to a person and often involved an action, specific situation, or brief exchange between two characters, or an account of some telling action or gesture, *gnômê* was simply a short statement, taken out of context. Examples of *chreia* are 'Isocrates said that the roots of education are bitter but the fruit is sweet' or 'Pythagoras, when asked the extent of a human life, made a brief appearance and then hid himself, making the length of his appearance the measure of life', while an example of *gnômê* is 'a counsellor should not sleep the whole night' (*Iliad*, 2.24). Theon did not include *gnômê* as an exercise, but mentions the use of such sayings to round off a section of a speech in his treatment of narration (91.12–92.22).

²² Theon calls this exercise *prosôpopoiia*, a term which is used elsewhere specifically of a passage where words are attributed to an inanimate object, like a city. See for example ps.-Hermogenes, *Progymnasmata*, 20.9–14. This is an example of the flexibility of rhetorical terminology.

to 'bring the subject before the eyes' of an audience.²³ The final two exercises were the most elaborate: the systematic discussion of a general question such as whether one should marry (*thesis*) and the introduction of a law (*nomou eisphora*). These last two constituted small-scale speeches with introduction, argumentation using *topoi*, and the *thesis* was also practised in the schools of philosophy.²⁴ Theon's *Progymnasmata* also originally contained additional exercises: reading, listening, paraphrase, elaboration and contradiction.

As illustrated by Aphthonios and the other collections of models, the exercises took the form of compositions of various lengths, ranging from a few lines, in the case of *mythos* or *diêgêma* to several pages of a modern edition in the case of the most advanced exercises. Theon advises the teacher gradually to increase the time spent on correcting the students' style, arrangement, use of arguments and more advanced features of presentation such as amplification and finally delivery, suggesting that students worked at improving each exercise over a period of time.²⁵ The status of these compositions varied greatly: the *enkômion* constituted a miniature epideictic speech in itself, as the student was expected to run through the standard headings of birth, education, achievements etc.,²⁶ the *thesis* was practically a deliberative speech in miniature, as well as being a philosophical genre in its own right.²⁷ Others corresponded to sections of speeches. *Diêgêma* was a preparation for the narrative section of a judicial speech, hence the emphasis on clarity, brevity and probability. Theon is particularly keen to point out the future application of the exercises. In his introduction he discusses the relationship of the *progymnasmata* to the three types of rhetoric: judicial, deliberative and epideictic, keeping their broader purpose firmly in view. He singles out *diêgêma*, *anaskeuê* and *kataskeuê*, and *chreia* as being particularly useful in judicial speeches, in which one needed to present a

²³ On the *progymnasmata* in general see Morgan (1998) 191–2; Kennedy (1983) 54–69; Bonner (1977) 252–76; Clark (1957) 177–212; On the *chreia* see Hock and O'Neil (1986). On the ancient definition of *ekphrasis* and the distinction between this and the modern usage see Webb (1999).

²⁴ See Patillon's introduction to Theon, *Progymnasmata*, lxxxiii–v; Schenkeveld (1997) 247–52.

²⁵ Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 71.2–26.

²⁶ See Nikolaos, *Progymnasmata*, p. 47. Marrou (1965) 302.

²⁷ See Clarke (1951); Marrou (1965) 315; Schenkeveld (1997); Themistius Oration 30 (3) 'Should One Be a Farmer?' is a developed example.

version of events with clarity, refute an opponent's version and introduce gravity into the presentation by quoting the words of some authoritative source.

Order

The Greek *progymnasmata* handbooks show a remarkable degree of uniformity in the content, definition and order of the exercises. But the impression of conformity which the surviving textbooks present is to some extent illusory. The frequent references to what 'some people' say, show that many competing systems were in existence in antiquity, and that the current corpus is the product of centuries of selection and rearrangement. Theon's text is itself an example: his exercises were originally arranged in a different order from the one preserved in the manuscripts, beginning with the *chreia*, rather than the *mythos*.²⁸ His chapters describing each exercise were rearranged to conform to later practice, placing *mythos* at the beginning of the series.²⁹

It does seem, however, that the Greek teaching of the *progymnasmata* was generally more systematic than that of the Roman schools. Quintilian's remarks on the beginning stages of rhetorical education suggest a scattered collection of exercises, shared between the grammarian and the rhetor.³⁰ Those to be taught by the grammarians include *fabula* (fable, Greek *mythos*), *chreia*, and *sententia* (*gnômê*) while others, including narration, confirmation and refutation, encomium and thesis, he identifies as the domain of the rhetor. The discussion of these exercises by Suetonius seems to imply that, by his time (late 1st–early 2nd century), none of these preparatory exercises was taught by the rhetors at all, and that all preparation for declamation was carried out in the grammarians' schools.³¹

²⁸ The original order of the exercises in Theon's text is: *chreia*, *mythos*, *diêgêna*, [*koinos*] *topos*, *ekphrasis*, *prosôpopoia* (= *êthopoia*), *enkômion* and *psogos*, *synkrisis*, *thesis*, *nomos*. See Lana (1959).

²⁹ Both Spengel, *Rhetores graeci* 2.59–130 and Walz, *Rhetores graeci* 1.145–257 print the text of Theon in the order preserved in the manuscripts. The recent editions by Butts and Patillon restore the original order, Patillon preserves Spengel's pagination for reference.

³⁰ Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 1.9. and 2.4.2, 18–24.

³¹ Suetonius, *De grammaticis et rhetoribus* 25.4. See also Patillon in Theon, *Progymnasmata*, xiii–xiv. Kaster (1995) 279–80 takes the passage as meaning that all the exercises had been relegated to the *grammatici* by Suetonius' time.

But Quintilian is careful to distinguish the place of the preparatory exercises in the Greek schools where, he claims, all the exercises were taught by the rhetor. (He approves of this practice and criticises the Roman rhetors who considered such elementary material to be beneath their dignity (1.8.6; 2.1.2).) The fact that Greek handbooks from Theon onwards present all the exercises together does suggest that their authors and readers saw the exercises as parts of a unified system to be taught by one master, or at least within a single school. In composing his handbook, Theon may therefore have been trying to ensure that these exercises were, or continued to be, taught as a coherent whole in the Greek rhetorical schools. The particularly complex and carefully graduated system of exercises which he describes certainly functions as a whole. And there is evidence that in Greek schools up to the end of antiquity, and beyond, the *progymnasmata* were taught as part of rhetorical studies, and were not generally taken over by grammarians. In the fourth century, for example, a leading rhetor like Libanios composed fair copies of these exercises, suggesting that he saw them all as part of his remit as a teacher of rhetoric.³²

Even so, practice must have varied considerably from place to place in both East and West, with small-town grammarians teaching as much of the curriculum as they could, if there was no local rhetor.³³ There must also have been enormous variation in the individual student's experience of learning the *progymnasmata*.³⁴ To be taken through the exercises by a grammarian who had perhaps had very little experience of rhetorical composition or performance, would have been a very different experience from being taught in the school of an experienced rhetor. Theon's introduction to his work, for example, shows the effects of long experience and deep reflection on the use of these exercises as a coherent preparation for rhetorical practice, a far cry from the simple recitation of definitions in response to questions found in one papyrus fragment.³⁵ And, as Teresa Morgan

³² Petit (1957) 90–3 suggests that Libanios took over from his teaching assistants when the students reached the stage of the *progymnasmata*. Byzantine sources show that the *progymnasmata* were thought of as the first stage of rhetoric, hence their inclusion in the Hermogenean corpus.

³³ Dionisotti (1982) 121 suggests that the school in Gaul described in a school text, in which poetry and rhetoric were taught side by side, might have been typical of a small town without its own rhetor.

³⁴ On the degree of diversity in ancient education see Kaster (1983).

³⁵ See Athonios, *Progymnasmata*, 52–5.

has shown, the evidence of papyri suggests that many individuals did not complete the whole set of *progymnasmata* and may only have gone as far as a simple *mythos*, narration, paraphrase, or grammatical treatment of a *chreia*.³⁶ In what follows, however, I will look at the system as a whole and how it served as a prelude to the more advanced stages of rhetoric, even if for many this would have been an unattainable ideal.

Between grammar and rhetoric

All the discussions of the *progymnasmata* make clear that the exercises gradually increase in difficulty.³⁷ The function of the earlier exercises in particular as a bridge between the teaching of grammar and of rhetoric is evident in the grammatical components of *chreia* and the two narrative exercises, *mythos* and *diégēma*. The anecdotes which were the basis of the *chreia*, as well as short narratives, were used as material for grammatical gymnastics in which the saying or anecdote was rewritten, putting the subject into the plural, or even the dual form or, where an action is involved, switching from the active to the passive voice.³⁸ The results can be surreal (especially in translation: in one of Theon's examples 'Isocrates the orator said that talented pupils were the children of the gods' becomes in the dual 'both Isocrateses the orators said that both talented pupils were both children of the gods').³⁹ But, as well as ensuring that students could use the archaic atticising dual, these grammatical exercises represent a step towards composition, a progression which was continued in the later elaborations of the *chreia* and in the other exercises. The presence of this grammatical component also explains why the *chreia* was placed first in Theon's sequence. The edifying single sentence anecdotes which formed the starting point for the developed prose *chreia* were easy to grasp and were used at an earlier stage in the education process, when students copied them out as writing exercises.⁴⁰ The progres-

³⁶ Morgan (1998) 199–203.

³⁷ See for example, Quintilian, 2.4.17, Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 64.28–65.26.

³⁸ See Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 101.10–103.2. Suetonius, *De grammaticis et rhetoribus* 25.4. One example found on papyrus is translated by Marrou (1965) 263–4.

³⁹ Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 101.16–17: Ἰσοκράτης τῷ ῥήτορι τῷ εὐφύει τῶν μαθητῶν θεῶν παῖδε ἐλεγέτην εἶναι.

⁴⁰ See Cribiore (1996) 44–6. Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 97.7–10 derives the name *chreia* from the ethical utility of the exercise.

sion to the grammatical manipulation of the same type of material was a logical next step. This type of gradual progression from the mechanical absorption of material, to manipulation, and finally to the creation of an original composition based on that material in the shape of the full-blown *chreia* exercise is a pattern which underlies the whole method of the *progymnasmata*.

On a slightly more advanced level, a basic *mythos* or *diêgêma* could also be elaborated by the student. Hermogenes' fable of monkeys who wish to build a city is elaborated by attributing appropriate speeches (effectively a form of *êthopoia*) to the characters (the monkey in his example cites man's enjoyment of the amenities of civic life, like theaters and baths, as a model for the apes) or by the use of description (illustrating how intertwined the various exercises in fact were).⁴¹ A *diêgêma* could be recast in a variety of grammatical forms, beginning with the protagonist in the nominative ('Medea was the daughter of Aietes') then an oblique case ('Medea is said to be . . .') using accusative and infinitive of reported speech) and in a variety of other modes.⁴² Alternatively, Theon suggests reordering a story to begin in the middle, after the example of the *Odyssey*, or at the end, as with Herodotus' account of Cambyses' request for Amasis' daughter (3.1).⁴³ Effectively, these exercises in reordering a narrative also introduced students to the distinction between a story and its narrative presentation. And the operations involved—manipulating a given set of data according to prescribed patterns—foreshadow the later exercises, though with less scope for creativity.

Theon's system

In Theon's conception of the exercises, each exercise could give rise to a variety of activities of differing levels of complexity. Like Quintilian, he advises his readers not to discourage students through excessive criticism, particularly at the beginning, and not to give

⁴¹ Ps.-Hermogenes, *Progymnasmata*, 2.11–3.4; at 23.15–22 he notes that 'some people' do not include ekphrasis as a separate exercise on the grounds that it is included in other exercises, such as *mythos*.

⁴² See Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 87.12–91.10, ps.-Hermogenes, *Progymnasmata*, 5.1–6.3; Patillon (1988) 34–9 and introduction to Theon, *Progymnasmata*, lx–lxiv; Schenkeveld (1984).

⁴³ Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 86.9–87.12. Cf. Quintilian, 2.4.15.

them tasks beyond their capacity.⁴⁴ As the students progressively mastered the basic grammatical exercises they would begin to compose their own examples, based on the teacher's models or on examples selected by him from classical and Hellenistic authors. The exercises of confirmation (*kataskeuê*) and refutation (*anaskeuê*) played a particular role in Theon's conception of the *progymnasmata*. The other authors present the confirmation and refutation of a narrative as discrete exercises, introduced between *gnômê* and *koinos topos*. (Aphthonios takes the story of Daphne and Apollo as his model here and argues, in his example of *anaskeuê*, that the story was unlikely, before performing a neat about turn and arguing the opposite to illustrate *kataskeuê*.) Theon, however, treated confirmation and refutation as procedures which could be applied to various types of composition in a separate series of exercises. The confirmation and refutation of a *chreia*, a *mythos* and a *diêgêma* formed a set of advanced exercises which should follow the sequence of composition exercises, adding a further graded level of activities.⁴⁵

The later examples of the exercises by Aphthonios and Libanios suggest that they came to be practised primarily as compositions. This explains the different position of *mythos*: as a composition this is one of the simpler ones and also has edifying content, serving, as Hermogenes said, to mould the souls of the young while they were still soft. The fully developed composition called *chreia* was far more complex, involving the praise of the person (e.g. Isocrates), the saying or action itself (e.g. the roots of learning are bitter but their fruit is sweet), adding supporting statements, and comparisons and examples.⁴⁶ Although Theon's approach is unique among the surviving handbooks, it underlines a key feature of the *progymnasmata* as a process, as exercises in which the activity was key, and not just the end result, the composition.

⁴⁴ Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 70.24–5, 72.4–9; Quintilian, 1. pr. 20.

⁴⁵ See Patillon in Theon, *Progymnasmata*, xxix–xxx. Quintilian, 2.4.18 also discusses confirmation and refutation as procedures applied to a narrative.

⁴⁶ See for example Hermogenes, *Progymnasmata*, 7.15–8.14. Marrou (1965) 262–4. A translation by Malcolm Heath of Libanios' treatment of this *chreia* is available online at: <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/classics/resources/rhetoric/prog-lib.htm>.

Traditional and classical themes in the Progymnasmata

The transitional place of the *progymnasmata* between grammar and rhetoric is also evident in the type of material the students worked with. While historical themes were common in declamation, at this earlier stage students made more use of the mythological figures and narratives which were synonymous with poetry. Texts from the classical canon provided models for the students' own compositions, as is evident from the discussions of the individual exercises in all the sources. (Theon cites examples of each exercise from epic, tragedy, new comedy, history and oratory.) The repertoire of narratives used in the examples by Libanios and Aphthonios is drawn mainly from tragedy and Homeric epic. Where historical figures do appear (usually as subjects of praise and blame) they are from the same classical Greek background as the heroes of historical declamation.⁴⁷ Demosthenes, who often features in declamations, is the subject of an *egkômion* by Libanios, while Aeschines and Philip of Macedon are the subject of *psogoi*.⁴⁸ Aphthonios even devotes an *egkômion* to Thucydides, whose material was the source of so many declamation themes and whose text provided models of *progymnasmata*, in which his writings are both cause and source of praise.⁴⁹

Students were expected to engage actively with the narrative content of the texts, by paraphrasing passages, or using the traditional stories as the raw material for their own compositions. The exercises often demanded that the students subvert or question traditions, composing a *psogos* (blame) of Achilles or Hector, or 'proving' that the story of Apollo and Daphne, or some episode from Homeric epic, was incredible.⁵⁰ Libanios includes an encomium of Thersites, in which the Homeric villain emerges as a proto-democrat, and his examples of *anaskeuê* (refutation) include the story of Locrian Ajax (also a subject of confirmation) and the story of Chryses' visit to the Greek camp in *Iliad* 1.⁵¹ This same critical engagement with the epic

⁴⁷ See Bompaire (1976); Nicolai (1992).

⁴⁸ Libanios, *Progymnasmata*, 251–7; 301–6; 296–301. Alexander, a problematic figure appears only as a subject of *chreia* and *ekphrasis*. On Alexander in Lucian and the rhetorical tradition see Bompaire (1958) 163–5.

⁴⁹ Aphthonios, *Progymnasmata*, 22–4.

⁵⁰ Libanios, *Progymnasmata*, 243–51; 282–90; 290–6; Aphthonios, *Progymnasmata*, 10–13 and 14–16.

⁵¹ Libanios, *Progymnasmata* in *Opera* vol. 8, pp. 123–35 and 150–4. A translation of the *egkômion* of Thersites by Malcolm Heath is available online at: <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/classics/resources/rhetoric/prog-lib.htm>.

or mythological tradition can be seen in Lucian's dialogues, or in Dio Chrysostom's *Chryseis* (*Or.* 61), not to mention the irreverent treatment of heroic figures on stage.⁵² These types of exercises were often based on a close reading of the source text, when there was one, for the minutest signs which could be used as ammunition for or against a point of view. Thus, the fact that Thersites was not ejected from the assembly is cited to show that the Greeks approved of his outburst, and the fact that he was present at Troy at all, although he had no reputation to keep up, is cited to show that he was more deserving of praise than the heroes Achilles and Odysseus, who tried to avoid joining the expedition.⁵³

This example shows the practical advantage of using familiar epic and legendary figures as the raw material for these exercises. The basic characteristics of the persons and actions involved were agreed, what really mattered was what the rhetor or his students could do with them and the possibilities for argument that they offered. When Aphthonios argues for and against the likelihood of the story of Daphne and Apollo, or Libanios uses the fact that Ajax was a leader in war to argue first that he would not have raped Cassandra (because he was a respected commander used to controlling his passions) and then that he probably did (because these things happen in war), the question is clearly not about the truth or falsehood of the traditional story.⁵⁴ These stories are elements of a common cultural property, to be manipulated and exploited as a demonstration of the art of argumentation. Their utility for the purpose lies precisely in the fact that they are well known.

Another part of this cultural *koinê* which was put to use in the *progymnasmata* was the cast of character types, like tyrants and misers, who provide the material for fictional declamation themes (*plasmata*) as well as novels. Some of these characters make their appearance primarily in the *koinos topos*, but the so-called 'ethical' *êthopoïiai* involved imagining a speech appropriate to a standard persona, like a general or a farmer. Libanios' model *êthopoïiai* include the imagined speeches of a reformed prostitute, a coward who sees a painting of a battle in his own home, in a play on the power of graphic representation and viewer response, and a cowardly miser who discov-

⁵² On heroic subjects in mime and comedy see Bompaire (1958) 192–5.

⁵³ Libanios, *Progymnasmata*, 250; 245–6.

⁵⁴ Libanios, *Progymnasmata*, 129 and 151.

ers a golden sword.⁵⁵ The subjects of *koinos topos* are mainly negative exempla, since the point of the exercise was to provide a stock of arguments and illustrations to deploy against a certain type of wrongdoer in an epilogue. The characters proposed as examples include adulterers, tyrants, temple-robbers, murderers, traitors, and a doctor who kills by poison.⁵⁶ Almost the only positive character-type is the tyrannicide, with his feminine counterpart, the paradoxical female tyrannicide mentioned by Theon.⁵⁷

Values

These topics convey a very similar set of values to the declamation themes, so that the type of process described by Bob Kaster in this volume starts with the *progymnasmata*. The interest of the *koinos topos* lies precisely in its commonplace nature: this was where students learned the arguments and views which were commonly recognised. Concern for the preservation of social order is clear in the verbal attacks on murderers, adulterers,⁵⁸ and also in the symbolic representation of overbearing power and ambition in the figure of the tyrant and his heroic opponent, the tyrannicide (a concern which also emerges in the negative portrayal of fathers and rich men in declamation). On the individual level, these topics convey an ideal of self-control (which also emerges in Libanios' *psogoi* of anger and of the vine as source of wine, and his moralising *ekphrasis* of the behaviour of a drunken man).⁵⁹ But there was also a political edge to the anti-tyrannical tradition which runs throughout imperial Greek declamation and oratory. Rather than being merely an unreal nostalgia for a long lost democratic past, it provided a stock of arguments against the misuse of power which inform Greek responses to Roman imperial rule.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ Libanios, *Progymnasmata*, 414–21.

⁵⁶ Libanios, *Progymnasmata*, 158–208.

⁵⁷ Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 106.14–15.

⁵⁸ The *koinos topos* against the adulterer is the flip side of the praise of marriage found in the *thesis* (where the answer to 'should one marry' is invariably 'yes' until Christian authors use the genre to promote celibacy, see Sara Rappe's chapter in this volume) and in the epideictic wedding speeches.

⁵⁹ Libanios *Progymnasmata*, 315–28 and 477–9. See Brown (1992) 48–58 on the control of anger as part of the education of the late antique elite.

⁶⁰ See Aelius Aristides *To Rome* and Pernot (1998); on the antityrannical tradition in Lucian see Bompaire (1958) 337–42 and in Dio Chrysostom see Whitmarsh (1998).

But this negative side of the fictional world of the rhetor's classroom was thought to pose potential dangers to the student. Nikolaos warns against including the usual vivid account (*hypotypôsis* or *ekphrasis*), which was a standard part of the *koinos topos*, when the subject was an adulterer or corruptor of the young. In this case the fear is for the speaker's reputation, the ability to place such subjects 'before the eyes' implies knowledge which would reflect as badly on the speaker as on his opponent.⁶¹ Theon in his introduction similarly notes that the rhetor should regulate the content of the student's compositions, making plain to them with an example from Aeschines that any references to shameful things should be covert, again to protect the speaker's reputation.⁶² (This reticence only applied to sexual transgressions, Theon evokes a murder in detail in his chapter on the *koinos topos*.)⁶³

The range of typical characters and actions which recur in the exercise of *koinos topos* also has the practical advantages of being both familiar and morally unambiguous, like the cast of inhabitants of the more complex world of declamation, dubbed 'sophistopolis' by Donald Russell.⁶⁴ And, like declamation, the *progymnasmata* present the students with a closed, fictional universe, with predictable values and roles for characters, an imaginary world, with set rules of engagement with which they can work.⁶⁵ Like the world of the traditional mythological figures, this provided scope for imaginative engagement within set bounds, as with the exercise of *êthopoia*, and to some extent with *ekphrasis* which aimed to represent the typical rather than the particular.

In composing an *êthopoia*, students had to think themselves into a character and situation and find the appropriate words to express that combination. The subjects of Libanios' many examples include tragic themes, like Ajax or Medea, which weave quotations from the source text into the speech, and variations on mythological subjects, like the words of Cheiron on hearing that Achilles was hidden among girls

⁶¹ Nikolaos, *Progymnasmata*, 45.9–16.

⁶² Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 71.26–31. Compare the elaborate figured speech of Libanios, Declamation 39 (translated in Russell (1996) 170–7) in which a son has to accuse his father of adultery with the son's own wife by innuendo.

⁶³ Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 108.32–109.11. See Pernot (1986) 277. Quintilian, 6.2.31 uses a very similar example to illustrate *enargeia*.

⁶⁴ Russell (1983) Chapter 2.

⁶⁵ Theon in his section on reading preserved in the Armenian advises the teacher to familiarise the student with stock character types, chapter 13, page 103 of the Budé volume. See also Pernot (1998) on the historical subjects of declamation and Patillon (1988) 331.

on Skyros.⁶⁶ The students often had to think themselves into a female role: mythical *êthopoïiai* include Niobe lamenting her children, Andromache lamenting Hector, Polyxena upon hearing that she was to be the bride of the dead Achilles.⁶⁷ As these subjects suggest, the interest of these female characters lies almost exclusively in their relationships to male characters or to their children (as in declamation and epideictic).⁶⁸ There is also a strong preponderance of emotional 'pathetic' speeches among the ones attributed to female characters, which are close to rhetorical *monôdiai*: short, intense, expressions of grief at the death of a person or the destruction of a city.⁶⁹ One exception by Libanios is a speech by Medea on the verge of killing her children who calmly argues why it is reasonable (*eikos*) for her to be angry.⁷⁰ The only fictional female speaker is Libanios' reformed prostitute who speaks in praise of her new found *sôphrosynê*, just as the only expressions of desire are unrealised, as with Libanios' eunuch in love, and his failed Pygmalion, an artist in love with a painted girl.⁷¹

It is difficult to identify any 'feminine' characteristics of these speeches, beyond the general notion of emotion (which is however not restricted to female speakers). These are very much rhetorical representations of female speech, just as the other characters belong to a repertoire of traditional, generalised types.⁷² This is hardly surprising given the perceived power of imitation to alter the soul of the imitator (particularly a 'soft' soul like that of the student of the *progymnasmata*). Quintilian (1.11.1-2) makes this fear, allied with the fear that the orator might behave like an actor, quite clear when he warns against trying to sound like an old man, or a woman, or expressing love, servility, greed or fear, since 'constant imitation affects one's character'.⁷³

⁶⁶ This is a variation on the theme of Cheiron and the education of Achilles which appears in Libanios' *psogos* and *egkômion* of Achilles. See also Philostratos, *Eikones*, 2.2.

⁶⁷ Aphthonios, *Progymnasmata*, 35-6 and Libanios, *Progymnasmata*, 391-6; 376-8; 411-12.

⁶⁸ Similarly, of Theon's two *chreiai* attributed to female characters, one by the Pythagorean philosopher Theano, is on the subject of sex and purity, while in the other, Olympias comments on her son Alexander's claim to be the son of Zeus. See Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 98.3-7 and 99.27-30.

⁶⁹ See Menander Rhetor, *On Epideictic* 434.10-437.4 and Aelius Aristides, *Or.* 18 (Monody for Smyrna); Libanios, *Or.* 17 (Monody for Julian).

⁷⁰ Libanios, *Progymnasmata*, 372-6 esp. 375.2. The same subject is described as an ekphrasis of a statue, *ibid.*, 516-18.

⁷¹ Libanios, *Progymnasmata*, 414-16; 434-7. See Plutarch, *Moralia*, 12B on the need to restrain young men's desires.

⁷² Compare Hermogenes, *On Types of Style*, 321.1-17 on *êthos*.

⁷³ Quintilian 1.11.2 'Frequens imitatio transit in mores'. See Richlin (1997).

Fiction and creation

Êthopoïia is perhaps the exercise with the closest affinity to creative literature. It is particularly close to poetry in method and subject matter (Ovid's *Heroides* are essentially exercises in what a certain heroine would say in certain circumstances) and several examples of verse *êthopoïiai* have been found from Roman Egypt, perhaps inspired by the poetic material.⁷⁴ Theon also identifies *êthopoïia* as a useful training for writing dialogues. Like the exercise, Lucian's dialogues of the courtesans and dialogues of the gods show a comparable approach, being essentially the words of a traditional character or character-type in some situation. The collections of fictional letters by Alciphron and Aristaenetos could also be considered as a type of *êthopoïia*.⁷⁵

Like declamation, the *progymnasmata* provided a stock of traditional material, bounded by its own norms and rules on the one hand, but mimicking the relationships and rules of probability of the real world on the other.⁷⁶ (Even the mythological repertoire is all 'realistic', quasi-historical in ancient terms, rather than fantastic.) In this sense, the *progymnasmata* also provided an introduction to fictional composition. The treatment of the *diêgêma* in the *progymnasmata* in fact included a definition of fiction within its tripartite classification of types of narrative according to the reality or otherwise of the events recounted. This model divided narratives into those which related things which have happened at some past moment (like history), those which related things which could not possibly happen (like mythical accounts of centaurs and the Cyclops), and things which were 'like truth', that is which were entirely plausible and followed the same rules of probability as the external world, but which may or may not actually have happened.⁷⁷ This tripartite definition of narrative reflected the practical needs of the law court, where a

⁷⁴ See Fournet (1992).

⁷⁵ On Alciphron see Anderson (1997) 2201.

⁷⁶ On the pedagogical advantages of such a world for the teaching of rhetoric see Winterbottom (1982).

⁷⁷ See for example, Nikolaos, *Progymnasmata*, 12–13; Morgan (1993); Barwick (1928). Related questions of truth and fiction are raised by the definition of *mythos* as a 'false story which represents (*eikonizôn*) the truth'. The recognition of the relation of the lesson expressed by the *epimythia* and the story related demands analogical thinking, see Patillon (1997) 49.

speaker needed to present a story as 'like truth',⁷⁸ just as the exercise of *êthopoïia* reflects the needs of a judicial system where defendants and prosecutors spoke for themselves.⁷⁹ But in the schools these exercises could develop into a form of fictional creation.

Reading, listening, imitation in Theon

The exercises discussed above required the students to engage with the narrative content of epic and tragedy. This kind of knowledge would not necessarily have been the exclusive preserve of the educated elite since this mythological *koinê* was still represented on the stage and in the visual arts, as Aline Rousselle points out in her contribution to this volume (the ekphraseis of statues of mythological subjects included in the Libanian corpus insist on the role of the visual arts in transmitting knowledge of these narratives). But access to direct knowledge of the texts themselves, like the ability to write atticising Greek in imitation of classical authors, would have been restricted to those with the time and money to acquire the full grammatical and rhetorical education. This kind of knowledge marked its recipients, and Theon's discussion of the interaction of students with classical texts, and the role of the rhetor as intermediary, is particularly interesting in this respect.

All the versions of the *progymnasmata* identify passages from classical literature as models of each exercise. In his introduction, Theon advises teachers to provide their pupils with examples of each exercise drawn from ancient literature (in each case he suggests examples from classical and Hellenistic texts) in addition to composing their own for their students to imitate.⁸⁰ Genre has little bearing on the use to which a given text is put: Theon uses Thucydides' account of the siege of Plataea (2.2–6), and not the narrative section of a judicial speech, to illustrate what he means by a narrative being plausible. The effect of such uses of literature is dual. On the one hand it encouraged the reading of classical literature, whether poetry, history or oratory, through a rhetorical lens, identifying features which

⁷⁸ The 'virtues' of narration, clarity, brevity and plausibility (*pitthanotês*), are a sign of the connection with judicial rhetoric see Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 79.20–1.

⁷⁹ Hagen (1966) 57.

⁸⁰ Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 65.30–69.27.

were analogous to the types of composition the student would have to undertake, even using rhetorical criteria to judge classical texts.⁸¹ On the other it encouraged the introduction of literary features into rhetoric and the rhetoricisation of poetry.

Each exercise involved a combination of listening to models (drawn from classical literature, or written by the teacher), reading out loud, and active imitation. Theon stresses the interconnection of these activities when he claims that, as apprentice painters need to practice themselves if they are to profit from the works of Apelles or other famous painters, one only truly appreciates the qualities of others' compositions if one composes regularly oneself.⁸² The student thus participates in a literary continuum, alongside his classical models. Theon is the only one to give an extended discussion of the use of models and the nature of the engagement demanded of the student. He also treated reading out loud (*anagnôsis*), listening (*akroasis*) and paraphrase (*paraphrasis*), as separate exercises.⁸³ In Theon's system these supplementary exercises accompanied the others from the very beginning of the course and were used to introduce the student to texts of increasing difficulty.

His comments on listening stress the reciprocity of this activity. The listener was an active participant whose state of mind was all important. He had to be well disposed if he was to gain anything from the exercises.⁸⁴ The exercise of reading a text out loud (not an easy task given the absence of word division) was clearly a preparation for public speaking and accustomed boys to use their voices, to be listened to, and to be judged by their peers. But Theon also wanted the teacher to show the boy how to think himself into the speaker's situation, using the appropriate gestures and acting out the text as an utterance in a past time and place. There is a direct link between this type of ventriloquism and the art of declamation, in which the speaker frequently assumed the persona of some figure

⁸¹ See Webb (1997) on interaction between poetry and rhetoric, Nicolai (1992) on the use of the historians. Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 60, 28–31 refers to the use of *êthopoia* by Homer and Euripides.

⁸² Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 62.1–10.

⁸³ Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 65, 20–26. as is clear from the discussion of his project in his introduction and from the Armenian version of his text. The Armenian text with French translation is published in Theon, *Progymnasmata* ed. Patillon and Bolognesi, pp. 102–110 (along with the further exercises of elaboration and contradiction).

⁸⁴ Theon, *Progymnasmata*, section 13 (French translation on p. 105 of the Patillon-Bolognesi edition). Patillon, note ad loc. points out the similarity to Plutarch's advice on listening, *Moralia* 37c–48d.

from the classical past. The extent to which this identification could be internalised is dramatically conveyed by Aelius Aristeides' dream of being Demosthenes addressing the Athenian people.⁸⁵ Aristeides may have been an extreme case, but he was reflecting a practice which Theon attributes to the earliest stages of rhetorical training.

The effect of such reading is profound according to Theon: reading aloud serves to imprint (*typōō*) a store of examples on the soul for the individual to draw upon later for his own compositions: 'for when we bear the impressions of the finest works, we will produce the best imitations'.⁸⁶ From the context it is clear that Theon means the reader/speaker's soul, so that the imitation is bodily as well as verbal, involving the physical memory of speaking, and acting the words with appropriate gestures. The key notion that words make an impression as they stamp themselves indelibly upon the soul of the receiver is also applied to the teacher's own compositions: students should learn and recite his examples (of confirmation and refutation) so that 'bearing the imprint (*typōthentes*) of their method (*agōgē*), they will be able to imitate them'.⁸⁷ This image of imprinting, also used throughout antiquity to express the effect of perception and the persistence of memory, implies that the student is indelibly marked by what he is exposed to.⁸⁸ He is physically distinct from those who have not undergone this education. The power of this idea also helps to explain the concern among some Christians about exposing themselves or their children to the effects of this traditional education.

The end result of the 'imprinting' process was the creation of the student's own compositions, an active and creative idea of *mimēsis* as 'acting like' rather than 'producing a copy of' which placed the student in continuity with the authors he read. The teacher acted as the intermediary, by introducing students to the texts, by explaining the state of mind in which they should read and listen, and providing his own compositions as contemporary models of mimetic art. The end result, according to Theon, was that the student should begin to have the same effect on his audience in turn, gaining the

⁸⁵ Aristeides, *Hieroi logoi* I.16.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 61, l.32–3: τυπούμενοι γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ καλῶν παραδειγμάτων κάλλιστα καὶ μιμησόμεθα'. Libanios, Letter 337, refers to a grammarian who was able to make the poets enter into (*eisagō*) the souls of his pupils.

⁸⁷ Theon, *Progyrnasmata*, 70.35–71.1.

⁸⁸ Plutarch *Moralia* 37F–38B stresses the importance of controlling what enters through the ears. Morgan (1998) 198 underlines the social and ideological implications of this use of classical material to mark out the elite.

ability to make his own speech inhabit (*enoikeō*) the mind (*dianoia*) of the audience.⁸⁹

Theon's conception of paraphrase is also important for the relation which it implies between the student and classical texts. Rather than being a stylistic exercise in rephrasing, paraphrase in Theon's conception is the reworking of the basic idea (*phantasia*) which underlies the source text, into a different form of words. The examples he cites include Demosthenes' account of the destruction of Phokis (19.65) and Aeschines' similar account of the destruction of Thebes (*Against Ctesiphon*, 157) which are identified as paraphrases of the account of the sack of a city embedded within Phoenix' speech in *Iliad* 9.593–4.⁹⁰ The implication is that through words one has access to the basic nucleus of thought in the poet's mind, which one can then express in different ways.⁹¹ The classical texts proposed as models are thus endlessly open to reworking, and again the student is inscribed into a continuous chain of Greek literature and into an ongoing process of communication.⁹² The teaching offered by the *progymnasmata* therefore encouraged the student to see himself in the direct line of descent from these models.

Topoi

Classical models and culturally acceptable values were not the only things which the *progymnasmata* were supposed to imprint on the students' minds. A further effect which Theon claims for this teaching is the imprinting of the students' minds with patterns of analysis and argumentation. In claiming that the teacher is supposed to make students learn examples of his own composition so that they can imitate them,⁹³ he points to another feature of this education: like declamation it provided students with a set of reusable schemes to help him find, arrange, and analyse material. The divisions, heads (*kephalaia*) and places (*topoi*) which preoccupy the authors of the hand-

⁸⁹ Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 72.1.

⁹⁰ Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 62.32–63.13. The passage, which is part of Kleopatra's attempt to persuade her husband Meleager to return to battle, is often quoted as a model of this type of description.

⁹¹ For a full analysis and discussion see Patillon in Theon, *Progymnasmata*, p. 125, n. 31 and Patillon (1988) 309–11.

⁹² See Too (1998) 210–11 on ps.-Longinus.

⁹³ Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 70.35–71.1.

books, and which can seem so sterile to the modern reader,⁹⁴ were a vital part of the technique of rhetorical composition and essential to the art of improvisation.

The exercise of *diêgêma*, for example, introduced students to the notion of parts of narration, otherwise known as *peristaseis*, or *peristatika*, that is the fundamental elements of the story or narrative content. These were person, action or event, place, time, manner and cause, corresponding to the journalist's 'who, what, when, where, how and why'. These elements of the story provided a key framework for the organisation of experience, what Patillon calls the 'micro-universe' of the rhetoricians.⁹⁵ They would be essential later on in the student's career as the starting point for the analysis of various types of case in declamation, or in the law-courts.⁹⁶ Similarly, when Theon identifies the subjects of *ekphrasis* as person, place, time, event, and even the manner, he is not proposing a rigid classification of types of descriptive text, but illustrating the point of contact between *ekphrasis* and *diêgêma*: each element of the story can be narrated simply, or expanded so as to become visible to the mind's eye.⁹⁷

In Theon's conception of the exercises, confirmation and refutation were two more of the processes to which the material of a *muthos* or *diêgêma* was subjected, while in all the other authors they are presented as separate exercises. Again the relevance to judicial oratory, in which a speaker needed to be able to undermine his opponent's version of events, and to predict the weaknesses of his own narration, is clear. These exercises taught students to argue on the basis of a set of *topoi* or heads (*kephalaia*): for example lack of clarity (*to asaphes*) (i.e. verbal ambiguity in the narration), impossibility (*to adynaton*) (Heracles cannot have killed Busiris, who lived several generations earlier), incredibility (*to apithanon*) or improbability, internal contradiction (*to machomenon*), lack of expediency (*to asymphoron*) or inappropriateness (*to aprepes*).⁹⁸ The details of the heads vary from author to author, but the basic principle remains the same.

In a confirmation or refutation of a narrative, each of these heads can be applied to each of the elements of the narration. Taking the

⁹⁴ See, for example, Marrou (1965) 263.

⁹⁵ Pernot (1986) 263–5; Patillon (1988) 330 and in Theon, *Progymnasmata*, xxxii–xxxiv.

⁹⁶ Hermogenes starts from persons and acts as the first categorisation in declamation (*On Issues*, 29.22–30.2.)

⁹⁷ On the subjects of *ekphrasis* see for example Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 118.9–10.

⁹⁸ For an overview of the types of argument recommended by Theon see Patillon in Theon, *Progymnasmata*, xcv.

example of Medea, Theon shows how one would argue the improbability (*apithanon*) of the story on the basis of the person (a mother would not kill her children, an argument which reveals the conventional understanding of 'person'),⁹⁹ place (she would not have been likely to do it in Corinth), time (she was at her weakest), manner (she would have tried to hide her act), and cause (she would not have been likely to kill her children out of anger for Jason since she was harming herself).¹⁰⁰ Taken together, therefore, the exercises of *diégêma* and *anaskeuê/kataskeuê* provided students with a grid, made up of the elements of narration, intersecting with the heads of arguments, against which to evaluate any narrative. For Aphthonios, this exercise was the key to the art taught by the *progymnasmata*. Once students had acquired this tool, it was up to them to judge which of the arguments was best in each case. To a modern reader of Euripides' tragedy such an approach to the story of Medea is endearingly (or frustratingly, depending on your point of view) literal-minded, but it illustrates both how such familiar narratives are ideal examples and the way in which the *progymnasmata* used them to demonstrate procedures and techniques.

More sets of heads or *topoi* (both terms are used) are taught in the exercises of *enkômion* and *psogos* (i.e. birth, education, achievement, each of which can be further subdivided, for example into race, country, ancestors and parents in the case of the first category).¹⁰¹ The practical utility of these schemata can be seen in their persistence even into Christian hagiography. Like the *topoi* mentioned above, these provided a set of flexible frameworks for the analysis and discussion of many types of subject matter. In this the *topoi* of the *progymnasmata* are comparable to the more elaborate system of *staseis* in declamation. Both contributed to forming an adult speaker who was able to improvise and never at a loss for suitable words. The exercises of *thesis* and *koinos topos* introduced students to the *telika kephalaia*, the heads of purpose, or criteria for action (for example, the lawful, the just, the useful and the possible) which were key to deliberative oratory. The consideration of an action with respect to these qualities taught students to think of a particular question in

⁹⁹ The defence of Locrian Ajax on the grounds that a general would be too self-controlled (to commit rape) (above, text to note 54) relies on a similar conception of person as function.

¹⁰⁰ Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 94.17–95.2.

¹⁰¹ Aphthonios, *Progymnasmata*, 21.20–22.9.

more general terms.¹⁰² As Pernot points out, these *topoi* or *kephalaia* are more than the constituent parts of a speech. Like the parts of narration they serve as a means of organising a mass of material and of exploring a subject before putting it into words.¹⁰³ The *progymnasmata* thus provided the student with a set of ways of thinking about the world and of criteria for judgement which were reinforced by his later training, not to mention the surrounding culture.

Conclusion

Read as prescriptive instructions the *progymnasmata* can easily come across as overly pedantic, sterile instructions for composition whose only advantage was to provide the future orator with a few set-pieces to be worked into his later rhetorical performances. Their use of classical themes can seem to betray a perverse blindness to the 'pure poetic origins' of the stories.¹⁰⁴ As Marrou notes, it is pointless to measure such exercises against a Romantic ideal of originality.¹⁰⁵ But it is equally unhelpful simply to identify this education with a 'classical' set of rules and norms, as Marrou goes on to do. The divisions and subdivisions of the exercises are part of a flexible training in techniques of analysis and expression, and the restricted, traditional range of subject matter provided a self-sufficient world for the student to work with, a set of themes for him to vary. Read as evidence for an educational process, these same exercises emerge as a pragmatic preparation for life as an eloquent member of the elite, able to find something to say about any subject and to say it in accordance with his audience's expectations.¹⁰⁶ They reinforced a set

¹⁰² Aphthonios, *Progymnasmata*, 42.9–10. See Pernot (1986).

¹⁰³ Pernot (1986) 265–70.

¹⁰⁴ Bompaire (1958) 201: 'Lorsque l'élève des rhéteurs songe à Actéon, à Phaëthon, à Niobé, à Pitys, à Thyeste, à Orithye, songe-t-il aux origines pures et poétiques de leur légende, ou aux mille et une façons de présenter leur sort pitoyable, dans une fable—et même une fable philosophique—une anaskeuê et une kataskeuê, dans une ephrasis, bref dans toutes les variétés d'exercices préparatoires. . . .' 'when the rhetors' pupil thought of Actaeon, Phaethon, Niobe, Pitys, Thyestes or Orithyia, did he think of the pure and poetic origins of their legends, or of the thousand and one ways of presenting their sad fate in a fable—even a philosophical fable—a refutation and a confirmation, an *ekphrasis*, in short in all the types of preliminary exercise?'

¹⁰⁵ Marrou (1965) 263.

¹⁰⁶ The author of the pseudo-Dionysian treatise on rhetoric (p. 261) is keen that his address be familiar with 'what is commonly said [about marriage in wedding

of culturally accepted values through the criteria used for praise and blame, persuasion and dissuasion, and introduced the student to the notion and practice of censure in itself. They also encouraged an attitude towards the texts of the classical canon as an open source of tradition, part of the student's cultural property, with which he was expected to engage, and not as a static, untouchable monument.

The practice represented by the *progymnasmata* was also a fluid one, subject to adaptation over time. Whereas Theon's emphasis on confirmation and refutation privileged the type of argumentation necessary for judicial oratory, the rise of epideictic from the second century onwards was reflected in a lost version by a certain Athanasios who proposed that all the exercises be subordinated to *egkômion* and that the encomiastic *topoi* should be the starting point for all the exercises.¹⁰⁷ Aphthonios and Nikolaos also reflect the importance of epideictic in their treatment of some of the exercises. Such variations, slight as they may sometimes be, are a reminder that these texts were written and used for practical ends and were responsive to large-scale changes in rhetorical practice. What is more, it does seem that, over time, the very existence of the *progymnasmata* served to bring about changes, with certain exercises coming to be recognised as independent forms in their own right, as Nikolaos notes with reference to *koinos topos* and *ekphrasis*.¹⁰⁸ While the *progymnasmata* were, as Graham Anderson has remarked, 'one of the most characteristic cultural forces in the formation of a sophist or a sophistic outlook' their practice both preceded and outlived the Second Sophistic, proving more durable in the end than the highly demanding and specialised art of declamation.¹⁰⁹

speeches]'. On the importance of learning the importance of rules as preparation for adult life, see Atherton (1998).

¹⁰⁷ See Pernot (1993) 59 citing p. 53 of Rabe's edition of Aphthonios.

¹⁰⁸ Nikolaos, *Progymnasmata*, 45.23–46.2 and 70.16–19.

¹⁰⁹ Anderson (1993) 47. See Hunger (1978) 1.92–120 on the *progymnasmata* in Byzantium; Grafton and Jardine (1986) 129–35, Margolis (1979) and Clark (1952) on the *progymnasmata* in early modern Europe.

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CONTROLLING REASON: DECLAMATION IN RHETORICAL EDUCATION AT ROME*

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To begin, let us consider three strange, sad, and lurid tales of crime and punishment.

In the first, a wealthy young man committed a rape. In accordance with the law, the young woman he raped was in compensation allowed to choose either his death or marriage to him without a dowry. Before she made her choice, he sent a delegation of his relatives to her, to ask her to choose marriage: when their entreaties had been heard, she was speechless, and wept. Hearing her reaction, the young man stabbed himself. While he lingered on death's threshold, the young woman announced that she chose marriage. After he died, both his new widow and his relatives claimed his estate.

Story two. One of two brothers committed a rape. Given the choice between the rapist's death and marriage to him without a dowry, the young woman chose his death. In accordance with the law, execution of the sentence was postponed for thirty days. In the interval, the rapist's brother performed heroically in battle and, in accordance with the law, was allowed two rewards of his own choosing. For the first reward he requested that his brother's life be spared, and his request was granted. For his second reward he requested the death of the woman who had been raped. His request was opposed by his brother.

According to our final story, a woman who had been raped was brought before a magistrate and given the opportunity, in accordance with the law, to choose the death of the man who she said had raped her or marriage to him without dowry. She chose marriage; he, however, denied that he had committed the rape. The

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matter was taken to court, where he was convicted. After his conviction, he dropped his objection to marrying her. She, for her part, wished to make her choice anew.

These stories are not taken from the police blotter, nor do they summarize the goings on of one or another modern soap opera. The stories are instead versions of three themes used in the schools of Roman rhetoric throughout the imperial period.¹ They are the raw materials of school declamation, the exercise in formal argumentation and verbal agility that every well-bred male of the empire came to know intimately. Together with similar stories of furious tyrants, poisoning stepmothers, adulterous wives, and disinherited sons, this material formed the anvil on which the oratorical skills of the elite were largely forged and their sensibilities significantly shaped. It is especially the role of such stories in the formation of sensibilities—the perception of equity and outrage, of the admirable and the loathsome—that we will consider in this chapter.

First, however, it is necessary to survey briefly the background and character of the exercise itself.² The practice of declamation at Rome dates at least from the early first century BC, when formal rhetorical instruction in Latin was institutionalized in the city. The first Roman rhetorical textbook, the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (80s BC), assumes the existence of such exercises (e.g., 1. 19–25, 2. 17–20, 3. 2, 4. 68), and Cicero on several occasions recalls engaging in them, alone or in the company of friends, developing themes in both Greek and Latin for exercise, for enjoyment, and even as a solace in retirement.³ By the triumviral period the practice was so common a pastime of the educated elite that Octavian—an accomplished but by no means extraordinary orator—is said to have indulged in it daily, not suspending his habit even during the war of Mutina (Suetonius *De grammaticis et rhetoribus* 25. 3). And when it emerges fully into view through the elder Seneca's recollections of

¹ Respectively, Quintilian *Declamationes minores* 247, Calpurnius Flaccus 25, and Seneca *Controversiae* 7. 8 = Quintilian *Declamationes minores* 309.

² The confines of this chapter can afford no more than a quick sketch; for more extensive discussion see esp. Bornecque (1902 [1967]), Bonner (1949), Kennedy (1972) 312–37, Bonner (1977) 277–327, Sussman (1978), Winterbottom (1980), Fairweather (1981), Dingel (1988), Bloomer (1997a), Imber (1997). On the development of the term *declamatio* (*declamare*) to denote the practice, see Bonner (1949) 20–31.

³ See, e.g., Cicero *Brutus* 310 (with Plutarch *Cicero* 4. 6), *Epistulae ad Atticum* 9. 4, 14. 12, *Epistulae ad Familiares* 9. 16. 7 (with 9. 18, 7. 33. 1), 16. 21. 5, Seneca *Controversiae* 1. 4. 7, Suetonius *De grammaticis et rhetoribus* 7. 2, 25. 3.

the Augustan Age, the cultivation of declamation has all the appearance of a cultural phenomenon both deeply rooted and widespread. It is the centerpiece of the education received by all adolescents who continued their schooling beyond the *grammaticus*' instruction in language and poetry. It is a performance occasion that can provide a highlight in the life of the social and cultural elite and as such can make (or break) the literary reputations of teachers, their students, and others. And it is a discursive form whose structures, aims, and tricks come to pervade all other literary genres. Ovid, it is no surprise to learn, was already noted as a brilliant declaimer when he was scarcely more than a boy, years before he published his first line of poetry.⁴

Declamations were of two main kinds, the mock-deliberative *suasoria* and the mock-forensic *controversia*: the latter exercise, which is far better documented, was to Roman rhetorical education what moot court competition is to the modern American law school.⁵ The principles and procedures of the *controversia* were straightforward and remained constant for centuries. A theme was presented—that is, a set of facts, usually governed explicitly by one or more hypothetical laws—issuing in some form of conflict: the three stories related above are typical specimens, especially as they illustrate the tendency for the conflict to derive, say, from the application of contradictory laws or from a distinction between the letter and the spirit of a law. One could choose to argue either side of the conflict, and indeed it was one of the aims of the exercise to develop the ability to argue *both* sides—in *utramque partem dicere*—with equal fluency. Having chosen his side, the would-be declaimer had first to distinguish the issues at the heart of the conflict, a process called *divisio*: for example, is it wrong in principle to do X? if it is wrong in principle, was it wrong in this particular case? if it was wrong in this particular case, are there nonetheless extenuating circumstances? And so on.⁶

Once the fundamental issues were distinguished, the declaimer still had two important preparatory jobs. He had to define the appropriate

⁴ For performance and reputation see, e.g., Seneca *Controversiae* 1. 3. 10, 2. 4. 8, 12–13, 3 pr. 12–17, 4 pr. 7, 7 pr. 8, *Suasoriae* 3. 6–7. On Ovid see esp. Seneca *Controversiae* 2. 2. 8–12.

⁵ For the less commonly attested *suasoria*, in which the speaker pretended to counsel a historical figure faced with a momentous choice (should Hannibal cross the Alps? should Alexander invade India?), see Seneca's collection of seven (extant) themes, with Edward (1928) in addition to the studies cited in n. 2 above.

⁶ The method of defining the "state of the question" was elaborated in *stasis*-theory, on which see esp. Hermogenes *On Issues*, trans. Heath (1995).

persona—a matter of decorum, making his self-presentation suit the nature of the case and the character of the speaker (the rapist, say, or the hero). And he had to determine the *color*—the narrative background or “spin”—that it would be most useful to give the facts stated in the theme: for though he could not alter or deviate from the facts themselves, the declaimer was allowed to interpret them in whatever way he wished or to invent a history for the facts that placed them in a light favorable to his own side. (That is, if the theme stated that a homicide had occurred, you could not produce the alleged victim alive and well; but you could try to present a scenario in which the homicide would appear justified.) With the issues defined, the *color* and persona determined, one could then proceed with the argument. Here one typically treated questions of law first—the applicability of the law to the facts, the letter of the law versus the spirit—and then moved on to questions of equity, rounding the speech off with an emotional peroration including pathetic pleas for clemency or sympathy. And all throughout one tried to punctuate the argument with *sententiae*—pointed and forceful epigrams—to catch the ear, tickle the wits, and impart a rhythm to the performance.

The pervasiveness of the performance is attested not least by the sheer number of declamations that have survived in one form or another from the Roman world, to give us a clear view of the essentials of the genre. Earliest, and in some ways most eccentric and entertaining, is the collection assembled, probably late in the 30s of the first century AD, by the elder Seneca for his three sons, to tell them something of the practitioners of the art who were active in the reign of Augustus and early in the reign of Tiberius, before the boys had reached an age to become practitioners themselves.⁷ Purportedly the product of Seneca’s prodigious memory, the collection is not an anthology of declamations as such;⁸ instead, it follows a scheme that is intended for, and readily accessible to, only those

⁷ The best available editions are Winterbottom (1974) (with translation), Håkanson (1989). For discussion see esp. Bornecque (1902 [1967]), Sussman (1978), Fairweather (1981), Fairweather (1984), Bloomer (1997b) 110–53; for further bibliography Sussman (1984). All ten books of *Controversiae* were originally provided with extended prefaces, in which Seneca offered character sketches of noted declaimers and other personal comment; but the prefaces to Books 5, 6, and 8 are lost, and the preface to Book 9 is incomplete. Of the main text, Books 3–6 and 8 survive only as excerpts.

⁸ *Controversiae* 2. 7. 1–9, quoted from Porcius Latro on a theme of adultery, is the only continuous declamation, though the MSS are defective at the end and must be supplemented from excerpts.

who are already initiates in declamation. First a theme is presented, with the relevant laws and the statement of facts; there then follows, not a sample treatment of the theme, but a catalog of the epigrams that various noted declaimers had deployed in their treatments of the theme on various occasions (cf. *Controversia* 1 pr. 4–5). Simply listed one after another and isolated from the connective tissue of argument, the *sententiae* are meant to be savored for themselves: one can compare the effect to reading, say, every twelfth line of Lucan (or any poem of Tibullus straight through). After the *sententiae* come two other, similar catalogs, of the *divisiones* and *colores*—the analyses of the issues, that is, and the spin put on the facts—again organized by speaker: Seneca tells us how the *divisio* of declaimer X differed, perhaps, from that of declaimer Y; and since Seneca liberally sprinkles these catalogs with his own opinions and recollected anecdotes, we are also sometimes told, for example, that of all the many stupid things that declaimer Z said in his long and ill-starred career, the *color* that he used in this particular case was far and away the stupidest.⁹ The abundance and pith of Seneca's opinions and anecdotes augment the collection's fascination as a masterpiece of connoisseurship: if it is true (as Henri Marrou once suggested) that ancient rhetorical display has its closest modern counterpart in jazz—as a performance that at its best combines inventive improvisation with structural discipline and technical virtuosity¹⁰—then Seneca's collection can be approached as the work of a great jazz savant talking about the musicians he has heard and their approaches to the standards of the jazzman's repertoire. If you do not know the melody and chord changes of *These Foolish Things*, the collection will leave you no wiser; but if you already carry the tune in your head, he can reproduce for you the best riffs from Thelonious Monk's version, or tell you exactly how Teddy Wilson's left hand in the bridge differed from Art Tatum's.

The other main collections on which we depend are of a less colorful kind. Sometime, probably, in the second century a rhetorician named Calpurnius Flaccus collected and published fifty-three of his own declamations, and these in due course were excerpted for their *sententiae*: the result is a collection of themes followed by disembodied

⁹ See, e.g., *Controversiae* 1 pr. 6–10, 2 pr. 1–3, 2. 1. 25–26, 33, 4 pr. 8–9, 7. 3. 8–9, 9. 2. 26–28, 9. 6. 10–13, *Suasoriae* 3. 6–7.

¹⁰ Marrou (1956) 200.

epigrams similar to one section of Seneca's work.¹¹ Then there are the two collections of continuous declamations ascribed in the manuscripts to Quintilian, the so-called *Declamationes maiores* and *Declamationes minores*, the "Greater" and "Lesser" declamations. The nineteen *maiores*, which are commonly taken to be teachers' display-pieces, are long, full-fledged compositions, typically running to over twenty pages.¹² By contrast, the *minores* rarely run to as many as three or four pages and are for the most part merely sketches offered by a rhetor to his students to illustrate how a given theme should be treated: originally at least 388 in number, of which 145 survive, these pieces are particularly interesting as teaching documents, for they present us with the teacher's *sermones*—discursive comment and direct instruction on the issues to be distinguished or the persona to be adopted—alternating with the examples that put instruction into action. Unlike the *maiores*, which have no chance of actually being by Quintilian, the *minores* might well be authentic and at very least derive from the school of a rhetor who knew Quintilian's doctrine intimately.¹³

These collections overlap considerably, so that it is not uncommon to find the same theme presented in more than one of them. The themes that they comprise were clearly part of a standard repertoire: one could probably ask an accomplished declaimer, on the spur of the moment, to deliver the *Sepultura tyranni qui se occidit*—a paradoxical theme on the appropriate "burial of a tyrant who committed suicide" (Quintilian *Declamationes minores* 329)—as easily as one could ask a jazz musician today to play *'Round Midnight*. But this same standardization—begun, to all appearances, quite soon in declamation's history—was among the qualities that made the institution vulnerable to criticism: how many times, Juvenal asks, must we listen to the schoolboys advising Hannibal, referring to one such standard theme (7. 160–67, cf. 10. 167–68). Indeed, from the time of the earliest of these collections we have a record of head-shakers and finger-pointers ready to use declamation as evidence that the world was heading for ruin at double-time. Already in Seneca—that

¹¹ The standard edition is Håkanson (1978); Sussman (1994) offers an English translation.

¹² The standard edition is Håkanson (1982), with English translation in Sussman (1987).

¹³ The best available editions are Winterbottom (1984) and Shackleton Bailey (1989); on the attribution to Quintilian and the character of the doctrine, Winterbottom (1984) xi–xix, Dingel (1988).

is to say, in reminiscences dating to the Augustan age—we hear from critics who look askance at the practice of declamation and the habits of the rhetorical schools more generally, largely on the ground that these practices and habits are inadequate to the task they claim to perform: to prepare the would-be orators to be orators in fact.¹⁴

The main culprit, on this view, was declamation's divorce from daily reality, which was manifested in several ways. Most conspicuously, there were the themes themselves, the sets of facts that defined the exercise, which often turned on the behavior of outlandish characters—pirate chiefs, tyrants and their assassins, stepmothers and their poisons—or on the peccadillos of stereotypes who seem to have stepped from the stage of New Comedy: wastrel sons or irate fathers, most conspicuously.¹⁵ To make matters worse—and a point to which we will return—the themes were governed by laws and legal practices that were largely fictional: for example, though no Roman son could bring his father into court and convict him of being insane, such actions for *dementia* are the stock-in-trade of the declamations.¹⁶ And to top it all off (the critics said) this playing about with fictional themes and imaginary laws was set at a further remove from forensic reality by the hot-house atmosphere in which the play was conducted. Juvenal calls this the *rhetorica umbra*, the “shade of the rhetorician's school” (7. 173), which sheltered the speaker from the heat and dust of the forum's rough-and-tumble: speakers could speak their pieces uninterrupted, without concern for questions from the judges or interjections by opponents; they would be buoyed up in the performance by the appreciative clamor of a select audience, who could be counted on to applaud and murmur approval at every

¹⁴ Criticisms of the “schoolmen” (*scholastici*): e.g., Seneca *Controversiae* 1. 7. 5, 2. 3. 13, 19, 3 pr. 7–12, 4 pr. 9, 7. 4. 10, 7. 5. 12, 9 pr. (*passim*), 9. 6. 10, 10 pr. 12; for later critiques see esp. Petronius *Satyricon* 1–3 and Tacitus *Dialogus de oratoribus* 28–32, with the reflections of Quintilian *Institutio oratoria* 2. 10, and Bonner (1949) 71–83.

¹⁵ On declamatory tyrants, see Tabacco (1985); on step-mothers, Imber (1997) 160–64; on fathers and sons, Sussman (1995). The similarity of declamatory themes and comic plots has often been remarked but never fully probed: investigation should prove worthwhile, as should consideration of the links between declamation and the novel.

¹⁶ See, e.g., Seneca *Controversiae* 2. 3, 2. 6, 10. 3, Calpurnius Flaccus 8. On the “laws” of declamation see Sprenger (1911) and esp. Lanfranchi (1938) and Bonner (1949), who attempt (instructively but often in vain) to vindicate their origin in Greek or Roman actuality; for a recent critique see Crook (1995) 163–67.

well-turned *sententia*; and in fact, the performance might prove to consist *only* of well-turned *sententiae*—the speaker might dispense entirely with argument and skip along from one epigrammatic peak to another—since nothing, finally, was at stake. As the character Messalla is made to say in Tacitus's *Dialogus de oratoribus* (*Dialogue on Orators*: 35. 4–5), summing up all the faults of the institution in contrast to the practices of the good old days: “that’s the rage nowadays—to elaborate in a great torrent of large-sounding phrases on the rewards given to tyrannicides or the choices made by women who have been raped or . . . the incestuous affairs of matrons or all the other themes that are treated day in and day out in the schools but occur rarely or never in the courts.” Little wonder (the critics gleefully noted) that several very celebrated declaimers were known to have been at a loss, and to have embarrassed themselves badly, when they ventured beyond the shelter of their *auditoria* to the open air of the forum.¹⁷

So said the ancient critics, and their judgments have faithfully been reproduced in modern accounts: the most recent general history of Latin literature, for example, duly reports that “rhetoric [sank] into pointless exercises, the *declamationes*, . . . which center on themes and subjects that are fictitious, novelistic, . . . and chosen precisely for their odd and unusual character.”¹⁸ Well, yes: “odd and unusual” they often appear to be; “fictitious” and “novelistic,” so it frequently seems. But “pointless”? That is a harder judgment to make. The most extreme of the ancient critics are rebuked by the fact that the schools and their declamations *did* produce competent advocates (Quintilian and the younger Pliny, for example).¹⁹ But a larger point is at issue. It seems questionable method for a modern observer to condemn as “pointless” the practice of another culture that flourished unaltered, and so presumably was thought somehow to satisfy the needs of that culture, for over 600 years. The long endurance of what may seem to us an inept practice is a sure sign that we are dealing with

¹⁷ See Seneca *Controversiae* 7 pr. 6 (cf. Suetonius *De grammaticis et rhetoribus* 30. 4) on Albucius Silus; Seneca *Controversiae* 9 pr. 3 on Porcius Latro, cf. Quintilian *Institutio oratoria* 10. 5. 18.

¹⁸ Conte (1994) 404; the quotation could easily be matched by ten more in a similar vein from scholarly works of the past century.

¹⁹ On the practice of advocacy under the Empire see Crook (1995). Ancient and modern critics of declamation also overlook the fact that—beneath their apparently sensational veneer—the themes often bear a tolerably close family resemblance to the casuistical cases of Hellenistic philosophical debate, as we find them transmitted, for example, in Cicero *De officiis* 3. 50ff., 89ff.

one of those discontinuities between the Romans and ourselves, a point of cultural distance that reminds us that these are in important respects strangers, no matter how often they seem to inhabit the same universe of ideas. It seems the proper response, therefore, to ask: what needs did this strange practice satisfy, and how?

The answer to the question is surely woven out of several strands; in the balance of this chapter I will pick out one of those strands and attempt to tease it apart.²⁰ I start from several indisputable facts about the practice. First, it was primarily intended for, and mostly engaged in by, students of rhetoric under the guidance of their teachers: that is, young males typically between fifteen and eighteen years of age drawn from the elite of the capital or of the larger provincial towns. Second, the themes or fact-sets on which the declamations were based are indeed often outside the range of common experience, not to say bizarre, as critics of the institution have insisted. Third—and by contrast—the arguments that are developed and the sentiments that are expressed to meet these eccentric facts are themselves *utterly* conventional, containing virtually nothing that the most respectable Roman gentleman would consider untoward or contrarian. (*None* of the ancient critics, be it noted, takes the declaimers to task for the substance of their arguments, whatever other faults they find.) Taking these three facts together, I suggest a hypothesis: that it was one of the main effects of declamation to inculcate, by sheer repetition, approved values in the still impressionable minds of the next generation of the elite; that one aspect of declamation which most commended it to its culture was the reassuring ability it developed in the declaimer to respond to the most startling, novel, or extravagant circumstances by appealing to the most traditional sentiments and by marshaling the most conventionally “reasonable” arguments. On this hypothesis, declamation tended tacitly to instil the belief that convention and tradition were sufficient to meet even

²⁰ For other recent approaches to declamation along lines similar to the following, with varying emphases, see: Beard (1993), on declamation as Roman ‘mythopoeisis’; Bloomer (1997a) and (1997b) 135–42, on declamation as an instrument of identity-formation and acculturation; and Imber (1997), esp. chapters 3–4, on declamation and the dynamics of Roman patriarchy (now the best treatment of Latin declamation in its social context, forthcoming from Harvard University Press). For Greek declamation see Russell (1983), esp. 21–39 (on the fantasies, values, and prejudices cultivated in the genre), and Hawley (1995); and for still more broadly conceived discussion of sophistic display and the creation of identity, Gleason (1995).

the most unexpected needs; and this belief in turn fostered the self-confidence—not to say, complacency—and sustained the social reproduction of the conservative elite who patronized the schools of rhetoric: declamation told this elite, in effect, what it wanted to hear. On this hypothesis, too, declamation gives us a singularly transparent window upon the Roman mentality in the act of formation. The acculturation of children in the intimacy of the home is largely closed to our view; and the texts of the earlier stages of education—above all, grammar—are concerned largely with matters of rote learning. But declamation shows us at least one consequential subset of the population learning to think in their culture. By becoming steeped in all the values, beliefs, and stereotypes implied in declamatory argument, the students of declamation acquired the reflexes needed to live as respectable men.

We can develop this hypothesis a bit if we return to our three original theme-stories and ask: why rape? The question arises, first, because the topic is simply so strikingly common. Some twenty-five different declamatory themes—a quite sizeable percentage of the total number of themes known from our main sources—are based upon an occurrence of male-female rape, as we generally understand the term: aggravated sexual assault, or forced, non-consensual sexual penetration, or what in classical Roman law is termed *stuprum per vim inlatum*.²¹ The question is given further point by the insufficiency of the most obvious answer: that a sensational subject like rape was a surefire means of riveting the attention of the participants, and especially of the adolescent males who were mainly involved. The answer cannot be sufficient because these themes, though based on the occur-

²¹ The themes are: Seneca *Controversiae* 1. 5 (= Calpurnius Flaccus 51), 2. 3 (= Quintilian *Declamationes minores* 349), 3. 5, 4. 3, 7. 6, 7. 8 (= Quintilian *Declamationes minores* 309), 8. 6, Quintilian *Declamationes minores* 247, 251, 252 (= 370), 262, 270, 276, 280, 286, 301, 343, 368, 383, Calpurnius Flaccus 16, 25, 34, 41, 43, 46; three other themes concern male-male rape (Calpurnius Flaccus 3 = [Quintilian] *Declamationes maiores* 3, based on a historical incident; Seneca *Controversiae* 3. 8, 5. 6). *per vim stuprum inferre* / *per vim stuprare*: see *Digesta* 48. 5. 30. 9 (“eum autem, qui per vim stuprum intulit vel mari vel feminae, sine praefinitione huius temporis accusari posse dubium non est, cum eum publicam vim committere nulla dubitatio est”), 48. 6. 3. 4 (“praeterea punitur huius legis poena qui puerum vel feminam vel quemquam per vim stupraverit”), cf. 48. 6. 5. 2; on *stuprum* (sexual penetration of a disapproved sort, or committed in illicit circumstances) see Fantham (1991). In declamation *rapta* = “raped woman,” in our sense of the phrase, everywhere but at Calpurnius Flaccus 41 (where *rapta* = “kidnapped,” *stuprata* = “raped”). I have preferred to use the Latin word in the text, to avoid English terms—“victim,” “survivor”—which import strong affective and ideological colorings from our own culture.

rence of rape, actually show no interest whatever in rape as such. Unlike the rapes represented in the imaginative literature of Rome—in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, for example—the act is never described or considered directly and in detail.²² Like the rapes of New Comedy, the rapes of declamation always occur offstage, or rather before the curtain has even gone up.²³

So to answer the question, "Why rape?," let us start from this salient characteristic: rape in declamation is almost never treated as an attack on or by fully human subjects, persons whose subjective experience is somehow integrated with their actions so that one could say "I thought or felt this and therefore I did that." In the case of the *raptor* (so the Latin term), the question of his motive is hardly ever addressed, and his self-conception after the act is left unexamined. Why he committed such an act, how the commission of the act grows out of or possibly alters (through remorse, say) some describable psychic state—questions of the sort that we associate with cause, effect, and individual responsibility—are usually left to one side. And even when, very exceptionally, such questions enter into discussion they are treated (we shall see) as the source of mystery and astonishment: "my life," the *raptor* says, "had always been such that I was amazed that I did wrong"; that is, the sort of person I really was before and (by implication) really am again bears no necessary and intelligible relation to my intervening action. Similarly, the subjective experience of the *rapta* is left inaccessible, even when reference is made to it. Recall, for example, that in the first theme with which we began the rapist "sent a delegation of his relatives to the *rapta*, to ask her to choose marriage: when their entreaties had been heard, she was speechless, and wept." Here silence and tears apparently mask the *rapta's* strong emotion and her own reflection on her condition that will lead to action, her choice; the silence and tears thus acknowledge, exceptionally, the inner state that mediates between the act experienced and the reaction that follows. But even this is the exception

²² On Ovid's rapes see for example Curran (1978), Richlin (1992), Johnson (1996).

²³ On rape and "seduction" in New Comedy see Fantham (1975), Anderson (1984), Packman (1993), Brown (1993), Konstan (1994), Scafuro (1997) 193–278, Lape (1998) 177–232. Despite similarities (see, e.g., n. 33 below) there is one striking distinction between the two genres: whereas rape in New Comedy invariably issues in pregnancy, with the plot then hinging on the disposition of the child, the rapes of declamation are hardly ever fertile (the exceptions are Calpurnius Flaccus 46, 51) and the problems to be resolved are otherwise constituted.

that proves the rule, for it is precisely the mask in this instance that matters: the silence and tears are all that we see, feeling and intention remain inarticulate, and it is the interpretation, or misinterpretation, of inarticulate intention that acts as the real engine of the theme.

Rape, then, does not provide a window onto an inner world of motive or felt response. If anything, the opposite: rape produces a mess that must be set straight, beyond question, but it does not play out as a very personal mess. It is rather a social mess, entailing the confusion of social status and social relations: the reputational standing of a family in the community is imperiled by the attack on its *puđicitia*; the lines of inheritance within a family become confused, potentially or in fact; even the relative standing and power of men and women, as we shall see, is at least momentarily inverted. From a purely functional point of view, of course, this kind of disruption is one of the main advantages of rape as a declamatory theme: perhaps even more variously than homicide, the act smashes at one blow many of the social surfaces that shape and constrain ordinary life. It then becomes the declaimer's job to put the surfaces back into some sort of acceptable, more or less conventional order—which is precisely the role for which the declaimer is being trained. Any young man who emerged from the school of rhetoric to practice at the bar would spend a large part of his energy in service of the belief that the most profound and wounding social rupture is amenable to reason.

What we think of as perhaps the most intimate of crimes thus becomes an occasion for the objectification of experience, for establishing distance from the mess that has occurred and for tidying it up by exercising rational control over it. The starting point and main instrument of control is what the declaimers referred to simply as the *lex raptarum*, "the law of women who have been raped." This is the law that governs the vast majority of the rape-based themes; it states "Let the woman who has been raped choose either the death of the *raptor* or marriage to him without a dowry."²⁴ Now the first

²⁴ The *lex raptarum*—"Rapta raptoris aut mortem aut indotatas nuptias petat" (vel sim.)—explicitly governs the theme, alone or in combination with another "law," at Seneca *Controversiae* 1. 5, 3. 5, 4. 3, 7. 8, 8. 6, Quintilian *Declamationes minores* 280, 286, Calpurnius Flaccus 16, 25, 34, 41, 43, 46, 51; the *lex* is implied also at Quintilian *Declamationes minores* 247, 251, 259, 262, 270, 301, 309, 343, 368, 383. Different "laws" govern a case of rape at Quintilian *Declamationes minores* 252 ("Raptor decem milia solvat," similarly 370 "Qui ingenuam stupraverit, det decem milia"),

thing that must be understood is that this is a fictional law, having no relation to the law actually applied in cases of rape. Under classical Roman law, a rapist was vulnerable to an *actio iniuriarum*, a civil suit in which damages could be sought; and forcible *stuprum*—rape as it is understood in the declamations—was also punishable under the criminal law governing *vis*, or public violence: here it was the violent aspect of the attack, not the sexual aspect (or even the gender of the person attacked), that made it punishable, and the punishment was death.²⁵ Nowhere in Roman law is it suggested that the woman who has been raped could choose to marry the rapist—until the sixth century, when a ruling of the emperor Justinian expressly *forbids* such a choice.²⁶

But though the declaimers' law was not the law of the *Digests*, it none the less stands in close harmony with the declaimers' world. How it does so can be seen if we first compare the *lex raptarum* with another declamatory law that is structurally very similar. It is a law that governs acts of blinding, and runs as follows: "whosoever shall have blinded another, let him either give satisfaction in kind or serve as the guide of the person who has been blinded."²⁷ Like the *lex raptarum*, this law provides for alternative forms of compensation. One

276 ("Rapta raptoris mortem aut bona optet"), 349 ("Raptor, nisi et suum patrem exoraverit et raptae intra triginta dies, pereat," similarly Seneca *Controversiae* 2. 3).

²⁵ For the *actio iniuriarum* see Treggiari (1991) 309–11, Scafuro (1997) 223–28; for capital punishment under the *lex Iulia de vi publica* (*Digesta* 48. 6) see n. 21 above, and cf. *Codex Justinianus* 9. 13. 1 (sim. 1. 3. 53).

²⁶ See *Codex Justinianus* 9. 13. 1. 2 "Nec sit facultas raptae virgini vel viduae vel cuilibet mulieri raptorem suum sibi maritum exposcere, sed cui parentes voluerint excepto rapto, eam legitimo copulent matrimonio, quoniam nullo modo nullo tempore datur a nostra serenitate licentia eis consentire, qui hostili more in nostra re publica matrimonium student sibi coniungere. oportet etenim, ut, quicumque uxorem ducere voluerit sive ingenuam sive libertinam, secundum nostras leges et antiquam consuetudinem parentes vel alios quos decet petat et cum eorum voluntate fiat legitimum coniugium" (compare, earlier, *Codex Theodosianus* 9. 24. 1, esp. §2). The ruling seems to address the suspicion (int. al.) that the alleged *raptor* and *rapta* sometimes connived in the allegation to circumvent paternal opposition to their marriage—the same suspicion exploited in several declamatory arguments alleging collusion by the principals: see Quintilian *Declamationes minores* 259, 262. 9 (cf. Seneca *Controversiae* 1. 5. 1, 2, 8, 2. 3. 1, 17, Quintilian *Declamationes minores* 349. 10) and Evans-Grubbs (1989), esp. 67–70.

²⁷ Quintilian *Declamationes minores* 297 "Qui excaecaverit aliquem, aut talionem praebat aut excaecati dux sit." As Margaret Imber has remarked to me, this theme bears comparison with themes of rape in another respect as well: for as the latter concern the "social death" of the *rapta* (below), in this theme the blinded woman is a prostitute—i.e., a woman already socially dead. The theme thus figures some of the same issues of gender and power that we find in the themes of rape.

of the alternatives calls for the essentially reflexive punishment of *talio*: *praebeat talionem*, the law says, translated here as "satisfaction in kind"—in this case literally an eye for an eye. The other alternative calls for an effective punishment, the demand that the blinder serve as the guide of the person he blinded. The one alternative is wholly present-oriented, satisfying a basic, reflex desire for vengeance *now*, in its most direct form, harming the offender in precisely the same way that you have been harmed, without real calculation of your own advantage. The other alternative is future-oriented, making precisely the calculation of needs to come and how they will be met now that the harm has been done.

The parallel with the *lex raptarum* is clear: here as well there are two alternatives very similarly constituted, one an immediate lashing out in revenge, the other conceived with a more consequential, problem-solving intent. The similarity is not quite exact, of course, for the first alternative in the rape law is not precisely a case of *talio*. True *talio*, following a rape, might be castration or, perhaps even more exact, *stuprum per vim inlatum*—that is, forced penetration that would cause a loss of *pudicitia* and so a loss of social standing. (In fact we find reference to both castration and *stuprum* in cases of informal vengeance for adultery: Valerius Maximus 6. 1. 13, cf. Catullus 21, Martial 3. 96.) A kind of deflection or shift seems to have occurred, from true *talio*—the rapist's castration or forcible sodomization—to his death. (Perhaps true *talio* in this instance was regarded as literally a fate worse than death, too terrible for the declaimers to contemplate even in their fictional speeches.) Yet the deflection seems eloquent in itself, yielding a certain sense in terms of the declaimers' culture: for the literal death of the rapist corresponds to and avenges, in eye-for-eye fashion, the social death of the *rapta* that is assumed to be the consequence of rape. After all, the *rapta* is spoken of repeatedly as *vitiata*—literally, "flawed, spoiled," that is, "damaged goods";²⁸ her *pudicitia* has been impaired; what had been her proper identity, as a marriageable maiden who would find a suitable mate ready to take her, has been deeply disfigured, if not destroyed. The actual death of the rapist is the symbolic counterweight to this destruction of identity. Contrarily, the more calcu-

²⁸ E.g. Seneca *Controversiae* 1. 5. 4, 7. 6. 5, 10, 7. 8. 4, 6, 8. 6, 9. 1. 11, Quintilian *Declamationes minores* 259, 262. 7, 270. 16, 18, 309; cf. the language of the law, in which *stuprum* = φθορά (*Digesta* 48. 5. 6. 1).

lated, future-oriented second alternative—marriage to the rapist without dowry—gives effective compensation, providing a means for the *rapta* to continue to have a proper social existence even after the damage has been done, with the person responsible for the damage bearing the cost, like the person who inflicted blindness serving as the guide of the one who was blinded. Rape in declamation is above all assumed to be a crime against property: a taking of the virginity that, with the dowry, is normally bartered for the socially safe haven of marriage.²⁹ The law implies a neat equation in the social economy: the man's life balances the woman's virginity, and the property in the dowry is equivalent in weight and significance to both.

Such neatness appeals to and enacts the world of reason that the school of rhetoric aims to embody. At the same time, these cases of rape have a subtext that conveys an equally improving message for the student of rhetoric: not only does reason work, but the loss of reason—the loss of rational control over oneself and one's actions—has nightmarish consequences, setting the whole world topsy-turvy. For the woman who has been raped finds herself, consequently and paradoxically, empowered as she would never normally be: she is given the power of life and death over the rapist—the *potestas vitae ac necis*, as one of the declaimers puts it, using the phrase that usually defines the *patria potestas*, the power of the Roman patriarch over the members of his household.³⁰ Whatever choice she makes, the consequences are devastating for the rapist: for even if she spares his life and chooses marriage, she bestows what the declaimers characterize as a *beneficium*, a kindness that the recipient is obliged to repay.³¹ The trouble, from the rapist's point of view, is that in this case the kindness can never be fully repaid: he is perpetually the debtor.

To illustrate the Romans' own awareness of this reversal I will conclude by examining one of the declamations whose theme was related at the outset of this chapter (*Declamationes minores* 309). You will recall the story.

²⁹ See, e.g., Quintilian *Declamationes minores* 276. 11 "... in gravissima iniuria, qua virginitatem perdidit, qua florem aetatis amisit, qua prima illa gratia apud maritum futura praerepta est."

³⁰ Quintilian *Declamationes minores* 309. 12 "Potestatem tibi vitae ac necis lex dedit" (to the *rapta*); the *rapta's potestas* or *potentia* is stressed also at Seneca *Controversiae* 1. 5. 3, 7. 8. 1, 3, 9, Quintilian *Declamationes minores* 262. 7, 276. 1.

³¹ See Seneca *Controversiae* 7. 8. 3, Quintilian *Declamationes minores* 247. 10, 251. 1, 3–5, 259. 3, 309. 17, 368. 1.

A woman who had been raped was brought before a magistrate and given the opportunity to choose the death of the man who she said had raped her or marriage to him without dowry. She chose marriage; he, however, denied that he had committed the rape. The matter was taken to court, where he was convicted. After his conviction, he dropped his objection to marrying her. She, however, wished to make her choice anew.

The declamation is spoken from the side of the rapist, who argues against the right of the woman to make a second, and presumably different, choice. The usual introductory *sermo*, or teacher's comment, includes the recommendation that "this young man's approach and delivery (*actio*) will have to be humble (*summissa*)." The sample declamation that follows would in fact sit comfortably on the lips of Uriah Heep. It begins like this:

I can in no way more appropriately aid my case, or do what is demanded by my sense of respectful behavior (*verecundia*), than by thanking this most gentle and clement girl. For though the law gave her all power over me, she in fact leapt at the chance to choose marriage, without my pleading with her, without (and here I must speak plainly) my even admitting the deed; and all this she did so readily, so quickly, that it scarce seemed plausible to me that she had suffered an injury at all. Then, having thanked her, I must make this admission: I was wrong to have hesitated. For what more desirable lot could have befallen me, even if I had not committed the rape? . . .

Still, members of the jury, I recognize that I must first give some explanation for my behavior, lest I seem to have acted cunningly and with evil intent in my denial. You know the many results of (simple) error, you know how much confusion (mere) chance creates, especially when the effects of error and chance are compounded by the darkness of night and the over-free use of unmixed wine. Otherwise, who would ever be a rapist? All unaware as I was, a solid and harmless fellow previously, I was—I cannot now rightly doubt it—deceived and led astray by all these influences: my life had always been such, my desire to protect my upright character had always been such, that I was simply amazed that I did wrong . . . But the very danger that my ignorance produced touched the girl, I believe: she had become convinced that my act was not the result of wanton lust. . . . I also thank the jurors [*viz.*, in the previous rape trial]: they set right the damage that my defiance would have caused; (for) had I won, I would have lost the chance for marriage with this excellent girl. Let us therefore be glad and grateful.

There follows a section, omitted here, which deals with the question of *ius*—that is, whether the woman is permitted, as a matter of law,

to make a second choice. Then the concluding section, as often, takes up the question of *aequitas*, whether it is fair that she make a second choice. The speaker now addresses the *rapta*:

You want to choose twice: even once is a lot. The law gave you power of life and death: for this kind of power to go on and on is worse than regal, worse than tyrannical. The very lightning bolts strike swiftly; the condemned does not fear the executioner's axe forever. . . . Tell me—did I do you any further wrong after the fact? You forgave the fact that I had raped you, you forgave the fact that I had taken away your virginity: fair recompense for *these* acts, you thought, was marriage; do you think death is fair recompense for a proper sense of shame [*verecundia*, which caused him at first to deny the rape]? . . . If you want me to be punished by the lash of fear, I have felt fear; if you want to be begged, I am begging, and I beg you by that clemency that you have already shown, I beg you now as though I were in fact your husband; and I recognize that throughout my entire life I must do what I can to make amends.

If we look at this text as a teaching instrument, we can ask what lessons it could succeed in teaching, beyond the ability to strut and grovel at the same time—an uncommon ability, but one not unique to the culture of Roman declamation. Certainly there are implicit several assumptions about human behavior in general that the speech would tend to reinforce. For example, there is the evident belief that one who has suffered an *iniuria* does not as a rule quickly forgive the perpetrator; in fact, the speech suggests, there is a strong *disincentive* to give ready forgiveness, since that leaves one open to the suspicion that one has not really received an *iniuria* ("all this she did so readily, so quickly, that it scarce seemed plausible to me that she had suffered an injury at all");³² the virtue of *clementia*, the speech teaches, is not an expedient virtue. Similarly striking is the invocation of another virtue to give a decent face to two quite contrasting actions: it was *verecundia*—the regard for others through which one maintains their good opinion—that first moved the speaker to deny the rape, and it is *verecundia* that moves him now to thank the *rapta* for her clement choice of marriage. That *verecundia* would have been best served by choosing not to commit the rape at all is no doubt true, but this is not one of the lessons that the speech tends

³² Cf. Seneca *Controversiae* 7. 8. 6 "nec quicquam magis suspectam faciebat vitatae causam quam lenitas optionis."

to promote. Instead, it is one of the speech's central arguments that rape does not result from willed choice at all but from a confluence of impersonal, external factors: chance, darkness, wine.³³

In the end, however, the mixture of self-congratulation and mealy-mouthed avoidance of responsibility that works its way through this short speech gives way to stark submission. The figure of the woman who has been raped seems to loom over the figure of the begging rapist; and it seems that he will beg forever. The asymmetry that usually characterizes the relations between males and females is here completely reversed: the male is now located on the side of eternal inadequacy.³⁴ There are surely elements of this speech that modern readers find repellent, an affront to our values; just as surely this last tableau would have inspired a shiver of distaste in any Roman male who could place himself, even hypothetically and momentarily, in such a position of utter loss of control.

Control, finally, is what the schools of rhetoric were about. Through their lessons, the young elite males who frequented the schools learned to control their own speech so that they might one day control the opinions of others, in the law courts, in their correspondence, or in conversation. The themes dealing with rape helped to further the goals of instruction by presenting useful test cases that carried with them a key assurance: whatever the mess produced by even the most monstrous acts, the calm surface of social relations, articulated above all by the exchange of property, could be restored by reasoned arguments delivered from a position of objective distance. At the same time a darker, supplementary assurance lurked beneath that calm surface, conveyed by the (misogynistically conceived) vision of the *rapta* who was given the upper hand by the rapist's crime and by the *lex raptarum*. This assurance impressed its weight subliminally upon the student's mind, through repetition in case after case: if you yourself lose control, it said, you will pay. You will pay with your property. You will pay with your dignity. And you will pay forever.

In his indispensable book on Roman declamation, Stanley Bonner pointed with disbelief and dismay at the character of the themes

³³ The link to the motifs of New Comedy is strongest here: see, e.g., Terence *Adelphoe* 469–71, Menander *Epitrepontes* 450–52, with Winterbottom (1984) 453 (on *Declamationes minores* 309. 4), Scafuro (1997) 246–59.

³⁴ Cf. Seneca *Controversiae* 7. 8. 4 "Neminem habere tam obsequentem maritum potes: hic iam nihil negabit."

that were the foundation of the exercise, especially themes of the sort that we have just been considering. "With regard to subject matter," he said, "it is hardly necessary to stress the bad effect upon the young pupil of this concentration on erotic and often sordid themes. . . . [T]he recurrent treatment of adultery and divorce, rape and incest, strikes a modern student as an incredible foundation for education."³⁵ I have tried to suggest a perspective from which this state of affairs might appear a bit less incredible. These 'deplorable' themes, rape included, all provided ways to think through what I have called a "social mess," of the sort that any member of the elite was from birth trained to regard with distaste. How to clean up such a mess—and, no less, how one should learn to fear it—were two valuable lessons that such themes were eminently well suited to teach.

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³⁵ Bonner (1949) 41; cf. Sussman (1994) 15, 17.

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PROBLEMS OF THE PAST IN IMPERIAL GREEK EDUCATION

Joy Connolly

The school itself must be a vital social institution . . . there cannot be two sets of ethical principles, one for life in the school, and the other for life outside of the school.¹

One of the reasons that today's struggles over classroom routine and the canon appear so difficult to resolve is that few participants in the debate agree on the proper goals of education in a modern democracy. John Dewey's once compelling vision of the school as the ethical glue of liberal society, summarized in the epigraph, tends to strike contemporary eyes as infeasible, or worse, as a plea for cultural homogeneity in its most insidiously oppressive form. Quite a different situation manifests itself in the Roman world, where, by the beginning of the imperial period, writers register broad agreement on the ethical and social goals, as well as the practical methods, of elite education. This is not to deny that rhetoricians, philosophers, athletic trainers and literary scholars engage in vigorous debates hinging on the weight allotted to their respective fields in educational theory and practice, and on the moral efficacy of education as a whole; on the contrary, their polemics helped shape major cruxes of ancient intellectual history. Nonetheless, for a time spanning at least five centuries, from the Hellenistic period to the emergence of Christianity as a force in education, no major revolutions in practical pedagogy unfold.

In Henri Marrou's view, the inertia characteristic of pedagogical discourse bears most of the responsibility for later educators' prolonged preservation of the original Hellenistic structure and methods.² In this chapter, I will consider this phenomenon not as a virtue but as a problem, arguing that the radically conservative tendencies of ancient education can become a source of significant strain for authors and teachers striving to equip their audience for contemporary

¹ Dewey (1909) 7, 11.

² Marrou (1956) xiii.

life. This is the case for Greek writers in the Roman empire, whose *paideia*, or cluster of educational beliefs and practices, intensifies its focus on the classical past precisely at a moment when its cultural and political stakes soar in the present.

Greek writers of the empire view themselves as the natural heirs of the fifth- and fourth-century tradition—the “high priests and torch-bearers of its wisdom,” as one writer puts it (*theon hierophantai kai daidouchoi sophias*, [Plutarch] *Moralia* 10e)—and consequently, their conception of education is closely interlocked with the classical discursive structures of rhetoric and politics.³ Imperial Greeks usually simply assume, like Strabo, that any educated man is also a political one, and vice versa (*Geography* 1.1.22). As Josiah Ober points out in this volume, Athenian politics was “intimately associated with public voice,” and the constant exercise of free speech was the key to the democracy’s success (pp. 187–8). Gorgias and other sophists in late fifth century Athens were the first to claim professional expertise in teaching the arts of eloquence that powered the city’s “public voices,” and in their wake, rhetoric assumed a central place in the classical Greek curriculum.⁴

Beginning in the fourth century BC, a series of apologists for rhetoric emerged who stress different aspects of its intellectual, moral and political value, in response to critiques mounted by philosophers as well as citizens concerned with the virtual monopoly on education held by the leisure class.⁵ Aristotle outlines the practical grasp of history and civic affairs, as well as insight into the beliefs and motives of the citizenry, that rhetorical training lends (*Rhetoric* 1356a, 1359b, 1393a–b). To the Attic orators, rhetorical education inculcates legal and social norms, adherence to which the *demos* may test in the course of a speaker’s performance (e.g., Aeschines, *Against Timarchus* 1.27–28).⁶ The claims of these and other writers reappear in expanded and annotated form in imperial writings. Aelius Aristides elaborates on Isocrates’ *Antidosis* (and perhaps Cicero’s *On the Orator*)

³ This tradition is explored in several essays in this volume (Ober, Nightingale, Corbeill); and see Euben (1997), especially “Imploding the Canon: the Reform of Education and the War over Culture” with accompanying bibliography.

⁴ Plato offers a famously critical account of Gorgias’ activities (*Gorgias*, esp. 452d5–e7).

⁵ On the latter see the fundamental analysis of the mass-elite relations in Attic oratory in Ober (1989) 314–40.

⁶ Halperin (1989) and more indirectly, Hesk (1999), examine the revelations of moral character that make up a central part of the Attic orators’ forensic strategies.

in his magisterial speech in defense of rhetoric and rhetorical training (*Or.* 2, esp. 23–5, 235–6). Polemon, a sophist and practicing physiognomist, reiterates the faith of Aristotle and the Attic orators in the morally revelatory utility of public speaking.⁷ Developments in Stoic philosophy of language in the early Hellenistic period helped fuel imperial scholars' interest in the general systematization of grammar, which transformed the study of rhetorical styles, causes, figures and tropes.⁸ If they did not make it an exact science, such taxonomies of eloquence lent rhetorical training an air of rigor and authority, and as such they constituted a vigorous contribution to the continuing post-Platonic debate over the propriety of elite adult men engaging in artificial displays of emotion and other disturbingly theatrical and effeminate behaviors. Answering Plato remains an urgent task for imperial writers dealing with rhetoric and education.⁹

The "second sophistic," the name given by the third century AD writer Philostratus to the Greek literary style of the era, arises from the prominence of so-called "sophists," expert orators who traveled the urban centers of the empire giving epideictic displays, teaching rhetoric, and, often, performing political services as ambassadors to the emperor or as mediators in the frequent disputes for legal and economic supremacy among the competitive eastern *poleis*. Though, numerically speaking, very few students are likely to have aspired to the sophists' profession, their high status, coupled with the epigraphical record of public oratory through the third century AD, testify to rhetoric's fixed location at the center of imperial Greek *paideia*, the obligatory preparation for a youth planning to enter public life.¹⁰ For these students, *paideia* transmits the social and intellectual lore that

⁷ Polemon's *On Physiognomy* is cited and discussed in Gleason (1995) 7ff. (the edition is Förster's, *Scriptores Physiognomonici Graeci*, Leipzig, 1892).

⁸ Atherton (1993) 89ff. Though ornamental styles and appeals to pathos still made up standard parts of the teaching rhetorician's repertoire, alternative handbooks (*technai*) became available that privileged the Stoic perspective on the art of persuasion (cf. *SVF* III.451). Cicero strongly criticizes Stoic writings on rhetoric: *scripsit artem rhetoricam Cleanthes, Chrysippum etiam, sed sic ut si quis obmutescere concupierit nihil aliud legere debeat* ("Cleanthes and Chrysippus also wrote treatises on rhetoric, but in such a style that only one who wishes to keep quiet should read them" (*On Ends* 4.7; cf. *Brutus* 113–6).

⁹ Aristides *Or.* 1, 2, 33, 34; Plutarch *On the Proper Way to Listen to Speeches*; Hermogenes *On Style* 1ff. On the importance of Plato for Greek imperial writers, see De Lacy (1974).

¹⁰ Epigraphical evidence that attests to the continuing importance of public speaking in the Greek imperial city: *IGRR* 3.530 (G. Julius Heliodorus), *IGRR* 4.1643 (Sellius Sulla) and other examples collected and sensitively discussed by Schmitz (1997).

accompanies and advertises personal affluence and good family; and on a broader scale, it functions as a vehicle of specifically Greek cultural identity. It also furnishes the political skills necessary to negotiate the lively scene of local government. All of these are complicated jobs, made more so, as recent scholarship has shown, by the imperial presence of Rome. At the same time, though the acquisition of good literary and artistic taste assumed a proportionally greater role in the student's cultural formation than had been the case in, say, the late classical period, Dio Chrysostom, Plutarch, Aelius Aristides, and others persist in using rhetoric as the compass for their thoughts on education, in keeping with a pedagogical philosophy now centuries old.¹¹ The survival of a rhetorical pedagogy, designed to train students for civic participation through public speech, insures by its face-to-face, communicative nature that education retains a direct connection to citizenship and politics. Rhetorical education reminds its practitioners to ask what sort of *citizen* education should produce.¹²

As democratic Athens, the touchstone of this pedagogy, recedes far into the historical past, this question becomes increasingly difficult to answer. Though Hellenistic Greek and Roman educators—and here I am thinking of rhetoricians and grammarians rather than trainers in athletics or music—continually stress their commitment to a reading list and rhetorical exercises hypothetically based in late classical curricula, the smooth continuity of their claim stands in sharp contrast with the momentous political transitions in progress over the centuries during which it is made.¹³

¹¹ See, for example, Dio *Or.* 18.1–2, Plutarch *Moralia* 801e, and Aristides *Or.* 23.1–4. Later rhetorical writers continue investigating the classical origins of their tradition, such as the identity of the inventor of declamatory exercises that are based on fiction (the candidates being Gorgias, Aeschines, and Demetrius of Phalerum).

¹² The point is worth emphasizing in the wake of Michel Foucault, whose *Care of the Self* (1986) implies that imperial elites largely lost interest in the civic sphere. Recently, political philosophers and scholars of education have begun to rethink the practical capacities of rhetoric in contemporary democracy. Iris Marion Young (1993) 123–131 is one of several scholars who seek ways to put Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative ethics into practice: she claims for rhetoric a newly prominent place in educational and civic practices. Gerald Graff (1987) has instructively traced the disappearance of rhetorical training in elite nineteenth century American universities to the changing role of the wealthy in American politics, where elites turned aside from public leadership in favor of offering advice behind the scenes.

¹³ Marrou (1956) notes: "A historian's first reaction is one of surprise: at first sight it seems strange that the prestige attaching to the art of oratory should have survived the social conditions that had produced it" (195). His answer: "In the eyes

The most pronounced of these begins in the late first century BC with the cessation of the Roman civil wars, which had thrown much of the Mediterranean region into economic and political disarray. In the midst of the conflict Cicero composed *On the Orator*, a blend of Peripatetic rhetorical treatise and Stoic manual of ethical philosophy specially tailored to the Roman context, which reconstituted the proper link between rhetoric and government by presenting Roman statesmen in the guise of rhetoricians—a polemical reminder that the teacher's job is fundamentally political.¹⁴ Not long after Cicero's death, during the consolidation of imperial rule in the decades following the reign of Augustus, Greek and Roman elites saw a distinctly new brand of politics gradually put into place throughout the empire.¹⁵ At Rome, the epicenter of political change, the consequences in store for traditional pedagogy seemed, to some authors, dubious at best: the most telling indicator of their uncertainty is the frequency with which they question the value of oratorical training.¹⁶ Now, in the absence of radical reform of the schools' structure and method, teaching Ciceronian rhetoric (or, for that matter, the classics of earlier Latin literature) entailed the imposition of what were fundamentally *republican* ethics and practices onto imperial education. Ultimately, although the *ars rhetorica* remained the status quo in Rome

of the Ancients eloquence had a truly human value transcending any practical applications that might develop as a result of historical circumstances" (196).

¹⁴ Cicero's argument is based on Isocrates (compare *On Invention* 1.2.2–3 and *On the Orator* 1.1.1 with Isoc. *Antidosis* 254; Diodorus Siculus 1.2.5–6 and Libanius *Ep.* 369.9 express the same opinion). Julius Caesar's sardonic observation that the dictator Sulla "didn't know his ABCs, giving up the dictatorship" speaks to the connection between education and political power from a different angle (*Sullam nescisse litteras, qui dictaturam deposuerit*, Suet. *Div. Jul.* 77). And see Corbeill above: "Roman education was political education" (p. 266).

¹⁵ Of the vast bibliography dealing with the shifts in politics and culture under Augustus, see Syme (1958) and the excellent collection of Raafaub and Toher (1990).

¹⁶ In response to a friend's query as to the propriety of an elected tribune's practicing oratory, the younger Pliny declares: "What matters most is what you think of the tribunate: whether you think it an empty shadow and a name without honor, or a holy power that ought not to be restricted by anyone, even its holder. When I myself was a tribune, perhaps I was wrong to think that I was something—but nonetheless I did give up pleading" (*plurimum refert, quid esse tribunatum putes, inanem umbram et sine honore nomen an potestatem sacrosanctam, et quam in ordinem cogi ut a nullo ita ne a se quidem debeat. ipse cum tribunus essem, erraverim fortasse qui me esse aliquid putavi, sed tamquam essem abstinui causis agendis*, *Ep.* 1.23.1–2). Compare his attack on the decadence of contemporary oratory (*Ep.* 2.14.1–4, 12ff.) and Tacitus' pessimistic observations in *Dialogue on Orators* 28.1ff. and 41; also *Germania* 20.2 and 25.3.

and abroad, Quintilian's own *Institutes of Oratory* reveals the extent to which the old republican justifications for education now had to be differently formulated, in accordance with the shifts taking place in Roman society's traditional networks of ambition, risk, and reward.¹⁷

The consolidation of empire embroils Greek writers in a different ideological tangle, propelled mainly by two developments in Greek intellectual discourse beginning in the first century AD. The first is the growing trend toward classicism in arts and letters, the most extreme manifestation of which is orators' and writers' collective effort to hoist their grammatical and lexical usage to what they considered a "pure" Attic standard (*attikismos*).¹⁸ Looking back to the past for stylistic models and subject matter had been a regular habit in literature and education since the codification of the earliest classical canons in the Hellenistic period, of course (on which see Criboire in this volume); but by the second century AD, the stylistic and thematic privileging of a limited number of classical texts, coupled with an escalating stress on strict adherence to the highest standards of Attic purism, holds a unprecedented grip on cultural production across genres, including epideictic and deliberative speechmaking, historiography, novels and even medical writing.¹⁹ Rhetorical handbooks, biographies of famous rhetoricians and orators, and essays on education attest to the spread of classicism to classroom routines. In sum, the impact of classicism on a pedagogical discourse already near frozen by centuries of traditionalist practice is significant.

The second factor complicating imperial Greek educational discourse is the disquieting awareness that the "search for classical

¹⁷ Vespasian's award of an official teaching post to Quintilian, an advocate of politically engaged rhetorical education in a Ciceronian mode, suggests that at least a few Roman educators who remained committed to their profession's political orientation gained imperial sanction under the middle principate. Quintilian responded by redirecting republican interest in the development of youthful virtue along an increasingly conservative trajectory of self-scrutiny and intolerance of difference—transforming the republican ethics of manly decorum from a means toward virtue into the end of the pedagogical process. Treating oratorical training, especially declamation, as lessons in maintaining the social order was another approach, discussed by Kaster in this volume (p. 334).

¹⁸ The most extensive treatment of Atticism as a literary phenomenon is Schmid (1897) who concludes that Atticism was a sectarian movement designed to appeal only to a small number of elite initiates (I.21–6). From the wholly different perspective of the philosophical debate over the ontology of correct usage (*hellenismos*), see the excellent introduction of Blank (1998) to Sextus Empiricus' *Against the Grammarians*.

¹⁹ Swain (1996) usefully discusses Galen's desire to prove that he can Atticize, even if he chooses not to do so (56–63).

Greece" that imperial classicism represents was not undertaken by Greeks alone.²⁰ "Do you not see?" Lucian asks a friend considering a job as a *didaskalos* in a Roman house:

They [the Romans] are quite wasted away with longing for the wisdom of Homer, the awesome power of Demosthenes, or the great mind of Plato . . . but really, [the master of the household] does not want you for these things at all, but since you've got a long beard, you are respectable in appearance and are neatly dressed in a Greek robe, and everyone thinks you are a grammarian or a rhetorician or a philosopher, it seems good to him to have such a man mingled with his retinue; for he'll seem to be a lover of Greek learning and a refined lover of beauty in the area of education. So, my noble friend, instead of your amazing speeches, it turns out that you've sold your beard and robe for a salary (*On Service in a Rich Household* 25).²¹

Lucian's satire should be seen in the context of the elder Pliny's claim that Italy now grants civilization to the world (*humanitatem homini*, *NH* 3.39), and the self-important tone of Fronto's exhibitions of *paideia* (e.g., *Epistles* 1.5, 6.1; *To Caesar* 3.8).²² Above all, this is a question of cultural ownership. Who owns *paideia*? The Greeks, with whom it originated, or the Romans, conqueror-custodians of much of the known world? As Peter Brown observes in his work on Greek

²⁰ The phrase is used by Elsner (1992) 5 and Woolf (1994) 125. See Alcock (1997) 109: "Maintenance of a separate cultural identity, one insistent on 'specialness' and privilege, colored the Greek relationship to Rome, and their responses to Roman rule. In return, Romans maintained the Greeks in a 'cognitive position' vis-à-vis themselves, unlike that of any other conquered people. Throughout the early imperial period, Greeks and Romans were engaged in a tense dialogue of 'cultural mapping,' of mutual self-definition and aggressive maintenance of boundaries."

²¹ οὐχ ὄρας;—ἐκτετήκασι τῷ πόθῳ τῆς Ὀμήρου σοφίας ἢ τῆς Δημοσθένους δεινότητος ἢ τῆς Πλάτωνος μεγαλοφροσύνης, δέϊται δὲ σου ἐπ' ἐκείνα μὲν οὐδαμῶς, ἐπεὶ δὲ πάγωνα ἔχεις βαθὺν καὶ σεμνός τις εἶ τὴν πρόσωπον καὶ ἱμάτιον Ἑλληνικὸν εὐσταλῶς περιβέβλησαι καὶ πάντες ἴσασι σε γραμματικὸν ἢ ῥήτορα ἢ φιλόσοφον, καλὸν αὐτῷ δοκεῖ ἀναμειγῆσθαι καὶ τοιοῦτόν τινα τοῖς προϊούσι καὶ προπομπεύουσιν αὐτοῦ· δόξει γὰρ ἐκ τούτου καὶ φιλομαθῆς τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν μαθημάτων καὶ ὅλως περὶ παιδείαν φιλόκαλος, ὥστε κινδυνεύεις, ὦ γενναῖε, ἀντὶ τῶν θαυμαστῶν λόγων τὸν πάγωνα καὶ τὸν τρίβωνα μεμισθωκέναι.

²² Voices with a different perspective are to be heard as well, of course: the younger Pliny advises an acquaintance newly appointed to a political post in Achaia, "Remember that you have been sent to the province of Achaia, to the true and genuine Greece, where *humanitas*, literature, and even agriculture, they say, are believed to have been invented. You have been sent to set in order the status of free cities" (*cogita te missum in provinciam Achaïam, illam veram et meram Graeciam, in qua primum humanitas litterae etiam fruges inventae esse creduntur; missum ad ordinandum statum liberarum civitatem*, *Ep.* 8.24.2; also 4, 5, 7 and Cicero, *Epistles to his Brother* I.1.16, 27; Vitruvius *On Architecture* 2.8.12).

learning in the Roman empire of a slightly later date, "The *paideia* which sons of notables had absorbed . . . was held to be permanently relevant to their subsequent careers . . . The ideal of a cultivated governor, the carefully groomed product of a Greek *paideia*, was a commonplace."²³ Under the Antonine emperors, Roman interest and investment in *paideia* materially increased, posing a dilemma for Greek writers who, in their intensive quest to imitate and re-enact the classical past, sought to repossess it for themselves.

To explain the classicizing tendencies prevailing in second century concepts of education and literature, recent scholarship has bound these two factors together, arguing that the demoralized political situation of the aristocracies in the Greek-speaking provinces leads to conscious attempts to recall the past through linguistic and literary archaizing, in order simultaneously to enhance Greek cultural pride and to exclude Romans from participation in the practices of Greek heritage. "To reassure themselves that Greece had a claim comparable to that of Rome," E. L. Bowie concludes in a much-cited essay on the imperial sophists, "they began to dwell more and more, in their principal cultural activities, on the political greatness of the past . . . [T]heir absorption in the Greek past complemented their acquiescence in the politically defective Roman present."²⁴ From this perspective, the voices defining or representing educational trends—rhetoricians, orators, grammarians, poets and historians—appear unified in their support of linguistic purism and a thorough grounding in "the books of old," as they called the fifth and fourth century classics (*ta ton archaion*), and in their deployment of a classicizing *paideia* as a strategy in the struggle to maintain Hellenic independence in the face of the military domination, linguistic contamination and cultural encroachment of Rome.

There is no doubt that changes in the Greek political experience beginning in the first century AD exert pressure on concepts and practices of *paideia* which manifest themselves most clearly in the ascendance of classicism, and more specifically, Atticism. There is a

²³ Brown (1988) 38; with reference to the Antonine period, see Brown (1978) 27–32.

²⁴ Bowie (1973) 209. See the extended discussion of Swain (1996) 29–42, 65–100, esp. 40–41: "Internal politics and the dangers of linguistic change [in Koine] are the major reasons for the project; but the existence of Latin is surely another . . . educated Greek resisted Latin because it was contaminating the purity of the language."

great deal of comparative evidence in modernity for the desire of colonized groups to erect a putatively purified version of their past as a banner of difference and superiority; and the conservative tendencies of education already prevailing in antiquity would have encouraged such a move.²⁵ However, the story does not end here. There are internal discursive conflicts in Greek imperial writings on education that bespeak a more complex array of views on the consequences of classicism for contemporary society. With the political background in mind, after very briefly laying out the framework of a typical imperial education, I would like to examine some unresolved tensions bound up in the paideutic turn to the past within the writings of the classicizing movement itself, and between those writings and the practices of contemporary rhetorical schools. These fragments of imperial educational discourse should help to nuance the current scholarly preoccupation with *paideia* as a weapon in Greek and Roman cultural wars.²⁶ Later on, I will suggest that these tensions provide a new context in which to consider the imagery of struggle and contestation that marks imperial representations of *paideia* in action.

Two problems must be addressed before proceeding any further. First, one might say that it is misleading, if not illogical, to speak in very broad terms about a single "Greek" political, cultural, or even pedagogical experience. The Romans drew sharp economic and political distinctions among Greek-speaking cities, extending trade benefits to some and legal sovereignties to others—a policy contemporary writers knew well.²⁷ On a less tangible level is the higher status, in the Mediterranean cultural imaginary, held by cities in Achaea and the Aegean, as compared to cities in areas farther east and south, where Hellenic culture necessarily signifies a variety of different things. "Your fine old Hellenic customs are your ornament," Dio Chrysostom tells an audience in Rhodes, "so that whenever someone comes to visit you, even if he happens to be a barbarian, he knows right away that he's not somewhere in Syria or Cilicia, where unless a man hears the name of a place called, say, 'the Lyceum' or 'the Academy,'

²⁵ A useful introduction to Indo-English novelists' use of myth for this purpose is Afzal-Khan (1993), especially on R. K. Narayan.

²⁶ A preoccupation that (I should note) I generally share.

²⁷ Jones (1940) 270–6 outlines the basic issues; but now see Alcock (1997), building on her earlier work in (1993) 17–32, 223.

he can't tell where he is" (*Or.* 31.163).²⁸ In what follows I do not wish to ignore the factors potentially differentiating the paideutic needs of, say, Rhodes and Cilicia, but I will approach the sources on the terms of their own self-conception as cosmopolitan Hellenes, unified in the face of barbarism.²⁹ Second, it is worth registering that the attitudes toward education I will describe are evident in Latin texts as well. Unfortunately, it is impossible in a study of this length to give proper attention to the imperial Roman school and its very different contexts (which would lead, I think, to significantly different conclusions), and so I have limited my comments to Greek sources, in the hope that they will also bear upon future interpretations of Latin education, particularly in the provinces.

Past perfects: the classical canon in a new context

The learned man, or *pepaideumenos*, is a type whose consistency of feature over time and space is the product of the nearly identical teaching methods of the liberal arts (*egkyklios paideia*) across the Greek-speaking empire. Teresa Morgan's recent comparison of dictation drills surviving on papyrus shows remarkably little change in the content and even the order of exercises used by teachers of young school-children across the empire for nearly a millennium.³⁰ Imperial students' "reading list" consists of Homeric epic, the bedrock of classical Athenian education, and a small number of prose and poetry works. Dio Chrysostom's version of the list begins with Menander and Euripides, doubles back to Homer "first, middle and last" (*prôtos kai mesos kai hystatos*), and ends with Herodotus and Thucydides, several orators, and Xenophon (*Or.* 18.6–17).³¹ Exercises in dictation and

²⁸ ὑμᾶς κοσμεῖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἀρχαῖον καὶ Ἑλληνικόν, τὸ παρ' ὑμῖν μὲν ὅταν τις γένηται, εὐθὺς αὐτὸν ἀποβάντα εἶδέναι, κὰν τύχη βάρβαρος ὢν, ὅτι οὐ πάρεστιν εἰς τινα πόλιν τῆς Συρίας ἢ τῆς Κιλικίας· παρ' ἄλλοις δέ, ἂν μὴ τις ἀκούσῃ τοῦ τόπου τὸ ὄνομα, φέρε εἰπεῖν ὅτι καλεῖται Λύκειον ἢ Ἀκαδήμεια, μὴθὲν διαφέρειν.

²⁹ In his division between Hellenes and *barbaroi*, Dio does not create a separate group for Romans: further discussion of this passage in Jones (1978) 34, and generally, Elsner (1992) and Woolf (1994).

³⁰ Morgan (1998) 3–7.

³¹ Dio's list also includes the "Socratic authors" (18.13), and a few other authors of "second rank" still worth reading (Theopompus, 10). Lyric, elegy, iambics and dithyrambs are only suitable for leisure reading (σχολήν, 8). On the pedagogical popularity of Euripides, see Criboire in this volume.

prose paraphrase would be written in approximations of Attic dialect and employ the lexicon of whichever professionally sanctioned list the teacher considered suitable.³² The degree to which grammatical and rhetorical drills encouraged the student to perfect his mimesis of ancient speech and literature is suggested not only by the repetitive nature of the extant exercises on papyrus, but by Philostratus, in whose *Lives* of contemporary sophists it is commonplace to say that a speaker plausibly “Hippiasizes” (<*hippiazô*) or “Kritiasizes” (<*kritiazô*). Plutarch attacks those who take this habit too far, imitating Aristotle’s lisp, Plato’s stoop, and Alexander’s characteristically up-twisted neck (*Mor.* 26b, 53c–d). Ground zero for a properly Atticizing *pepaideumenos* would have involved avoiding errors of pronunciation and grammar—always substituting the characteristically Attic double t for every double s, and scrupulously reinserting the optatives that had dropped out of Koine, for example—and monitoring against lapses into non-Attic diction. In short, the goal was to escape gaffes like those recounted by Lucian, who greeted a Roman governor in the early morning with a phrase used only in the evening (*On a Slip of the Tongue* 1).³³ Because of the role played by *paideia* in proclaiming class status and creating politically important bonds of *philia* based on shared knowledge and behavior patterns, such mistakes were said (and presumably believed) to cripple a career.

Recent scholarship has demonstrated the important role played by rhetorical education in training youth in the practices of the putatively natural *habitus* of elite manliness.³⁴ No other training more effectively compelled bodily and mental habits to conform with the ideology of mastery over self and others that was an integral part of elite self-conception, embodied in the upright carriage and refined gestures that the fledgling *pepaideumenos* polished to perfection under a rhetorician’s tutelage. There he also acquired the oratorical and historical knowledge required for participation in the governing council (*boulê*) and the public assembly (*ekklêsia*), both of which remained central parts of the urban scene, the active residue, so to speak, of classical democratic practice.

³² The lexicon itself was a matter of dispute: see Athenaeus *Sophists at Dinner* 97c–122e.

³³ See also Lucian’s *On the False Critic*. Swain (1996) 42–64 helpfully discusses the practices of purism.

³⁴ Gleason (1995) on imperial Greek sophists; on Quintilian, Connolly (1998) and Gunderson (1998).

The *progymnasmaton* and *meletê*, the rhetorical exercises in which the student assumed the voices of characters from myth and history to gain practice in epideictic, deliberative and forensic types of speech-making, were not entirely removed in structure and style, then, from his future experience in the council and assembly. Where the archaizing orientation holds clear sway is the choice of voice and theme. Steadfast disregard for current and recent events is the rule: from the perspective of these exercises, history virtually comes to an end with Alexander's conquest of Greece. Examples best illustrate the five sources dominating the handbooks: ahistorical fables ("monkeys debate whether to found a city," [Hermogenes] *Progymnasmata* 1.20ff.), Homeric and tragic narratives (Medea, [Herm.] *Prog.* 2.16–19; the Trojan war, Aphthonius *Prog.* 10.29), philosophical and ethical questions (Aphthonius on marriage, *Prog.* 13.109ff., cf. Theon *Prog.* 12.242ff.), and of course Attic oratory (Aesch. *Against Timarchus*, in Theon *Prog.* 7.224; various works of Demosthenes, Theon *Prog.* 1.150ff.). For epideictic orations that demanded attention to present circumstances, such as the praise of a city or the current ruler, the student consulted the lists of suitable figures and tropes collected in many contemporary handbooks.³⁵ Whether ancient speeches were simply re-enacted or rephrased, or new compositions on traditional themes were elaborated with classical allusions and argumentative techniques, constant practice accustomed the student to speak and behave according to the classicizing norm.

Though Greek imperial authors are fond of emphasizing the importance of the *pepaideumenos*' external self-fashioning—an interesting stance, as recent studies in social constructionism help to show—simply looking the part was not enough. Entering public space in the garb and posture of an educated man invited the scrutiny of one's peers.³⁶ In his description of one dishonest impersonator, Lucian shows the extent to which "private" refinement is a public affair (*On*

³⁵ Examples provided in Philostratus' *Lives*: on Persian War strategy (Isaeus, 514); Demosthenes' speeches against Leptines or after Chaeronea (522, 527); the Spartan reaction to Sphacteria (528); also Polemon's *Progymnasmata*, two versions of the funeral oration at Marathon. Anderson (1993) 47–68 usefully collects further examples. It is worth noting that (according to the handbooks) students would act out quite unusual voices, notably hysterical female parts such as Niobe, Hecuba and Andromache (e.g., Aphthonius *Prog.* 11.102–3, [Hermogenes] *Prog.* 9.44).

³⁶ And in some cases, the ridicule of the uneducated: on the admittedly special case of philosophers, see Dio on the consequence of external appearance (*Or.* 72).

an Ignorant Book-Collector). An uneducated man must not hold a book in his hand whenever he walks outside, for instance, because his inability to discuss the work with passersby would make him an object of serious ridicule (18). The sophist Favorinus also dwells on the issue of *paideia*'s authenticity: even if a man is a Roman by birth (Favorinus himself was from Gaul), he may become truly Greek not only in language but in "thought, manners, and appearance" (*gnomên, diaitan, schêma*) if "among the Athenians he atticizes his speech, among the Spartans he loves the gymnasium, and in every other place he talks philosophy" ([Dio Chrysostom], *Or.* 37.25–26).³⁷ Hermogenes' introduction to *On Style* criticizes students who try to improve their style by simply copying the ancients, instead of acquiring knowledge of them (1.10).³⁸

It is not easy to identify the nature of a political career in this period with great certainty, in part because extant texts are likely to give an unreliably high estimate of the importance of oratory's role in political practice.³⁹ However, it is possible to say that under the Roman empire, political deliberation before the *dêmos* on matters of economy and external relations seems to have been largely a matter of form. The political decisionmaking that mattered occurred on the comparatively intimate scale of the *boulê*, which gradually evolved into an exclusively aristocratic group that granted seats solely on the basis of birth and wealth.⁴⁰ At the same time, precisely because the *boulê* was face-to-face territory whose boundaries *paideia* helped define, the mental and physical behaviors that years of rhetorical training put in place served as necessary markers of class and cultural achievement. But *paideia* was not simply a sign of belonging to the world of the *boulê*: it materially aided deliberation and negotiations. The intervention of Roman officials in unsettled or inefficiently organized provincial areas represented a constant and odious threat which the imperial oligarchies sought to avoid by maintaining harmony (*homonoia*)

³⁷ The passage is a striking comment on the power of *paideia* to change a person's identity: ὅτι Ῥωμαῖος ὦν ἀφ᾽ ἑλληνίσθη, ὥσπερ ἡ πατρίς ἢ ὑμετέρα, παρὰ Ἀθηναίους δέ, ὅτι ἀττικίζει τῇ φωνῇ, παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις δέ, ὅτι φιλογυμναστέι, παρὰ πᾶσι δέ, ὅτι φιλοσοφεῖ.

³⁸ It should be noted that Hermogenes' route to knowledge involves careful study of rhetorical handbooks like his own, rather than the systematic reading of ancient texts.

³⁹ A point very effectively made by Brunt (1994) 34–35.

⁴⁰ On the political condition of Greek cities, Jones (1940) is still useful, esp. 170–191; Deininger (1971) holds a fairly optimistic view of the *dêmos*' power, whereas de Ste. Croix (1981) 300–315 is pessimistic.

in city bounds and on the provincial level. Epideictic speeches in a deliberative mode, like those performed by Dio Chrysostom and Aelius Aristides before the assemblies of Alexandria, Rhodes, Smyrna, Nicomedia and many other eastern cities are showpiece examples of the kind of oratory used to dampen tension between cities and address factional disputes within them. The oratorical skills possessed by members of the imperial oligarchies oiled the decision-making machines of deliberation on which the smooth operation of city and province alike depended.

Together, the grammarian and rhetorician bore the heavy responsibility for the student's successful entry into this competitive world. As one writer puts it, the teacher is both farmer and an animal-trainer ([Plutarch], *On the Upbringing of Children* 4c, 12b-c): under his influence, the finished product of *paideia* is changed beyond recognition from his original unpolished self, every utterance, gesture and thought reworked according to the imagined norms of an earlier age—which was also, it must be recalled, a democratic age.

This last is a factor that acutely exacerbates the teacher's already formidable task. Though figures from classical Greece are expected to serve as models for the imperial student's ethical and intellectual formation—for which reason he replicates a classical accent and style, and immerses himself in ancient history—the dissonance between the political context of classical textual production and the imperial present disallows a simple ideological occlusion by which the glories of the past may compensate for or remedy the discontents of the present. Specifically, the intense focus on the Attic orators and historiographers fostered by the classicizing curriculum gives rise to two ethical systems, one inside and one outside the schools, existing in conflict with the other's values and practices—precisely the condition attacked by John Dewey, we may recall from the epigraph to this chapter, in his 1909 essay on American public education. Closer examination of a set of writers discussing contemporary education will show that placing these two ethical systems under the same yoke—that is, putting democratic Athenian texts to work inculcating an imperial elite *habitus*—may be performed only through an intricate process of selection, revision, recontextualization and censorship; and even then those texts show signs of escaping the ideological controls placed upon them. Imperial praise of the past, we will see, is not always what it seems.

*Refiguring the classical past**Rhetorical redescription*

An anonymous essay on the upbringing of children that survives in Plutarch's *Moralia* crystallizes the issues in its first few paragraphs. The author begins by placing education firmly in the context of civic participation by drawing attention to the proper manner of conceiving a child. In order to have virtuous and happy children who will blend adult philosophical interests with an active political life, men are advised not to father bastards, since they will never possess the ability to speak freely (*parrhêsia*, 1b).⁴¹ This point is quickly dropped, however, in favor of the real significance of noble birth, which turns out to be not its consequences for unencumbered participation in public or private discourse, but its endowment of a sense of natural superiority. A story about Themistocles' son drives the message home: "they say he often told many people that whatever he wished was agreed to by the *dêmos*; for whatever he wanted, his mother wanted; whatever his mother wanted, Themistocles wanted; and whatever Themistocles wanted, all the Athenians did as well" (c1). The treatise's first classical *exemplum* (*paradeigma*), and also its first reference to the Athenian political system, this small anecdote sets the tone for the entire piece, which refigures classical democratic practice in imperial terms—in this case, transforming the connection between free social status and free and authoritative public speech into a young man's boastful self-satisfaction in his high birth, described in the context of undemocratic behind-the-scenes domestic diplomacy.⁴²

Earlier, I claimed that every ancient educator is concerned with the civic consequences of his pedagogical program, which is to say, what kind of citizen it might ideally produce. In the case of pseudo-Plutarch, for all his use of quotations and *exempla* drawn from the democratic context, we may easily summarize the answer: an obedient man who conforms in every respect to social rules of courtesy

⁴¹ The condition of the ideally virtuous and happy man is explicated more clearly at 8b.

⁴² Similarly, the first reference to Spartan government consists of an amusing story about a short queen, who, pseudo-Plutarch imagines, will produce unsuitably short kings: the story promotes a "natural" investment in class hierarchies further developed at 8e–f. For *paradeigma*, I will use the more familiar Latin term *exemplum/a* below.

and taste in a non-democratic city.⁴³ He establishes an emphasis on submission and conformity at the very start through a series of metaphors, from tamed wild beasts (2d, 3b), to branches straightened by force (2d–e) and warm sealing-wax impressed into molds (3f). Basic rules of conduct, “to practice the simple life, to restrain the tongue, to be above anger, and to control the hands,” accompanied later by a list of Pythagorean maxims, systematize his vision (10b, 12d–f). Its strongest expression appears in the author’s recommendation to train children to accept defeat with grace, for “there is such a thing as a Cadmean victory” (10a–b). In the end, the good child will learn to shun disagreement with his peers, to bend in the face of resistance, to restrain sensations of anger or injustice, to speak in a style designed to appeal to the few rather than the many, and to avoid offending those in power.⁴⁴ All these traits stand in opposition to the world of *parrhêsia* that opened the essay, and in fact stand at an uneasy distance from the philosophical and political context out of which most of the *exempla* are drawn.

In fact it is in the essay’s manipulation of the *exempla* that the rhetorical strategizing required to put classicism to work in an educational treatise is laid bare. The *exemplum* is an essential part of ancient educational method for ethics and rhetoric alike. Its usage in imperial Greek writing, however, and especially in this essay, belies the traditional scholarly approach to it as a straightforward “model” or “ideal mirror” of contemporary practice.⁴⁵ Stylistically and semantically speaking, to use an *exemplum* is to shear away the historical conditions that produced it in the first place, which not only permits the relocation of the *exemplum* in a context better suited to a given ideological blueprint, but in some cases, allows the notional erasure of characteristics that contrapose that blueprint. Viewed in this light, *exempla* constitute an ideologically motivated rhetorical strat-

⁴³ Atherton (1998) provocatively examines the role of grammatical training in encouraging submissive attitudes toward authority the Roman empire; and see my conclusion below.

⁴⁴ The essay’s long section dealing with the necessity of resisting flatterers (*kolakes*, 12f–13d) is best understood, I think, as a counterweight to the essay’s call for training in submission: on the one hand, the flatterers themselves represent a perversion of obedience (they are “slaves by choice,” *proairesai de douloi*, 13c); on the other, they pervert the courtesy and pliancy of properly educated youths, who are vulnerable to their wiles.

⁴⁵ Duff (2000) represents the latest such treatment.

egy that inscribes highly selective memories into the text. They facilitate a controlled (mis)reading of the classical past.⁴⁶

This is conspicuously clear in pseudo-Plutarch's treatment of Plato, Archytas of Tarentum, Socrates, Pericles, and Demosthenes, the *exempla* for his secondary theme, self-restraint (the complement to obedience and conformity). Archytas is described as preventing himself from beating an incompetent hireling; Plato does the same when faced with a gluttonous slave. Socrates appears in two anecdotes: he makes jokes at the expense of a violent youth who has kicked him, instead of responding in kind (10c); and when asked whether he is angry at Aristophanes for composing the *Clouds*, he answers, "Not at all: when I'm ridiculed in the theater it's just like being in a big symposium" (10d). Lifting these three figures cleanly out of their intellectual and civic context enables the author to control his reader's vision of classical Athens, now rewritten as aristocratic domestic space on a miniature scale. A scenario reminiscent of Greek New Comedy neatly divides the private homes of Plato and Archytas into the hierarchy of good master and criminal servant, where the ethical stakes are low and their honorable behavior has no effect outside the household. Socrates' joking remark makes the public polemics of the democratic theater, and the potentially extremely serious consequences of Aristophanes' comedy for Socrates himself, equivalent to the fashionable banter of the symposium. In his confrontation with the violent youth, Socrates is mobilized as a model of perfect tact who successfully averts vengeful conflict with his attacker through humor, in line with the author's previous exhortation that children bear injury with submissive grace (10a). These two representations (mis)direct the reader away from other textual and historical aspects of Socrates' relation to speech and conflict, from his use of the negative elenchus in the Platonic dialogue to his eventual choice of death over withdrawal from Athens' public eye.

Similarly, when Pericles and Demosthenes appear as the essay's model representatives of oratory, they are praised not for their eloquence, but instead for those moments when they choose to remain silent, which the writer characterizes as proof of their obedience to social convention (6d-e).⁴⁷ Like Socrates, Demosthenes and Pericles

⁴⁶ The phrase "controlled (mis)reading" is drawn from Goldhill (2000).

⁴⁷ This account of rhetorical vice explains the author's earlier apologies for the blunt style of language employed by Aristippus and Diogenes (4f, 5c).

may serve as models only because the reader encounters them in carefully tailored—in this case, literally silenced—versions that accord with the author's unmistakably contemporary agenda.⁴⁸

Pseudo-Plutarch's problem with rhetorical training, which is first described, tellingly, as the "panegyric babble" taught in the schools (*panēgyrikon leron*), is the threat it poses to the young man's acquisition of a morally healthy education (*[paideias] adiaphthorou kai hygainouses*, 6a). Learning to "please the many," or "the rabble" (*to gar tois pollois areskein . . . tois syrphetodesin ochlois*, 6b), leads to not only moral decay but, worst of all, loquacious rudeness (*polulogian, ametrian*, 6c). This reading of the vices of oratory replaces the stuff of traditional philosophical and political critiques directed toward rhetoric's ethical and civic failings—exemplified in Plato's *Gorgias* and *Republic* or Sextus Empiricus' *Against the Rhetoricians*—with a focus on the normative socialization of taste. Why? The illustrative examples of vice suggest an explanation. They consist of Greeks who lose control of their tongues, offend their kings (Alexander, Ptolemy Philadelphus, and Antigonos) and are punished (11a–d). If it is not exactly the writer's literal concern to warn his reader to avoid angering rulers—how many of those readers would ever meet the Roman emperor?—it is the image that to him best communicates *paideia's* goal: to accustom young men to obey those in authority (*archousin hypeikein*, 7e). In the end, oratory, the deliberative and forensic vehicle of Athenian democracy, is transformed into a matter of good taste and courtesy; and the field of cultural knowledge gained from the writings of classical Greeks is shifted away from politics to the social conventions of imperial oligarchy. The *exempla* operate as metaphors of conformity in their own right, in so far as praise and imitation of them (on however skewed a basis) figures the acts of social obedience pseudo-Plutarch advocates throughout the essay.

Much educational theory involves decisions about censorship: what should the student learn, and what kinds of literature, history, or art must be hidden from him or her? Plato's educational theory in the *Republic* is one of the earliest and most explicit engagements with the problem. There, Socrates makes censorship and deception central to

⁴⁸ This civic or political agenda is one of several, such as promoting proper notions of domestic life, and contemporary movements in philosophy valorizing endurance and passivity (on which see Shaw 1985 and esp. 1996, though pseudo-Plutarch is not a Stoic).

the experience of the citizenry (*Rep.* 414c–415c). That censorship is appropriate Socrates establishes on the grounds that behavior is largely constituted by and through what men and women hear throughout life (*logoi*, 376c–77c).⁴⁹ Consequently, these stories must be rewritten so that the models for imitation they present are virtuous in a strict sense, unadulterated by inconsistency and error (395b–396a; cf. 602a). The difficulty, Socrates admits in his extended analogy between virtue and poetic performance, is that vicious performances in a “mixed” style are “by far the most pleasing to boys and their teachers, and to the mob as well” (397d). By contrast, pseudo-Plutarch’s use of *exempla* fulfill Plato’s standards of representational virtue. As signs that present an abbreviated, “single” face to their reader, *exempla* may be defined and redefined with facility. This particular essay exploits what we may call the semiotic maneuverability of the *exemplum* in order to disengage its historical referents from their original polyvalent, and thus troublesome, Athenian context.

Engineering a limited view of the past, however, introduces its own set of problems for pedagogical practice. *The Rhetoric Teacher*, one of Lucian’s satirical essays on education, concerns itself directly with the way in which the one-sided and repetitive use of *exempla* makes them vulnerable to further (mis)readings. This piece confronts the reader with two paths of rhetorical training, the “hard” and the “soft,” each supervised by the appropriate teacher (7). Neither escapes Lucian’s satire. The teacher guiding the student on the rough road to eloquence is an imposter (*alazôn*), an “old man of Kronos’ time” who “puts dead men up for imitation,” and to make matters worse, not even in war-time, when their antiquated speeches may have some use (10). He utters gibberish (*lerous*) about Demosthenes and Plato, and severely punishes the smallest deviation from their Attic path (9). The instructor of the soft road is a weak effeminate who recommends memorizing fifteen or twenty Attic words, and using recent exercises (*meletai*) as classical cribs: “Mention Marathon and Cynegeirus everywhere . . . pack in Salamis, Artemisium, and Plataea,” he says, and the crowds will be astonished “at your appearance, voice, gait, your striding about, your sing-song tone, your sandals, and those ‘divers things’ (Attic dialect *ta atta*) of yours” (18, 20). Whereas the two teachers share many vices, notably vainglory and ignorance, their

⁴⁹ Ober (1998) 224–6.

worst faults are strikingly different, and that difference makes the significance of classicism clear. The soft rhetorician is attacked for his deceitful effeminacy; the hard rhetorician, for his obsession with ancient history and oratory. Lucian's invective sets up the traditional Greek suspicion of cunning feminine persuasion, embodied in the soft teacher, as the satirical counterweight to the classicizing trend espoused by his tough-minded but equally useless colleague: in doing so, it tars effeminacy and classicizing pedantry with the same brush.

This and other Lucianic satires along similar lines, such as *Service in a Rich Household* and *On a Slip of the Tongue*, represent important dissenting voices in reaction to second century classicism.⁵⁰ On a practical basis, Lucian's assault on classicism reveals the dangers involved in the distillation of classical events and characters into the *exempla* and the aphorisms that are so prominent in imperial handbooks and treatises on education. The satire's double attack on both the hard and the soft instructors questions the basis on which contemporary education may authenticate either intellect or good character. Even if the *pepaideumenos*' knowledge of classical Greek texts and history is genuine, the nature of rhetorical training metamorphoses that knowledge into an act: whether the student follows Hermogenes' advice to gain familiarity with the ancients or he chooses simply to imitate them (*On Style* 1.10), the past threatens to end up as parody.

Rhetoric revisited

What kind of rhetoric, then, is appropriate for the imperial student? Completely different in tone from Lucian's satires, but similar in their inability to settle on a good path for rhetorical training, are Aelius Aristides' speech against Plato's *Gorgias* (*Or.* 2) and Plutarch's essays on *Political Advice* (*Mor.* 798a–825a) and *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend* (*Mor.* 48e–74e). Aristides tries to refute Plato's arguments by treating all kinds of public utterance as oratory, from Homer to prayers to the gods; ultimately, however, he abandons the purpose of rhetoric in a non-democratic context as an unanswerable question. Times have changed, his long speech concludes, and men may at least hope to gain something from practicing oratory at home alone (2.428).

⁵⁰ The essays are usually ignored or treated as products of Lucian's "insecurity" about his Samosatran origins: so Swain (1996) 45–9.

In his attempt to shape democratic oratory to the demands of a classicizing *paideia*, Plutarch maps out an unsteady path between the vices and virtues of Athens, and their (lack of) utility for his readers. As proof of his initial claim in *Political Advice*, that training in eloquence is necessary for good citizenship, he adduces the *exempla* of Pericles and Nicias, and develops a long comparison between leaders and ship-captains: the texture of his language here owes a good deal to Thucydides, Plato's *Gorgias*, and Demosthenes' *Olynthiacs* and *Philippics*. This line of argument ends abruptly, however, with Plutarch's admission that provincial Greece requires no military leadership, no anti-tyrannical revolutions, no formation of brilliant alliances. The solution, he suggests, is to engage in public lawsuits and imperial embassies, suitable duties for courageous and intelligent men—but this passage initiates a narrative swerve away from present concerns to anecdotes of ancient corruption, tyranny, factionalism, political clubs and military honors resolutely based in a non-imperial context (805b–813a). It is when Plutarch returns to comment directly on the politics of the present that his conflicted views over the proper nature of rhetorical education begin to emerge clearly, and in the end, the message of paideutic submission in the pseudo-Plutarchan essay makes a forceful reappearance.

In the final third of the essay, Plutarch turns to the malice directed toward politicians in every city governed by the people (*panti demo*, 813a). His reader may escape this only if he learns to put deceitful oligarchic tactics to work behind the scenes of the democratic oratory Plutarch has praised earlier in the essay (esp. 803e–804b). Powerful men must conceal their alliances and play-act in the assembly: they may oppose the law, and later claim to be convinced; thus they will carry the people with them (813b). The frank revelation of this anti-demotic strategy sets the stage for the climax of the essay, which addresses the constraints on power affecting citizens in broader terms. Here Plutarch returns to education proper, warning would-be politicians that they must not only remember the words of Pericles, “watch out, Pericles: you are ruling free men, Greeks, Athenian citizens,” but also, “you who command, are also under command” (813e–f). “There are no ‘lances of the plains,’” he continues, referring to a common motif of current rhetorical exercises: “instead imitate the actors, who put their own deep emotion and character and reputation into the performance, but obeying the prompter, they do not transgress the rhythms and measures of the power allotted by those

in authority" (813e-f).⁵¹ Perhaps Plutarch's least subtle commentary on the problems of classicizing *paideia*, the passage condemns the conservative practice of rhetorical declamation that indiscriminately praises past glories, and suggests that the value of *paideia* lies in its capacity to train students to play their parts. These are telling complements to his subsequent recommendation that young men acquire powerful Roman friends (814 c-d).⁵² What Plutarch finds useful in the classical past is its fund of *exempla*, which he uses, like pseudo-Plutarch, to promote pacificity, taste and propriety rather than political action: he reminds the reader of the Thirty's amnesty, the Athenians' punishment of inappropriate literary composition, their love of suitably restrained celebration and proper religious practice, the omission of a newlyweds' house in the city-wide search for Harpalus' bribes (814b). Later, again like pseudo-Plutarch, Plutarch describes rhetorical education as training citizens in a self-effacing moderation designed to calm internal dissension and to please the strong. The essay ends with Plutarch's conclusion that the sharp edges of democratic discourse in the lawcourt or public assembly must be dulled, like the padded hands of boxers' in the palaestra (825d-e). Scholars familiar with Plutarch's general avoidance of anti-Roman comment have disputed over the issues of political allegiance apparently driving these remarks' bitter tone. It is best, I think, to view them as observations on the problematic incompatibilities inhering in classicizing *paideia*—not necessarily in terms of its impact on Greek relations with Rome, but in terms of the internal consistency of contemporary pedagogy.

For if, in his admonition to forget the "lances of the plains," Plutarch aims to turn his readers away from excessive pride in the democratic past, his prescriptions sit very uneasily with the pedagogical practice prevailing in the schools. Imperial students did, as we established earlier, read, rewrite, memorize and re-enact the work of the Attic orators, and their efforts were concentrated on the most famous, which is to say the most dramatic, speeches. Some of these, such as Demosthenes' *Philippics*, stir up resistance to tyranny; others

⁵¹ "πρόσχε, Περικλείς· ἐλευθέρων ἄρχεις, Ἑλλήνων ἄρχεις, πολιτῶν Ἀθηναίων"· ἀλλὰ κάκεινο λέγειν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν, "ἀρχόμενος ἄρχεις" . . . "οὐ ταῦτα λόγῃ πεδιάς" . . . ἀλλὰ μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς ὑποκριτάς, πάθος μὲν ἴδιον καὶ ἦθος καὶ ἀξίωμα τῷ ἀγῶνι προστιθέντας, τοῦ δ' ὑποβολέως ἀκούοντας καὶ μὴ παρεκβαίνοντας τοὺς ρυθμούς καὶ τὰ μέτρα τῆς διδομένης ἐξουσίας ὑπὸ τῶν κρατούντων.

⁵² This is followed by a long passage warning against flattery and excessive reliance on Roman power (814c-816a).

dwell on the wealth and military glory of Athens. Plutarch's awareness of the conflict between the content of the student's learning and its application erupts in the following passage in *Political Advice*. There are magistrates (*archontes*) like little children (*mikra paidia*), he says, who

foolishly command the people to imitate the deeds and spirit and practices of their ancestors, which are completely disproportionate with present times and circumstances . . . There are many other ways in which the leader telling of ancient times can still 'play the ancient exemplum' and consider wisely in their fashion for present times . . . But Marathon and Eurymedon and Plataea, and all the other *exempla* that make the masses swell with pride and rejoice about nothing, should be left behind in the sophists' schools (814b-c).⁵³

Or perhaps not even there. If Plutarch thinks that the imitation of character (*êthopoia*) in public speaking before the people (*ta plêthê, tous pollous*) should exclude the re-enactment of democratic glories (and in particular, resistance to monarchical tyranny), then its central role in the schools must certainly be undermined.

In the end, Plutarch concludes that Greeks should use classical Greece as a model of grace under submission, and defends this stance with the claim that submission is actually a virtuous practice, even a democratic one. To endure the slander and fury of a magistrate, for example, is to do a service "for the people" (*dêmotikon de kai blasphemian enegkein kai orgên archontos*, 817c). But the disputes natural to democracy, which Plutarch praised earlier in the essay as proof of classical Athens' natural vigor, turn out, in the Roman context, to do harm, because a city that permits discord within its walls may lose the right to govern itself (815a-b).⁵⁴ Finally, Plutarch simply suggests that living under the rule of another is itself an honorable part of education; and to prove his point, he recounts the story of a man who told Theopompus, king of the Spartans, that the great power of Sparta lay in its rulers, to which the king replied, "Rather, because the people were persuaded

⁵³ οἱ δ' ἄρχοντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀνοήτως τὰ τῶν προγόνων ἔργα καὶ φρονήματα καὶ πράξεις ἀσυμμέτρους τοῖς παροῦσι καιροῖς καὶ πράγμασιν οὐσας μιμεῖσθαι κελεύοντες ἐξαίρουσι τὰ πλήθη . . . πολλὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλα τῶν πρότερον Ἑλλήνων διεξιόντα τοῖς νῦν ἡθοιοεῖν καὶ σωφρονίζειν . . . τὸν δὲ Μαραθῶνα καὶ τὸν Εὐρυμέδοντα καὶ τὰς Πλαταιάς, καὶ ὅσα τῶν παραδειγμάτων οἰδεῖν ποιεῖ καὶ φρυάττεσθαι διακενῆς τοὺς πολλούς, ἀπολιπόντας ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς τῶν σοφιστῶν.

⁵⁴ Obedience to the ruling power does not necessarily entail loss of virtue, and given the tendencies of the Greeks as a nation, Plutarch remarks, it may even result in moral improvement: more freedom than the rulers presently allow could do them harm (824c).

to obey.' Now both these things are wrapped up in each other. It is the job of education in citizenship (*politikes paideia*), as most people think, to produce good subjects" (*Mor.* 816e–f).⁵⁵

If there is one Athenian characteristic that problematizes the ideology of submission outlined by Plutarch and his anonymous counterpart, it is *parrhêsia*. Freedom of speech is the prototypical Athenian virtue: Socrates describes Athens as the city possessing *parrhêsia* in the greatest degree (*Gorgias* 461e), which, he says, clearly distinguishes them from non-Greeks (487b). Even in the classical period, *parrhêsia* is a source of anxiety.⁵⁶ In the context of education, Plutarch takes up *parrhêsia* at great length in a long paideutic treatise on the detection of flattery.⁵⁷ The essay concentrates on the problem of a flatterer's insidious powers of redescription, a rhetorical schema known as *paradiastole* or *abusio* (Rutilius Lupus, *de fig.* 1.4), through which one word is made to signify another, even its opposite: bravery for rashness, prudence for cowardice, profligacy for cheapness, and so on (56b–e; cf. 60e, 61a).

Ironically, Plutarch's own treatment of *parrhêsia* puts the flatterer's redescriving technique to use. Employing the tactics of exemplarity we have witnessed in pseudo-Plutarch, he whittles down the crucial democratic right of free speech into bad manners, shifting the site of *parrhêsia* into the exclusively non-civic and non-political space of aristocratic relations.⁵⁸ Thucydides' account of Pericles' assumption of individual responsibility for the vicissitudes of Athens in wartime (in Thucydides 2.64) provides the model of frank relations among aristocratic friends (73a). To Aristophanes' complaint that Cleon unfairly attacked him for reviling his policies, Plutarch argues that Athenian comedy should have been subject to the rules that govern a private household: "it is least suitable to expose the faults of a husband in the hearing of his wife, a father in the sight of his chil-

⁵⁵ Θεόπομπος δ' ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα σφῆξεσθαι τὴν Σπάρτην διὰ τοὺς βασιλεῖς ἀρχικοὺς ὄντας "μᾶλλον," ἔφη, "διὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς πειθαρχικοὺς ὄντας." Γίνεται μὲν οὖν δι' ἀλλήλων ἀμφοτέρα ταῦτα. λέγουσι δ' οἱ πλείστοι καὶ νομίζουσι πολιτικῆς παιδείας ἔργον εἶναι τὸ καλῶς ἀρχομένους παρασχεῖν.

⁵⁶ In the *Antidosis* (10, 43–44, 179) Isocrates praises *parrhêsia*; contrast his criticism of it as the perverse version of *isonomia* (7.20). Philodemus offers his own twist on the virtue in his essay encouraging the Epicurean student to abandon political life (*On parrhêsia*).

⁵⁷ This topic is addressed in the pseudo-Plutarchan essay on education and by Dio Chrysostom as well (*Or.* 1, 4, 6).

⁵⁸ Plutarch appears to use *parrhêsia* to connote "freedom of speech" in a general manner as well as in the specific context of democratic public institutions: he does not mention *isēgoria*, the freedom of speech specifically associated with the classical *ekklesia*.

dren, a lover in the presence of his beloved, or a teacher in the presence of his students . . . [similarly, Aristophanes' error in exposing Athenian mistakes before foreigners] must be guarded against by those who desire not to show off or play the demagogue, but to use frankness in a helpful and beneficial way" (71c, d; cf. 66b, 67f).⁵⁹ The comic audience and the democratic assembly, two of *parrhêsia*'s original Athenian contexts, are now invisible. The only political contexts the essay associates with *parrhêsia* are the court of Alexander and the Roman senate under Tiberius, and here *parrhêsia* appears exclusively as a vice, the worst kind of masked flattery (60b–d).

The classical reference directly informing Plutarch's representation of *parrhêsia* as a type of flattery is Plato's *Gorgias*. This brings us back to rhetorical education, for in that dialogue Socrates defines rhetoric as "flattery" that gives pleasure to the masses (*kolakeian*, 463b1) in his attack on Gorgias, a pre-eminent teacher of rhetoric. Plutarch's definition of flattery as false mimesis (53c) recalls Socrates' characterization of an orator as one who pretends knowledge that he does not have (*Gorg.* 459c6–460a2); further, Plutarch says, in an evocation of Socrates' attack on the unpredictably shifting opinions of public speakers, flatterers keep changing their roles in order to please (55a).⁶⁰ Plutarch permits his reader to view only one virtuous context for *parrhêsia*: a private friendship between cultured men. Public *parrhêsia* he characterizes only as flattery—a reworking of Plato that helps Plutarch close the door on the free speech of Athenian democratic culture for his imperial readers.

The canon goes to charm school

Dio Chrysostom's oration, or essay, on the education of men preparing to enter politics voices a similarly conflicted perspective (*Or.* 18). At first glance, his famous list of recommended reading suggests a panacea to the lamentable enfeeblement of Greek political life, a common theme in Dio's oratory (e.g. *Or.* 12.85, 31.111, 38.36). At the end of the list, Xenophon emerges as Dio's unqualified favorite,

⁵⁹ ἥκιστα δὲ πρέπει γαμετῆς ἀκουούσης ἄνδρα καὶ παῖδων ἐν ᾧσει πατέρα καὶ ἐραστήν ἐρωμένου παρόντος ἢ γνωρίμων διδάσκαλον ἀποκαλύπτειν . . . διὸ δεῖ φυλάττεσθαι . . . τοὺς μὴ παρεπιδείκνυσθαι μηδὲ δημαγωγεῖν ἀλλ' ὀνησιφόρος καὶ θεραπευτικῶς χρῆσθαι τῇ παρρησίᾳ βουλομένους.

⁶⁰ At one stage, Plutarch actually invokes public speakers (*rhētores*, 57b) to help characterize one type of flatterer.

because of his practical utility for the student, the product of his vast experience in harsh political and social realities (14, 17). This far from innocuous choice, which encourages Greek readers to seize for themselves a practical model for independent oratory, gives the speech a sharp political edge. In contrast to pseudo-Plutarch and Plutarch, Dio (a sophist by profession) gives high praise to popular oratory for its dual capacity to raise the spirits of men who have fallen into a state of depression and disempowerment, and to crush the overbearing and conceited (in the latter case the Romans are implied: 2, 15–16). Dio casts Xenophon both as the most important source of inspiration when handling arrogant men, and as the best model for the orator facing an audience of resentful and despondent Greeks. His message cannot be missed: if the man in politics needs “to cheer and comfort men, *no one who knows Greek* cannot help but be stirred by Xenophon’s hortatory speeches.”⁶¹ Dio himself weeps when reading the *Anabasis* (18.15). This is a representation of Greek *paideia* in its most politically motivated mode, in the same category as Apollonius of Tyana’s admonition to Greek parents to give their children Greek instead of Latin names, and to bring them up in the traditions of old (Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius* 4.5).

Counterbalancing his patriotic praise of Xenophon, however, is Dio’s high opinion of Euripides and Menander, the first authors on his list. The importance of the two for civic *paideia* is their perfection of four elements of style: character illustration (*mimêsis*), charm (*charis*), compassion (*prosêneia*), and plausibility (*pthanotês*). A few passages later, when reviewing the usefulness of the Attic orators, Dio takes these things into account when he advises his reader to devote himself to Hypereides and Aeschines instead of Demosthenes, who, though surpassing his rivals in every respect (this is, of course, the conventional judgment of post-classical Greek literary critics), speaks in a style too grand and powerful for contemporary readers (11). Even Lysias, with his subtle lucidity, is inferior to Lycurgus, whom Dio propels onto the recommended list on the strength of his gracefulness alone (12). With one hand, then, Dio praises Xenophon as the author who best equips the imperial Greek to contend with the dominant power of Rome; with the other, he tailors the ancient

⁶¹ This recalls Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ assertion that every reader of Isocrates’ *Panegyricus* is sure to become a patriot and supporter of democracy (*Isoc.* 5).

canon in order to privilege those orators whose talents lie in the area of persuasiveness, entertainment and charm. For Dio, as for Plutarch, “there are no lances of the plains” when a career is at stake.

As we have seen, Plutarch, pseudo-Plutarch, and Dio Chrysostom similarly engineer the textual past to suit the needs of their imperial audience, and I hope to have shown how that engineering relies on carefully directed rhetorical misreadings of classical texts and concepts.⁶² On occasion, however, the gap between past and present is extremely difficult to camouflage. Near the end of his speech on the literary canon, Dio recommends that students read recent orators as well as ancient ones—“though someone will attack me for doing so,” he says—on the grounds that contemporary critical faculties are not “enslaved” (*doulomenoi*) as they are with classical texts (*tois palaiοis*, 18.12): this is a strong word that resonates with Lucian’s satirical attack on pedantry. Elsewhere Dio reveals that the listening public seems to have its own ideas about the displays of classical learning that were the hallmarks of elite *habitus*. “If I am seen to use examples from Greek history, don’t laugh at me,” Dio implores an audience from his home city, Prusa, “for I’m not jeering at my fatherland; I don’t believe you or the Council to be incapable of understanding such matters for yourselves. But I particularly want you to have a Greek character, and to be neither ungrateful nor stupid” (43.3).⁶³ Knowledge of “examples from Greek history” is a central part of Dio’s definition of *paideia*, of course, but his speech suggests his recognition of his Prusan audience’s different, comparatively “freer” vision. In another oration (13), he recommends abandoning *paideia* altogether—a polemical claim advanced elsewhere through his habit of impersonating the Cynic Diogenes, everywhere attacking conventional paideutic practices (esp. *Or.* 4, 6, 8, 9). This speech draws on Socrates’ admonitions to the Athenians that their educational system was useless (*oudemias paideias chrêstês*, 13.26). On one level, Dio’s point simply remounts the old Platonic debate between philosophy and rhetoric, music, athletics and poetry, all of which are dealt with one by one in this speech. But a critique of current classicizing trends

⁶² See also Aristides’ attack on the tasteless impropriety of Athenian Old Comedy (*Or.* 29, esp. 27–28).

⁶³ Ἐάν οὖν Ἑλληνικοῖς, ὥσπερ εἴωθα, φαίνωμαι παραδείγμασι χράμενος, μὴ καταγέλασθε. οὐ γὰρ καταφρονῶ τῆς πατρίδος, οὐδὲ ἀδυνάτους ὑμᾶς νομίζω αὐτοὺς συνιέναι τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὐδὲ ἀπαιδεύτον νομίζω οὔτε τὸν δῆμον οὔτε τὴν βουλὴν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ὑμᾶς βούλομαι τὸ ἦθος Ἑλληνικὸν ἔχειν καὶ μῆτε ἀχαρίστους μῆτε ἀξυνέτους εἶναι.

runs just below the surface, when, for example, Dio discusses his listeners' fanatical obsession with the past (13.29). Further, he claims that philosophical training disdains ethnic boundaries—another cut at a *paideia* that stresses the conservation of an exclusively Greek heritage (13.32).⁶⁴

At times Plutarch, too, expresses his commitment to the classical tradition with deep ambivalence. His statement that the political weakness (*asthenian*) of the Greeks enables them to devote their lives to the refined pursuits of *paideia*, for example, is colored by strong resentment: "... for fortune has left us no other prize (*athlon*) to fight for" (*Mor.* 824e). In another essay on *Whether Greece is More Famous Because of War or Wisdom*, Plutarch favorably contrasts Greek generals with Greek authors, and ultimately heaps ridicule on literary labors, especially those having to do with rhetoric (*Mor.* 345c–351b).⁶⁵ As Rappe argues elsewhere in this volume, the conflicts between "Garden, Porch and Grove" are not only internecine battles (p. 405); in a Christian period, they end in a condemnation of conventional *paideia* and its goals. This is a path already laid out by writings like these, which seem to lend us glimpses of a debate over *paideia*'s turn to the past in progress just behind the curtain of the classicizing texts now available to us.

Conclusion: imperial struggles of definition and enactment

Competition among teachers, students and other intellectuals for economic or symbolic capital is a motif of Greek and Roman literature—even, one might say, its governing theme.⁶⁶ In the imperial period, *paideia*'s internal battles take on a new intensity, with several different types of educators claiming it as their special domain. Though the sophists leave behind the most eloquent testimony, and are perhaps best known today, grammarians, philosophers, physicians, and even athletic trainers assert their cultural prerogative with equal

⁶⁴ This is similar to the approach taken by Sextus Empiricus in *Against the Grammarians*.

⁶⁵ Plutarch's *Lives* would profit most from a nuanced discussion of his *exempla* and the motives behind them along the lines I have tried to lay out here (a gap noticed by Goldhill [2000]).

⁶⁶ E.g., the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod*; Callimachus and the Telchines (*Aetia* 1): on the prominence of the contest in the critical tradition, see Too (1988), 18–50.

justification.⁶⁷ Their debates are waged through invective, in public disputes and slander. In his early third century AD collection of sophists' *Lives*, Philostratus singles out criticisms of his subjects made by their contemporaries (usually in order to refute them): "I will now discuss the sophist Scopelian, having first attacked those who speak badly of him . . ." (*Lives* 514). From the invective against grammarians and other teachers focused on poverty, cruelty, sexual excess, and pedantry, recently collected by Ineke Sluiter, it is clear that the writers are men fighting to enlarge their share of cultural capital at the expense of their pedagogical compatriots.⁶⁸ Analogous to the battles carried out for possession of education around the schools are the conflicts going on inside them. There, to learn well is to endure physical and emotional anguish: teacher and pupil stand at odds with one another and themselves, and definitions of success are always double-edged. In Philostratus, for instance, sophistic fame is often a zero-sum game in which teachers ungracefully give way to the next generation. Of course, the association between education and suffering is far from new. Simple corporal punishment is an old habit in the schools of antiquity: "education is a partner of pain," Aristotle says (*meta lypês hê paideia*, *Pol.* 1339a), and earlier evidence of this attitude is to be found in classical Greek writings. Nevertheless, the growing intensity of the battles among teachers and students invites the speculation that the internal ideological tensions I have discussed in this chapter may have a concrete effect on the practices of imperial schools.

In classical Athenian texts, corporal punishment is nearly always meted out against *moral* offenders, boys who have failed to meet their teachers' or parents' ethical standards (e.g. Aristophanes *Clouds* 972). Though the existing evidence is extremely limited, it is possible to say that it is only in the later Hellenistic and Roman period that descriptions of corporal punishment in a purely non-moral context make a decisive appearance in the sources.⁶⁹ Henri Marrou views

⁶⁷ Thanks to Onno van Nijf for his persuasive paper on the role of trainers in second century culture, and Philostratus' treatment of them in his essay "On Athletics," in a conference presentation in Leiden, May 2000. On the classical grammarian, see Kaster (1988) and now Morgan (1998).

⁶⁸ Sluiter (1988).

⁶⁹ Among the earliest: a fragment of Menander, "He who is not beaten does not learn" (ὁ μὴ δαρεῖς οὐ παιδεύεται); Chrysippus expresses approval of corporal punishment (Quint. *Inst. Orat.* 1.3.14); Herondas' *Mimiambos* 3; also see the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus*, where basic schooling is a miserable experience indeed: "When

Lampriscos, the brutal teacher of Herondas' third mimiamb, as kin to contemporary Alexandrian philologists, who habitually translated the Hebrew *mûsar*, meaning both "education" and "chastisement," with the word *paideia*. In his *Epistles*, Horace describes Lampriscos' Roman descendant, Orbilius "the thrasher," who gives beatings that have nothing to do with improving his charges' moral sense: there is a frighteningly arbitrary feel to their timing and harshness (*Orbilius plagosus*, *Ep.* 2.1.70; cf. Suet. *On Grammarians* 9).⁷⁰

At the beginning of an oration on slavery, Dio Chrysostom likens students to servants and slaves, using students' vulnerability to beatings from their teachers and athletic trainers as evidence (15.19). In the voice of one of the two "characters" in his speech, Dio rearticulates Socrates' account of corporal punishment in the *Lysis*; but where Socrates emphasizes the price of enduring violence even at the hands of a slave (the *paidagôgos*) in exchange for moral improvement, Dio focuses on the sense of terror and social destabilization the beating creates: for a few moments, the child looks, and presumably feels, like a slave. The reversal in social hierarchy that teachers embody generates fear and detestation among his students, a phenomenon Dio describes in another speech. Here, Dio comically sketches a collection of "types," including the Teacher—and, less comically, the average boy's reaction to him:

... boys are unable to look with pleasure upon anyone whom they see has the appearance of tutors, and looks prepared as though they will beat them and not to allow them to make any mistakes and be

the child reaches the age of seven, after having endured much physical pain, he is set upon by tyrannical tutors, teachers, and trainers; and as he grows older there are scholars, mathematicians, and military instructors, all a great crowd of despots . . . then comes the Lyceum and the Academy and the gymnasium-masters, with their canings and excessive punishments" (366e–367a).

⁷⁰ Marrou (1956) 159. Latin graffiti: "Take a beating, I've taken three already" reads one graffito (*vapula, III vapulo*, Bonner, ch. 11: 118 n. 27, 12); accompanying a sketch of an overburdened donkey: "Work, little ass, just as I have worked, and much may it profit you!" (*labora, aselle, sicut ego laboravi, et proderit tibi*). Cicero refers casually to the *katomus*, the position in which a student awaiting the cane or whip was held (*Letters to his Friends* 7.25.1). On the problem of dull students, see *For Roscius* 11.31 and *Rhetorical Treatise for Herennium* 4.10.14. Gruesome portraits of savage teachers: Ovid *Amores* 1.13.17–18; Varro, p. 251 (Riese) = R. Müller (Leipzig 1938), 52–2; Pliny the Elder *Natural History* 13.42.123, 9.39.77; Seneca *On Favors* 6.15.1–2, *Epistles* 94.9, *On Mercy* 1.16; Martial 9.68.1–2, 9.29.5, 12.57.4–5, 10.62.8–9; Quintilian 1.3.14–17; Juvenal 7.213–32, 1.15; *Latin Anthology* p. 268 Burman. Such references are likely to have lent a Roman coloring to the deeply Hellenic curriculum: experiencing pain placed literate education in the same experiential category as the military exercises praised by Cato and prized by generations of later Roman writers.

careless. If it were possible for the boys to laugh and insult such men, they would do that before anything else (72.10; cf. 32.9).⁷¹

Lucian sees the hardships endured at school in a similar light in his piece *The Parasite*, in which students routinely go home in tears, and unhappily set out to school the next morning, only wishing they could run away from the suffering that awaits them (13). Lucian himself (or rather, a first person speaker in the Lucianic text) recalls the thrashings he received from his teachers trying to improve his lack of concentration (*Dream* 2). Failure to pay attention is also the reason for the punishments dealt out by teachers and pedagogues in Plutarch's essay on the proper way to listen to speeches (*didaskalon kai paidagōgon*, *Mor.* 37d); the bored apprehension inspired by the lecture is the topic of the first century CE poets Antiphanes and Philip (*AP* 11.322, 347).

The assent to the infliction of physical pain on children implied in these texts is an especially puzzling development in light of the protective attitudes toward the elite body otherwise prominent in imperial authors—and, for that matter, in politics as well. Paul, a Roman citizen, successfully speaks out for his rights after being chained and beaten in Philippi (*Acts* 16.37; cf. 22.25–9). When a young elite in early fourth century Asia Minor was brutally flogged, his shocked friends and family pleaded with the governor to show mercy specifically because of his *paideia* (*Orat.* 1.225 = I.182). Libanius, who reports the scene, later wrote an angry letter to the governor of Cyrene, who had committed an identical act of injustice (*Ep.* 994.2 = XI.124).⁷² Examples could be multiplied, but the point is that we are left with an enigma. In a culture deeply invested in the integrity of the elite body, characterized by its members and by modern scholars as highly refined and intolerant of impropriety, the school is imagined as the source and the object of contestation, mockery and abuse.⁷³

⁷¹ οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες ἡδέως ὁρᾶν δύνανται οὐς ἂν ἴδωσι παιδαγωγῶν σχῆμα ἔχοντας καὶ παρεσκευασμένους οὕτως ὥς ἐπιπλήξοντας αὐτοῖς καὶ οὐκ ἐπιτρέποντας ἁμαρτάνειν οὐδὲ ῥαθυμεῖν. εἰ γάρ τοι καὶ τοῖς παισὶν ἐξῆν τῶν τοιούτων καταγελᾶν καὶ ὑβρίζειν, οὐδὲν ἂν πρότερον τούτου ἐποίουν.

⁷² Cited in Brown (1988) 53.

⁷³ So Jones (1986) speaks, with some exaggeration, of "the golden age of the Second Sophistic, when highly trained speakers called 'rhetors' or 'sophists' enjoyed enormous influence and success" (10); Gleason (1995) praises "the long high noon of Hellenistic civilization" (166), and Anderson (1993) characterizes the whole era in terms of "the πεπαιδευμένος and his world" (8).

In a 1581 pamphlet on public education, Richard Mulcaster, tutor to the young Princess Elizabeth and teacher in a London grammar school for tailors, encouraged his colleagues to reconsider their role in society. "The buddes of private discipline be the beauties of pollicie," Mulcaster pointed out, in his call for schools to simulate as closely as possible the standards of conduct in civilized society at large.⁷⁴ Mulcaster saw that a school that mimics the ethics of its state has a unique power to tug its young subjects into fixed positions of civic obligation and conformity, and consequently he recommended a pedagogical system that copied the communicative and disciplinary practices of Tudor government.

Along similar lines, Catherine Atherton argues for the "existence of a broad parallel between exposure to the sorts of sophisticated and complex rule- and norm-governed uses of language which dominated public discourse, and acquisition of social habits relating to the role of laws and norms in Greco-Roman society," which embrace the use of violence in pedagogical practice.⁷⁵ In conclusion, I would like to build on her argument with the suggestion that the struggles going on in and around the imperial Greek school are fueled in part from the gap between the pedagogical ethics and practices derived from democratic Athens, which students and teachers enacted every day in their historical studies and especially their oratorical performances, and the conditions of imperial civic life. This gap opens a space in which the contending agents of *paideia* may clash over its meaning and function. Does imperial education teach submission and conformity or might it be a repository of democratic, resistant values? In the day to day practice of the imperial Greek school, these two options exist in tension with one another. In an important material sense, education itself becomes a matter of violent struggle.

Learning to be Greek, and more specifically, to be a citizen of imperial Greece, does not represent simple absorption in or nostalgia for the past, but rather the acquisition of a set of carefully selected, rhetorically reconstituted facts about the past. In its excavation of the ethical and political dissonances set up throughout the reconstituting process in imperial pedagogical treatises, speeches, and satires,

⁷⁴ Mulcaster, "Positions, Wherein Those Primitive Circumstances Be Examined, Which Are Necessarie for the Training Up of Children, Either for Skill in Their Books, or Health in Their Bodie" (p. 294), cited in Curtiss (1997), 20–21.

⁷⁵ Atherton (1998) 241, in a fine article on imperial Roman pedagogy.

this chapter has tried to show that whatever "classical Greece" meant to the teachers of the period was a matter of constant redefinition and struggle that admitted few easy answers. Here lies its usefulness for us, as I see it, as a lesson in the costs and benefits accompanying any pedagogical effort to return to the past. If Greek imperial authors do not exactly replicate our own second thoughts about reviving the "traditional" canon, legalizing English as the national language, or enforcing the behaviors of another era in our schools, they may at least enrich our debates over these things in fruitful ways.

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IMAGES AS EDUCATION IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE (SECOND-THIRD CENTURIES AD)

Aline Rousselle

The Greek contribution to the culture of the Mediterranean world unified by Roman rule included philosophy, science, rhetoric, and the incomparable analytical tool of Aristotelian logic. It was the Greeks too who developed the widespread use of static scenes and narrative images, representing persons or myths, on objects and buildings. The potters' quarters of the Classical Greek cities of the sixth-fourth centuries BC produced vases with painted decoration which were exported in large quantities. The Etruscans imitated the Greek painters' favorite subjects in different contexts, on funerary urns and the walls of funerary chambers, for example. Under the Roman Empire, everyday objects were decorated with scenes from myth and history, with visual references to the rituals which marked key moments in life or even everyday activities, sometimes within the framework of a mythical subject.

Towards the end of the second century AD, at least in Rome where we have some early evidence, Christians began to create images based on their own range of subject matter but following patterns borrowed from the surrounding pagan culture. A considerable repertoire of narrative images was used to illustrate the Old and New Testaments. In the course of the third century, as the Christians were developing this repertoire, the Jews, prohibited by their religion from making, or particularly from worshipping, figural images, began to introduce objects with figural decoration into their homes and even to decorate their synagogues with biblical paintings, and then with figural mosaic floors (in a rather rudimentary fashion). The excavation of an embankment at Doura Europos on the Euphrates revealed a synagogue hall covered with painted biblical images, as well as a Christian hall covered with rudimentary paintings. We know from Christian texts that these new images could be the subject of commentary and discussion. The sculpted images on Christian sarcophagi were the successors to the myths which were frequently depicted on pagan sarcophagi as burial replaced cremation

during the second century AD. In this funerary context such images served both as decoration and to display the wealth of the deceased and his or her family, but they surely called for interpretation. We know that Christian interpretations of images were essentially symbolic. The impact on it of the type of training dispensed in the pagan schools, both before and during this period, remains to be determined.

What impact did school and further education have on the way the inhabitants of the ancient Mediterranean, who were so fond of endless debate and discussion, understood and talked about the countless pictorial narratives that surrounded them? Marrou referred briefly to the teaching of drawing and the use of images as illustrations and teaching aids, as part of his discussion of the Iliac Tables.¹ As far as the artists themselves are concerned, we know there was a system of apprenticeships, as with other crafts. But as far as art history or iconography or aesthetics are concerned, there are no traces of any formal training. When we speak of Lucian or Philostratus as 'art critics' we are applying the standards of the nineteenth-century, and even then 'criticism' was not taught but was the result of a decision by a writer or an artist as in the case of Baudelaire's *Salons*.

And yet we know that certain paintings and sculptures were widely regarded as masterpieces for a millennium, from the fifth century BC up until the fifth century AD and beyond. A cultivated elite was familiar with the works, the names of the artists and the places where they could be seen.² Visitors to sanctuaries could find guides to show them around, or even exegetes to explain and comment on the paintings and sculptures.³ These guides handed down traditions about the artists, the history of the works, the identity of the figures or the scenes, and sometimes their meaning. Copies (*aphidrymata*)⁴ were also known, these were sometimes reduced in size (particularly in the

¹ H. I. Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'Antiquité* (6th edition) (Paris, 1965) 205 and 250.

² See the collection of sources in Adolphe Reinach, *La peinture ancienne (Recueil Milliet). Textes grecs et latins*, with introduction and notes by Agnès Rouveret (Paris, Macula, 1985) (1st edition, *Textes grecs et latins relatifs à l'histoire de la peinture ancienne*, Paris, Klincksieck, 1921) hereafter *Recueil Milliet*.

³ A guide explains a painting by Apelles in Lucian, *Calumnia*, 5; for the guides at Delphi see Pausanias, X, 28, 7. Ramsay MacMullen, *Paganism in the Roman Empire* (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1981) 29–31.

⁴ On *Aphidrumata* see Cicero, *ad Atticum*, XIII, 29, 1, with the commentary of J. Beaujeu, in Cicero, *Correspondance*, vol. VIII (Paris, CUF, 1983) 249–250: there is nothing to suggest that Cicero had an existing monument in mind when he planned

case of cult statues) or adapted to local needs (as in the case of the Tyche of Antioch which became the model for city personifications).

The cultural elites of the Mediterranean world were able to make use of their direct or indirect knowledge of these great works in metaphors, witticisms, or erudite allusions. None of this was taught, but it was part of the school environment, as we will see, since the influence of certain aspects of the standard curriculum can be seen in the ways in which paintings and sculptures were described and analysed. Given the quantity of statues on display in public spaces and sanctuaries, which were objects of cultural tourism, one can well imagine the comments of visitors, who would sometimes have been accompanied by their children. But above all we do have some examples of visitors' comments and of the types of explanation given by local guides and recorded by writers. And it is here that we find the intellectual frameworks provided by secondary and further education applied to iconography.

Here we will look at the ways in which techniques of textual interpretation transmitted in schools were applied to the explanation of images in everyday contexts, in discussions of a statue or a painting. This chapter will therefore be devoted essentially to the treatment of images by pagan rhetors and philosophers. And we will be able to see the powerful influence of the traditions of description and interpretation inculcated by Hellenistic and Roman secondary education, particularly in its methods of analyzing myth and history.

Given the growth of recent research on ancient iconography, not to mention the explosion of images in our own culture, it will be interesting to survey the evidence for what was taught and disseminated by a hermeneutic of images modeled on techniques developed for the analysis of discourse in the study of rhetoric and in philosophy.

a memorial for his daughter (which was never built); the use of the term *aphidruma* here is unusual. See p. 250, reference to the term: *aphidruma* is used of a temple or altar which is copied or transferred from another temple or altar. The primary idea is that of construction, not consecration. C. Picard, *Ephèse et Claros* (BEFAR 123, Paris, de Boccard, 1922) 126. See Philostrate, *Life of Apollonios of Tyana*, V, 20, P. Grimal, *Romans grecs et latins* (Paris, 1958) 1188–89 trans. Conybeare, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical Library, 1969), I, 506 for statuettes of a divinity made in large quantities and transported by sea to the sanctuary where they are sold to visitor. See E. Gubel, "Bulletin d'antiquités archéologiques du Levant inédites ou méconnues, II", *Syria* 62, 1985, 176–179 for a collection of 16 terracotta figurines from Tyre, which the author compares to 260 figurines found in underwater excavations. Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca*, XV, 49, 1–3 (ed. and trans. Claude Vial, t. X, CUF, 1977) 61–2.

This is not an anthropological approach to images of the type that has become popular in current scholarship. Nor will I treat the statements of intellectuals and philosophers about images as beliefs the moment they differ from our ways of thinking. Instead I will consider them as forms of intellectual inquiry, as articulations of issues that could be the subject of teaching. There were many types of discourse concerning images. Here I am only concerned with those which were transmitted consciously, as part of an educative process. In so doing, I will try to find out whether the philosophical ideas that were utilised when training people to interpret images provided the citizens of the ancient Roman world with a training in critical analysis.

I. *Learning to analyse images: recognition and identification*

The creation of the notion of art in classical Greece led to the first reflections on art, which it is rather misleading to treat as art history or art criticism. Instead of 'history', there were two types of discourse on art, one concerned with techniques, the other with the relation of the image to reality or to ideas.⁵ Already in antiquity, the interpretation of images played an important role in the analysis of art. This analysis usually develops from description (and identification) to a reduction of the image to discourse and then to the interpretation of that discourse. Ancient viewers had first to identify the subject matter before commenting on a painting or an image in general. This meant recognizing the mythical, historical or literary episode represented and then commenting on it. The existence of theories of imitation, within the framework of the platonic concept of *mimesis*, made it possible to make this transition from viewing an image to explaining the text it illustrated.

It is important, first of all, to distinguish formal iconographic training, which is culturally transmitted, from the general visual training which begins when the mother first looks at her child. This general visual training combines universal characteristics, common to all human beings, with the shaping of the gaze effected by the unspo-

⁵ Philippe Bruneau, "Situation méthodologique de l'Histoire de l'art antique", *l'Antiquité classique*, XLIV, 1975, 2, 425-487, esp. p. 459, where the author describes art history as formed of two branches: the history of techniques and lists of artists.

ken conventions of the surrounding culture.⁶ We must also distinguish iconographic training from visual semiotic training, which includes all visual signs. First of all then we will examine the general characteristics of this iconographic training.

In a few passages of his *Eikones* (descriptions of paintings) Philostratus addresses his listener, who is presented as a viewer of the paintings, and asks him to remember the texts which the paintings illustrate, texts which are well known to the listener-viewer: 'have you recognized, my boy, that this is from Homer?'⁷ The ability to identify figures and scenes in the visual arts was developed by the training which took place within the family and within the school,⁸ rather than in a specifically religious context. Children encountered canonical texts, in the form of summaries or extracts, when they had only just learned to read. They continued these literary studies throughout the rest of their education, memorizing scenes and stories from myth and epic, and acquiring methods of commenting on texts. From their first days at school, children linked memories of texts to memories of the illustrations of those texts. They had seen images of the gods and heroes at home, in the city, in sanctuaries. At school the teacher might use sculpted or painted representations to explain or to test the students' knowledge.⁹ Agnès Rouveret's suggestion that paintings were used above all as 'memory images' supports this

⁶ For the levels of learning see the work of Gregory Bateson, *Vers une écologie de l'esprit* (Paris, Seuil, vol. I, 1977, original edition 1971) 253–282. At level zero, the individual is unable to use the process of trial and error; at level 1, he uses trial and error in a stable context and can correct his choices; at level 2, he can do this in a changing context. At a third level the individual is capable of questioning the value of the systems of reference which provide various contexts with their consistency.

⁷ See the introduction by F. Lissarague in Philostratus, *La galerie de tableaux*, trans. A. Bougot revised and annotated par F. Lissarague, preface by Pierre Hadot, (Paris, 1991) 5, and the passage cited: I, 1, 1, p. 11 (the beginning of the first *Eikon*). See in general, Karl Lehmann-Hartleben, "The *Imagines* of the Elder Philostratus", *The Art Bulletin* 23 (1941) 16–43.

⁸ On epic as a means of learning myths see, J.-L. Durand, "Mémoire grecque", in *Histoire et linguistique*, ed. P. Achard et al., *Actes de la Table ronde de l'ENS "Langage et sociétés"*, (28–30 avril 1983) (Paris, 1984) 255–9.

⁹ See H. I. Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation* (Paris, 1965) 250 et n. 12 p. 566; A. Sadurska, *Les tables iliâques*, (Varsovie, Mouton, La Haye-Paris, 1964). On the *Odyssey* see Kurt Weitzmann, "A Tabula Odysseaca", *AJA* (3rd series) 45 (1941) 166–81 and figs. 1 and 2 to p. 166; Odette Touchefeu-Meynier, *Thèmes odysseens dans l'art antique* (Paris, 1968) 105. Agnès Rouveret, *Histoire et imaginaire de la peinture ancienne* (Rome, 1989) reviews the arguments in favour of the didactic use of Iliac scenes and suggests a mnemonic function.

argument:¹⁰ the scenes illustrated in this way show the predominance of images drawn from epic and myth. These pictures had inscriptions, a title which was sometimes long enough to give a brief explanation of the actions represented. The figures were sometimes named as in earlier vase painting, and as they occasionally are on the decorated sarcophagi of the Roman period.

Children became familiar with the texts at the same time as they learned the traditional ways of representing the characters who peopled their mythical and religious universe, and even their supply of everyday metaphors: one referred to 'an *Iliad* of woes', or to meeting 'black-buttocks', meaning Heracles, a threat which mothers made to their children if they misbehaved.¹¹ They learned the costumes and attributes of the gods and heroes, their typical poses, their most important deeds, they learned which characters appeared together and the actions or objects they were associated with. In this way they learned to identify the images that would surround them for the rest of their lives (even in their dreams), to comment on them, and even to make use of them in their rhetorical compositions. The paintings we know of showed scenes from the *Iliad*, from the Theban cycle, and the labours of Hercules. In temples, they could see paintings and sculptures of the gods with their attributes, as well as scenes from Homeric epic. Throughout the imperial period, praise was lavished on Polygnotus' painting of the Sack of Troy at Delphi.¹² Cicero referred to this learning process as follows: 'From our childhood Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, Neptune, Vulcan and Apollo have been known to us with the appearance with which painters and sculptors have chosen to represent them, and not only with that appearance, but with particular attributes, age and dress'.¹³ Children also learned to recognize divinities in the theater, which they attended with their parents, and acted or recited scenes from tragedy in the theater.¹⁴ From their seats in the amphitheater they also watched executions

¹⁰ A. Rouveret, *op. cit.*, 355 et 358.

¹¹ Philostratus, *Life of Apollonios of Tyana*, (Loeb, I, 210) Conybeare translates *melampugou tuchein* by "catching a Tartar"; see the translation by P. Grimal, p. 1099 with n. 1 on the anecdote.

¹² Philostratus, *Life of Apollonios*, VI, 11, Grimal, 1227 (Conybeare, II, 52); on this painting see A. Rouveret, *op. cit.* 135-9.

¹³ Cicero, *De natura deorum*, I, 29 [81], ed. A. S. Pease, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958) vol. I, 412-3.

¹⁴ See for example, Charles Picard, *Ephèse et Claros*, BEFAR 123 (Paris, de Boccard, 1922) 342-3.

presented as episodes from myth,¹⁵ and watched as statues of the gods were paraded in processions. On the wall of the *Stoa Poikile* or 'Painted Stoa' in Athens one could see scenes from the *Iliad* by Polygnotus, while the Parthenon frieze showed the gigantomachy. Christians were concerned to protect children from this education: '... if we want our future guardians to believe that to quarrel with each other for trivial reasons is the greatest cause of shame; we should not tell them stories or paint pictures of gigantomachies and the many and varied enmities between gods and heroes and their relatives and close friends ... the divine combats which Homer wrote about should not be admitted into the city, whether they are presented in allegories (*hupoioiai*), or without allegory'.¹⁶ Eusebius, who quotes this passage from Plato, could also have cited Aristotle who warned in the *Politics* against allowing children to see paintings and statues which were 'morally' incorrect.¹⁷ Such images would certainly have been difficult to explain to children, even with the help of the allegories used by adults, as we will see below. Texts are expurgated, statues must be hidden. In both cases their meaning calls for explanation.

II. Naming things: speaking about making and conceptualizing the artifact

Porphyry uses three terms to designate images themselves, one (*semeion*) expresses their quality as signs, while the other two are more familiar to us in this context: *eikôn* and *eidolon*. But what is the term used for man-made images when one wants to emphasise the process of making and not on its qualities as an image? Ancient authors did not have a concept of 'representation', even though they speak of *mimêsis* and *mimêmata*. When speaking of the artist's actions, they

¹⁵ Tertullian, *De spectaculis*, XXI, 2 on girls attending the shows with their fathers, ed. and trans. Marie Turcan, SC 332, (Paris, 1986) 265; Cyprian, *Ad Donatum*, 7-8, ed. and trans. J. Molager, SC 291 (Paris, 1962) 92-5. Coleman, Kathleen M., "Fatal Charades: Roman Executions staged as Mythological Enactments", *JRS* 80 (1990) 44-73. A. Rousselle, in J.-M. Carrié and A. Rousselle, *L'Empire romain en mutation des Sévères à Constantin* 192-337 (Paris, Seuil, 1999) 311-312.

¹⁶ Plato, *Republic*, II, 378c1-d7, quoted by Eusebius, *Praep. ev.*, II, 7, 6-7, ed. and trans. des Places, SC 228, 125. On the idea of childhood education as an imprint on the memory see Minucius Félix, *Octavius*, 23, 8, (Beaujeu, CUF, 1974) 36.

¹⁷ Aristotle, *Politics*, VII, 1336a-b, 17: warns against exposing children to immoral stories, there should be no obscene words, stories, statues and paintings, the latter should not be displayed in public but should be reserved for sanctuaries where the rites themselves are obscene. I am grateful to Yun Lee Too for this reference.

emphasise the process of making in the case of sculpture.¹⁸ We can see this from the way Tatian discusses the statues of Greek poetesses as part of his argument against paganism¹⁹ 'Lysippus made Praxilla in bronze', the artists are said to be the *dēmiourgoi* of the women. He has no term at his disposal to express the concept of 'representation'. Molly Whittaker conveys this very effectively when she translates 'made a bronze statue of', or says that these women 'were made' (whereas A. Puech's French translation uses the verb 'représenter').²⁰ The Greeks think of sculpture in terms of 'making' and not of 'representing'.²¹

To convey the idea of making an object which resembles something the verb *eikazô* or *exeikazô* is used, or for a painting *exeikonizô*, to make an exact copy.²² But this is not exactly the same idea as 'representation'.²³ More often the verb 'to paint' was used. The concept of *mimêsis* derives from Plato,²⁴ and the *Eikones* insist on resemblance because this was a quality valued by society.²⁵ The idea of resemblance, or 'copies', existed, but this is not exactly the same as 'representation'. There is, however, one verb which does bring us close to representation, that is *deiknymi* 'to show', from which we get *deikêlon* or *deikêlon*,²⁶ which are both used when speaking of images or stat-

¹⁸ A. Rouveret, op. cit., 14, shows that there is an important difference between painting and sculpture.

¹⁹ Tatian, *Oratio ad Graecos*, XXXIII, ed. and trans. Molly Whittaker (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1982) 17, 34 and 61 includes a catalogue of statues; see also A. Puech, *Recherches sur le Discours aux Grecs de Tatien, suivies d'une traduction française du Discours avec notes*, Paris, 1903 (trad. pp. 107-158). The discovery of a statue base inscribed with the name of a Greek poetess prompted a reconsideration of the idea that Tatian's catalogue was invented. P. Bernard proposed an exedra in Boeotia as a setting for these statues of poetesses. See Paul Bernard, "Les rhytons de Nysa I, Poétesses grecques", *Journal des Savants* (1985) 25-118, especially the appendix, 97-115.

²⁰ For this passage see, A. Puech, *Recherches sur le Discours aux Grecs de Tatien*, p. 150.

²¹ Ph. Bruneau, "Situation méthodologique", *L'antiquité classique* 44 (1975) 425-87, p. 460: "un art qui crée". Bruneau seems to think that in becoming self-conscious art changes from creation to reproduction.

²² Philostratus, *Life of Apollonios of Tyana*, II, 22, Conybeare, I, p. 172.

²³ See Agnès Rouveret's fine study of the vocabulary of painting, op. cit.

²⁴ W. J. Verdenius, *Mimêsis. Plato's Doctrine of artistic Imitation and its meaning to us* (Leiden, Brill, 1972). Eva Keuls, *Plato and Greek Painting*, (Leiden, Brill, 1978). A. Rouveret, p. 24, n. 34. J.-P. Vernant, *Religions, histoires, raisons* (Paris, 1979) 105-37.

²⁵ See in general, A. Reinach, *Recueil Milliet*, and for its popularization see Strabo's story of a partridge in a painting by Protogenes at Rhodes: partridges brought to the painting by their owners would call out to it. Strabo, 14, 2, 5, ed. and trans. H. L. Jones, Loeb, *The Geography of Strabo*, vol. VI, 1970, 268-269.

²⁶ For example, Porphyry, cited by Eusebius, *Præparatio Evangelica*, III, 9, 5 (trad. E. des Places, SC 228, 1976) p. 192. See below.

ues. This however is closer to the idea of 'presentation' than 'representation', expressing the root notion, without the idea of repetition.

Stoicheiōsis was the arrangement of elements (*stoicheion* = 'element') to form a whole.²⁷ The term is used around 165–172 CE by Tatian in his *Address to the Greeks*. Tatian, who also wrote the *Diatesseron*, a fragment of which was found on papyrus during the excavations at Doura,²⁸ converted to Christianity after experimenting with the Greek philosophical schools. He argued that Greek education was of no value and claimed that most of it was borrowed from the barbarians. In the *Address to the Greeks*, he uses the term *stoicheiōsis* to speak of the creation of the zodiac by demons and, a little further on, he uses it in connection with the verb *dēmīourgein* 'to create', which he used elsewhere of the making of statues of female figures.²⁹ The linguistic comparison given by Tatian provides the best explanation of the meaning of phrases that one could hope to find: 'just as letter-characters and lines formed from them cannot themselves give the meaning (*sêmeinein*) of their arrangement, but men have fashioned (*dedēmīourgēkasi*) for themselves signs (*sêmeia*) of their thoughts and from the nature of the combination know how the meaning of the word has been prescribed'.³⁰ Tatian is describing a whole whose elements would signify nothing by themselves but whose meaning is derived from their arrangement in a phrase. If *stoicheiōsis* is the arrangement of elements, any commentary, will have to proceed analytically, as in the grammarian's school, by breaking down the image first of all. To what extent is it possible to compare iconographic composition to written verbal discourse? This will be the subject of the next sections.

²⁷ Plato, *Timaeus* 39f., uses *stoicheia* of the stars and the four elements. Augustine speaks of the *elementa mundi*, referring to Galatians 4, 3.

²⁸ C. Bradford Welles, R. O. Fink et J. Frank Gilliam, *The Parchments and Papyri*, in *The Excavations at Dura Europos, Dura Final Report, V, part I* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1959) a third-century parchment.

²⁹ Tatian, *Oratio ad Graecos* IX, XVII and XXXIV. In his commentary, p. 119, n. 2, Puech compares the use of *stoicheiōsis* to LXX, II Mac. 7, 22, where it is used of the composition of the human body. In chapter XVII Tatian does compare writing, and the signification of elements in combination, to the human body. Tatian transmitted knowledge of the Greek poetesses to the East, see Paul Bernard, "Les rhytons de Nysa I, Poétesses grecques", *Journal des Savants* (1985) 25–118.

³⁰ Text, M. Whittaker, p. 34; I prefer to translate *semeion* as 'sign' rather than 'symbol'. On the distinction between *semeion* and *symbolon*, the first of which includes the second within its range of meaning see Curzio Chiesa, "Simbole et signe dans le *De interpretatione*", in *Philosophie du langage et grammaire dans l'Antiquité, Cahiers de Philosophie ancienne*, n° 5 (Bruxelles-Grenoble, 1986) 203–218.

III. *Speaking of images*

It would be very surprising if all the ancient discussions of images were without exception highly intellectualised and incomprehensible to the majority. As far as iconography is concerned, most of the ordinary discussions were probably no more sophisticated than our own, but we only know of them through intellectuals and their works, which does not make it easy to see what normal practice might have consisted of.

Two forms which served to express ancient thought about images (sculpture and painting) are well known: *ekphrasis* and allegorical interpretation. Both of these derive from rhetorical training.

A. *Before commentary, description: Ekphrasis*

The elementary exercises (*progymnasmata*) taught by the grammarians and in the rhetorical schools included narration and description. As part of their training, students composed stories based on mythical episodes, or moralizing anecdotes.³¹ Quintilian advised restraint in these passages, to stop them becoming digressions.³² When summarizing scenes, students were doing exactly the same thing as artists who were obliged to select figures, objects, and actions: they were condensing the story. The *progymnasmata* also shared a repertoire of stories with the visual arts: one rhetorical exercise involved imagining Niobe's lament over the bodies of her children, a scene which we find on sarcophagi. When students learned to describe scenes, they therefore learned techniques that could be applied to the description of the figural arts.

There was no need for the works of art described in *ekphrasis* to have existed in reality: we do not know whether the descriptions we have corresponded to real paintings. The description of the painting, or work of art, 'replaces' the painting, just as anatomical description seemed to be able to communicate what the anatomist would see through autopsy ('direct vision'), until, that is, Leonardo da Vinci invented a method of drawing from several angles, rendering rhetorical description obsolete.³³ *Ekphrasis*, the description of a painting,

³¹ Marrou, *Education*, 262.

³² Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, II, 4, 3 and IV, 2.

³³ Arnould Moreaux, *Anatomie artistique de l'homme* (Paris, Malbène, 1975) VII.

was therefore an independent literary genre,³⁴ it did not constitute the interpretation of an image. This was a culture which appreciated the art of speaking as much as the visual arts: it was normal for a work which pleased the eye to give rise to a work which pleased the ear, as in Lucian's *Eikones*³⁵ or the *Eikones* of the Philostrati, grandfather and grandson.³⁶ And a description of the painting in the temple of Europa-Asherat in Tyre, which depicted the rape of Europa by Zeus disguised as a bull, is included in a novel by Achilles Tatius in the second century.³⁷

Ancient discussions of art tell us that there is something in the visual arts that creates an impression on the viewer. This is *mimêsis*, resemblance, and the words of the verbal description are supposed to create the same sensation. The literary genre of *ekphrasis* continues up to the end of the Empire, and in particular in the literary milieu of Gaza, where two authors of *Descriptions* came from: Procopius and Choricus. We have Procopius of Gaza's sixth-century description of a fresco in a public building which depicted the story of Phaedra and Hippolytus. It showed Phaedra writing a letter to Hippolytus in which she declared her feelings. A second scene showed Hippolytus receiving Phaedra's message while out hunting.³⁸ Another

³⁴ J. Palm, "Bemerkungen zur Ekphrase in der griechischen Literatur", *Kungl. Humanistiska Vetenskaps-Samfundet i Uppsala, Årsbok* (1965-1966) 108-211 (non vidi).

³⁵ Lucien, *The Hall*, in Lucian, t. I, Harmon, Loeb. See L. Bompaigne, *Lucien écrivain* (Paris, 1958) 707-735.

³⁶ For the grandfather's *Eikones* see Philostratus, *La galerie de tableaux*, trans. Bougot-Lissarague, loc. cit., 1991.

³⁷ Achilles Tatius, *Leucippe and Clitophon*, 1, 1, trans. P. Grimal, *Romans grecs et latins*, Tours (1958) 875-877; ed. et trans. S. Gaselee, Loeb, vol. I, 1984 (1st ed. 1917), 2-5; the date is based on the evidence of two papyrus fragments of Achilles Tatius which date from end of the second, see the introduction to the 1984 edition, pp. IX-X. See also the descriptions in Heliodorus' *Aithiopika*. See Sandrine Dubel, "La description (ekphrasis) d'objets d'art dans les Éthiopiennes", *Pallas* 36 (1990) 101-116. On ekphrasis as the description of landscape see Véronique Merlier-Espenel, "Les représentations de la nature dans les *Métamorphoses* d'Apulée", in *La nature et ses représentations dans l'Antiquité*, coordonné par Christophe Cusset, préf. de R. Martin, Paris, Centre national de documentation pédagogique (1999) 157-172. Delphine Dumas-Acolat, "Les représentations de la montagne à Rome: vision par l'écrit et figures iconographiques", *ibid.*, 69-78, brings out well the idea of transitivity, the replacement of the visible by language.

³⁸ On this mythological themes at Tyre see, Maurice Chéhab, "Sarcophages à reliefs de Tyr", *Bull. du Musée de Beyrouth* XXI (1968) pl. 27, sarcophagus 447. See now Pascale Linat de Bellefonds, *Les sarcophages attiques de la nécropole de Tyr. Une étude iconographique*, Editions Recherche sur les civilisations, diff. de Boccard, Mémoire n° 52 (1986) p. 27.

text described a complex mechanical clock complete with mythological figures. A pupil of Procopius wrote a description of an astronomical image in hexameters. Choricus has left us a description of the church of St Sergius of Gaza embedded in his encomium of bishop Marcianus.³⁹

Ekphrasis, or description, was a transposition, a translation, a verbal copy. In fact the Latin *descriptum* means 'copied', as in the case of official records.⁴⁰ As this suggests, there was thought to be a certain transparent 'transitivity' between text and image. The question remains of whether ancient commentators made use of this process of identifying and describing scenes as a component of their interpretations.

The transitivity between text and image was a two-way one. A history could be written on the basis of images. It has been suggested that Herodian used the paintings sent to Rome from the East by Septimius Severus when he wrote his account of the emperor's Parthian campaign and the capture of Ctesiphon.⁴¹

So it was possible, within the bounds of tradition, to describe a work and then to move on to the interpretation of the text which was now the equivalent of the image.

B. *Exegesis*

Ekphrasis presupposes that there is a transitivity between image and text, complete transparency. Allegorical exegesis, by contrast, is based on the assumption that one has to be taught to unveil the intention of the image. For the sake of clarity, it is important to distinguish two allegorical approaches: the rhetorical figure, and the project of interpretation.

³⁹ F. M. Abel, "Gaza au VI^e siècle d'après le rhéteur Choricus", *Revue Bénédictine*, 40 (1931) 5–31; Paul Friedländer, *Spätantiker gemäldezyklus in Gaza, Des Prokopios von Gaza ekphrasis eikonos* (Vatican City, 1939) (Studi e testi, 89), and the reconstruction in pl. XI et XII. See Reinach, *Recueil Milliet*, p. 43 and n. 3 p. 42, who mistakenly assumes that the painting was in a private house. (M. Lee Thompson, "The monumental and literary evidence for programmatic painting in Antiquity", *Marsyas*, Studies in the History of Art IX (1960–61) 36–77, notes this error on p. 58, n. 108). See also G. Downey, *Gaza in the Early Sixth Century, Centers of Civilisation VIII* (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1963).

⁴⁰ Fritz Schulz, "Roman registers of Birth and Birth Certificates", *JRS* 33 (1943) 58: the formula is 'descriptum et recognitum'.

⁴¹ Herodian, *Histoire des empereurs romains de Marc-Aurèle à Gordien III*, III, 9, 12 (Roques, 1990) 98; (Whittaker, Loeb, 1969, p. 323).

The creation of allegorical images: rhetoric

The Greek grammarians used the term *hyponoia*, and then *allegoria* (translated into Latin as *significatio*) to designate the rhetorical figure in which one uses an image, metaphor or story (parable) in order to make an impression on the audience through some quality that is lacking in the original idea.⁴² These images, metaphors or parables are able to communicate the meaning of a statement (understood as the intended meaning) either because they are related to each other, or because each is a development of the preceding one. Their most striking feature is the use of the concrete to explain the abstract. This is one of the intellectual approaches transmitted through education which aim to identify and fix one meaning, which is treated as the only possible meaning. It is not a question of trying to enrich the meaning through a variety of approaches, but to illuminate it by the use of something which might appear to be an approximation, but was considered to be synonymous.

It is however, important to understand exactly how far the use of rhetorical allegory could go, given that the speaker needed to be certain he would be understood. G. Sauron is right to point out that 'traditional symbols' (like oak and laurel for example) were juxtaposed in a decorative composition in order to create a symbolic discourse. It is possible, he writes 'to envisage the creation of much larger decorative compositions, using several combinations which group motifs as if they were the elements of speech, and arranging them in accordance with a particular syntax in order to create a meaning which could be extremely complex.'⁴³ This practice of creating an iconographic discourse by juxtaposing elements could be compared to a patchwork, whose aim is decorative, but which is here charged with a complex meaning, which has to be firmly established.

E. Will wrote that 'in antiquity, artistic expression is closely bound to ideas. It is hard to conceive of monuments at this period which do not first of all claim to have meaning, which are not first of all monuments to devotion, and only then works of art'.⁴⁴ This is precisely

⁴² Jean Pépin, *Mythe et allégorie* (Paris, éd. Aubier-Montaigne, 1958) 87-8 et 133.

⁴³ G. Sauron, "Discours symbolique et fonction décorative à Rome à l'époque augustéenne: problèmes de méthode", *MEFRA* 92 (1980) 699-713, cit. p. 703; p. 699, Apollo's laurel (myth): *supplicatio* (ritual); myrtle: Venus, *purificatio*, *ovatio*; p. 700, the distinction between pure decoration and symbolic decoration.

⁴⁴ Ernest Will, *Le relief cultuel gréco-romain* BEFAR 183 (Paris, 1955) 53.

what the texts tell us, texts which originated in milieux which claimed, either as a result of a real intellectual concern, or snobbery, or as a result of intellectual trends, to endow whatever they wished with meaning. When, in 1942, Franz Cumont studied the funerary symbolism of the Romans he stated explicitly that his aim was to reconstruct a system of symbolic iconography which was used consciously by the Romans, a system which is partly known from literary references to themes which were common to oral and written literature alike, as well as to iconography. The symbolic meaning of an orally transmitted story spelled out in written commentaries is thus accepted by the historian as evidence for the meaning of visual representations of the same story. At that time, scholars were interested in the meaning as consciously expressed by the artists, in the explicit, acknowledged meaning of certain representations. Written sources sometimes made it possible for this to be reconstructed. Visual narratives are assumed to refer to a body of oral literature, to myth and history as transmitted by society. It was thought to be possible, on the basis of the examples elucidated by texts, and by studying figures, to reconstitute a symbolic system which was used consciously, a form of language and communication active in Greco-roman society at the beginning of the first millennium.

Clearly these are simply conventions which applied at certain times and places (codes). Greco-roman society attributed a certain meaning to a certain story and its visual representations at a particular period, and within the framework of a particular philosophy or religion.⁴⁵ But as soon as we have evidence for several ancient interpretations it is impossible to tell which was adopted by viewers of a particular work, and where there is no literary evidence, there is no certainty at all. But we do know that the practice of making allegorical works of art, or of subjecting works to allegorical interpretations according to certain conventions, continued throughout the ancient Mediterranean world. We cannot assume that the creation of allegorical paintings was restricted to the second and third centuries AD. This was a coded form of communication which made use of myths as well as personifications, sometimes both at once.

⁴⁵ What we call convention is discussed by Plato, with reference to language, in the *Cratylus* 433c–435c.

In the *Republic*, Plato compares the choice between vice and virtue to a scene in which one sees Opinion on one side, and Truth on the other. Adeimantus describes to Socrates the feelings of a young man who hears talk of virtue and vice, using a passage from Pindar: "Is it by justice or by crooked deceit that I shall scale the higher tower⁴⁶ and so live my life out in fenced and guarded security?" (He faces a choice between reputation without good deeds or good deeds without reputation.) "Then since it is "opinion" as the wise men show me, that "masters the reality" and is lord of happiness, to this I must devote myself without reserve. I must draw a façade (*prothura*) and an appearance (*schema*) in a circle around me as a shadow-painting of virtue.' A. Rouveret interprets the circle which Adeimantus draws around himself as a circle made by a compass. Adeimantus speaks of a '*prothura*' which, as A. Rouveret points out, was the stage-building in the theatre.⁴⁷ This fundamental text can be compared to Philostratus' description of a drawing in the *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*: an Egyptian asks Apollonius whether he has seen the choice of Heracles 'in writings on painting'.⁴⁸ He then describes the two personifications. The figure of Heracles gave rise to many different moral interpretations, particularly by Cynic philosophers who held him up as a model of the sage's struggle against vices. There is an echo in Apuleius' *Florida*, where the Cynic Crates is described as a 'Heracles (of vice)'.⁴⁹ One of the Philostratean *Eikones* (I.27) shows the healing hero Amphiaraus sinking below the earth. He is depicted in front of a cleft in a rock 'Truth clad all in white is there and the gate of dreams . . . and the god of dreams himself . . . carries a horn in his hands, showing that he brings up his dreams through the gate of truth.'

It seems to be a simple matter to find a widespread interpretation of certain myths which were useful for everyday communication and to apply these to any image of these myths. But the stories presented in the visual arts in which male and female figures, devoid of any

⁴⁶ A. Rouveret, *Histoire et imaginaire*, p. 56 translates as "à la forteresse la plus élevée".

⁴⁷ Plato, *Republic*, 365b, trans. P. Shorey (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical Library, 1982) vol. 5, 135-7 and A. Rouveret, *Histoire et imaginaire*, p. 56.

⁴⁸ Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, VI, 10, Conybeare, Loeb, vol. II, 33; Conybeare translates "picture books", but I would prefer to see them as collections of ekphraseis, similar to Philostratus' *Eikones*.

⁴⁹ Apuleius, *Florida*, 22.

identifying attributes, are supposed to personify vices and virtues need inscriptions or a commentary of some sort if they are to be recognised. Visual personifications were a common feature of ancient art, and for this reason they are accompanied by inscriptions.⁵⁰

Allegorical interpretations of images

The teaching of exegesis was one of the grammarian's functions, at this level it simply involved supplying all the grammatical and historical knowledge necessary for understanding a text.⁵¹ When dealing with the Homeric poems he encountered the multiplicity of allegorical exegeses proposed by philosophers of all schools from the sixth century BC onwards.⁵² Like the philosophers, grammarians discussed the validity of interpretations of this type⁵³ which, being relatively simple to disseminate, became part of standard everyday practice. Philosophers used images in support of their arguments. In this way Celsus compared the images on the peplos presented annually to Athena to an interpretation of Zeus' words to Hera as 'God's words to matter'.⁵⁴ Neoplatonic interpretations from Plotinus to Porphyry dealt with Homeric myths as well as myths deriving from the Asiatic religions which were becoming familiar in the Mediterranean world. Like the orally transmitted Asiatic myths, the central text of Greek culture (the Homeric poems), presented a mixture of coherence and obscurity which demands an allegorical reading if one is searching for meaning, rather than being content to enjoy the narration of marvelous stories. Porphyry's interpretation of the cave of the nymphs in the *Odyssey* compares it to the mithraic cave, as part of an inventive and powerful philosophical approach.⁵⁵ He

⁵⁰ Ernst Gombrich, *Icones symbolicae: Philosophies of symbolism and their bearing on Art* (1948, et éd. Phaidon Press, 1972, 1st publ. in collected essays), although it deals with later images, is very illuminating.

⁵¹ Marrou, *Histoire de l'Éducation*, 252–9.

⁵² Briefly mentioned by H. I. Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation*, 256. See the fundamental work of Jean Pépin, *Mythe et allégorie. Les origines grecques et les contestations judéo-chrétiennes* (Paris, Aubier-Montaigne, 1958, 2e éd. Seuil, 1976, 3e éd. Brepols, 1981). The introduction to the second edition is important. See also F. Buffière, *Les mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque*, (Paris, 1854).

⁵³ J. Pépin, op. cit., on the history of interpretations and the position of the philosophers (Platonic opposition, for example, in Chapter 2) as well as on the debates among Alexandrian grammarians who preferred philological exegesis (Chapter 9).

⁵⁴ Origène, *Contra Celsum*, VI, 42, (Borret, SC 147, t. III), 283.

⁵⁵ Porphyry, *L'autre des nymphes dans l'Odyssee*, trans. Yann Le Lay, with an excellent introduction by Guy Lardreau, 'La philosophie de Porphyre et la question de

also wrote an interpretation of the myths of Attis and Cybele, as we know from Eusebius,⁵⁶ in which he wrote that Attis symbolized the flowers that appear in the springtime and die without bearing fruit. The emperor Julian, for whom allegorical exegesis was a way of exploring questions of ethics as well as natural history, gave another interpretation in the fourth century, which attributed an ascetic signification to the cult of the Great Mother and her castrated lover-son.⁵⁷ We can at least ask whether allegorical interpretations of images involved the same types of approach used in the interpretation of these verbally transmitted myths.

C. *The Tabula Cebetis: allegorical invention or allegorical interpretation*

The only allegorical commentary on a painting which has survived—we are speaking of interpretation, rather than description—is an anonymous treatise of the first century on a votive image placed in a temple of Cronos.⁵⁸ We do not know whether this image was real or fictional but the text, which describes figures in a space delimited by three concentric enclosures, could easily be translated into visual form. An ancient relief, which has since been lost, is recorded in a sixteenth-century engraving and editions of the *Tabula* from the sixteenth century onwards contain modern engravings of the image. This commentary was at one time thought to have been made for a Pythagorean, on the basis of indications in the text itself, but it is

l'interprétation' (Lagrasse, Verdier, 1989) (Greek text with English translation in Porphyry, *The cave of the Nymphs in the Odyssey*, a revised text with translation by Seminar Classics 609, State University of New York at Buffalo, Arethusa monographs, 1, 1969).

⁵⁶ *Praep. ev.* 3, 11–12, (des Places, SC 228), 215.

⁵⁷ See the fine study by Dario M. Così, *Casta Mater Ideaea. Giuliano l'Apostata e l'etica della sessualità* (Venise, Marsilio Editori, 1986) 96–97.

⁵⁸ *Cebetis tabula*, éd. F. Drosihn revised by Karl Praechter, Teubner, 1891, now: J. T. Fitzgerald et L. M. White, *The Tabula of Cebes* (Soc. of Biblical Literature, Texts and translations 24, Graeco-Roman Religious Series 9), Chico, Californie, Scholars Press, 1983. See also D. Pesce, *La Tavola di Cebete* (Antichità classica e cristiana, 21) (Brescia, Paideia, 1982); with the review by Jaap Mansfeld, dans *Studies in Later Greek Philosophy and Gnosticism*, ed. Jaap Mansfeld, (Variorum reprints, 1989) 484–6; French translation by Mario Meunier, in Marcus Aurelius, *Pensées* ed. Garnier, Paris, n.d. See Emile Bréhier, *Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie* (Paris, 3e éd., 1950): ch. III, "La méthode allégorique", p. 39f. et p. 281: the *Tabula Cebetis*. See also the study by R. Joly, *Le tableau de Cèbes et la philosophie religieuse*, Coll. Latomus LXI (Bruxelles, 1963) to be read in the light of the studies by Pesce, Fitzgerald and White.

currently thought to belong to a Stoic or Cynic milieu with definite tendencies to eclecticism.⁵⁹ In this text, visitors from abroad find themselves unable to understand the meaning of the painting and are happy to find an old man to provide them with the key. Their guide begins by identifying the places and the figures, the most easily recognizable of which is a figure of Tyche standing on a sphere. We are also told that a female figure with a whip is waiting for the people who are approaching her. But the narrative would be incomprehensible without the explanation provided: some people make their way directly towards the good and towards happiness from the moment they are born, while others take their time, allowing themselves to be distracted by the seductions of pleasure, represented as figures with no particular attributes. The commentary does not just describe and identify, it explains the content within the framework of moral teaching. There is therefore a hidden meaning, a disguise, which requires initiation to take place through the act of decoding.

The value of this text must have lain in its moral message and the ease with which it could be memorized (though this seems superfluous for such a simple moral). The image—in its literary or visual form—was well known, perhaps through school education, and reference to it was an almost obligatory prelude to advice about the correct path to follow. The same basic pattern (a choice of way of life and a mass of personifications: Opinion, Deception, Covetousness, Error, Moderation, Endurance) occurs in several of Lucian's dialogues. The reference is made explicit in two cases, in one a character announces that he would like to paint a picture of the life of the wealthy in the manner of Cebes, in the other a character says to a friend: 'I wish first of all to paint a picture in words like Cebes showing you the two paths which lead to rhetoric, which you seem to desire so much'.⁶⁰ In both of these passages in Lucian *Virtue*, or

⁵⁹ It is included in H. Thesleff, *The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period*, 1965. This was the opinion of A. D. Nock, "Orphism or popular philosophy?", *Harv. Th. Rev.*, 33 (1940) 312, reprinted in *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World*, ed. Zeph Stewart (Oxford, 1972) I, 514, for the Pythagorean exegesis of Homer see A. D. Nock, "The cult of Heroes", *HTR*, 37 (1944) 61–173, in *Essays*, II, 573–602; and in "Sarcophagi and symbolism", *AJA*, 50 (1946) 152–153: according to Nock, the esoteric links of Pythagoreanism were widely known. He also states (n. 52) that the *Tabula Cebetis* does not refer to the afterlife (for the opposite opinion see R. Joly, *op. cit.*, 69).

⁶⁰ For a list of the explicit and implicit allusions to the *Tabula* in Lucian see

Happiness, is said to sit on a summit which is extremely difficult to reach, but the mention of any goal can be prefaced with a citation of the *Tabula*, or an allusion to it.⁶¹

In the *Tabula* the text creates the personifications and then goes on to demand or provide the explanation. But as soon as one tries to extract meaning from a pre-existing text it is abundantly clear that any image, description, or story, has many meanings.⁶² In Greek literary criticism, as in modern attempts to locate meaning, readers have accepted that many meanings are possible, but, in order to keep the advantages of a single meaning, have created a hierarchy of levels of meaning, sometimes singling out one as 'true'. The exegetes of the third century AD, in their search for meaning, treated every image, metaphor, or story as a figure, used to communicate an idea which the author chose not to express in direct terms. In the rhetorical approach—which involves the use of the concrete image to elucidate the sense—it is the idea which is obscure and needs a concrete example to make it comprehensible. In the second approach the opposite is true and the material world, whether real or reproduced in art and literature, is obscure and opaque and hides a superior reality.

This level of allegorical exegesis came after much intense work to establish the text and understand its literal meaning (the disciplines of philology and history). There were various distinct stages between description and allegory, all of which were of value in themselves as intellectual exercises. I will not give further details of the exegetical approach of the ancient philosophers here, beyond mentioning the existence of these levels of interpretation. I will focus instead in what follows on examples of works of art in order to see more clearly what this type of commentary involved at this period.

R. Joly, op. cit., 80–1; explicit: Lucian, *On Salaried Posts in Great Houses*, 42, (Harmon, Loeb, III, 479), and *The Teacher of Rhetoric*, 6, (Harmon, Loeb, IV, 140).

⁶¹ See chapter VII of the study by R. Joly.

⁶² The bibliography is too long to be cited in its entirety here. In addition to the work of J. Pépin, *Mythe et allégorie*, cited above, an older study is that of Roger Hinks, *Myth and Allegory in ancient art* (London, The Warburg Institute, 1939); for a more general overview see, Morton W. Bloomfield, "Varieties of Allegory and Interpretation", *Revue internationale de philosophie*, vol. 162–163 (1987) 3–4, 328–46.

IV. *The Practice of Interpretation: Lucian, Apollonius of Tyana and Porphyry*

In his essay *On Calumny* Lucian describes and interprets a famous painting by Apelles, a contemporary of Alexander. The *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* portrays at several points the philosopher's responses to the images, sculptures, tapestries and paintings he sees. An analysis of all these commentaries as a group will allow us to identify the range of methods of interpretation that might have existed and to compare them with the methods applied to textual commentary.⁶³ Then I will look at the surviving fragments of Porphyry's work *On Statues*. The selection made by Eusebius, who preserves some quotations in order to argue against the pagan philosopher's ideas, tells us a great deal about the type of careful reflection upon the importance of images in general, which could be carried out within the framework of technical, logical, philosophical thought.

1. *Lucian of Samosata*

Lucian claims to have seen a famous painting by Apelles which seems to have been kept at Alexandria, where Lucian worked in the prefect's office from 170–175. The painting represented Slander (*diabolê*) and was a large allegorical painting. The use of allegory is known earlier than Apelles, sometimes within Homeric scenes, like the figure of Strife by the sixth century artist Kalliphon,⁶⁴ and the figures of Credulity and Trickery, depicted alongside figures from the *Iliad*, by Aristophon of Thasos in the fifth century.⁶⁵ But in Apelles' painting the sheer quantity of purely allegorical figures calls for exegesis. The first step is to identify all the figures: a seated man who is not named but must be the king to whom Slander is speaking, in the shape of 'an extremely beautiful woman, full of passion and excitement'. She drags a young man along by the hair and is accompanied by two more women: Ignorance and Suspicion. Envy is also

⁶³ Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx", *Cahiers de Royaumont*, 7 (1967) 183–200, noted "quelques thèmes concernant les techniques d'interprétation", whose history should be investigated. He was apparently unaware of such an amount of scholarly work already available.

⁶⁴ Pausanias, V, 19, 1 (Reinach, *Recueil Milliet*, n° 75, 73 et 85). Lucian, *Calumny*, 3–5, Reinach, *Recueil Milliet*, n° 414, p. 320; Reinach, *Recueil Milliet*, n° 75, p. 73, and n° 99, p. 85.

⁶⁵ Pliny the Elder, *Natural History*, XXXV, 139 (Reinach, *Recueil Milliet*, n° 99, p. 85).

depicted, accompanied by Treachery and Deceit. Finally a woman in black, Repentance, follows on raising her eyes towards the Truth. Lucian could perfectly well have stopped at this point and discussed the moral significance, as in the *Tabula Cebetis*, which he knew well. But here, as elsewhere, his rationalism led him to give a very prosaic interpretation of the painting, and to provide a historical exegesis, a sort of pictorial euhemerism. He connects the painting to an incident in the life of Apelles, when a jealous rival falsely accused him of conspiring against Ptolemy, Alexander's successor. The whole story was disguised in an allegory. But if the plot to which Lucian refers actually existed, it must have been long after Apelles' death. Lucian, who must have known his dates perfectly well, therefore made a deliberate choice to give a 'historical', or 'literal' exegesis, to use the terminology of the schoolroom, rather than an allegorical exegesis.

2. *Apollonius of Tyana*

At the request of the Empress Julia Domna, wife of Septimius Severus (who reigned from 193–211) a certain Philostratus composed the *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, a sage who traveled throughout the Greek world and the East.⁶⁶ He also wrote a collection of *Lives of the Sophists*. This Philostratus died in the reign of Philip the Arab, between 244 and 249. Other works have come down to us under the name of Philostratus, including a series of descriptions of paintings, the *Eikones*.⁶⁷ In the proem to the *Eikones* Philostratus states that they were written in order to 'teach young people to interpret (*hermêneuein*)'.⁶⁸

If it was the same Philostratus who wrote the *Eikones* and the *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, it would not be surprising to see him putting some discussions of works of art into the mouth of Apollonius. Everywhere he goes, even in Babylonia, Apollonius sees and interprets images of Greek myths or episodes from Greek history, which

⁶⁶ See E. L. Bowie, "Apollonius of Tyana: Tradition and Reality", *ANRW*, 16, (1973) 1652–99.

⁶⁷ A second Philostratus, grandson of the first, is the author of a second series of *Eikones*. G. Anderson, *Philostratus* (London, 1986) app. I, 291–6. See the introduction by F. Lissarague to *Philostrate, La galerie de tableaux*, loc. cit., 1–2 and notes p. 119.

⁶⁸ Philostratus, *Imagines*, 295 K, 10, Loeb, p. 5; trad. Bougot-Lissarague, loc. cit., p. 10.

is less surprising now that we know more about the Hellenised art of the East. Apollonius' comments on the works of art he sees range from literal or historical interpretations to symbolic interpretations, corresponding to the whole spectrum of levels of interpretation which are normally reserved for texts.

Even if the author of the *Life of Apollonius* was not the same Philostratus who wrote the collection of *Eikones*, we can be sure that the discussions of art attributed to Apollonius are not simply naïve outbursts, since one scene shows him conducting a maieutic exercise with his student—a native of a certain 'Niniveh', identifiable as Hierapolis in Syria⁶⁹—on the subject of artistic creation and its perception. In the temple where Apollonius and his friend are waiting to be summoned by the king of Taxila, Apollonius takes advantage of the display of bronze sculptures to reflect on *mimêsis* in art.⁷⁰ 'Apollonius said "Damis, is there such a thing as painting?" and he replied "Why yes, if there is truth." "And what does this art do?" "It mixes together," he replied, "all the colours there are, blue with green, and white with black, and red with yellow." "And for what reason," said Apollonius, "does it mix these? For it isn't merely to get a colour, like dyed wax." "It is," said Damis, "for the sake of imitation, and to get a likeness of a dog, or a horse, or a man, or a ship, or of anything else under the sun; and what is more, it represents (*exeikazei*) the sun himself, sometimes borne upon a four horse chariot, as he is said to be seen here, and sometimes traversing the heaven with his torch if you depict (*hypographein*) the ether and the home of the gods." "Then, Damis, painting is imitation?" "And what else could it be?" he replied, "for if it did not do this it would be an idle playing with colours." After this, Apollonius explains to Damis that the recognition of shapes in clouds is not a result of art, not even divine art, but of the fact that we carry within us forms which we recognize.⁷¹ "We are both agreed that man owes his mimetic faculty to nature, but his power of painting to art. . . . And

⁶⁹ See E. L. Bowie, art. cit., *ANRW*, 16, (1973) 1653–67. On the identification of Hierapolis, see Patrick Robiano, "Un Hiéropolitain méconnu, Damis de Ninive", in *La Lettre de Pallas*, 4 (1996) note 9 (developing a suggestion by Meyer, *Hermes* 52, 373–4).

⁷⁰ Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, II, 20 and 22, trans. Conybeare, I, 172 and 174 (trans. P. Grimal, 1085–7).

⁷¹ A classic example, see Aristotle, *De insomniis* 461b, French trans. Tricot, p. 106: memory traces cause us to see the forms of men or centaurs in clouds.

for this reason I should say that those who look at works of painting and drawing require a mimetic faculty; for no one could appreciate or admire a picture of a horse or a bull, unless he had formed an idea of the creature represented.'” The terms of his lecture echo those of Plato: statues, *mimêsis*, signification. Apollonius adds that it is not just a question of imitation (*mimêsis*) but that the ability to form mental images (*phantasia*) must also be taken into account.⁷²

We must not imagine that philosophers encouraged complicated interpretations as a matter of course. The role of the philosopher could be precisely to overturn the mystical interpretations and to provide a purely literal or historical commentary in their place. The statue of the athlete Milo at Olympia was the subject of symbolic interpretations, but Apollonius of Tyana did not agree: ‘For Milo is represented standing on a disk with his two feet close together, and in his left hand he grasps a pomegranate, while the fingers of his right hand are extended and pressed together as if to pass through a narrow gap. Now among the people of Olympia and Arcadia the story told about this athlete is, that he was so inflexible that he could never be induced to leave the spot on which he stood; and that this was also shown by the grip of the fingers as he held the pomegranate and that they could never be separated from one another, however much you struggled with any one of them, because the intervals between the fingers are very close; and they considered that the fillet bound around his head was a symbol of self-control. Apollonius admitted that this account was wisely conceived (*epinenoêsthai*) but said that the truth was still wiser. “In order that you may know what Milo had in mind (*nous*) it is necessary to know that the people of Crotona made this athlete a priest of Hera. As to the meaning of his mitre, I need only remind you that he was a priest. The pomegranate is the only plant which is grown in honour of Hera; and the disk beneath his feet means that the priest is standing on a small shield to offer his prayer to Hera, and that this is also indicated by his right hand; as for the way in which the fingers are rendered (*to ergon*) and the lack of separation, this should be put down to the ancient style of the making.”’ In this way Apollonius demolished the whole interpretative edifice that had been constructed around a statue which people no longer understood, proving himself a thoroughly

⁷² VI, 18–19, Conybeare, II, 76–78 (Grimal, 1235–6).

common sense iconographer.⁷³ And yet there was an interpretation which could have inspired him and which is found in the *Interpretation of Dreams* by Artemidorus of Daldis: a dream of a statue of Aphrodite with her feet close together seen in a dream signifies that a marriage would last,⁷⁴ indicating the inefficacy of the power represented by the god depicted. Here, a stylistic convention of archaic art gave rise to a symbolic interpretation, which seems to have become widespread, once the convention was no longer understood. One further point: the statue which was discussed by visitors to Olympia cannot have been that of Milo. He competed at Olympia six times between 532 and 516⁷⁵ and the sculpture of this period was different in appearance from the statue described by Philostratus. The type of sculpture which the Greeks called 'daedalic',⁷⁶ with their stiff posture, legs together, gave way as early the second half of the seventh century to *kouroi* with one leg placed in front of the other. This is an example of an image being reattributed.

The first-century *Astronomy* of Hyginus, who was probably Augustus' librarian, includes a commentary on a statue which, like Apollonius' reading of the statue of Milo, was limited to the historical meaning:⁷⁷ 'The statue of Hammon inspired Leon, author of a *History of*

⁷³ Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, IV, 28, Conybeare, I, 410-2 (Grimal, 1160-1). The passage seems to describe a *kolossos*, one of the statues with its legs close together which were replaced by Herms. See P. Chantraine, "Grec kolossos", *BIFAO*, 30 (1931) 449-52; Georges Roux, "Qu'est-ce qu'un kolossos?", *REA*, 62, 1960, 5-40: originally these were not large scale works, the colossus of Rhodes caused the meaning of the term to come to refer to a statue of enormous size (p. 36). See especially J.-P. Vernant, "La catégorie psychologique du double. Figuration de l'invisible et catégorie psychologique du double: le colossos", *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs II* (Paris, Maspéro) (lecture given in 1962, 1st ed. 1966, 251-64), 1971 edition, 65-78. But also, the *kouros*, cf. J. Ducat, "Fonctions de la statue dans la Grèce archaïque: kouros et kolossos", *BCH*, 100 (1976) 239-51; see A. Rouveret, op. cit., 147-8, for the kouros as memorial statue (*mnēma*), while the kolossos is a magical presence.

⁷⁴ Artemidorus of Daldis, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, V, 39, trans. R. J. White (Park Ridge, NJ, 1975) 234 (French trans. A.-J. Festugière, (Paris, Vrin, 1975) 272; text ed. R. A. Pack, *Artemidori Daldiani Onirocriticon libri V* [Leipzig, 1963]).

⁷⁵ See L. Moretti, *Olympionikai. I vincitori negli antichi agoni olimpici* (Rome, 1957) n. 122.

⁷⁶ See the fine chapter by Françoise Frontisi-Ducroux, *Dédale. Mythologie de l'artisan en Grèce ancienne* (Paris, 1975) 95-117 esp. 99.

⁷⁷ Hyginus, *De astronomia*, ed. and trans. A. Le Boeuffe, (Paris, CUF, 1983) the author's identity, pp. XXXI-XXXVIII; interpretation of statues p. 60. See Michèle Fasciato and Jean Leclant, "Notes sur les types monétaires présentant une figure imberbe à cornes de bélier", *Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire*, 61 (1949) 7-33, and p. 16, n. 1 on Hyginus.

Egypt, to give the following story: when Liber ruled Egypt and the other lands, and enjoyed the reputation of having been the first to reveal everything to men, a certain Hammon came from Africa, bringing a large flock of sheep to Liber in order to win his favour and to acquire a reputation as an inventor... the sculptors who made statues of Hammon (*qui simulacra faciunt Hammonis*) make them with horns on his head (*capite cornuto instituunt*) to remind men that he was the first to present them with animals. Those who wished to give Liber the credit for introducing cattle on his own initiative, without asking Hammon, set up statues of Liber with horns (*Liberi simulacra cornuta fecerunt*); as for the ram, he is said to have been placed in the sky as a reminder.⁷

Apollonius discussed other statues, and this seems from one remark by Philostratus to have been a common type of exercise. He writes of a statue in 'Niniveh'—Hierapolis in Syria again—that Apollonius came to more profound conclusions than the priests and diviners of the city.⁷⁸ Seeing a statue of a woman, with horns budding from her forehead, he identified her as Io, who was seduced by Zeus and transformed into a cow. In Babylon he saw tapestries representing scenes from Greek myth in golden thread: 'Andromedas and Amymones and Orpheus everywhere. They like Orpheus in particular, perhaps for his tiara and his trousers'. There were also scenes from the Persian Wars, one of Darius' generals seizing Naxos, the siege of Eretria and the battles of Xerxes as well as construction works.⁷⁹ Philostratus' Apollonius therefore combined the identification of scenes and characters with reflections on the cultural context in which the works were created: in one case the archaic style and the priesthood, in the other the Persian interest in a divinity wearing trousers. It is important to note however that when images of Greek myths and historical figures reached the East, as is in fact clear from archaeological discoveries like those at Nysa, they were the subject of awkward local interpretations which could easily give rise to new myths or variants of myths.

Philostratus was also interested in the moral intentions of the works. At Taxila, at the gateway to India, he saw bronze reliefs depicting the exploits of Alexander and Porus in large compositions. Philostratus compares these works to the most famous Greek paintings, by Zeuxis,

⁷⁸ Philostratus, *Apollonius*, I, 19, Conybeare, I, 50 (trans. Grimal, 1047).

⁷⁹ Ibid., I, 25, Conybeare, I, 76 (Grimal, 1056).

Euphranor and Polygnotus. 'The representation of character in the painting was pleasant in itself'.⁸⁰ The rendering of character results from the fact that one could see Porus' respect for Alexander, in the scene in which Alexander tends to Porus' wounds.⁸¹ Apollonius also points out a statue of Tantalus which was four cubits high (about 1.76 metres) and reinterprets the myth of Tantalus who, he claims, was slandered by the poets, and in fact wished to share the immortality which the gods had bestowed upon him.⁸²

In Apollonius' explanations of images we see a level of interpretation which is well known from textual exegesis: the literal or historic interpretation. But Apollonius sometimes moves on to the symbolic level: 'The cult statue was covered in pearls in the symbolic manner used by all the barbarians for their sanctuaries'.⁸³ 'He marveled at the symbolic construction' of the statue of Aphrodite at Paphos.⁸⁴ Philostratus also gives a description of a painting, very much in the spirit of the one described by Cebes as mentioned above, depicting the young Heracles between Vice and Virtue, one adorned with cosmetics and jewelry, the other plainly dressed.⁸⁵ It is clear that any picture can be interpreted in this way, but also that painters must have deliberately chosen to paint allegorical scenes of this type. 'If they are to be revered for the hidden meanings which they convey' he says of the Egyptian representations of divinities in animal form.⁸⁶

In the *Life of Apollonius* we therefore find a variety of types of interpretation of works of art corresponding to the range of levels of interpretation applied to texts, from a type of philological analysis (history of the conventions of representation), to historical explanations, and finally symbolic interpretations.⁸⁷

⁸⁰ On *ethos* in painting, see A. Rouveret, *Histoire et imaginaire*, 129–61. She shows that *ethos* expresses character while *pathos* expresses passions.

⁸¹ II, 20, Conybeare, I, 169 (Grimal, 1086).

⁸² III, 25, Conybeare, I, 284 (Grimal, 1122).

⁸³ II, 24, Conybeare, I, 180 (Grimal, 1090).

⁸⁴ III, 58, Conybeare, I, 345 (Grimal, 1140). Grimal and Conybeare both give the translation "statue" for the Greek *hedos*, which means 'seat', 'temple' and 'statue' because the Aphrodite of Paphos is a well known statue. This makes the use of *hedos* still more interesting.

⁸⁵ Philostratus, *Apollonius*, VI, 10, Conybeare, II, 32–34 (Grimal, 1220).

⁸⁶ Philostratus, *Apollonius*, VI, 19, Conybeare, II, 80 (Grimal, 1235–6).

⁸⁷ References to meaning were not absent even from the descriptions in Philostratus' *Eikones* as P. Hadot notes in his preface, op. cit., X et XVI.

We can see yet another aspect of the relationship of the inhabitants of the Greco-Roman world to their statues, not this time in their interpretations, but in actions. First of all, attention to religious rites:⁸⁸ Apollonius notes the Greek rites used in the worship of statues of Greek gods in India.⁸⁹ By a statue of Aphrodite in Paphos (Cyprus), he explains the ancient rites to the priests who no longer know them.⁹⁰ He digs near a tomb which is supposed to be that of Palamedes at Methymna to find the statue of Palamedes. When he finds a statue of a man, older than he expected, he decides that it is Palamedes because of the inscription on the base. He re-erects the statue and builds a shrine around it large enough for ten people to eat and drink near it.⁹¹

In another episode, a statue of Leonidas conveys such a powerful sense of presence that Apollonius almost embraces it.⁹² At the border between Ethiopia and Egypt he sees a statue of Memnon in his sanctuary, surrounded by broken fragments of statues. It was a statue of a seated young man 'the feet close together after the style in which statues were made in the time of Daedalus, the arms of the figure were perpendicular to the seat and pressing upon it, for though the figure was still sitting it was in the very act of rising up'. And the statue begins to speak when the sun's rays touch its lips.⁹³ In these conditions it is hardly surprising that a young man could fall in love with a statue of Aphrodite.⁹⁴ This agalmatophilia is specific to a culture in which statues were the persons they represented.

3. *Porphyry (233/4–303) and the hermeneutics of images*

In his polemic against Porphyry's ideas on images in the *Praeparatio Evangelica*, Eusebius of Caesarea (c. 263–c. 339) gave a resume of the philosopher's treatise *On the Statues of the Gods* from which he

⁸⁸ On Apollonius' investigations of rituals in general see, E. L. Bowie, art. cit., *ANRW*, 16, 2 (1973) 1688–9.

⁸⁹ III, 14, Conybeare, I, 257 (Grimal, 1112–3).

⁹⁰ III, 58, Conybeare, I, 345 (Grimal, 1140).

⁹¹ IV, 13, Conybeare, I, 373 (Grimal, 1148).

⁹² IV, 23, Conybeare, I, 398 (Grimal, 1156).

⁹³ VI, 4, Conybeare, II, 15 (Grimal, 1214).

⁹⁴ VH, 39, Conybeare, II, 134–6 (Grimal, 1254). On sexual attraction to statues, see D. Gourévitch, "Quelques fantasmes érotiques et perversions d'objets dans la littérature gréco-romaine", *MEFRA* 94 (1982) 823–42. I would see less perversion in these feelings and their pursuit than D. Gourévitch does.

cited extracts.⁹⁵ Born in Syria, Porphyry studied at Athens before meeting Plotinus in Rome. Alongside the interpretations of myths we therefore have some examples of iconographic analysis.

In contrast to Apollonius' interpretations, the interpretations of statues in Porphyry's work which Eusebius preserves are all symbolic. Porphyry mocked people who saw only wood or stone in statues, comparing them to people for whom 'stelai are stones, writing tables are wood, books woven papyrus' that is, to the illiterate. He referred to the type of training mentioned above, speaking for those who 'have learned to gather the writings concerning the gods from the books of statues'.⁹⁶ Porphyry gave the meaning of colours (white is the colour of the celestial gods) and of forms: the sphere, circle, pyramid, obelisk, cylinder, phallus, triangle.⁹⁷ These extracts also include a description of Zeus, each detail of which is given a symbolic interpretation: 'They have made the statue (*deikelon*) of Zeus anthropomorphic because it was through the intellect that he created and because he accomplished everything through seminal reasons; he is seated as a sign of the stability of his power; his upper body is naked, because he is visible in the intelligible and heavenly parts of the universe; his front parts are covered because he is invisible in the lower parts, which are hidden, he holds the sceptre in his left hand, since, of all the parts of the body, the most dominant and intellectual is the hidden organ, the heart; for mind, the creator, is the king of the universe; and in his right hand he holds either an eagle, because he rules the aerial gods, just as the eagle

⁹⁵ Eusebius, *Praep. ev.*, III, 7; III, 9, 4-5; III, 10, 13; III, 11, 7 and 9-12, des Places, SC 228, 1976, pp. 181-3; 193; 205; 213-5. See also J. Bidez, *Vie de Porphyre* (Gand-Leipzig, 1913) 143-57 and appendix I. The treatise was written before Porphyry met Plotinus, which dates it to before 263, pp. 21-8 et 38. Dario Cosi, *Casta Mater Ideae. Giuliano l'Apostata e l'etica della sessualità* (Venise, Marsilio Editori, 1986) 94-8, contains an excellent survey of the work done on the lost works of Porphyry which dealt with the allegorical interpretation of pagan myths.

⁹⁶ Des Places translates *ek biblon tōn agalmatōn* as "dans des représentations comme dans des livres", loc. cit., 181.

⁹⁷ Ap. Eusebius, *Praep. ev.*, III, 7, 4, p. 183. These are the 'Platonic Forms', for the most part, as contemporary psychologists present them in three-dimensional form as part of ophthalmological examinations. Apuleius, *Apology*, 61, Valette, CUF, 74, tells of seeing 'many geometric forms' in the workshop of an artisan: 'cum apud eum multas geometricas formas e buxo uidissem subtiliter et affabre factas, inuitatum eius artificio quaedam mechanica ut mihi elaborasset petisse, simul et aliquod simulacrum cuiuscumque vellet dei, cui ex more meo supplicassem, quacumque materia, dummodo lignea, exsculperet.'

rules the birds of the air, or a victory, because he himself has conquered everything.⁹⁸ Applying the same interpretative principles, Porphyry explains that 'the virginal statue of Hestia is placed over the fire of the hearth: because this is a fertile force, they represent it in the form of a woman with prominent breasts'. The statue of Demeter is crowned with ears of corn because she conceived 'Core, that is the grain which comes from seeds', 'while the poppies around her are a symbol (*symbolon*) of her fertility.'⁹⁹ Porphyry also explained the symbolism of Aphrodite's hands held over her breasts and pubis: 'she hides her breasts and her pubis because this power is the cause of birth and nourishment'. In this he goes further than Philostratus' Apollonius, since he unveils the symbolic significance which was hardly mentioned by the earlier philosopher.¹⁰⁰ What is more, he refers to statues (*eikones*) of the gods in order to elucidate myths: Dionysus 'looks like a woman in order to indicate (*menyein*) the bisexual force which germinates fruit'; Pluto's helmet symbolizes the invisible pole; 'his broken sceptre is the sign (*sêmeion*) of his power over the underworld'.¹⁰¹ There is a rich vocabulary with which to speak of meaning: symbol (*symbolon*), sign (*sêmeion*), indication (*mênynon*).¹⁰² But it is important to point out that we are dealing with symbolic meaning, and not with the first level attempted by Apollonius, that is, description in terms of artistic styles. Here the identification of the statue is in itself an element of the symbolic interpretation.

In the rest of the text cited by Eusebius, Porphyry forgets that he is speaking of images, of statues; he speaks as if it were self evident. In fact it is self evident, not simply because it is a treatise on images, but because visual images and mythological stories can be subjected to the same type of interpretation. He interprets the attributes, the colours of the clothing, Serapis' purple tunic, Hecate's white robe,

⁹⁸ Ed. E. des Places, loc. cit., III, 9, 5, p. 193. E. des Places, *ibid.*, 183, n. 3 compares this interpretation with Apollodorus' interpretation of a statue of Apollo in the second century BCE, cited in Macrobius, *Saturnalia*, I, 17, 13, ed. and trad. H. Bornecque (Paris, Garnier, s.d.) t. I, p. 171.

⁹⁹ Ap. Eus., *Praep. ev.*, III, 11, 7, p. 213.

¹⁰⁰ Porphyry, ap. Eusebius, *Praep. ev.*, III, 11, 41, p. 227.

¹⁰¹ Ap. Eus., *Praep. ev.*, III, 11, 10-11, p. 215.

¹⁰² Philo, *Leg. ad Gaium*, 98, ed. and trans. A. Pelletier, Philo, *Oeuvres*, vol. 32 (Paris, Cerf, 1972) 130: as part of his criticism of Caligula putting on divine attributes before appearing in spectacles, Philo mentions the attributes of wooden idols: *dia symbolôn mênynonta tas ôpheliâs*, and uses the term in a positive sense; the benefits wrought by the pagan gods are signified by their symbolic attributes.

Cronos' white hair, and gestures: Aphrodite covering her breasts and pubis, Hermes' erection.¹⁰³ After giving examples of the symbolic interpretation of Greek images, Eusebius collects together some interpretations of Egyptian images taken from the same work by Porphyry.¹⁰⁴ Like Apollonius in Philostratus' text, Porphyry uses a symbolic interpretation to explain the animal form of these gods. The absence of Syrian gods from the list is notable, as is the absence of Artemis of Ephesus, who was as familiar to Romans as to Greeks and who demanded interpretation.

In his introduction to the *Cave of the Nymphs*, Guy Lardreau suggests that by the third century it was impossible for pagan philosophers not to make a great effort to interpret myths in order to 'preserve the harmony of Homer and Plato'.¹⁰⁵ Saving Greek culture demanded this intellectual effort. One could also say that statues would also have been lost, if the same type of effort had not been expended on them, and with them a whole culture of visual beauty would have been lost. In this perspective, we cannot be content to see this accumulation of interpretations merely as a form of intellectual enthusiasm. It was a question of preserving a culture. But, for the moment, it is impossible to say what a literal interpretation of statues would have constituted for Porphyry, even if one admits that he did not neglect the letter, that is philology, in his interpretations of texts.¹⁰⁶

Conclusion

One may wonder to what extent the practice of iconographic interpretation provided people with the tools to conceptualise the use of images. The teaching of graded levels of interpretations could be applied to static and narrative compositions, particularly those which historical images, images of triumphs or large sculptural compositions presented to the viewer during ceremonies and in public buildings. The painted or sculpted compositions of a religious nature, repre-

¹⁰³ Ap. Eus., *Praep. ev.*, III, 11, 22-44, pp. 219-27.

¹⁰⁴ Ap. Eus., *Praep. ev.*, III, 11, 45-51, pp. 229-31, 12, 1-6, pp. 231-3, 13, 1-2, p. 235.

¹⁰⁵ Guy Lardreau, introduction to *Porphyre, L'autre des nymphes dans l'Odyssée* (Lagrasse, Verdier, 1989) 31.

¹⁰⁶ G. Lardreau, *op. cit.*, 33-5, who also notes that there is no important literal exegesis which is purely 'literalist'.

senting complex myths which were actualised in ritual, could be subject to exactly the same type of interpretation as the myths themselves.

We do not have any examples of commentaries on images from schools, either from schools themselves, or from grammatical and rhetorical handbooks. We have seen that Philostratus mentions 'books on painting', which seem to have been either descriptions, or books of pictures accompanied by text. Porphyry mentions 'books of statues', which, from the context seem to have contained drawings of sculptures. There has been a lot of discussion about the existence of pattern books, in which these texts, which seem to reflect the knowledge of the elite, rather than artists' notebooks, have not been mentioned. But once we have established that description was part of the teaching of grammarians and rhetors, and that the words of the description were treated as if they were the equivalent of the image, it is possible to see how some authors made use of the various levels of exegesis which were applied to texts in their approach to the discussion of images. The fragmentary texts which have survived give the impression that the abundance of images of myths, especially given the complexity of those myths and the symbolic attributes given to the asiatic gods (Cybele, Attis, Mithra) as well as to the Egyptian gods, may have encouraged the use of allegorical exegesis as a response to those images.

In making it possible to attribute a moral meaning to most statues and sculpted or painted scenes, allegorical exegesis probably helped to preserve the core of this artistic and cultural heritage and to transform religious dedications and images of gods into words of art. The exegetical techniques could be applied to biblical themes, which were sometimes as scandalous as Homer's stories, and could contribute to the creation of a new repertoire and to its moralising interpretation.

Translated by Ruth Webb

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THE NEW MATH: HOW TO ADD AND TO SUBTRACT PAGAN ELEMENTS IN CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

Sara Rappe

Communis opinio sees a mitigation of the pagan-Christian cultural divide that appears so sharply drawn, for example, in the Apologetic literature of the fourth and fifth centuries.¹ Pagans and Christians rather shared in traditional forms of *paideia*, whose very commonality was perhaps underscored by the relatively rare attempts to separate the two cultures. Notorious exceptions, such as Julian's amendment to the Theodosian code, prohibiting Christians from teaching pagan great books, or Justinian's Julian inspired closure of the Athenian academy in 529, confirm the rule. It is perhaps one of the great insights of Marrou's work on Christian education to have noticed this commonality. In his study of Augustinian notions of education, Marrou rightly emphasized *curiositas* (curiosity, intellectual hyper-activity) as a scare-word that runs through Augustine's curricular reforms. Literary erudition as well as scientific investigation fall under its rubric, while the technical aspects of Augustine's own researches (as for example, the nature of measure in *De musica* or the basis of semiology in the *De magistro*) are piously subordinated to the architectonic structure imposed by Augustinian ethics.

Marrou further developed his insight by showing the origins of this condemnation of *curiositas* in the antecedent culture wars of the Hellenistic philosophical schools, between Garden, Porch, and Grove. Although the curricular concerns of these schools can be expressed in the terms of positive formulae (e.g., the physics/ethics/logic of

¹ The *status quaestionis* is conveyed ably by Brown when he writes, Altogether, the impression conveyed by many modern scholars, that the fourth century AD was characterized by a widespread and fully conscious conflict between Christianity and paganism, derives, in large part, from a skillful construct first presented to the Roman world by the Christian historians of the fifth century. It was they who chose to speak of the previous century in terms of a conflict brought to a rapid conclusion in a series of memorable victories by the Christian faith. In this manner, they imposed a sense of narrative closure on what has been more appropriately termed, a "Wavering Century." The pagans must know that there had been a war and that they had been conquered. Brown (1992) 128.

the Stoa) it also true that the Hellenistic schools often promulgate a withdrawal from conventional *paideia*. Thus the ten books *Against the Professors* of Sextus Empiricus are an elaborate critique of dogmatic culture and scientific inquiry. Though they are the foundational texts and present the primary argumentative structures of neo-Pyrrhonism, essentially their method is critical; they denounce the most prestigious achievements of pagan learning. Again, Philodemus' treatise *Peri Parrhêsias* ("On Freedom of Speech") enjoins a form of confessional discourse on the would-be disciple of Epicurus, whose purpose is to purge the student of any egregious indulgence in pleasure and to guard against the formation of new desires. "On Freedom of Speech" is thus a manual that describes a program of doctrinaire oversight and censorship, and so offers a pedagogical agenda whose purpose is to limit the student's involvement in mainstream culture. In any epoch, education is defined both by inclusions and exclusion, by what is removed from the curriculum and what is instilled into the memory of the learner and the community to which she belongs. This process of addition and subtraction is integral to the institutional requirements of the community, as for example in classical Athens, where citizens are compensated to attend the festival of Dionysus, or again, as in Plato's utopian fiction, where tragic poets are exiled from the canon. Indeed by studying Plato's educational provisions in the *Republic* (see Nightingale, this volume) one comes to appreciate how foundational censorship, or the regulation of knowledge or cultural capital, becomes for the operation of any regime. The educational program of the early Christian Church proves to be no exception. Thus the debate over the place of pagan letters in the intellectual life of Christians, itself reiterates the central values of ancient literary culture. It is the preexistence of a disciplinary demarcation within that culture, the division between philosophically correct literature and literature that corrupts or misleads the reader, that lies behind the Christian rhetoric of exclusion in terms of which the debate takes shape.

We know that elite members of late antique society, whether pagan or Christian, learned identical technai from more or less the same teachers. Brown and Kaster emphasize the continuity of rhetorical and grammatical practices among the upper echelon as providing the cement of an authoritarian bureaucracy, in which social position is raised on the pulleys of friendship. Or rather, an elite education afforded its beneficiary the sense of shared belonging to a *modus*

vivendi that emphasized values of politeness, of mutual diplomacy, of social collaboration. This aspect of maintenance of power within the socially elite families of the Roman Empire, a situation that depended on the continuity of cultural institutions and of the traditional roles of the rhetor and grammaticus, is one aspect of Christian education.² Not only was it the case, then, that Christians of the fourth century received training in the traditional institutions that had functioned for centuries as the nerve center of the pagan world, it is also the case that the secular world found itself experiencing a brain drain of the most profound order. During the process of cooptation, Christians could manifest a certain ambivalence about the virtuosity acquired in pagan think tanks, such as the University of Athens or the school of Libanius at Antioch, both venues for the young Cappadocian intelligentsia to cut their intellectual teeth. Gregory of Nyssa writing to his brother Basil's old professor, the pagan rhetorician Libanius, openly shares his enthusiasm for belles lettres, using language that indicates his appreciation for the benefits of a liberal education: "whenever I had leisure, I devoted my time and energies to this study, and so became enamored of your beauty, though I never yet obtained the object of my passion." (Letter X).³ At the same time, Gregory of Nyssa can also emphasize the corrupting effects of traditional *paideia*, as he does in the *Life of Makrina*, which features their ascetic sister taking over the schooling of Basil after his preliminary studies at the University. A central paradox of the Christian letters movement plays out as the conflict between worldly authority or secular power and the Christian rhetoric that denounced the ambitions furthered through *paideia*.⁴ John Matthews writes of the late antique rhetorical culture shared by privileged pagans and Christians alike, whether provincial bishops or urban magistrates, "in

² On this subject, cf. Petit (1957), Kaster (1988) and Brown (1992). The Christian community closely followed the continuum of social gradations in the towns. As Kaster writes,

It is more accurate and more productive to think of the literary culture as a neutral zone of communication and shared prestige, across which the best families could move, near the turn of the fifth century, toward a "respectable, aristocratic Christianity." Having made the passage, the Christianized aristocracy brought the literary culture with it as naturally as it brought the traditional values and perquisites of family and class. Kaster (1988) 89.

³ In letter XVI Gregory addresses two students of Libanius, to whom he has sent his treatise against Eunomius, in the hopes that they will perhaps make its contents known to the master himself. Wilson (1975) 11.

⁴ Cf. Kaster (1988) 28 and *passim*.

an important sense, the function of this culture was precisely to define an elite over against the ordinary run of mankind."⁵

Christian leaders took full advantage of the persuasive powers associated with their rank and privileged education.⁶ Libanius taught the sons of functionaries, allowed the children of families in the Curial status to attain to an education befitting their station, and introduced some students in the ranks of professorate.⁷ In general his students were culled from the higher strata of a Roman society that provided for little upward mobility, though perhaps Augustine is an index of just how powerful literary *paideia* could prove in the furthering of ecclesiastical or secular ambition. The bishops who framed Christian curriculum as a theological issue belonged to the Roman aristocracy,⁸ while success in the traditional arts exactly qualified one as an interlocutor in the culture debates of the Church. In other words, there could be no Christian appropriation of pagan culture without Christian teachers first attaining to the highest credentials in that culture. Further, the very staging of this pedagogical debate was designed to enable the most gifted and privileged members of society to benefit from a classical education while secure in their status as members of the increasingly powerful political majority.

I. *Canonics*

Considering, first, the curricular wars fought in the Apologetic literature and educational tracts of the second through fifth centuries, we see that in the questions they posed about canon, authority, stylistics, and moral content, Christian authors were often concerned to identify themselves as members of an intellectual elite. This elevated

⁵ Matthews (1989) 78.

⁶ Cf. again Brown (1992) 123:

A subtle shift occurred by which the rhetorical antithesis between non-Christian *paideia* and "true" Christianity was defused. *Paideia* and Christianity were presented as two separate accomplishments, one of which led, inevitably, to the other. *Paideia* was no longer treated as the all-embracing and supreme ideal of a gentleman's life. It was seen, instead, as the necessary first stage in the life cycle of the Christian public man.

⁷ Cf. Petit (1957) for a prosopographical discussion of the social status of the famous rhetor's pupils.

⁸ Cf. Petit (1957) 124, who quotes Basil, *Epistle* 116, concerning the question of remaining true to the offices bestowed on one's rank.

stance with regard to their pagan interlocutors enabled Christian apologists to engage in an even match, and to beat their pagan critics at their own game, through the deployment of superior rhetoric or intellectual credentials. At the same time, this same erudition allowed Christian authors to display what was trivial, absurd, or repulsive in the ancient pagan culture; by deploying standard *epideictic* techniques authors such as Clement and Tertullian succeeded in revealing the rival tradition's most unattractive secrets.

Indeed in the Latin West, Christian authors themselves were responsible for the revival of traditional *paideia*, as in the case of Tertullian, the "Christian sophist" who perhaps single handedly created a renaissance in the field of old-fashioned Latin rhetoric.⁹ The brilliance of Tertullian's pagan-acquired oratory fired such notable followers as Minucius Felix, Cyprian, Arnobius, Lactantius and perhaps Augustine himself.¹⁰ Thus the genre stretching oddity of Tertullian's *Apolegeticum*, a non-judicial defense of a class of persons (Christians) who were being prosecuted out of court, is counter-balanced by the fluency of its forensic structure. For example chapters 1–3 set forth the traditional exordium, an appeal to the judges for a fair and impartial trial. It is precisely out of ignorance concerning the Christians that there is universal prejudice against them; in fact, the pagans are guilty of the very crimes imputed to the Christians, namely, incest, cannibalism, infanticide, and treason. Further this exordium allows Tertullian to deploy traditional pagan catalogues of exempla to great rhetorical effect. So Tertullian highlights his own erudition by citing more commonly used lists of human sacrifice among the pagans—Saturn, Iphigenia, the blood sacrifice at the games of Jupiter in Rome—but then caps the list by adding to it the practice of infanticide in ancient Carthage, or the contemporary practices of contraception and meat-eating (*Apol.* 9.16). Again, moral exempla feature as standard components of a conventional education, and Tertullian demonstrates his virtuosity as when he offers an encomium to Christian courage by citing the stock in trade pagan paragons of self-sacrifice. We hear of Empedocles leaping into Etna's flames, Anaxarchus who succumbed to a barley pestle, an anonymous harlot who chewed off her tongue to spit it at a tyrant.

⁹ Barnes (1971) 190, on the intellectual poverty of Latin literature in the third century and the cover up attempt of the *Historia Augusta*, which pretends to review a lengthy catalogue of unattested authors.

¹⁰ Barnes (1971) 194.

Though Tertullian will admit no compromise with pagan culture (*apud poetas omnia indigna, quia turpia*, "All poetry lacks value because it is immoral," *Ad. Nat.* 2,1); and famously denounces the fashionable academic philosophy of his time (*quid simile philosophus et Christianus, Graciae discipulus et caeli*; "What do the philosopher and the Christian, the disciple of Greece and the disciple of heaven, have in common?" *Apol.* 46, 18) in fact Tertullian succeeds as one of the most outstanding translators of elite pagan culture into a Christian vernacular.

True it is that the apologetic shrillness of Christian rhetoric in the third and fourth centuries denounced the immorality of pagan traditions and apparently revealed unbridled disgust for the moral content of pagan theology and ritual, as well as a harsh and unyielding attitude toward its proffered cultural icons. And yet, it is the virtuosity and status achieved through *paideia* that lends weight to the on-going cultural critique. Even as men like Clement, Justin, and Tertullian create a literature that attempts at all costs to distance itself from pagan traditions, it only succeeds in its mission through a very direct transmission of that same tradition. We can observe the formation of a hybrid Christian-pagan culture, then, even in the earliest stages of Christian education.

Turning now to Christian treatments of canon, perhaps one of the few explicit treatises concerning the use of pagan *belles artes* in the formation of Christian character before Augustine's *De doctrina Christiana*, is Basil's *Ad adulescentes*, a short treatise written (presumably) for his young nephews. This all too brief document tantalizes with the suggestion of various well defined *topoi* in ancient education theory: comparison of life to athletic contests, with virtue as the prize (a Cynic *topos*); the intimation that preparatory studies are necessary before a life of philosophically based virtue is embarked on (Platonic and Peripatetic *topos*); diatribe material, such as the denunciation of wealth. Though much of the treatise adds little by way of a specifically Christian curriculum, the seeds of a Christian anthropology show the direction Basil is heading. More unique to the letter are the metaphors Basil uses to demonstrate the place of pagan arts: an external or superficial wisdom that clothes the true person, "as a leaf furnishes shade to the fruit (*Ad. Ad.* III.10)." Or again, pagan learning is alien wisdom for Christians who undertake it as Moses exercised himself in the letters of the Egyptians or David studied the Chaldean wisdom (*Ad. Ad.* III.12–16). This is "external" (*exothēn*) culture, which is useful because it furnishes a vague picture of genuine

virtue. From the viewpoint of Christian anthropology, the idea seems to be that the ordinary basis of education, namely, the formation of excellent habits through adherence to normative practice, has little to do with the innate virtue of the soul. Or perhaps the point is historical: pagan wisdom furnished a decent preliminary sketch for what would be a genuine art of living with Christian revelation.¹¹ Along these lines, Basil relates an anecdote in which Socrates allows himself to be assaulted, as if he were offering an illustration, however historically backward it might be, for the Christian injunction against retaliation.¹²

This transformation of liberal education (*eleutheros paideuein*) into external or preliminary culture is no more than a Christian reiteration of such *topoi* as we find, e.g. in Seneca's *Epistle ad Lucilium* 88. There Seneca concedes the usefulness of a liberal education (*studia liberalia*), but suggests that the one truly liberal study is wisdom (*sapientia*), not because it is worthy of a free person, but because it makes one free. Seneca cites with contempt the typical curriculum found with the *grammaticus*—history, poetry, diction, mythology—none of it conducing to the practical tasks of freeing oneself from desire or fear. Seen in this light, Clement's *Ad adulescentes* has the unmistakable Stoic ring and hardly seems a charter for a distinctively Christian education. So far, we have seen that Christians rely on rhetorical techniques either for the serious purposes of defending Christians against charges of criminality, or openly elevate the art of rhetoric and the training of the grammarian as the distinguishing marks of a cultural superiority. Finally, Basil suggests that study of the classics works as a propaedeutic to the more serious but decidedly adult enterprise of Christian intellectual and moral training.

By the time Augustine wrote his *De doctrina Christiana* (ca. 427) Christian letters flourished and it was now time to bring back some of the philosophical tropes that governed the ancient quarrel between philosophy and rhetoric. Socially, Augustine found himself no longer to be addressing (as the Cappadocians) ranking members of Roman society, nor did he expect that his fellow presbyters would have enjoyed the same training and professional standing that himself had cultivated. Augustine, as renegade professor and late comer to the Church, now found himself engaging in a self-examination as he

¹¹ *Ad. Adulescentes*, 10.2 (*skiagraphia tēs aretēs*): a rough sketch of virtue.

¹² *Ad. Adulescentes*, 7.25ff.

attempted to deploy these same professorial skills to the benefit of his fellow Christian teachers. From Tertullian's Christian sophistry, we see Augustine attempting to produce disciples of his own stamp, though again these students were no longer to be the polished products of a liberal education.

Augustine in this treatise explicitly distances Christian rhetoric from the grammatical traditions of ancient Rome. *Latinitas* itself, the one measure of cultural standardization throughout the Empire, is now trivialized or worse, pathologized, as the concern of a feeble mind:

Whether you say *inter homines* or *inter hominibus* does not matter to a student intent upon things. And again, what is a barbarism but a word articulated with letters or sounds that are not the same as those with which it was normally articulated by those who spoke Latin before us? Whether one says *ignoscere* with a long or short third syllable is of little concern to someone who beseeches God to forgive his sins no matter how he may have managed to articulate the word. What, then, is correctness of speech but the maintenance of the practice of others, as established by the authority of ancient speakers? But the weaker men are, the more they are troubled by such matters. Their weakness stems from a desire to appear learned, not with a knowledge of things, by which we are edified. *De doctrina Christiana* II.45–6.¹³

In book four of this same treatise, Augustine formulates a new rhetorical training, in which Scripture, not pagan models, will provide the stylistic canon. Life is too short and ill affords the Christian teacher a period of leisure in which to cultivate rhetorical works. Instead, eloquence will advance through a kind of inductive learning; the Christian *rhêtor* will become acquainted with the hallmarks of style, in the way that children naturally become competent in the rules of their native grammars (*De doctrina Christiana*, 4.12–14). Augustine then proceeds to prove the soundness of his method by subjecting the letters of Paul to a rhetorical analysis, and ends the treatise by sketching a manual of style for effective preaching. In this treatise, we witness a complete upset of the secular art and its grip upon the institutions of Christian *paideia*. No doubt Augustine spoke from experience in the pulpit; the institutes of preaching were a new form of oratorical rules, designed primarily to save souls, and to ensure that truth could be revealed with as much persuasive power as its antithesis.

¹³ *De doctrina Christiana*, translation of Green (1977) 40–1.

In Augustine's *reductio artium ad philosophiam*, to use Marrou's phrase¹⁴ we see a move away from the arts of the grammarian, or rather, Augustine chooses a different model for his Christian education, in which Scripture will suffice for what would otherwise be the distractions of pagan letters. In fact such a reduction (in effect philosophical training purged of literary erudition) is already anticipated in Plato's own pedagogical tract, the *Republic*. By reducing their diet of inflammatory culture, Plato produced the lean watchdogs of his commonwealth, the first utopian institution founded on the principle of censorship. Augustine's reduction, then, offers us nothing by way of Christian innovation, despite its severity toward pagan encyclopedic learning—since it amounts to a rehearsal of prior Platonist strictures of what did and did not conduce to the elevation of the mind. The very censorship that purported to dethrone pagan culture and to promote a first deviant but quickly more dominant culture (Christianity), in effect reinstalled pagan values, and sought its justification on the prior tradition's abrogation of what we might think of as First Amendment issues.

The question of canon, then, is of great importance to the culture wars of the early Christian period. Pagan critics measure Christian doctrine against the rule of philosophy, or question the teaching credentials of Christians by suggesting that they have not received accreditation in the approved institutions of higher learning. For example, the earliest systematic pagan attack on Christianity is Celsus' *'On the True Doctrine.'*¹⁵ From what can be reconstructed of this treatise through Origen's masterful reply, formulated some 70 years later, it seems that the Platonist philosopher, Celsus, adapted certain Stoic doctrines concerning the natural revelation afforded by reason, to suggest that human beings are in possession of an original, universally discoverable wisdom. This true account is attested among the highest and most ancient civilizations, including Egypt, Assyria, Persia, India, and various other tribes (*Contra Celsum* I, 16).¹⁶ The Jewish nation, however, corrupted and distorted this doctrine through the botched efforts of Moses, who offered a misleading account of reality to his followers;

¹⁴ On this aspect of Augustine's pedagogical work, see Marrou (1938) especially chapter 5.

¹⁵ This treatise must be reconstructed from Origen's reply, formulated some 70 years later. Cf. Borret (1967–76).

¹⁶ Cf. Frede (1994) 5194 and Frede (1999) 133–4.

similarly, the Christians have in turn further embraced and amplified the mistakes introduced by the Jews. The Christian claim to be a uniquely privileged revelation of the truth, since it does not accord the same status to the gods of other nations or see in foreign religions the universal principles of monotheism (and what amounts to a largely Middle Platonist metaphysical scheme), belies its intellectual inferiority. Christians in turn respond by allowing the force of Greek philosophical *paideia*, and arguing, as Justin Martyr does, that for example Plato and Moses are in substantial if not literal agreement about the nature of reality, and share the fundamental premises of what turned out to be pagan/Christian monotheism. Again, we have a variation on this theme in the more deprecatory treatise of Tatian, *Ad Graecos*. Here we find the familiar curricular themes rehearsed and dismissed with contempt (Plato learned the doctrines of the Pythagoras, who essentially plagiarized the “*graologia*” (old wives tales) of Pherecydes, but what of it?, *AG* 3.3). Or again, Tatian complains that philosophers disgrace themselves through associating with tyrants (Plato, Aristotle) or attain notoriety (witness Crates’ *kunogamia*, *AG* 3.3) at the expense of common decency, or accept pay for imparting their wisdom (some take up to 600 gold coins per annum to perform such “philosophical” acts as letting their beards grow long!, *AG* 19.1). Therefore, the question of authority to teach, of license to teach, is central in the apologetic literature of both pagans and Christians. That Christianity purports to be a divinely revealed teaching is not necessarily a Christian invention. Or rather, the forms that this claim took in the educational debates between pagans and Christians suggest that once more, any such claim could be easily manipulated to the advantage of a given party.

Fundamentally, however, the debate concerning which literature, Hebrew or Hellenic, is more ancient or deserves more credence, stems from a Greco-Roman obsession with tradition and antiquity; originality had always been an index of how suspicious a thinker would appear. Indeed, it appears that one of Proclus’ code name for Christians includes the noun *kainotomia*, i.e. innovation.¹⁷ Thus Justin will argue, as a proof of the prestige of Biblical doctrines, that Plato’s cosmology borrow heavily from Moses (*First Apology*, 44), while later Clement will argue the new-comer’s (i.e. Plato’s) worthlessness,

¹⁷ Saffrey (1975) 553–63, esp. 563.

inasmuch as he simply plagiarized what remained authoritative in his cosmology from Moses (*Strômateis*). Again, we see that Christian writers will adapt the Hellenic tropes of *archaiologia*, already well ensconced in Greek and Latin classics as for example, in Herodotus, Thucydides, Plato, or Varro's *Antiquitates rerum humanarum et divinarum*.¹⁸ In turn pagan philosophers experienced a certain amount of peer pressure to come up with their own credentials concerning participation in a revealed tradition. In the third century, the Neoplatonist Iamblichus emphasized the relationship between philosophy and revelation by writing on the mysteries of the Egyptians or by embracing the Chaldean oracles as providing a guide to contemplative praxis. The Oracles were a Middle Platonist work written in hexameters and purported to contain the divinely inspired teachings of the Babylonians, thus affording philosophical *paideia* the veneer of archaism, and providing the Neoplatonists with their own philosophical *archaiologia*. Again, Proclus emphasized the transmission of wisdom along a golden chain of personal initiation, a line that stretched back into mythical times beginning with Apollo, Pythagoras, Plato, and so forth.¹⁹ Late Athenian Neoplatonism was a peculiar mixture of scholasticism and pagan religious cults, all blended into a syncretic system by the third-century Syrian philosopher, Iamblichus. Pressed by the example of Christianity to become a tradition associated with a revealed theology, Neoplatonists accorded a scriptural status to the writings of Plato, Homer, Orpheus, and the Chaldean Oracles, even while embracing non-Greek theologies as expressions of a larger, universal revelation.

The researches of this Athenian school were designed as a return to the original wisdom that gave birth to their tradition. Proclus in the *Platonic Theology* can say: "All of Greek theology is the child of Orphic mystagogy: Pythagoras was the first to receive initiation from Aglaophamos, Plato in turn received from the Pythagorean and Orphic doctrines perfect knowledge concerning the gods." (1.5.25–26). Indeed the last Platonic scholarch, the pagan philosopher Damascius, (he headed the school when at last the emperor Justinian closed its doors in 519), brings his relentlessly discursive critique of Neoplatonic metaphysics to a close by appealing to revelation. Perhaps the most surprising passage in the *Doubts and Solutions concerning First Principles*

¹⁸ For this kind of literary argument see Young (1999).

¹⁹ O'Meara (1989). Cf. also Athanassiadi (1993).

occurs toward the end of the treatise, where Damascius appears to eschew traditional metaphysics in favor of revealed wisdom:

We use human language to speak about principles that are divine in the highest possible degree. We cannot conceive or name them without being compelled to use our own ideas about realities that far exceed every mind, life, and being. Even when the Gods instruct some of us concerning these or other matters, they [do not teach] such [thoughts] as the Gods themselves have. Instead, they use an appropriate language when instructing Egyptians, Syrians, or Greeks . . . and so transmit matters of great import to human beings by using a human *dialect* (*Doubts and Solutions concerning First Principles*, III.140.11–25)

Indeed Neoplatonists in the very last stages of these culture wars countered with a newly invented mythology, the golden chain or sacred race, a philosophical family with dynastic pretensions in which intermarriage played a considerable role.²⁰ Again, pagans embraced Christian charges that Greek philosophy originated among the barbarian races as part of their conceit to belong to a universal revelation. The inquiry into canon shaped the curriculum of both Pagan/Christian educational systems, which therefore mutually informed each other, using largely the same conceits, and deploying them in much the same ways. Both Pagans and Christians were willing to cede philosophy over to revelation, intuitive knowledge, faith, and scripture, in an effort to control anxiety about the authorization of their remarkably similar methods of *paideia*.

II. *Mos*

We have already seen that pagan-Christian dialogue involves a mutual appropriation of and accommodation to many of the same concerns with curriculum, canon, and credentials. But some of the charges laid against Christians or Pagans go beyond these rather pedantic issues and become criticisms of a culture at large. Thus Tertullian deploys his pagan rhetorical training to counter accusations of Christian cannibalism or incest (*dicimur sceleratissimi de sacramento infanticidii et pabulo inde, et post convivium incesto*, *Apology* VII.1) with an outraged and sardonic attack on state mandated violence (“I say nothing of him who pushes another in front of himself to the lion—in case he is

²⁰ Cf. Athanassiadi (1993).

not quite murdered enough when he cuts his throat afterward") (*De Spectaculis*, 23). At the same time, Christians denounce pagan institutions such as theater, circus, arena, and bathhouse not only in an apologetic context, but also in the course of providing moral instruction for new initiates. This campaign against the immoral majority is difficult to chart as an educational development, however, because Christians most readily deployed pagan charters against mass culture, the diatribe literature of popular morality that flourished in this period. Moreover, when it comes to more radical proposals to elide or abrogate prevailing social norms, there is a question as to how far this discourse is a literary topos and so incorporates Christianized genre that specialize in narrative forms such as *bioi*, or reflects large scale changes in social practices.

Turning now to Clement's handbook of Christian education, the *Paedagogus*, we can observe how this process of appropriating mainstream or current intellectual trends, an effort to be *au courant* within one's social milieu, helps Clement define a viable Christian mediocrity.²¹ Not only does Clement borrow wholesale *topoi* and quote material verbatim from popular moralizing authors such as Musonius Rufus, but this method inevitably leads him to modify Christian teaching concerning such areas as marriage and sexuality. In the *Paedagogus* we find such topics as, "That marriage is not an impediment to the philosopher," directly borrowed from the *Diatribes* of Musonius,²² a theme that obviously owes much to prior social configurations of the philosopher in pagan settings. The Greek philosophical tradition in fact offered a wide variety of social and literary experiments, from Plato's recommended community of wives, or *koinônia tôn gynaikôn*, to Crates' dog-marriage, to Epicurus' vegetarian commune, to Diogenes' single-handed solution. Alternatively, from the more essential questions of lifestyle, in this treatise Clement descends to matters that would seem more personal, to items of daily comportment such as not speaking with one's mouth full (II, 13, 1-2) or how to clean the teeth (II, 33,4)!

Books II and III offer us a complete *diata*, a fulsome treatise on what Clement actually terms the art of living, or *technê peri bion*. In

²¹ Cf. Markus (1990) chapter 4.

²² Marrou, Introduction to *Paedagogus*, p. 52. Marrou catalogues the following *Diatribes* in terms of their place in the *Paedagogus*: III-IV, That women have a philosophical vocation; XII-XIII, On sexual morality; XIV, That marriage is not an obstacle for the philosopher; XVIII, On food; XIX, On clothing, etc.

its attention to the minutia of dress, furniture, diet, bathing habits (cf. the anachronistic approbation of the philosopher's beard, popular in Hadrian's time but in Clement's 3rd century Alexandria hopelessly out of fashion)²³ the *Paedagogus* can seem a perplexing amalgam of Alexandrian folklore combined with highly sophisticated Roman burlesque. Consider for example the opening chapters of book III, a detailed discussion of practices involved in cosmetics (*kallopizesthai*) conveniently divided into feminine beauty secrets (chapter 2) and male adornment (chapter 3). In chapter II.2 we learn about prevailing fashions in Egyptian temples, which, Clement reports, can be filled with swindlers or the odd assortment of cats, crocodiles and snakes (III.2.1–4). Or again, Clement takes this opportunity to display his considerable erudition as familiarity with the minor writers of Greek comedy, quoting at length from the “*Malthakē*” (Voluptuary) of Antiphanes (III.2.7), where the comic poet pretends to spy on vain women in the midst of their toilette. What are we to make of this literary refinement as an index of Christian pedagogical techniques?

That Clement is not above recommending a modification or relaxation of otherwise stringent ascetic tendencies can be seen in other works, as for example his “Who is the Rich Man Who Will Be Saved?”²⁴ Clement handles the problem posed by a literal reading of the biblical passage, “It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of God,” (Mark 10:25) for his presumably privileged audience by applying a typically Stoic solution. Wealth constitutes one of the Stoic *adiaphora*, indifferents, a class of things that might promote but in no wise constitute happiness, or beatitude. Clement will interpret the passage psychologically; the early disciples must learn to renounce, not wealth, but passions, if they are to attain the goal of happiness. Here Clement develops a strongly Stoic account of Christian beatitude as consisting in the inward state of *apatheia*, or freedom from harmful emotions.²⁵

The *Paedagogus*, and indeed much of Clement's projected trilogy, *Protrepticus*, *Paedagogus*, and *Didaskalos*,²⁶ affords an opportunity to see how an educator operating in a social setting as a member of the

²³ III. 19.1; Marrou, Introduction to *Paedagogus*, p. 90.

²⁴ On Clement's Christian mediocrity see Clark (1999) especially 94–5.

²⁵ On Clement's reading of the bible in *Quis Dives Salvetur*, see Clark (1999) 95.

²⁶ On Clement's pedagogical *magnum opus* conceived in three parts, according to standard (i.e. Senecan) categories—exhortation, precepts, and virtue—see Marrou, Introduction to vol. I of *Paedagogus*.

Christian minority found that compromise was an effective pedagogical tool. Not only does erudition become a weapon in the larger culture wars, but it is in some sense a secret weapon, because undetected and valorized within the culture at large. This dispute over the place of erudition surfaces in a more complex way in terms of the literary representation of asceticism, that is, the voluntary renunciation of the amenities of civilization, or rather, of mainstream culture. Christian *bioi* feature the wise in combat with the learned;²⁷ underprivileged members of society (i.e. unmarried women; illiterate monks) become the teachers of those who enjoy the greater social status. Gregory of Nyssa wrote a Socratic dialogue on death after the manner of Plato's *Phaedo*, featuring his elder sister Makrina in the role of Socrates. Makrina's role in the dialogue is to console Gregory over death of their brother, Basil by teaching him Christian doctrines concerning the resurrection of the dead. Throughout the dialogue, Makrina, a household saint who never married, is referred to as "The Teacher."²⁸ Gregory's sister appears as a shadowy figure, mysteriously imbued with spiritual authority and a domestic air that at once transcends and never quite reaches the institutional *paideia* in which Gregory has been schooled. Is she then, like Plato's Diotima, the fictional invention of a Christian-Platonic dialogue? Perhaps Makrina is a literary allusion both to the *Symposium* and to the *Phaedo*, a touch that adds sophistication to what seems an ascetic meditation on death, in a treatise that precisely refutes pagan speculation on the subject.

One aspect of Christian literary *paideia* utilizes pagan genres in order to transmit values that are at odds with pagan doctrines. Yet the literary representation of asceticism in all its forms remains problematic as an index of Christian *paideia*; the boundary between *theôria* and *praxis* is muddled. As Averil Cameron writes,

this literature [on virginity] was typically a learned literature, whose practitioners had usually themselves received the best classical education available at the time. While encouraging virgins to avoid the classics, read Hebrew, and become learned in the Scriptures, they extolled uneducated "simplicity." Their praise of the unwashed and uncultured over and against the social advantages of civilization and learning,

²⁷ Brown (1982) on the role of the counter cultural advisor whose very lack of erudition grants a certain authenticity to his admonitions.

²⁸ Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Soul and Resurrection*.

which they did not hesitate to display themselves in their own writings, is indicative of an area of deep ambiguity and uncertainty in contemporary Christian culture.²⁹

In his *Life of Makrina*, Gregory of Nyssa writes an encomium to his elder sister, this time functioning as the antidote to urban erudition, the person to whose influence their brother Basil owed his renewed asceticism. Makrina here is the spiritual guide and mentor, taking in hand the young Basil, freshly minted from the University of Athens, "excessively puffed up by his rhetorical abilities," and persuading him to join the family in an ascetic regime.³⁰ As another instance of this ambivalent message concerning the place of letters in the ascetic life, Clark cites Palladius, *Historia Lausiaca* 55. According to our author, Melania the Elder is said to have mastered a formidable reading list of "three million lines of Origen and two and a half million lines of Gregory, Stephen, Pierius, Basil, and other worthy men."³¹

Again, Gregory of Nyssa's treatise *On Virginity* (*Peri partheneias*) follows in the ancient philosophical/rhetorical tradition that has sages, sophists, and saints, all declaiming on the theme, "Ought one to marry (*ei gamêteon*)."³² The entire treatise is written in high rhetorical style, employs elevated diction and an impressive vocabulary list replete with tragic loan words, alludes to Cynic diatribe, sketches a Stoic account of the emotions, and is motivated throughout by a Neoplatonic mystical ascent. At the same time the treatise uses the metaphor of virginity to insist on a simplification of the person; stripping off the "tunic of flesh," the soul is to be wedded to the divine. Finally, virginity is the link between human and divine nature, an aid to the vision of God that gives the soul wings for its spiritual union. How much Gregory's Platonizing Christianity requires that a reader be steeped in the literature of the ancient philosophical schools, and how much his Christian Platonism requires a reader trained in the spiritual and physical disciplines he celebrates, is a difficult ques-

²⁹ This quotation is from Cameron (1991) 85, and is also quoted by Clark (1999) 56.

³⁰ Gregory of Nyssa, *Life of Makrina*, 6. On the *Life*, see Brown (1988) 278 and Rousseau (1994) 9–10. See also Elm (1994) on the domestic origins of urban asceticism in the fourth century.

³¹ This quotation is from Clark (1999) 57.

³² Cf. Oltramare (1926). See also Aubineau in Gregory of Nyssa (1966) Introduction, 94–5. For a list of passages contra marriage, cf. Stobaeus *Anthol.*, IV, 22, vol. IV, 494–568.

tion to answer. And yet askesis might be thought to entail precisely a rejection of urban based intellectual fashions, or the elevation of the private, domestic sphere over the public arena of disputation, as a newly valorized source for virtue.³³

One final example of this aspect of Christian education, in which askesis is presented as the royal road to spiritual renewal, a byway overlooked by the person too heavily laden with pagan letters, can be seen throughout the text of St. Augustine's *Confessions*.³⁴ For as Brian Stock shows, convincingly to my mind, Augustine narrates the story of his conversion as a reading journal that extends through books 1 through 9 of the *Confessions*. As an autobiographer, Augustine informs us about his inner state primarily through reference to what he has been reading, so that the culminating moment in the narrative is the auditory voice, "*tolle, lege.*" Augustine's ascetic journey begins with a text. Can askesis rightly be considered an alternative to mainstream forms of education? If culture works by way of symbolic representation to transmit fundamental values for inclusion within a community,³⁵ then in the terms of early Christian society, this affirmative culture is embodied in the various genres of literature that developed after pagan models: the homily, the epistle, the life, and the dialogue.

III. Discipline

In all of this Christian culture, both appropriation and repudiation operate not only to create an esoteric community, but also to ensure that this community survives through assimilation to or absorption of pagan cultural forms. Thus *askêsis*—or renunciation of mainstream culture—figures heavily in the self-representations of Christian communities, and indeed there are whole literatures, such as the *Apophthegmata Patrum*, or *Sayings of the Desert Fathers*, that are an index of a given

³³ On the domestic affiliations of asceticism and the private as the training ground for Christian virtue, see Clark (1993), Brown (1988) and Elm (1994).

³⁴ Stock (1996). This all too brief example is entirely indebted to Stock's challenging book.

³⁵ For a working definition of culture, I refer the reader to Brenkman (1987) 51: Culture comprises the symbolizations, representations, and expressive forms through which a collectivity secures its identity and solidarity at the same time that it relates itself to nature and differentiates itself from other collectivities with which it has relations of interdependence, whether cooperative or antagonistic.

community's commitments to this alternative, ascetic *paideia*. The *Sayings* record the oral traditions handed down by monks in the Egyptian deserts, and perhaps ironically reveal the silences of the monks' cells. If this silence is just as passionately cultivated and if those who practice it are as thoroughly disciplined in simplicity, as any student at the University of Athens is trained in eloquence, our only evidence for this is literary.³⁶ Indeed, one member of the Cappadocian circle, Evagrius Ponticus, found his way into the desert of Nitria (50 km southwest of Alexandria) and joined the monastic community whose oral wisdom traditions are recorded in the *Apophthegmata Patrum*. Educated in the rhetorical manner and schooled by Basil and Gregory Nazianzus, Evagrius Ponticus makes an ambivalent appearance in *Apophthegmata Patrum*.³⁷ Several anecdotes pit Evagrius against the fathers, and in these exchanges we see the interesting confluence of urban intellectualism facing off with desert wisdom. Such stories reflect the suspicion felt by members of the monastic community with regard to literary cultivation, and the less literate monks invariably come off as the prize winners in the contest for virtue. Thus Evagrius appears in conversation with two venerable monks, both of whom take the opportunity to point out the spiritual disadvantages his over-educated condition affords him:

Someone (i.e. Evagrius)³⁸ asked the blessed Arsenius: "How is it that we, with all our learning and our sagacity, possess no [virtue] and yet these Egyptian peasants are progressing in virtue?" And Abba Arsenius said to him: "We with the lessons of the world, have nothing, yet these Egyptian peasants have acquired grace from their labors."

Evagrius said: I went to visit Makarius and I said to him, "Give me a saying so that I may be saved." And he said to me, "If I give you one, will you listen and practice it?" And I said, "My faith and my love are not hidden from you." Abba Makarius told me, "... If you cast far from you the rhetoric of this world and gird yourself in the humility of the Publican, you can be saved."³⁹

³⁶ On the *Apophthegmata Patrum* and high literate culture, see Clark (1999) chapter three, "Reading in the Early Christian World." Clark cites Burton-Christie (1993). Cf. also Rubenson (1990).

³⁷ *AP* or *Apophthegmata patrum* (*Sayings of the Fathers*) are preserved in an alphabetic collection in PG 65, 72a–440d. *Apophthegmata* of Evagrius are nos. 173a–176a.

³⁸ *Apophthegmata Patrum*, Arsenius, 5, 88d–89a and quoted by Guillaumont (1962) 53.

³⁹ *Les vertus de notre Père, le juste et grande abba Macaire*, text édité par E. Amélineau, *Histoire des monastères de la Basse Egypte*, Annales du Musée Guimet XXV (Paris, 1894) 157–8.

Evagrius brought his Cappadocian intellectual credentials to the desert of Nitria; though steeped in the writings of Origen he came to renounce the hyper-intellectualism of the city and increasingly embraced ascetic teachings on meditation that flourished in the Kellia.⁴⁰ As a result of this fusion, Evagrius proved to be one of the most original thinkers and radical teachers in the tradition of the desert fathers. His training manuals for monks still survive in the Greek, though his more speculative work, the *Kephalaia Gnostica*, or *Gnostic Centuries*, survives intact only in a Syriac version. Because he embodies the convergence of the ascetic and the urban traditions, and because his story captures a moment in history when Christianity turns against itself to continue its dialectic with pagan teaching, Evagrius is a supremely important figure. His students number among the most powerful of Christian mystics, and one in particular, Palladius, attained fame as the author of the *Lausiac History*. In order to understand the historical importance of Evagrius as a figure in Christian education, however, it is necessary to place him in the theological environment of his day, late fourth century Alexandria.

Throughout this chapter, I have been discussing the educational literature of the fourth century as though the boundary lines between the two groups of contestants were clearly demarcated, that is, *Christiani contra Paganos*. And yet of course the picture is not nearly so simple, since paganism could be and inevitably was detected in Christian writers. Perhaps one of the most violent battles over pagan books occurs within the Christian tradition itself, a battle which has come to be known as the Origenist controversy.⁴¹ For the sake of brevity, one can only indicate some of the tenets that proved Origen's undoing, inasmuch as they strongly associate him with pagan teaching concerning time, creation, and the nature of the ultimate reality.⁴² From a theological perspective, the primary charge against Origen is one of Arianism: Origen is accused of teaching that the son is subordinate to the father, because he maintains the unknowability of the Godhead.

⁴⁰ On the contemplative traditions associated with Nitria, see Clark (1992).

⁴¹ Clark (1992). Clark's book details the controversy as it developed over successive centuries, chronicling its beginnings with the reactionary treatise of Epiphanius, the *Panarion*. Clark goes on to discuss the political underpinnings of the controversy as well as its reemergence in the sixth century, in fact the century in which Evagrius is anathematized. Another excellent source for learning about this intellectual crisis in the early Church is Guillemon (1962).

⁴² As reconstructed from Saint Jerome's letter, *Contra Joannem Hierosolymitanum ad Pammachium* PL 23, 355-96.

Origen also goes astray, according to Jerome, when he teaches the pre-existence of souls to human bodies, the doctrine of metempsychosis, and denies the final reality of the human physical body.⁴³

Evagrius also surfaces as a figure deeply implicated in the growing storm brewing over the question of Origenism in the fourth century.⁴⁴ Evagrius' teaching methods came to be associated with an Origenist enclave in Nitria, while he himself was excommunicated in 553 because of the Origenist tendencies discoverable within his theological system. For this reason, too, his speculative writings were destroyed. Evidently he taught that all rational beings were, in their original state, equal to the Logos. Before the existence of souls, there was a single spiritual world consisting in a plurality of intelligent beings, all equal by virtue of their inherent wisdom. At some point, these intellects failed in their knowledge of God and this failure resulted in hierarchy, a rupture or movement (*kinêsis*) in the original state of things, rather like a spiritual big bang. The intellects then become souls who receive embodiment in a world that is a direct result of their degree of distance from the first principle, and so we have angels, humans and demons. This world body is a vehicle for the soul's liberation, the means by which it returns to its original state of unity with the Logos.

Now this system is the background for understanding the ascetic teachings of Evagrius. In what follows, I survey the pedagogical works of Evagrius, particularly as outlined in his esoteric handbook for Christian education, the ascetic training manuals consisting in the trilogy, *The Logos Praktikos*, the *Gnôstikos* and the *Kephalaia Gnôstika*, as well as two treatises that have been transmitted under the name of St. Nilus, *On Thoughts* and *On Prayer*. Evagrius writes these works in the tradition that accepts different gradations of teaching, depending on the disposition and talents of the student. Not all teaching is suitable for rank beginners; some things may only be communicated to students who belong to a monastic community; some doctrines,

⁴³ Cf. the *Chronicon*, IV, 218, PG 110, 780a–792c, a document that records Justinian's condemnation of Origen and Evagrius in the sixth century.

⁴⁴ For example Jerome mentions Evagrius three times in his letters in connection with the Pelagian controversy, and the Pelagian error, concerning the question of whether or not human beings could be free from sin: *posse hominem sine peccato esse*. (Augustine, *De gestis Pelagii*, 24); Clark (1992) 56. Jerome accuses Evagrius of asserting that human beings can come to be completely free from sin or error, because they can achieve *apatheia*, a complete absence of any movement of thought.

again, are suited to differing stages of spiritual practice. This caveat is significant, because it forms a key to understanding the differing aims of Evagrius' writings.

According to Evagrius, there is a distinction between practical life (*bios praktikos*) and contemplative life (*bios theoretikos* or *gnōstikos*). The practical life is dedicated to the cultivation of the requisite mental and physical disciplines that, pursued rightly, bring the student into a condition of mind known as *apatheia*, or freedom from deluded thoughts.⁴⁵ Only after the student has achieved this stability of mind and freedom from the distractions of thought, will the higher studies, such as theology, have any meaning. This aspect of Evagrius' teaching methods, that is the centrality of *apatheia*, is important both within the entire structure of Evagrius' thought, and within the greater cultural amalgam of fourth-century intellectual history. St. Jerome, for example, accuses Evagrius of Pelagianism, insisting that this doctrine belongs to the "heresy of Zeno, to wit, [the doctrine] of impassability, or rather sinlessness."⁴⁶ God alone, according to a certain strain of orthodoxy, is completely unchangeable and incorruptible; necessarily human beings undergo change and are subject to imperfections. Among the Cappadocians, the word *apatheia* is used sparingly; in fact it is Clement who uses the word, though more in the Stoic context, to indicate the rational sanity of one who has mastered emotion in general and anger in particular.

According to Evagrius, however, it is human beings who achieve *apatheia*, through the purification of the intellect; God is perfectly pure intellect and consequently has no need of *apatheia*. Similarly, for those who have attained to this condition, the intellect is not *apathēs*, but rather pure, unconditioned, perfectly naked, in its original state. In sum, then, the first stage of Christian teaching is practical; it involves actively fighting against thought (*logismos*) or affections, which in reality are the work of demonic forces that wage continual war against human beings.⁴⁷ Evagrius goes so far as to systematize the kinds of thoughts that afflict human beings in their spiritual struggles; he speaks of eight kinds of affection that can be mutually implicated in the demonic states of mind. These affections arise from the

⁴⁵ Cf. *Gnōstikos*, chapter 49: "The goal of the practical teaching is to purify the intellect and to render it impassible." Guillaumont's edition.

⁴⁶ Jerome, *Commentary on Jeremiah*, IV, 1, CSEL 59, 220-1.

⁴⁷ Cf. *Logos praktikos*, I.1: "Christianity is the teaching of Christ, our savior, composed of practical, physical, and theological knowledge."

epithumia, or appetite, and include physical desires such as gluttony, lust, or sloth; they also arise from *thumos* and include peculiarly human desires such as pride, ambition, or anger. Thoughts are primarily acquisitive or aversive in nature; passionate responses to the world are in fact an integral aspect of any being endowed with sensation.⁴⁸

When the monk has succeeded in this battle against the demons, through sustained watchfulness and guarding the mind, gradually the experience of *apatheia* begins to manifest itself. This is more or less a permanent condition and can be recognized by several signs that Evagrius proceeds to detail in the second half of his *Praktikos*. Although *apatheia* can be present in various degrees, a person firmly rooted in this virtue remains with thoughts entirely undisturbed or unaffected despite the appropriate stimulus. The mind is freed from its habitual responses and can turn, without the interference of memory, impulse, or thought, to the contemplation of reality. Only when this kind of concentration is present does Evagrius think the student is ready for the contemplative life.⁴⁹

Conclusion: Subtraction

I hope by now it has become apparent that the various forms of subtraction or negation that we have all too briefly surveyed—that is, the Christian replies to pagan culture—are in the end translations of that culture. Yet whether we are studying pagan culture or the Christian transmission of pagan culture, it cannot escape us that each of these traditions includes cautionary tales about the limitations of culture, of *paideia*. To return to the remarks of Marrou cited at the beginning of this chapter, even the most doctrinaire of educational works, like the *Republic*, at least ponders the dangers that any cultural system poses to the growth and well being of those who are situated within it. But the question is, can members of a culture get outside the viewpoint of their culture long enough to meditate on the very limitations it imposes? Should the history of culture include the possibility for self-reflection, the possibility that culture itself can be self-reflexive?

⁴⁸ Cf. *Logos praktikos*, I.4: "Every pleasure beings in appetite, whereas sensation gives rise to appetite. For that which is without sensation is also without appetite."

⁴⁹ Cf. *Logos praktikos*, I.2: "The kingdom of the heavens is the *apatheia* of mind together with true knowledge of reality."

Evagrius' teaching on the nature of the mind is interesting because it presents us with an important kind of answer to this question. In teaching that all thoughts are inherently disturbances of the intellect, the work of demonic forces, Evagrius utilizes Stoic and Platonic doctrine in a highly original manner. Borrowing from the tripartite psychology of Plato that distinguishes between intellect, emotion, and appetite, Evagrius infuses a Stoicizing psychology not only into the activity of prayer, but into Christian anthropology as well. The idea seems to be that all thinking, all images, in short, all productions of the human mind, actually limit the vision of the mind and confine the person to a largely false and highly problematic experience of the world. As Evagrius writes in the treatise, *On Thoughts*, "wisdom arises with the removal of all thoughts that are bound up with objects" (*On Thoughts*, chapter two). Thinking, the entire business of creating a mental reflection of the world, leads to problems precisely because it is implicated in the false sense of self that is the target of Evagrian theology.

As we saw above, for Evagrius, the hierarchical ranking of individual souls constitutes a merely temporary stage of cosmic development. In the stage subsequent to the soul's fallen or individuated condition, that is, in the restored unity of the logos, "there will be no leaders, nor [intellects] subordinated to leaders, but all will be Gods." (*Kephelaia Gnōstika* IV, 51).⁵⁰ In the sixth century, the Origenist crisis that ultimately led to Evagrius' excommunication centered largely on the theological implications of asserting the equality between human intellects and Christ as the logos. But in the fourth century, the political dimensions of this same anthropology received scrutiny. In fact, just those individuated conditions in which the ordinary human soul discovers its life, including social hierarchy, gender, and religious affiliation, were central to the Origenist crisis of the fourth century. As Elizabeth Clark recounts in *The Origenist Controversy*, part of Jerome's attack on Origen's teaching concerning resurrection involved the desire to maintain social order into eternity. If Origen is correct about the lack of physical bodies for human beings after the resurrection, then "not only will the devil be placed in the same ranks as the cherubim and the seraphim, but it will not matter

⁵⁰ For this reason, Evagrius is associated with a heretical enclave of monks in Jerusalem who were anathematized on the grounds that they taught the equality of the human soul to the logos Guillaumont (1962) 147–150, quotes Justinian's letter of 553, which mentions "certain monks in Jerusalem" condemned as "*isochristoi*."

whether we were pagans or Jews rather than Christians. Moreover, Origen's notion that new falls may result in souls being clad with new bodies renders dubious the maintenance of proper ranking of men over women and virgins over prostitutes."⁵¹ In his treatise "On Thoughts," Evagrius grounds this lack of social distinction that comprise the usual identity politics of church and world in the state of *apatheia*, in which there exists no "male or female . . . no Greek . . . slave or free." In other words, with the mind's freedom from thinking, from cultural conditioning, fundamental power structures are no longer operative.⁵² The choice about whether or not one should inwardly reproduce the social world together with its hierarchies of power and identity rests with the person who practices this radical form of emptying the mind, a practice assisted by resisting, not institutions, but thoughts themselves.⁵³ Accordingly, in the heretical teachings of Origen and Evagrius, rooted as they are in asceticism, a viable curriculum seems to prize apart the collocation of power and *paideia*, insisting that *paideia* is not only or not primarily a vehicle of cultural incorporation. The nakedness of the intellect refers not only to the preliminary stage of *apatheia*, or emptying the mind from thought constructions, but also the final lack of distinction between rational beings that constitutes their original nature. And yet this teaching is incredibly dangerous, given that it implies the failure of human institutions such as theology itself.

For Evagrius, theology as the supreme science and ultimate Christian curriculum can only result in the realization of its own limitations. In his *Gnōstikos*, the "teacher's manual" for monastic education, Evagrius writes, "Every proposition has a predicate [that consists] in a genus, specific difference, species, property, accident, or expression composed of these things. But none of these forms of predication applies to the Holy Trinity." (*Gnōstikos*, chapter 41). Again, in chapter 27 he writes, "Do not rashly practice theology, nor attempt to define the divine. For definitions belong to transient creatures." In these texts, we see the discursive corollary of the practical component to Evagrius' curriculum. Effectively, his theology falls outside of the scope of the Trinitarian politics that so fueled the Origenist persecutions of the fourth and sixth centuries.

⁵¹ Clark (1992) 145. Clark cites Jerome's *Apologia* II, 12 (CCL 79, 47).

⁵² Evagrius, "On Thoughts," chapter 3.

⁵³ Evagrius, "On Thoughts," chapter 3.

Foucault's influential⁵⁴ study of Christian *askêsis* has undoubtedly landed us in a hermeneutic circle whose boundaries we should cautiously explore. His writings on discourse suggest fruitful areas of research into the relationship between education and authority. And yet his contrapuntal reading of ascetic texts leads Foucault to assert the autonomy of the individual in terms of techniques for self-invention that are derived from bodily practices. Thus Foucault practices a Cartesian form of inquiry, separating the mentalistic disciplines imposed from without by power structures, to bodily disciplines voluntarily undertaken to realign one's personal desire structure. Foucault's division between positive or affirmative culture, i.e. prescriptive culture that hails the subject as a lexical item within a given discourse, and the self-imposed culture of askesis, in which a subject works out a given formulation in a form of personal abstraction, is I suggest Cartesian.

I take the teachings of Evagrius to go beyond this Cartesian conception of askesis. It is not, as Foucault suggests, primarily a bodily discipline or dietetics that constitutes the care of the self. Or rather, as Evagrius would have it, this care for the self really only arises as a preliminary practice; in reality, the self, the human soul as such, disappears or is seen past, once the system of self-invention, or thought construction, is brought to a halt. In short, it is the recollection of the limitations of culture that constitutes Evagrius' askesis.

One could raise all kinds of objections to Evagrius' educational tracts: he was preaching to the converted—undoubtedly since his senior disciples were those already adept in the contemplative practices he describes. Or again, as a participant in the culture wars of the Christian church, his doctrines were part of a discourse that aimed at increasing monastic independence. Nevertheless, Evagrius was effectively written out of the history of education: he was condemned as an Origenist in 553 and many of his writings were destroyed. Perhaps this example of subtraction, the attempt to delete a voice that resonated precisely because Evagrius paid so much heed to the limitations of even an elite education, is deeply ironic. For it was Evagrius' attempt to subtract from what was already learned that caused him to be eventually removed from the ranks of Christian teachers.

⁵⁴ *History of Sexuality*, vol. III. For Foucault's influence on contemporary studies in asceticism, witness such titles as e.g. *Power and Persuasion; Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire; Power, Authority, and Social Discourse in Late Antiquity*. The number is legion.

Throughout this chapter, I have been concerned with the continuities of pagan and Christian cultural life, and have spent some time discussing the connections between social infra structures and the operations of *paideia*. I have also spent some time on questions of cultural authorization, showing that largely this force is a conservative one that permits little in the way of genuine innovation. If this chapter ends with a focus on Evagrius Ponticus, a teacher who dropped out of the urban rat-race and eventually lost credibility within the tradition he sought to foster, it is because I think we need to see the limitations of the now standard equation, power and *paideia*. Whatever one might think of Evagrius' extreme views about the dangers of cultural productions of any sort, it is important to see that he forms a kind of absent chapter in the history of education. Evagrius would ultimately claim that his teaching lies outside the operations of a cultural transmission that is seemingly governed by the requirements of stability, social concord, and identity politics.⁵⁵

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⁵⁵ Sincere thanks to the editor of this volume, Professor Yun Lee Too, for her commitment to this project and for editorial advice. Nevertheless, all views and any errors are the author's responsibility.

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THE SCHOOLS OF PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE: THE EVIDENCE OF THE BIOGRAPHIES

Robert Lamberton

Within the range of ancient philosophical education, it was a tradition unique to the Platonists of the Roman Empire that scholarchs (in some cases, at least) wrote the biographies of their predecessors. Two of these, one from third-century Rome and the other from fifth-century Athens, are preserved intact. A third, broader in scope, conveys a wealth of information about the Platonists of Athens and Alexandria at the end of the fifth century. These unique windows into the practice of Greek philosophical education will provide the bulk of the information brought to bear in the following essay, which has no pretense to offering a comprehensive view of its subject. The study of Platonic philosophy, like philosophical education in the other schools, is a subject that no ancient author addresses in its own right, and so we are inevitably left with more questions than answers.¹ If we were to ask, in general terms, how philosophical education was carried out in the Greek schools, we would have to turn first to the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, where pedagogic realities are largely obscured by the distorting mirror of satire. The sad fact is, however, that the quality of our information goes downhill from that problematic beginning. The Platonists' biographies are an exception to this rule, and provide us with much of the human content recoverable in the field of ancient philosophical education.

¹ That is to say that we lack information on the pedagogy and the mechanics of such education, though we do have several introductory texts that may throw light on the presentation of Plato's philosophy in the schools. The earliest of these, by the otherwise unknown Alcinous, has been taken to be a manual for teachers of Platonic philosophy (Dillon [1993] xiv). One of the latest, formerly attributed to Olympiodorus (hereafter *Anon. Proleg.*: Westerink [1962, 1990]), provides important evidence for the canon of dialogues taught in the schools (see below, pp. 444–5). On ancient philosophical education generally, Clarke (1971), ch. 3, gives a broad (and so often questionable) overview, with a subchapter (99–108) on “The neo-Platonist Schools.”

The tradition begins, as far as we are aware, with the *Life of Plotinus* composed by his student and literary executor Porphyry in the first year of the fourth century, thirty years after the philosopher's death (*Vit. Plot.* 23).² The fact that we can be so precise about the date of composition is a function of Porphyry's unique style of scholarship and of self-presentation. He devotes an extraordinary amount of time to detailing his own credentials and his sources, in order to lend the greatest possible credibility to the facts and judgments that he relays about his teacher. The result is a unique document, arguably the most reliable account of an ancient philosopher to come down to us from his own time. We have no evidence that Porphyry's precedent was followed in Rome, or that a regular succession of scholars was ever established there, though Porphyry would appear to have continued teaching in the tradition of his own professor. In Athens, where the term *diadochos* or "successor" was applied to an extensive series of later Platonic teachers culminating in the early sixth century, Marinus of Neapolis (Nabulus) wrote the life of his teacher Proclus the Successor not long after the latter's death in 485.³ The last of the series, Damascius' *Life of Isidore*,⁴ also known (both in antiquity and today) as his *Philosophical History*, is not

² Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus* (hereafter *Vit. Plot.*) has received a great deal of critical and scholarly attention, most recently in the massive edition by Luc Brisson *et al.* (1982, 1992). Within that edition, Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé (1982) commented extensively on the matters under discussion here. Her study goes far beyond the present one on a number of points. English translations of the *Life* can be found prefaced to virtually all translations of the *Enneads*. That of A. H. Armstrong (1966) 1–85 is the most useful. Chapter division as well as line numbers (where supplied) below are those of Brisson *et al.*, which correspond exactly to those of the OCT of Henry and Schwyzer (*Plotini Opera* I, 1–38).

³ Marinus' *Life of Proclus*, or *On Blessedness* (*peri eudaimonias*) (hereafter *Vit. Proc.*) has been less studied than its predecessor. The best critical text and commentary are those of Rita Masullo (1985). Citations below are by chapter, followed (where needed) by Masullo's line number. An English Translation can be found in Rosán (1949) 13–35. Oikonomides (1977) printed Boissonade's 1814 Greek text opposite a translation that had been privately circulated by K. S. Guthrie (Oikonomides [1977] xiv). The result is quite misleading, with major discrepancies between the Greek and the English as printed. On the term *diadochos* and some problems raised by its use in the ancient sources, see Glucker (1978) 121–58, esp. 153–8; Athanassiadi (1999) 42–5 with n. 73.

⁴ Damascius (hereafter *Phil. Hist.*) is well served by Athanassiadi (1999), a new text with English translation and notes, whose numbering of the fragments is followed here. See also Asmus (1909, 1910, 1911). A somewhat more extensive collection of fragments that that of Athanassiadi, based closely on Asmus' reconstruction, can be found in Zintzen (1967), which has been the standard edition. Athanassiadi (1999) 385–403 provides complete concordances to Zintzen.

preserved intact, but what we have amply demonstrates that its scope was quite different from that of the two others. Damascius, who was scholar in Athens in the early decades of the sixth century, wrote the life of his teacher Isidore at the request of one of Isidore's students (who was also his own student) (*Phil. Hist.*, Test. III, 3–21), but clearly treated this obligation as the core of a far-ranging portrait of his own intellectual world.⁵ While these biographies have the great virtue of bringing their subjects to life, they leave nearly invisible what we know to have been important aspects of Platonic education, notably mathematics,⁶ while they throw somewhat more light on other parts of the curriculum.

Plotinus' peculiar position in the history of Greek philosophy gives his biography a unique importance. From the six centuries between the death of Plato himself and the beginning of Plotinus' career as

⁵ There are, of course, other philosophical biographies of tremendous importance for the reconstruction of ancient Greek philosophical systems, preeminent among them the *Lives of the Philosophers* of Diogenes Laertius. This is the most comprehensive collection, though its inclusive coverage peters out in the second century BC. Thanks to a single reference to a student of Sextus Empiricus (late second century AD) the collection is conventionally dated to the mid-third century of our era, making Diogenes roughly contemporary with the Philostratus whose *Lives of the Sophists* dates to the 230's. Immune to the archaizing prejudices of Diogenes, Philostratus' biographies range from the fourth century BC to his own generation, with an emphasis on the rhetors of the Second Sophistic of the high empire, for which he is our most important source. A century and a half later, Eunapius of Sardis' *Lives of the Sophists* takes up the story with Plotinus and follows it down through the time of Julian the Apostate and beyond. Finally, we have preserved in fragmentary form a peculiar and very lively *History of the Deviations of the Platonists from Plato* by the decidedly odd Platonist (or Pythagorean) Numerius, datable to sometime in the second century, which has been seen as an important model for Damascius (Athanasiazi [1999] 40).

⁶ Plotinus "was not ignorant" of the mathematical sciences, according to Porphyry (*Vit. Plot.* 14) but had not studied them in depth. Proclus wrote a commentary on Euclid that is extant, and so surely taught at least the first book of the *Elements*, but Marinus makes no mention of mathematical education in his school. Photius (*Vit. Proc.* Test. III, 83–90) supplies the information that as a student in that school, Damascius studied geometry and arithmetic under Marinus, while Ammonius taught him astronomy. None of this could be deduced from Marinus, but the surviving fragments of Damascius contain praise of Ammonius as outstanding among Proclus' students in geometry and astronomy (*Phil. Hist.* fr. 57C), and indicate that mathematical theorems could be matter for dispute in Proclus' school (fr. 93). It is Photius as well who tells us that Damascius and Isidore taught Theodora and her sisters geometry and number theory, among other subjects (*Phil. Hist.* Test. III, 4–10). Finally, Damascius' famous comparison of Hypatia (who studied mathematics with her father Theo [*Phil. Hist.* fr. 43A]) with Isidore is a precious indication of the relative valuation of these skills: "Isidore was quite superior to Hypatia, not only as a man to a woman, but as a true philosopher to a geometrician" (*Phil. Hist.* fr. 106A).

a writer, we have not a single intact text contributing to the history of philosophical inquiry in the tradition of Plato. Then, composed between 254 and his death in 270, the fifty-four treatises that Porphyry assembled into Plotinus' *Enneads* present us with six centuries of Platonic inquiry as a *fait accompli*, along with a new beginning. Much can be reconstructed of what intervened,⁷ but this does not reduce the importance of the fact that it must be reconstructed. In the *Enneads* we have, quite miraculously, not just a single work but an entire oeuvre, preserved virtually intact, an oeuvre comparable in bulk to the Platonic corpus. For the historian of Greek philosophy, this constitutes a new beginning of extraordinary importance, but for the historian of ancient philosophical education, this corpus, along with the introductory *Life*, is if anything even more important, because as Porphyry tells us more than once (*Vit. Plot.* 4.11; 5.60–61) the treatises Plotinus wrote were the direct and immediate expression of the lectures and discussions in the school.

Before looking at the information this material can yield for the understanding of Plotinus' pedagogy, we should stand back for a moment and look at Plotinus' accomplishment from the perspective of his contemporaries—for, thanks to Porphyry, even this perspective is accessible to us. It will come as no surprise that Plotinus emerges as less original, less of a watershed, as viewed from their perspective. His own teaching took place against the background of Platonic commentators of the previous century, whose commentaries were read aloud in the sessions of the school (*Vit. Plot.* 14, see below, pp. 443–4). The continuities were, then, more obvious than the discontinuities, and Plotinus the teacher situated himself clearly and deliberately in a dense and well-documented tradition of commentary on the issues raised by the dialogues of Plato. The anxiety of influence enters again and again into Porphyry's account of his teacher. Plotinus' thought was heavily dependent on that of his own principal teacher Ammonius Saccas (*Vit. Plot.* 3; 14.14–16) and his right to repeat, and indeed to base his own teaching on Ammonius' ideas was questionable and disputed. Porphyry gives us some sense of the competition and the dynamics of the interactions of Plotinus with his fellow students Origen⁸ and Erennius (*Vit. Plot.* 3), but the

⁷ The basic reference work is Dillon (1977).

⁸ Not the Christian, but a polytheist Platonist who must have been much younger than the Christian. Brisson *et al.* (1982) 113–4 with bibliography.

rivalry of the successors of Ammonius is portrayed vividly in the anecdote of Origen's unannounced appearance in Plotinus' school (*Vit. Plot.* 14.20–25). When Origen appeared, Plotinus was reduced to embarrassed silence, observed that “the desire to speak is removed when the speaker sees that he is talking to people who already know what he is going to say,” and fled. On top of his dependence on Ammonius, which Porphyry concedes, Plotinus was accused of excessive and inappropriate use of the ideas and writings of Numenius (*Vit. Plot.* 17.1–6), who had been dead for the better part of a century.

Porphyry further supplies us with Longinus' perspective on the matter of Plotinus' status and originality (*Vit. Plot.* 19.38–42; 20.68–86). Porphyry was associated with Longinus in Athens,⁹ and it was after leaving Longinus' school in 263 that he moved to Rome to study under Plotinus (*Vit. Plot.* 4.1–6, 66–68; cf. 20). A considerable part of our information about this Platonic teacher comes from Porphyry's account of Plotinus and of his own education under the two. The picture that emerges is that of a one-sided rivalry, with Longinus coming off as a pedestrian thinker (“a philologist but not a philosopher” in Plotinus' words, *Vit. Plot.* 14.19–20), and an ill-advised critic of Plotinian positions (*Vit. Plot.* 21.18–23). Porphyry tells us about this rivalry in order to lend credibility to Longinus' assessment of Plotinus in the preface to a treatise in fact composed to refute Plotinus. The Athenian Platonist begins by distinguishing among four groups: teachers of philosophy who wrote nothing (and devoted themselves exclusively to guiding their students through oral teaching), those who wrote, but only as a *parergon*, those who wrote but only to repeat what others had already said in the past, and those who made substantial contributions through their writing. In the latter category, he places only Plotinus and his student (clearly Porphyry's rival) Amelius: “The writings of these and these alone strike me as deserving of examination” (*Vit. Plot.* 20.80–81). The rhetoric of the introductory eulogy is not lost on anyone, least of all Porphyry, but the picture painted by Porphyry, reinforced by the cited testimony of the adversarial but laudatory Longinus, is highly credible. It corrects the accident of preservation that makes Plotinus' thought appear unique, but at the same time indicates that in the intensely competitive context of the teaching of philosophy in the intellectual centers of the

⁹ Not the author of *On the Sublime*. On the historical Longinus, see Brisson and Patillon (1994).

mid-third century, the originality of his contribution was acknowledged.

There were, then, teachers who wrote and teachers who did not write, and the testimony of Porphyry and (through him) Longinus is a good indication that those who did not write might nevertheless be credited with original and productive ideas (e.g. Ammonius Saccas) while those who did write might fail to distinguish themselves as original thinkers.¹⁰ Plotinus, it would seem, was viewed as a generally derivative thinker, at least during his ten years of exclusively oral teaching (244–254), though the substantial contributions of his subsequent writings (during the years 254–270) impressed even Longinus, with whom he disagreed on fundamental issues.

The *Life of Plotinus* provides important support for the notion that students of philosophy typically shopped around, listening to teacher after teacher in one center of learning, and then in some cases moving on to other centers. There is little doubt that, by the year 300, this sort of philosophical odyssey of inquiry had become a topos, a frequently repeated motif suitable to the characterization of the restless, young intellectual in his thirst for knowledge and truth. Christians, in particular, exploited it in order to characterize the futile philosophical quest that, in their literature, inevitably leads to conversion.¹¹ It is therefore striking that the *Life of Plotinus* delivers two different perspectives on the itinerant student of philosophy, and allows us to get some sense of the relationship of literary topos to lived reality.

Plotinus' own search for a teacher is presented (with explicit appeal to Plotinus' own autobiographical account, *Vit. Plot.* 3.1–2) with full psychological trappings:

[He said that] at the age of 28 he embraced philosophy, but after encountering the most renowned philosophers in Alexandria at that time, came away silent and saddened, and told one of his friends of his experience. This friend understood his soul's desire and took him to Ammonius, whom he had not yet tried. When he had gone and listened to Ammonius, he said to his friend, "That is the one I was looking for." (*Vit. Plot.* 3.6–13)

Plotinus listened to Ammonius for the next eleven years and then, after joining Gordian's ill-fated campaign against the Parthians (another

¹⁰ Cf. *Anon. Proleg.* 13.1–14.

¹¹ Justin Martyr, *Trypho* (intro.). For further bibliography, see Brisson *et al.* (1992) 207, *ad Vit. Plot.* 3.7–15.

episode in his philosophical quest), moved to Rome and himself began to teach (*Vit. Plot.* 3.15–24).

Porphyry's account of his own studies replays this scenario in a less rhetorically charged mode, without explicit invocation of the restless intellectual search and its fulfillment.¹² Born about 234, perhaps in Tyre, and certainly raised there,¹³ Porphyry went to Athens at an unknown age to continue his education. The *Life of Plotinus* tells us a great deal about Longinus, the most celebrated Athenian Platonist of the mid-third century, including several anecdotes that link him personally to Porphyry. In the preface to *On the End* (*peri telous*), which Porphyry cites at length (*Vit. Plot.* 20), Longinus refers to Porphyry as the "companion" (*hetairos*) both of himself and of Plotinus. Porphyry, both here and elsewhere, often refers to Longinus and to his opinions, but although the *Suda* makes Longinus his "teacher" (*didaskalos*),¹⁴ Porphyry himself seems never to identify Longinus in this way. By contrast, he does, in the *Homeric Questions*, refer to the Athenian *grammaticus* Apollodorus as "my teacher"¹⁵ and to the list of his Athenian teachers may be added the geometrician Demetrius.¹⁶ A fragment of Porphyry preserved in Eusebius (*Prep. Ev.* 10.3.1) offers our richest portrait of Longinus and his circle, including Apollodorus and Demetrius.¹⁷ What all of this adds up to is that Porphyry traveled first to Athens in pursuit of higher education (literary/rhetorical, mathematical, and perhaps philosophical), then moved on to Plotinus' school in Rome, presumably now committed to philosophy. He stayed with Plotinus for only five or six years until, in a crisis of suicidal depression, he left Rome at Plotinus' suggestion and went to Lilybaeum in Sicily. He gives the reason for this choice: "I had heard that a certain Probus, a notable [or perhaps "eloquent": *ellogimos*] man, was living there" (*Vit. Plot.* 11.11–17). However notable he may have been at the time, this Probus is otherwise unknown. Porphyry was not to return to Rome until after Plotinus' death, which occurred two years later (270). Other students were more fortunate, or at least less peripatetic. Amelius, from nearby Tuscany,

¹² The basic givens of the life of Porphyry were documented and analysed by J. Bidez (1913), now supplemented especially by the studies in Brisson *et al.* (1982, 1992).

¹³ *Vit. Plot.* 7, Bidez (1913) 5–6.

¹⁴ *Suda* s.v. *Logginos* 1, III, 279, 4–5 Adler (cited by Pépin in Brisson *et al.* [1992] 493, with n. 65). Porphyry fr. 15T Smith.

¹⁵ Bidez (1913) 31 Porphyry fr. 14T Smith.

¹⁶ On the authority of Proclus *In Remp.* 2.23.14–15 (= Porphyry fr. 13T Smith).

¹⁷ Bidez (1913) 30–1.

studied with Plotinus in Rome for twenty-four years (*Vit. Plot.* 3.35–45).¹⁸

One of the most striking patterns that emerges from Porphyry's account of Plotinus' school is the sharp distinction he maintains between categories of students. "[Plotinus] had numerous auditors [*akroatai*], but of devoted followers drawn to him by a commitment to philosophy [*zelotai kai dia philosophian synontes*] there were Amelius . . . [and roughly six others]" (*Vit. Plot.* 7.1–3). Neither the phrase designating the second category nor the list of members of that category is without problems, but in general terms Porphyry makes the claim that there was an inner circle of less than ten students (to which he himself belonged for some five years) as well as a larger, public audience, and that the basic distinction between the two groups was that the former had devoted themselves to the philosophical life while the latter had not. Clearly, the tale of the search for a teacher that carries the student on a quest from city to city is relevant principally to the former group. They are presumably the only students of Plotinus who would be referred to as his "companions" (*hetairoi*). The casual students or auditors that Porphyry singles out are first of all senators, men actively involved in politics and the public sphere, but two individuals neatly mark the limits of the two categories. Zethus (a physician of Arabian origin) is listed among the *hetairoi*, but took an active role in public life, despite Plotinus' efforts to "restrain" (*anastellein*) those unphilosophical impulses. The "auditors" on the other hand included a senator named Rogatianus,¹⁹ who underwent a conversion, left his lictors at the door rather than emerge to take up the office of Praetor, and abandoned his worldly possessions. Plotinus praised him, "holding him up as an example to those engaged in philosophy" (*eis agathon paradeigma tois philosophousi probalomenos*, *Vit. Plot.* 7, 45–46). Porphyry seems to be saying that Rogatianus earned Plotinus' praise and was held up as an example to the inner circle (*hoi philosophountes*) though there is no suggestion that his change of lifestyle was tantamount to gaining admission to that group.

Porphyry gives us no substantial basis for an estimate of the total numbers of auditors who attended Plotinus' classes. He emphasizes

¹⁸ On Amelius: Brisson (1987). On the implied rivalry of Porphyry and Amelius, below, pp. 446–47. Amelius had had an earlier teacher, named Lysimachus (*Vit. Plot.* 3.43), of whom very little can be said with certainty (Brisson in Brisson *et al.* 1982, 95–6; Brisson 1987, 799–800).

¹⁹ Perhaps to be identified with the Rogatianus who was Proconsul in Asia in 254. See Brisson in Brisson *et al.* (1982) 109.

that casual visitors were not discouraged and that "whoever wanted" (*ho boulomenos*, *Vit. Plot.* 1.13) might attend, apparently without attracting attention. This leaves open the possibility that women attended as well as men. The phrasing of the opening of *Vit. Plot.* 9 seems, rather oddly, to continue the list of categories of students: "He also had women who were very devoted to philosophy (*sphodra philosophia[i] proskeimenas*). . . ."²⁰ The chapter however turns immediately to Plotinus' domestic arrangements, the women of his household, and the prominent men who entrusted to Plotinus the care of their widows and orphans. None of the anecdotes of the school explicitly relates that women attended. Nevertheless, the combination of Porphyry's emphasis on the philosophical commitment of the two Geminas and of Amphicleia (*Vit. Plot.* 9.1–3) with his insistence on the openness of the school (*Vit. Plot.* 1.13) seems to tip the scale in favor of their presence in the lectures and discussions. Plato's Academy, according to traditions that went back at least to Dicaearchus (fr. 44 Wehrli), included women, and the Platonic teachers of the fourth and fifth centuries clearly included women (Hypatia) and we know that women were among their students (e.g. *Phil. Hist.*, Test. III, 8–10).

If special formal instruction was provided for the "companions," beyond the public instruction offered in the "classes" (*synousiai*), there is little in Porphyry's account to indicate as much. Rather, the classes seem to have consisted of lectures based on readings from commentators on Plato, lectures that might be interrupted or even suspended by questioning by the students. One might assume that the "companions" took the most active roles in the questioning, and this seems to be borne out by Porphyry's account.

This freedom of interruption and intervention might create an atmosphere that was chaotic to the point of incurring the criticism of some of those in attendance. Porphyry claims that the situation was particularly acute during the early years of Plotinus' teaching, before his own arrival in the school: "The school was full of disorder and nonsense, as Amelius told me, because he encouraged his students to ask him questions" (*Vit. Plot.* 3.35–38). But this willingness to tolerate digression and questioning clearly continued to be characteristic of Plotinus' teaching. Porphyry relates with evident self-satisfaction (*Vit. Plot.* 13) that he himself interrogated Plotinus on the relationship

²⁰ See Brisson's note *ad loc.* Brisson *et al.* (1992) 242.

of soul and body for three entire days of classes until one Thaumasius protested and in turn was put in his place by Plotinus. One might conclude that in Thaumasius' eyes, Porphyry's insistent questioning was the sort of "nonsense" (*phlyaria*) that had characterized Plotinus' classroom in earlier years. The "companions," then, seem to have been part of the performance, and the auditors (sometimes to their frustration) were at the mercy of their questions and their frequently exercised right to intervene and direct the course of inquiry.

One of the greatest paradoxes in Porphyry's presentation of the school of Plotinus bears on the use of texts in class and hence on the structure of the curriculum. By Porphyry's account, Plotinus was virtually unable to read because of the weakness of his eyes. This explains why texts "were read to/for him," (*Vit. Plot.* 14.10) but it does not explain what role these texts played. Their identity is spelled out with characteristic explicitness:

In the classes, they read for him the commentaries, whether those of Severus, or those of Cronius or Numenius or Gaius or Atticus, and among the Peripatetics those of Aspasius, Alexander, and Adrastus, and whichever ones came up. (*Vit. Plot.* 14.10–14)

The vocabulary is unambiguous: *hypomnêma* means "commentary" and the authors in question were commentators of the text of Plato and Aristotle. The fact that Porphyry goes on to discuss Plotinus' reaction when a treatise of Longinus "was read to him" may or may not be an indication that the reading took place in a class—the easier solution would be to say that it did not. But why should the texts we can be certain were read in Plotinus' classes be commentaries? There is no mention of the text of Plato as an object of study—and indeed, we have Porphyry's emphatic claim that the matter of the classes was what became the written works of Plotinus—essays that are decidedly not in the form of commentaries on the text of Plato. This would seem to preclude a pedagogy based on the text of Plato as primary focus of inquiry, and yet both the reading of the commentaries and all available precedents and comparanda would seem to suggest just that sort of pedagogy.²¹

The evidence of the *Life*, in isolation, cannot provide a solution to this dilemma, but various attempts have been made to throw light on Plotinus' pedagogy by way of procedures documented elsewhere.

²¹ On the problems raised by the passage, see Goulet-Cazé (1982) 262–73.

Among the most influential of these was that of Émile Bréhier in his introduction to the Budé *Plotin* (1924). Bréhier developed the analogy of the school of Epictetus (*Stoicorum maximus* in the judgment of his contemporary Herodes Atticus)²² to explain how essays not in the form of commentary could emerge from a classroom where the task at hand was the explication of a received text. In Epictetus' classroom (so Bréhier maintained) the lesson would begin with the reading aloud by a student of a text from Chrysippus or another of the old Stoics. The student may also have offered a paraphrase or commentary. Then, we are told, came the "second act" when Epictetus himself took over and delivered an extemporaneous lecture, using the text and/or its concerns as his starting point.²³ These, as edited by his student Arrian, became the *Discourses* (*diatribai*). How much we owe to Arrian, as *reportator*, in the shaping, wording, and titling of these texts remains a matter of dispute.²⁴

The analogy is less than compelling, for several reasons. To begin with, the individual *diatribai* of Epictetus are on the whole far shorter and far less complex than the essays that make up the *Enneads*. It is likewise difficult to agree with Bréhier's conviction (reflected throughout his edition) that virtually every one of the fifty-four treatises has as its point of departure a specific text of Plato or of Aristotle.²⁵ Moreover, even if the *point of departure* of all or most of the essays is as Bréhier described, it is nevertheless true that each essay typically proceeds by weaving together citations or echoes of two or more unrelated texts (usually passages from Plato or from Aristotle) in such a way that it is difficult to imagine *these* essays as the product of a classroom where the topic under examination was, for instance "Plato's *Symposium*." They simply do not individually address a single *Haupttext*, and if we had only Porphyry's assertion that Plotinus' writings addressed "the subjects that came up" in the classes (*tas empiptousas hypotheses*, *Vit. Plot.* 4.11), we would assume that the courses were organized around problems ("Beauty," "The Soul," etc.) and not around texts.²⁶

²² Aulus Gellius 1.2.6. Bréhier's source for the reconstruction of Epictetus' pedagogy was Bruns (1897) (Bréhier [1924] xxviii–xxxvi).

²³ Bréhier (1924) xxix.

²⁴ Dobbin (1998) xx–xxiii.

²⁵ Bréhier (1924) xxix.

²⁶ Marinus' *Life of Proclus* points to two different categories of classes in the Athenian school, and a possible solution to this dilemma. See below, pp. 452–3.

We do know, however, that very shortly after Plotinus' time—and probably already in the mid-third century—there was a core curriculum in place (though not necessarily followed) in schools of Platonic philosophy that was to exert influence as long as the polytheist schools endured, and beyond.²⁷ We have an introductory lecture on Platonic philosophy from sixth-century Alexandria—our principal source for the contents of that core—that explicitly identifies itself as “preliminaries to our reading together (*synanagnôsis*) of Plato” (*Anon. Proleg.* 28).²⁸ Porphyry's younger contemporary Iamblichus is credited with the definition of the Platonic curriculum, though he may in fact have found most of the elements already in place. We can thus say that, from shortly after the year 300 at the latest, students of Platonic philosophy typically read a sequence of twelve dialogues, hierarchically arranged according to their subjects—or rather according to their corresponding “virtues” (*aretai*, *Anon. Proleg.* 26.30–44). Students of philosophy in the tradition of Plato encountered “ethical virtues” in the *Alcibiades*, “political virtues” in the *Gorgias*, and “cathartic virtues” in the *Phaedo*, and then went on to the “contemplative (*theoretikai*) virtues” in the *Cratylus* (elucidating words) and the *Theaetetus* (elucidating concepts, *noêmata*). The final stage of the process, still concerned with “contemplative virtues” introduced the student to the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* (on matters of “physics”),²⁹ and finally matters of theology in the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*. This basic curriculum culminated in the *Philebus* on the highest good. Finally, all of this was brought together in a reading of the *Timaeus* and the

²⁷ See Goulet-Cazé (1982) 277–80. Like one of her principal sources (Praechter [1909]), she puts more faith than the present author in the evidence pointing to a highly standardized curriculum in the pedagogy of the Platonic schools of the Roman Empire.

²⁸ See Westerink's analysis (1990) xliii–lvi of the ancient prolegomena and introductions, which sometimes allow the reconstruction of the sequence of lessons of the introductory course. The term *synanagnôsis* was the title of a work of Proclus, in which (according to Elias) ten essential points were prescribed as essential components of an introduction to the philosophy of Aristotle.

²⁹ None of these categories is unproblematic, and the last might at first sight appear absurd. It does not settle the issue to note that what ancient philosophy called “physics” also included what we call metaphysics. Westerink restored both *Sophist* and *Statesman* to the rather garbled list preserved in the *Anon. Proleg.* See Westerink (1990) lxvii–lxxiv for the argumentation, which is both convincing and widely accepted. It is documented that Iamblichus' reading of the *Sophist* included the identification of the sophist of the title as the Demiurge (*Schol. ad Soph.* 216A). This implies a reading linked to the cosmological myth in the *Statesman*, and helps to explain why these unlikely dialogues were thought useful for imparting “matters of physics.” Cf. Festugière (1969) esp. 285.

Parmenides, the dialogues that synthesized Platonic teaching on nature and theology, respectively. These are precisely the dialogues on which the preserved and attested commentaries—in large part representing the lectures of scholarchs—concentrate.³⁰

The history of the Platonic curriculum before Iamblichus is obscure and depends on a very sketchy and pluralistic account in Diogenes Laertius (3.62) and on a somewhat richer one in sections 4 and 5 of the brief introduction to Plato of Albinus (mid second century AD).³¹ Here we learn that, at the least, there were various notions of where to start reading Plato, and that Iamblichus' championing of the *Alcibiades* as the first dialogue to "do" (*prattein*) had precedents at least back to Albinus' time. Festugière made an ingenious case for adding Porphyry himself to the list of those who embraced this pedagogic principle.³²

Are we to imagine, then, that Plotinus in fact cycled continuously through this list of dialogues, or something resembling it? Almost certainly the answer must be negative, and Iamblichus' core of twelve prescribed dialogues should be taken to represent an ideal introductory program, far removed from the realities of any Platonic school—and probably, even his own. Indeed, what little we know of ancient educational "curricula" seems to represent, at best, the projection of ideals that were seldom, if ever, realized.³³ We can say little more, in any case, about the structure of Plotinus' courses. He clearly both lectured and entertained questions, starting from readings from earlier commentators, and was tolerant of very substantial digressions from whatever line of inquiry might have been undertaken (*Vit. Plot.* 13). Porphyry reports with admiration that Plotinus the writer excelled in maintaining the train of his thought in suspension, while he engaged in necessary conversations, and that he could return to the point where he left off without any review of what had gone before (*Vit. Plot.* 8.11–19). No doubt Plotinus the teacher often had occasion to use those same skills.

³⁰ In fact, there is no attested commentary on the *Statesman*, needed only for its myth, to which the Neoplatonists refer frequently. See Westerink (1990) lxix.

³¹ Text of Albinus: vol. 6 of Hermann's edition of Plato (Leipzig, 1880) 147–51. More recently Nüsser (1991) 24–85 (which I have not seen). The only published English translation (*vide* Göransson [1995] 49, n. 4) is that of Barges (1854). For discussion of Albinus and the obscure Alcinous, long confused with him, see Göransson (1995) and Dillon (1993).

³² Festugière (1969) 285, n. 27.

³³ Morgan (1998) 52.

The classes did not meet throughout the year (*Vit. Plot.* 5.3–5), but it seems that the “companions” had access to Plotinus year-round. Certainly, the anecdotes Porphyry assembles portray a community of intense personal relationships—notably, rivalries. Porphyry’s description of Plotinus’ living arrangements (*Vit. Plot.* 9, 11) and his brief mention of his own (*Vit. Plot.* 11.12–14) make it clear that the school was not the students’ place of residence. This is not to say that Plotinus did not aspire to establish a community of scholars under the same roof. This emerges in the quite amazing anecdote of his request—addressed to the emperor Gallienus—for a deserted Campanian city and its adjacent land, in which to found a “city of philosophers,” a “Platonopolis” (*Vit. Plot.* 12).

Porphyry devotes more attention and description to Amelius (above, pp. 439–40) than to his other fellow students, and here, exceptionally, this most meticulous and self-validating of authors damages his own credibility. His report of Longinus’ admiration for Amelius (*Vit. Plot.* 20.68–81) is at odds with his own portrait of a scholar whose principal virtue was “diligence” (*philoponia*, *Vit. Plot.* 3.43), and who filled a hundred rolls with notes (*scholia*, *Vit. Plot.* 3.46) on Plotinus’ classes. One can take Porphyry at his word that he himself was the designated editor and literary executor of Plotinus (*Vit. Plot.* 24), but when he takes credit for encouraging Amelius’ belated impulse to write, and assembles repeated instances of Plotinus’ praise of himself (*Vit. Plot.* 15), something resembling sibling rivalry between the two is all too apparent.³⁴

This rivalry brings up one last aspect of Plotinus’ pedagogy that emerges from the *Life*: controversy. An extended series of anecdotes in the *Life* attests to the fact that the “companions” were routinely given assignments in the form of formal refutations, whether of positions taken in the meetings of the school (*Vit. Plot.* 15.6–17;³⁵ 18) or of texts and positions from outside on which Plotinus took a strong position (*Vit. Plot.* 16.9–18). Porphyry’s account of his own mistaken attempt, shortly after his arrival at the school, to refute Plotinus’

³⁴ Cf. Brisson (1987) 795.

³⁵ The speech of Diophanes in praise of pederasty, against which Proclus assigned Porphyry the refutation, may well have been presented not at a regular meeting of the school but at one of the school’s celebrations of the birthday of Socrates or of Plato, which were explicitly occasions for performance, both poetic and rhetorical (*Vit. Plot.* 2.40–3; cf. Philippe Segonds *Ad Vit. Plot.* 15.6–16 in Brisson *et al.* [1992] 267–68).

position on the relationship of mind to intelligibles offers the most complex example:

... I set out to write a refutation and tried to demonstrate that intelligibles exist outside of mind. He had Amelius read this aloud and when he had finished, Plotinus smiled and said, "It should be your job, Amelius, to resolve the dilemma into which he has fallen for lack of understanding of our ideas." Amelius wrote a substantial volume *On Porphyry's Dilemmas*, and I in turn wrote in response to what he had written and Amelius responded to this as well. After two exchanges, I, Porphyry, finally grasped what was being said, changed my position, and wrote a palinode, which I read in class (*en tē[i] diatribē[i]*). . . . (*Vit. Plot.* 18.10–19)

These performances express vividly the intimate relationship between rhetorical and philosophical education. The latter was in large part the extension of the former, though of course at this stage the skills acquired from the rhetor were in theory being put to use in the service of arriving at the truth. One would like to think that in these performances (in contrast to the rhetoric of assembly or lawcourt) the syllogism decidedly outweighed the enthymeme, but in exchanges of this sort, the issue was finally the success or failure of the arguments.

Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus*, for all its frustrating silences, gives us by far the richest and most credible description in ancient literature of a philosophical school in action. By comparison, the other two biographies offer little more than anecdotes, and if we extend our search as far as Eunapius (writing near the end of the fourth century), we find those anecdotes taking on a magical and folkloric coloring.³⁶ The two Athenian biographies in the series under consideration here, however, are closer to the spirit and the realism of Porphyry, though they were written nearly a century after Eunapius. Theodosius I, who in 391 and 392, in a paroxysm of Christian bigotry, turned the power of the imperial legal system against all polytheist sacrifice, first public and then private, was Eunapius' exact contemporary. Unlike Theodosius (who died in 395), Eunapius lived on another two decades, and his voice is among the most eloquent lamenting the collapse of Hellenism. The Platonists of Athens and Alexandria were prominent over the next century and a half among the intellectual

³⁶ The most remarkable is Eunapius' account of Iamblichus, the student of Plotinus and perhaps of Porphyry, conjuring up Eros from the pools of the Gadara baths for his students (*Vit. Soph.* 459).

leadership of the resistance against Christianity. In Athens, the teaching of Platonic philosophy seems to have been inseparable from polytheism. The edict closing the school in 529 and the departure of the teachers, probably in 531—whether they later returned in a private capacity or not—marks the end of the recorded history of the School of Plato in his native city.³⁷ In Alexandria as well, Platonism was identified with polytheism and in the periods of most intense Christian violence against polytheists, some teachers of Platonic philosophy, including Hypatia, died, while others, including Isidore, left town. In Alexandria, nevertheless, there was a transition, and the last sixth-century Alexandrian scholarchs, probably beginning with Elias, were Christians.³⁸ As Leendert Westerink pointed out, it is probably thanks to this successful transition, along with the fact that the last Alexandrian scholarch, Stephanus, was appointed *oikoumenikos didaskalos* in Constantinople by the emperor Heraclius sometime in the second decade of the seventh century, “that we can now read most of the Neoplatonic thinkers in the original, instead of collecting their fragments.”³⁹

Marinus’ *Life of Proclus* (d. 485) and Damascius’ *Life of Isidore*⁴⁰ reflect in varying degrees the impact of these religious and social conflicts on the teaching of Platonic philosophy.⁴¹ The openness of Plotinus’ school (*Vit. Plot.* 1.13) is a thing of the past. Proclus, on the evening of his arrival in Athens in 430, aged perhaps nineteen (*Vit. Proc.* 12, 290–91), impressed Syrianus and Lachares by publicly paying homage to the new moon. They themselves had just given the young man—still a stranger, and of unknown views on religion

³⁷ Alan Cameron (1969) considerably eroded the reputation of this famous watershed of Late Antiquity, throwing a great deal of light on the aftermath and the evidence for continued activity of polytheist teachers down through the sixth century. Still, even if Simplicius and a few other polytheist philosophers may have been writing in Athens in the 560’s or even into the next decade, we hear of no students, and there can hardly have been much teaching. Scholars there may have been, and even something of the property of the succession to support them, but its recorded history may nevertheless be said to have ended.

³⁸ Westerink (1961) 126–31; (1990) xxi–xxxvi.

³⁹ Westerink (1961) 126.

⁴⁰ The date of Isidore’s death is impossible to fix. Martindale (1980) 628–31 (Isidorus 5) pointed to a terminus ante quem of 526 for the *Life* (and so for Isidore’s death), based on a reference to Theodoric’s power in Italy (*Phil. Hist.* fr. 51A), but there is no definite evidence of Isidore’s activity after the 480’s.

⁴¹ Schemmel (1908) offered a broad, richly documented account of the Athenian schools of rhetoric and philosophy in the fourth and fifth centuries, though his general formulations are not always supported by his sources (notes 46, 52 below).

and the law—a brush-off, in order to perform the same prohibited religious observances in discreet privacy (*Vit. Proc.* 11, 276–88).

One is left with the impression that everything is done in private, for a trusted few students whose commitment has been demonstrated. We have preserved, as the Sixth Book of Proclus' *Commentary on the Republic*, the text (presumably greatly expanded) of a lecture on Homer that Proclus delivered at a celebration of Plato's birthday (cf. *Vit. Proc.* 23, 567–69). It closes with an injunction to keep the privileged interpretations secret (*In Remp.* I 205, 22–3 Kroll).⁴² Clearly, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were pre-eminent in the vast range of literature whose impact on an ignorant and bigoted public Proclus feared (*Vit. Proc.* 38). To divulge the true meaning even of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* was an activity carried on behind closed doors, protected with calls for secrecy. The proverbial expression "live without attracting notice" (*lathe biosas*), denounced by the Platonist Plutarch of Chaeroneia centuries earlier, surfaces in both the Athenian *Lives* with positive force. The maxim Plutarch had characterized as both Epicurean and irresponsible is now presented as Pythagorean and exemplary.⁴³

Living arrangements reflect the changed climate as well. The scholarch Plutarch accepted Proclus into his home (*homoection epoieito*, *Vit. Proc.* 12, 302), where he lived during the last two years of Plutarch's life. Along with the succession to the chair, Plutarch entrusted to Syrianus both Proclus (now twenty-one or twenty-two) and his own grandson Archiadas, so that Proclus continued to be housed with the scholarch. Syrianus was presumably already living in Plutarch's house, a property that would be part and parcel of the succession, so that Proclus (apart from a year spent in Lycia to escape persecution in Athens, *Vit. Proc.* 15) will have lived in the same house from his arrival in Athens in 430, through his senility in the early 480's (*Vit. Proc.* 20, 26), and until his death in 485 (*Vit. Proc.* 29, 727–33).⁴⁴

⁴² Festugière (1970) *ad loc.* (I, 221, n. 8) referred to this as a "topos bien connu" but in the light of *Vit. Proc.* 38, it was clearly something more than a decorative gesture. To Proclus, the disappearance of the sacrifices was to be laid at the door of hamfisted, literalist readers who mocked the gods because they found accounts of them in Homer (and elsewhere) which, if understood literally, were easily mocked.

⁴³ Plutarch, *An recte dictum sit latenter esse vivendum* = *Mor.* 1128B–30E. *Vit. Proc.* 15, 379–81, of Proclus' year in Lycia; *Phil. Hist.* fr. 111, of Isidore's Alexandrian friend Sarapion.

⁴⁴ An elaborate house near the Theater of Dionysus, on the south slope of the Acropolis, fits the topographical data supplied by Marinus remarkably well, and has been called "the house of Proclus." See Frantz (1988) 42–4 with plates 27, 44. On

Thirty years before Proclus' arrival in Athens, in the heyday of Plutarch of Athens, we have the biased testimony of Synesius of Cyrene to the effect that the study of philosophy in Athens was defunct.⁴⁵ There seems to be little doubt that a revival occurred in the fifth century, but its scope is a matter of debate. The evidence of Marinus is ambiguous.⁴⁶ He writes as if Proclus, during his two years with Plutarch, were in fact his *only* student: "[Plutarch] was so pleased with him that he gave freely of himself for his philosophical education, and this in spite of the fact that he was hindered by age, since he was very elderly" (*Vit. Proc.* 12, 292–95). It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that if Plutarch had not been reading the *Phaedo* and the *De Anima* with Proclus, he would not have been teaching anyone at all. Perhaps there were other students, but Syrianus was leading them, in order to relieve the pressure on the old man—or perhaps Marinus simply wants us to know that, as a beginner of great promise, Proclus was singled out from the start. In any case, when he goes on to describe the sequel, when Proclus was passed on to Syrianus, Marinus still leaves us wondering if the student population of the Athenian Platonic school was more than a handful of scholars:

[Syrianus] took him on and not only was yet more helpful to him in his studies but shared his home with him and made him his companion in the philosophical life, finding in him the sort of student and successor he had long been seeking, and receptive of his abundant teachings and divine doctrines. (*Vit. Proc.* 12, 313–17)

what may have been Damascius' house, on the north slope of the Areopagus ("Areopagus House C"), Frantz (1988) 37–42 and 44–8, with plates 27, 31–7; also Athanassiadi (1999) 343–47 ("Appendix I. The House of Damascius?"), with plates.

⁴⁵ Epistle 135 (*PG* 66, 1524B–D), perhaps written in 396, sings the praises of Synesius' own teacher Hypatia, and claims that now only the beekeepers revere Athens, while the "Plutarchan sophists" (presumably Plutarch and Syrianus) lure students not with their wisdom but with "the little pots from Hymettus" (*tois eks Humettou stamniōis*, 1524C–D). Cf. *Epistle* 54 (*PG* 66, 1381A–B) for similar disparagement of Athens.

⁴⁶ Jones, Martindale, and Morris (1971) 708 (Plutarchus 5) found just six attested students of Plutarch, compared to only three for Syrianus (Martindale [1980] 1051 [Syrianus 3]) and ten for Proclus himself (Martindale [1980] 916–17 [Proclus 4]). Marinus in closing (*Vit. Proc.* 38, 906–10) proclaims that "many came from far and wide to hear Proclus" (*polloi . . . autō[i] pollaxothen ephoitesan*), some only to listen (*epi akroasēi psilē[i]*) and others as aspiring students (*zēlōtai*), but there is little evidence elsewhere in the *Life* to support this claim. Schemmel (1908) estimated a student population of at least 300–400 for the Athenian rhetors of the period, but hedged uncharacteristically on the estimate of aspiring philosophers ("wozu noch eine allerdings bedeutend kleinere Zahl von Studierenden der Philosophie" 494).

We learn later (*Vit. Proc.* 26, 609–26) that at the end of Syrianus' life, he seems to have had just one other student (along with Proclus), Dominus. There can be little doubt that Syrianus gave Proclus personal attention:

In less than two years, [Syrianus] read with him all the works of Aristotle, logical, ethical, political, and physical, and the theological science that stands above these.⁴⁷ After having sufficiently guided him through these, as through the preliminary Lesser Mysteries, he brought him to the initiation into Plato, gradually and not taking "a transgressive step" [*Chald. Or.* fr. 176 Majercik] as the Oracle says, and made him, with the unclouded eyes of his soul and the pure circumspection of his mind, a spectator of Plato's truly divine mysteries. (*Vit. Proc.* 13, 318–26)

By the age of twenty-eight, as we learn a few lines later, Proclus had already completed his massive *Commentary on the Timaeus*, which is extant. Proclus' education in Athens in the 430's was, then, inclusive—Marinus wants us to understand that he had absorbed the whole of Aristotle and Plato in his twenties—and it was largely one-on-one. Plutarch even told him from the start to write down the content of the lessons, playing on his ambition and "saying that, once he had filled out the notes, there would be a commentary on the *Phaedo* by Proclus" (*Vit. Proc.* 12, 297–300). He was to write voluminously for half a century, and forty-five titles (roughly twenty of them commentaries) are attributed to him. He compiled at least ten commentaries on dialogues of Plato, of which five (*Parmenides*, *Timaeus*, *First Alcibiades*, *Cratylus*, and *Republic*) survive. Marinus estimated his output at seven hundred lines a day.⁴⁸

It is striking that nine of the ten dialogues on which Proclus wrote were included in the Iamblichean curriculum—the one exception being the *Republic*, and here Proclus' commentary is not of the usual type, which proceeds sentence by sentence and argument by argument. Rather, it is a collection of essays and lectures on specific problems in the dialogue. It seems that he (and Syrianus before him) probably did not read the *Republic* with students, at least on a regular basis, because of its length and complexity.⁴⁹ What both Syrianus

⁴⁷ The Platonists regularly referred to the *Metaphysics* as the *Theology* of Aristotle.

⁴⁸ *Vit. Proc.* 22, 550–51. The passage is further discussed below.

⁴⁹ The three dialogues from the Iamblichean canon on which Proclus apparently did not write are the *Symposium* and the *Gorgias* (on which Plutarch wrote), along with the *Statesman*, on which we know of no commentaries, and whose place in the ideal curriculum is conjectural. See above, pp. 444–45.

and Proclus did include in the curriculum, rather surprisingly, were the Orphic poems and the *Chaldaean Oracles*—though, because of a dispute between Proclus and his fellow student Domninus, neither had the full benefit of Syrianus' comments on either of these texts (*Vit. Proc.* 26). The only text Marinus mentions himself reading with Proclus is the *Orphica* (*Vit. Proc.* 27, 656).

Although it starts with Proclus' youth and proceeds to his old age, Marinus' *Life* is also organized around a hierarchy of virtues similar to that reflected in the Iamblichean curriculum, and proceeding from "physical virtues" by way of moral, social, cathartic, and intellectual virtues, to the "theurgic virtues" that constitute the highest rank (*Vit. Proc.* 2, 3). These are the constituent elements of the "success" or "blessedness" (*eudaimonia*) of Marinus' subtitle. This odd structure explains why we in fact learn little, beyond what has already been invoked here, about Proclus' pedagogy and the nature of his school. We learn, for instance, that he himself read the *Politics* of Aristotle and the *Laws* and *Republic* of Plato, but this is in the context of Marinus' praise of his "political virtues" (*Vit. Proc.* 14, 334–36), and no light is thrown on their status in the school curriculum. Indeed, we get only a few casual references to Proclus' teaching specific texts, and must rely on the commentaries, preserved and attested, as evidence for what was taught. Beyond the references to texts already mentioned, there is the story (*Vit. Proc.* 26, 646–55) that near the end of Proclus' career, the young Hegias (later perhaps an undistinguished successor, but more likely a politician)⁵⁰ encouraged him to continue teaching, in spite of his infirmities, and Proclus not only read with him "the *Platonica* and the other theologies" but gave him his own writings (*grammai*) as well. Young Hegias working one-on-one with the aged Proclus mirrors the young Proclus with Plutarch, over half a century earlier. The emphasis is on succession, but the chain is composed of individual links.

There is a single passage—one that has attracted some attention⁵¹—that may yet throw more light, not only on Proclus the teacher, but on the modes of instruction in the schools generally. Marinus has just expounded his teacher's "cathartic" (perhaps better: "ascetic") virtues, which he also notes constituted the content of

⁵⁰ Athanassiadi (1999) 319, n. 380 *ad fr.* 145A, with bibliography.

⁵¹ Schissel (1926); cf. Rosán (1949) 26, n. 17; Siorvanes (1996) 6.

much of his "discourse" (*logoi*, *Vit. Proc.* 18, 452), and now he moves on to the "intellectual virtues" and to Proclus' vast reading:

... all of which he worked up both clearly and powerfully in his classes (*synousiai*), and made the foundation of his writings. He was possessed of an immoderate love of work (*philoponia*): he would explicate texts (*exegeito* ... *praxeis*) five times in a single day, sometimes more, and generally wrote about seven hundred lines. Then he visited other philosophers, and again held evening classes that were unwritten (*agraphoi*). (*Vit. Proc.* 22, 547–53)

It is these "evening unwritten classes" (*agraphoi hesperinai sunousiai*) that we would like to know more about. It is striking to imagine Proclus at the height of his powers offering five or more text-based classes (or commentaries) each morning,⁵² but the language Marinus uses to describe the evening classes is both suggestive and problematic. If indeed the distinction is between classes rooted in explication (which here as in Plotinus' school included the evocation, perhaps the reading, of existing commentaries, *Vit. Proc.* 27, 656–61) and those that were *agraphoi* in the sense of "textless"—that is, addressed problems rather than texts—then we have here direct evidence for a pedagogic compartmentalization that seems implied elsewhere, but is not made explicit.⁵³

Damascius' *Philosophical History* tells us a great deal about the personalities of the Athenian and Alexandrian schools during Proclus' latter years and beyond, but throws limited light on the specifically pedagogic issues that concern us here. Its principal subject, Isidore, was elected to the Athenian succession, but Damascius seems to say that this election was "honorary rather than actual" (*ep' axiomati mallon ê pragmati*, *Phil. Hist.* fr. 148C). If indeed he taught in Athens as

⁵² *exêgeito* ... *praxeis* is reasonably clear. Cf. Masullo (1985) *ad loc.* and *ad* 226, with bibliography. Schissel (1926) 266–67 discussed the vocabulary. Schemmel (1908) intuited that each such class would have covered roughly one and a half Teubner pages and that Proclus performed five such explications daily, all of different texts: "Es waren ja immer verschiedene Jahrgänge zu berücksichtigen und Proklus las ausser über Platon auch über Aristoteles, Euklid, Hesiod (513)." This rosy picture of a school bursting with life is difficult to embrace, given the scant evidence for numbers of students.

⁵³ Schissel (1926) seems to be the first to have explored this vocabulary and arrived at this conclusion: "Ἀγραφοὶ hiessen diese συνουσίαι, weil sie keinen Text zur Grundlage nahmen, d.h. nicht Interpretationen waren, sondern weil hier in Frage und Antwort, also dialektisch, Probleme und Schwierigkeiten gelöst wurden (268)."

successor, it is unclear just when this was, or for how long.⁵⁴ Whether the absence of discussion of pedagogic matters is an artifact of the fragmentary transmission of the text or of Damascius' choices as biographer and historian is impossible to say. The text as we have it, however, seems to be testimony to an increasing emphasis and focus on personal relationships among the members of this shrinking philosophical/religious community. This emphasis, moreover, is not entirely coincidental: we are told that it was "the mother of virtues, as Pythagoras said, friendship itself, that [Isidore] cultivated most diligently of all" (*Phil. Hist.* fr. 26A).⁵⁵ The *Philosophical History* is, in fact, the narrative of Isidore and his friends (and some others), with the greatest interest directed toward the various versions of the philosophical life they cultivated, and toward the wonders they witnessed and reported.

There is a corresponding loss here of any hint of a systematic curriculum, along with a marked decline of intellectual investment in texts (*Phil. Hist.* fr. 34C, D).⁵⁶ Rather, texts are suspect and too much concern with too many of them a distraction, rather than a path to knowledge:

He avoided the bulk of the literature, productive of a broad knowledge of opinions, but not of wisdom. Staying with a single teacher, he modeled himself on him alone and transcribed what he said. (*Phil. Hist.* fr. 35A; cf. fr. 37E)

⁵⁴ He seems to have succeeded Marinus, who was sickly and is assumed not to have served for long after he succeeded Proclus in 485, but it is impossible to say just when this might have taken place. Isidore was in any case "planning to leave Athens" at the time Marinus died (*Phil. Hist.* fr. 151C) and the sequence of excerpts in Photius is not inconsistent with his having done so. If Damascius in fact succeeded Isidore (and the evidence is not much more than Theodora's request and the existence of the biography itself, *Phil. Hist.* Test. III, 1–18), this could have happened almost any time in the first quarter of the sixth century. Damascius himself was certainly successor in 529, in any case, and had probably held the chair since early in the century. The very end of the fifth century seems to have been a low point in status, and presumably in enrollment, for the Athenian Platonists. With this decade may be associated Aeneas of Gaza's dialogue *Theophrastus, or On the Immortality of Souls and the Resurrection of the Body* (PG 85, 871–1004), where Athens is once again presented (by an Athenian speaker named Theophrastus) as a place where philosophy once was a shining light but now "is unknown and has been reduced to nothing" (877A). Cf. Cameron (1969) 27–8.

⁵⁵ The fragment, from the *Suda* (iv, 204, 27–9 Adler) does not in fact mention Isidore. The identification goes back to Asmus.

⁵⁶ On this, see my "Neoplatonists and their Books" to appear in a volume in the series *Studies and Texts in Antiquity and Christianity* springing from a 1999 project on "Mechanisms of Canon Formation in Ancient Societies" at the Institute for Advanced Studies of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

Nevertheless, these teachers, both in Alexandria and in Athens, clearly did go on teaching Plato and Aristotle, much as their predecessors had done. In Alexandria, Damascius implies, the students were still numerous in Hypatia's time—sufficiently so as to attract the jealousy of the Bishop, Cyril, who sent his thugs to murder her (*Phil. Hist.* fr. 43A, E). Hierocles, who taught Isidore, lectured repeatedly on the *Gorgias* (fr. 45A), and wrote a commentary on the Pythagorean *Golden Verses* that is extant (fr. 45B). In Athens, even the dim Marinus published a *Parmenides* commentary (*Phil. Hist.* fr. 97I, J) and wrote another on the *Philebus*, which Isidore's comments led him to burn (fr. 38A).

The relationship between the study of rhetoric and that of philosophy that emerges in Damascius' text is complex and problematical, and the snapshot anecdotes preserved in the *Suda's* excerpts rarely make it possible to reconstruct entire careers. Nevertheless, it is clear from the story of Damascius himself that rhetoric was the commonest path to philosophy, though the transition was typically characterized as a conversion, in which the rhetor and his world were rejected contemptuously as distractions from a higher goal (*Phil. Hist.* fr. 34C on Isidore; fr. 137B for Damascius' own renunciation of rhetoric). We see again here the familiar tension between the conflicting demands of public service and of philosophy (fr. 100A, B on Theagenes), the extension into *praxis* of these two educational alternatives.

This tradition of Platonist philosophical biography reflects more continuities than discontinuities, doubtless in large part by design. The conventions and tropes of the genre account for this phenomenon up to a point, but it is likely that there is also an element of historical truth here. If, for comparison, we had for third-century Rome and fifth- and sixth-century Athens and Alexandria the sort of published curricula we have for German *Gymnasias* and universities of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, we would no doubt observe an oscillation of offerings within limits perhaps quite close to the ideal reflected in the Iamblichean curriculum (supplemented by readings in Aristotle, the archaic poets, and the *Chaldaean Oracles*). If, on the other hand, we had enrollment statistics, we would even more certainly observe a progressive, though no doubt far from linear, decline, punctuated by periods of recovery. Indeed, if the judgment of recent scholarship is correct,⁵⁷ it was the relative success

⁵⁷ Cameron (1969) 28–9; Athanassiadi (1999) 44–5.

of a Proclus or a Damascius in Athens that attracted imperial attention and led to pressure and ultimately to confiscation of property. In this deteriorating environment, however, and in spite of demonstrably growing commitment to theurgy among the paths to the truth, these last polytheist Platonists seem, in their everyday school activities, to have continued in the traditions of Platonic philosophical education that were received and passed on by the schools of the High Empire.

* * *

Iamblichus, Proclus, Isidore, and his friends emerge from the pages of their historians and biographers, from Eunapius to Damascius, as a dying breed, a shrinking group of intellectuals of the old school who outlived the social and the cultural context in which Greek philosophical education had been born and had flourished. While there is some truth to this account, it is also misleading.

The sixth and seventh centuries were a period of economic decline in the Byzantine world, culminating in the loss of most of Syria to the armies of Islam. Continuing movements of population from the north left the countryside of the southern Balkans largely Slavic-speaking and Hellenism a shrunken, increasingly urban phenomenon, isolated in a relatively few centers. In those centers, however, the study of philosophy went on, though the teachers and commentators whose work we know concerned themselves primarily with Aristotle, not with Plato, and they were Christians. From the mid-seventh to the mid-ninth century, higher education disappears from view—literacy itself must have been sparsely distributed—and if there is any continuity of knowledge of school philosophy, it came from sporadic study of the *organon* of Aristotle. From the ninth century, when Byzantine education began to revive, to the eleventh, when institutions of higher education reappeared, an educational system took shape, with Aristotle at its pinnacle, that was to train the Byzantine bureaucracy of the high Middle Ages and preserve a remarkable level of scholarly exploration of the Greek intellectual past for another half millennium. It was therefore Aristotle and not Plato who emerged from the Middle Ages as the *maestro di color che sanno*.

That, then, is one of the paths that led to the future. The other carried Aristotle, by way of Syriac, to the Arab world, which from

the ninth century (in particular at the Bayt al-hikma of Baghdad), became the new center of Greek learning.

The documentation of those continuities in Greek philosophical education, however, is far more scattered and more lacunose than the story we have been tracing. These last Platonists in Alexandria and Athens identified themselves with an intellectual and religious culture whose protracted demise they witnessed and documented. They chose to make their story a final chapter in the history of Greek philosophical education, and we may at least provisionally grant them the role they carved out for themselves.

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Abbreviations

<i>AJA</i>	<i>American Journal of Archaeology</i>
<i>AJP</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
<i>ANRW</i>	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt</i>
<i>BAGB</i>	<i>Bulletin de l'Association G. Budé</i>
<i>CA</i>	<i>Classical Antiquity</i>
<i>CJ</i>	<i>Classical Journal</i>
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
<i>CR</i>	<i>Classical Review</i>
<i>GR</i>	<i>Greece and Rome</i>
<i>GRBS</i>	<i>Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies</i>
<i>ICS</i>	<i>Illinois Classical Studies</i>
<i>JHS</i>	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
<i>JRA</i>	<i>Journal of Roman Archaeology</i>
<i>JRS</i>	<i>Journal of Roman Studies</i>
<i>MEFRA</i>	<i>Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire de l'École Française de Rome</i>
<i>MH</i>	<i>Museum Helveticum</i>
<i>PCPS</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Association</i>
<i>Rev. Sc. Ph. Th.</i>	<i>Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques</i>
<i>RhM</i>	<i>Rheinisches Museum für Philologie</i>
<i>RPh</i>	<i>Revue Philologique</i>
<i>SO</i>	<i>Symbolae Osloenses</i>
<i>TAPA</i>	<i>Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association</i>
<i>ZPE</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>

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